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ABSTRACT 
 
At the center of all medieval Christian accounts of both metaphysics and ethics stands the 
claim that being and goodness are necessarily connected, and that grasping the nature of this 
connection is fundamental to explaining the nature of goodness itself.  In that vein, medievals 
offered two distinct ways of conceiving this necessary connection: the nature approach and the 
creation approach.  The nature approach explains the goodness of an entity by an appeal to the 
entity’s nature as the type of thing it is, and the extent to which it fulfills or perfects the 
potentialities in its nature.  In contrast, the creation approach explains both the being and 
goodness of an entity by an appeal to God’s creative activity: on this view, both a thing’s being 
and its goodness are derived from, and explained in terms of, God’s being and goodness.  Studies 
on being and goodness in medieval philosophy often culminate in the synthesizing work of 
Thomas Aquinas, the leading Dominican theologian at Paris in the 13th century, who brought 
together these two rival theories about the nature of goodness.  Unfortunately, few have paid 
attention to a distinctively Franciscan approach to the topic around this same time period.  My 
dissertation provides a remedy to this oversight by means of a thorough examination of John 
Duns Scotus’s approach to being and goodness—an approach that takes into account the shifting 
tide toward voluntarism (both ethical and theological) at the University of Paris in the late 13th 
century.  I argue that Scotus is also a synthesizer of sorts, harmonizing the two distinct nature 
approaches of Augustine and Aristotle with his own unique ideas in ways that have profound 
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implications for the future of medieval ethical theorizing, most notably, in his rejection of both 
the natural law and ethical eudaimonism of Thomas Aquinas.    
After the introduction, I analyze the nature of primary goodness—the goodness that 
Scotus thinks is convertible with being and thus a transcendental attribute of everything that 
exists.  There, I compare the notion of convertibility of being and goodness among Scotus and 
his contemporaries.  While Scotus agrees with the mainstream tradition that being and goodness 
are necessarily coextensive properties of everything that exists, he argues that being and good are 
formally rather than conceptually distinct.  I argue that when the referents of being and good are 
considered, both views amount to the same thing.  But when the concepts of being and good are 
considered, positing a formal distinction does make a good deal of difference: good does not 
simply add something to being conceptually, but formally: it is a quasi-attribute of being that 
exists in the world independently of our conception of it.  Thus Scotus’s formal distinction 
provides a novel justification for the necessary connection between being and goodness.            
Furthermore, I argue that Scotus holds an Augustinian hierarchy of being.  This 
hierarchical ranking of being is based upon the magnitude or perfection of the thing’s nature.  
But since goodness is a necessarily coextensive perfection of being, it too comes in degrees 
dependent upon the type of being, arranged in terms of the same hierarchy. This account, while 
inspired by Augustine’s hierarchical nature approach, is expressed in terms of Aristotelian 
metaphysics.     
But this necessary connection between being and goodness in medieval philosophy faced 
a problem: Following Augustine, medievals claimed that “everything that exists is good insofar 
as it exists.”’ But how is that compatible with the existence of sinful acts: if every being, in so far 
as it has being, is good, then every act, insofar as it has being, is good.  But if sinful acts are bad, 
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then we seem to be committed to saying either that bad acts are good, or that not every act, in so 
far as it has being, is good.  This first option seems infelicitous; the second denies Augustine’s 
claims that “everything that exists is good.” Lombard and his followers solve this problem by 
distinguishing ontological goodness from moral goodness and claiming that moral goodness is an 
accident of some acts and does not convert with being. So the sinful act, qua act, is 
(ontologically) good.  But the sinful act, qua disorder is (morally) bad.  Eventually, three 
distinctive grades of accidental or moral goodness will be applied to human acts: generic, 
circumstantial, and meritorious.  I argue that Scotus follows the traditional account of Peter 
Lombard, Philip the Chancellor, Albert the Great, and Bonaventure in distinguishing ontological 
goodness from moral goodness, and claiming that only the former converts with being, while the 
latter is an accident of the act.   
Aquinas, in contrast, writing in the heyday of the Aristotelian renaissance, focuses 
instead on the role of the act in the agent’s perfection and posits his convertibility thesis of being 
and goodness in the moral as well as the metaphysical realm.  Thus, when one begins a late 
medieval discussion with Aquinas, and then considers what Scotus says, it seems as though 
Scotus is the radical who departs from the conservative teachings of Aquinas.  And this is just 
false: we need to situate both Aquinas and Scotus within the larger Sentence Commentary 
tradition extending back to Peter Lombard and his followers in order to understand their 
agreement and divergence from the tradition.   
Next, I turn the discussion to Scotus’s analysis of rightness and wrongness.  I first 
explore the relationship between rightness and God’s will, and situate Scotus’s account within 
contemporary discussions of theological voluntarism.  I argue Scotus holds a restricted-causal-
will-theory —whereby only contingent deontological propositions depend upon God’s will for 
vi 
 
their moral status.  In contrast to Aquinas, Scotus denies that contingent moral laws—the Second 
Table of the 10 Commandments (such do not steal, do not murder, etc.)—are grounded in human 
nature, and thus he limits the extent to which moral reasoning can move from natural law to the 
moral obligations we have toward one another.  In conjunction with these claims, I argue that 
Scotus distinguishes goodness from rightness: An act’s rightness will depend on its conformity 
to either (1) a necessary moral truth or (2) God’s commanding some contingent moral truth.  The 
moral goodness of an act, in contrast, involves right reason’s determination of the suitability or 
harmony of all factors pertaining to the act.  In establishing this, also argue that much of the 
disparity among contemporary Scotus scholarship on the question of whether Scotus was a 
divine command theorist or natural law theorist should be directly attributed to a failure to 
recognize Scotus’s separation of the goodness of an act from the rightness of an act. 
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INTRODUCTION:  
THE PRIORITY OF GOODNESS 
 
Vetus Latina, Antiqua Auctoritas 
Medieval Christian theologians were obsessed with the concept of goodness—and rightly 
so, since goodness saturates the Christian religious tradition, stemming from both the biblical 
witness itself, as well as ancient philosophical and theological authorities.  The Bible constantly 
speaks of God’s goodness, both in his nature as God, and in his dealings with his creatures.  
Consider the Psalms, which abound with such ascriptions to God:   
• Psalm 31:19: “How great is Your goodness, which You have stored up for those 
who fear You, which You have wrought for those who take refuge in You, 
before the sons of men!”1  
• Psalm 65:4: “How blessed is the one whom You choose and bring near to You 
to dwell in Your courts. We will be satisfied with the goodness of Your house, 
Your holy temple.” 
• Psalm 107:1: “Oh give thanks to the LORD, for He is good, for His lovingkindness 
is everlasting”  
• Psalm 119:68: “You are good and do good; teach me Your statutes.”  
• Psalm 34:8 “O taste and see that the LORD is good; How blessed is the man who 
takes refuge in Him!”  
 
But God, as perfectly good, also calls us to be good and do good too: the prophet Micah 
                                                 
1 All biblical referecnes are from the New American Standard Bible.  
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(Micah 6:8) says, “He has told you, O man, what is good; And what does the Lord require of you 
but to do justice, to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God?”  And the New 
Testament authors are replete with similar admonitions: Paul writes to the church at Ephesus to 
“walk as children of Light (for the fruit of the Light consists in all goodness and righteousness 
and truth), trying to learn what is pleasing to the Lord” (Ephesians 5: 9-10).  And in Galatians, he 
writes: “So then, while we have opportunity, let us do good to all people, and especially to those 
who are of the household of the faith” (Galatians 6:10).   
Goodness also functions in significant, but more subtle ways.  For example, the biblical 
account of creation unites the notions of existence and goodness, such that, insofar as something 
exists, that thing is good.  The biblical writers ground this conceptual unity between existence 
and goodness in God’s nature as a good God and his creation of things that are in some sense 
like him—good.  The creation account in Genesis, for example, portrays God as recognizing the 
goodness of what he created: “God saw all that He had made, and behold, it was very good” 
(Genesis 1:31).  And the Apostle Paul also acknowledged this association of the existence of 
God’s creation with its goodness: “For everything created by God is good, and nothing is to be 
rejected if it is received with gratitude” (1 Timothy 4:4). 
Moreover, in the eyes of medieval theologians, the Bible conjoins the notions of 
goodness and desirability: that in some deep and profound sense, things are desirable because 
they are good.  Both finite and infinite goods are attractable—they draw us towards them; they 
beckon us to come, and to partake in their goodness.  To say something is good is to say that it 
has value, and that it’s worth pursuing.  This is especially true of God, the highest good 
(summum bonum).  “Taste and see,” the Psalmist says, “that the Lord is Good” (Psalm 34:8).  In 
the same vein, Peter writes, “like newborn babies, long for the pure milk of the word, so that by 
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it you may grow in respect to salvation, if you have tasted the kindness of the Lord” (1 Peter 2:2-
3).  Thus we are drawn to God as our good and our end, for he is most desirable.  In fact, God’s 
infinite goodness not only makes him a desirable end worth pursuing, but an object worth 
worshiping.    
In addition to the preeminence of goodness within the biblical tradition itself, the 
principal philosophical influences on the high middle ages—Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, 
Augustine, Boethius, and Pseudo-Dionysius—prioritized goodness as one of the chief concepts 
to analyze, and the foremost thing worth pursuing.  In that vein, many of these ancient sources 
suggested the ubiquity of goodness: that goodness was a property or characteristic of all things.  
It is not surprising, then, that when late-medieval authors encountered these ancient sources—
Christian and Pagan—they sought to incorporate various insights about goodness into their 
medieval Christian worldview: from Plato, that God is the archetypal good and we are good to 
the extent that we participate in his goodness; from Aristotle, the notion of the good as an end, 
and God as the highest end and thus highest good (summum bonum); from the Neo-Platonism of 
Plotinus mediated through Pseudo-Dionysius, that goodness is diffusion of being; from 
Augustine and his conflict with the Manicheans, that everything that exists is good in so far as it 
exists; and from Boethius, that God is Goodness and Being itself, existing in the simplicity of his 
undivided nature, and his goodness functions as the helm and rudder by which the fabric of the 
universe is kept stable.2     
In the hands of capable medieval schoolmen, these notions were embraced and debated in 
various ways.  But one common theme stands outs: Everything that exists, in so far as it exists, is 
good.  This often repeated and seemingly counterintuitive claim stands at the center of medieval 
                                                 
2 Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy III.12, L:44-45.   
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Christian accounts of both metaphysics and ethics.  According to Scott MacDonald, all medieval 
accounts of being and goodness share the following two common features:  
[A] There is some sort of necessary connection between being and goodness which is 
fundamental to explaining the nature of goodness. 
And,  
[B] Everything which is, is good.3   
Medieval accounts of the relationship between being and goodness differ in so far as they 
offer diverse accounts of [A] in order to support [B].  In this regard, there are two distinct ways 
of conceiving the necessary connection between being and goodness: the nature approach and 
the creation approach.  The nature approach explains the goodness of an entity by an appeal to 
the entity’s nature as the type of thing it is and to the extent that it fulfills or perfects the 
potentialities in its nature—the actualization of its being, and consequently, its goodness.  In 
contrast, the creation approach explains both the being and goodness of an entity by an appeal to 
God’s creative activity: on this view, both a thing’s being and its goodness are derived from, and 
explained in terms of, God’s being and goodness—as the archetypal pattern for creaturely 
goodness, and the infinite source of the diffusiveness of being.  
Thus the medieval fascination with goodness and its relationship to being was fueled by 
two distinct but equally important sources—the Bible and the antiqua auctoritas—and by the 
time of the late 13th century, contained a long and storied history.        
The Significance of Analyzing Goodness in Duns Scotus  
My dissertation provides a thorough examination of John Duns Scotus’s metaethics, 
specifically, his metaphysics of goodness: how he conceives the nature of goodness, its 
                                                 
3 Scott MacDonald, The Metaphysics of Goodness in Medieval Philosophy before Aquinas, Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Cornell University, 1986, 1-2.   
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relationship to being, and its normative implications.  The rationale behind such a project is 
threefold.   
First, much work has been done on the relation of being and goodness in the medieval 
tradition between Augustine and Aquinas, especially by Scott MacDonald.4  However, very little 
has been written on the nature of goodness in medieval philosophy after Aquinas.  Moreover, the 
being and goodness project is often portrayed as culminating in the synthesizing work of Thomas 
Aquinas, the leading Dominican theologian at Paris in the 13th century, who brought together 
these two rival theories about the nature of goodness: the nature approach and the creation 
approach.  Unfortunately, few have paid attention to a distinctively Franciscan approach to the 
topic around this same time period.  I propose to partially remedy both of these oversights by 
means of a thorough examination of John Duns Scotus’s approach to being and goodness—an 
approach that takes into account the shifting tide toward voluntarism (both ethical and 
theological) at the University of Paris in the late 13th century.  I will argue that Scotus is also a 
synthesizer of sorts, harmonizing the two distinct nature approaches of Augustine and Aristotle 
with his own unique ideas in ways that have profound implications for the future of medieval 
ethical theorizing.     
Second, one important reason that little work has been undertaken on Scotus’s 
metaphysics of goodness is that the Subtle Doctor doesn’t have one type of goodness to be 
examined, but many types of goodness, often calling the same concept of goodness by multiple 
names.  At various locations in his writings, Scotus names all of the following as types of 
goodness: primary goodness, secondary goodness, essential goodness, accidental goodness, 
                                                 
4 Scott MacDonald, The Metaphysics of Goodness in Medieval Philosophy before Aquinas. See also MacDonald, 
Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology (Ithaca: Cornell 
University press, 1991).    
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transcendental goodness, infinite goodness, goodness as a primary perfection of being, goodness 
as a secondary perfection of being, natural primary goodness, natural secondary goodness, moral 
goodness, generic goodness, meritorious goodness, gratuitous goodness, goodness as ordered to 
a reward by reason of divine acceptance, specific goodness, virtuous goodness, circumstantial 
goodness, perfect goodness, goodness as the end, and goodness as conformity with right reason.    
With this in mind, one significant goal of the project is to taxonomize these many forms 
of goodness found in Scotus, with the aim of (1) getting clear about the relation between being 
and goodness generally, (2) discerning exactly what Scotus’s metaethics looks like, and (3) 
clarifying the relationship between his metaethics and his normative ethical theory.  As it turns 
out, Scotus’s metaethics contain a number of novelties that undergird his decisive break with 
both the medieval ethical eudaimonism and the natural law of his predecessors.    
Finally, by clarifying the various kinds of goodness in Scotus, I hope to show that what 
many take to be Scotus’s normative ethical theory is simply his moral metaphysics; and, while 
this metaethical account of goodness no doubt relates to his theory of normativity, it is not 
identical with it.  I shall argue that while Scotus’s metaethics undergirds his normative ethical 
theory, it provides such an account with little content: normativity will arise, for the most part, in 
the role that divine commands (as expressions of the divine will) play in the establishment of 
moral norms and not so much as the perfecting of one’s nature by the fulfillment of one’s 
teleological function.   
In doing so, Scotus separates the rightness of an act from the goodness of an act.  An 
act’s rightness will depend on its conformity to either (1) a necessary moral truth that has 
intrinsic moral worth or (2) God’s commanding some contingent moral truth that lacks moral 
value apart from the divine will.  The moral goodness of an act, in contrast, involves right 
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reason’s determination of the suitability or harmony of all factors pertaining to the act, which 
includes factors involved in (1) and (2).  Given this, goodness is a broader notion than rightness, 
such that we could conceive of acts on this model which are right but lack the appropriate moral 
goodness.  In establishing this, I hope to further show that much of the disparity among 
contemporary Scotus scholarship on the question of whether Scotus was a divine command 
theorist or natural law theorist should be directly attributed to a failure to recognize Scotus’s 
separation of the goodness of an act from the rightness of an act.     
Dissertation Overview 
In chapter 1, I sketch out the connection between being and goodness in the medieval 
tradition prior to the thirteenth century.  I first explain and then provide examples of the creation 
and nature approaches.  Next, I show how Aquinas synthesized the two traditions.  Finally, I 
summarize the way in which Scotus holds a synthesized nature approach of Augustine and 
Aristotle.  However, Scotus offers two broad types of goodness—primary and secondary—only 
one of which is directly connected to being.  This distinction will set the stage for the next two 
sections of the dissertation.   
In Part Two, I analyze the nature of primary goodness—the goodness that Scotus thinks 
is convertible with being and thus a transcendental attribute of everything that exists.  Chapter 2 
examines the notion of convertibility of being and goodness among Scotus and his 
contemporaries.  While Scotus agrees with the mainstream tradition that being and goodness are 
necessarily coextensive properties of everything that exists, he argues that being and good are 
formally rather than conceptually distinct.  I argue that when the referents of being and good are 
considered, both views amount to the same thing.  But when the concepts of being and good are 
considered, positing a formal distinction does make a good deal of difference: good does not 
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simply add something to being conceptually, but formally: it is a quasi-attribute of being that 
exists in the world independently of our conception of it.  Thus Scotus’s formal distinction 
provides a novel conception of [A] in order to explain [B].           
In chapter 3, I argue that Scotus holds an Augustinian hierarchy of being.  This 
hierarchical ranking of being, based upon the magnitude or perfection of the thing’s nature, 
Scotus calls “an order of eminence.”5  I then argue that since goodness is a necessarily 
coextensive perfection of being, it comes in degrees dependent upon the type of being, arranged 
in terms of the same hierarchy.  I conclude that Scotus subscribes to the well-worn adage that 
Everything that exists, in so far as it exists, is good, and thus there is a necessary connection 
between being and goodness.  This account, while inspired by Augustine’s hierarchical nature 
approach, is expressed in terms of Aristotelian metaphysics.     
In Part Three, I explore Scotus’s notion of secondary or accidental goodness—the genre 
of goodness that does not convert with being and is not transcendental.  In chapter 4, I consider 
Scotus’s notion of secondary goodness broadly construed.  I argue that Scotus provides four 
characteristics of secondary goodness: (1) a harmony or suitability (convenientia) between two 
things, (2) a secondary perfection of something, (3) a non-absolute quality, and (4) similar to 
beauty.  Chapters 5 and 6 examine secondary goodness as applied to moral acts.  In chapter 5, I 
sketch out the convoluted history of three types of secondary goodness as applied to human acts: 
generic, moral, and meritorious.  As we will see, Aquinas’s approach to such issues differs 
substantially from the tradition that preceded him.  In chapter 6, I examine Scotus’s account of 
generic, moral, and meritorious goodness, and contrast his overall approach to goodness with 
that of Aquinas.  On the metaphysics of goodness, I will argue, Scotus follows the traditional 
                                                 
5 De Primo Principio I.7.   
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account of Peter Lombard, Philip the Chancellor, Albert the Great, and Bonaventure in 
distinguishing ontological goodness from moral goodness, and claiming that only the former 
converts with being, while the latter is an accident of the act.  In contrast, Aquinas does not 
distinguish such things.  In chapter 7, I turn the topic to badness.  Since goodness and badness 
are in some sense contraries, and Scotus has provided a long and complex account of goodness, I 
examine Scotus’s equally multifaceted account of badness that plots along the same trajectory as 
goodness, but as a mirror opposite. 
In Part Four, I turn the discussion to rightness and wrongness.  Chapter 8 explores the 
relationship between rightness and God’s will, and situates Scotus’s account within 
contemporary discussions of theological voluntarism.  I argue Scotus holds a restricted divine 
will theory—whereby only contingent deontological propositions depend upon God’s will for 
their moral status.  In contrast to Aquinas, Scotus denies that contingent moral laws—the Second 
Table of the Decalogue—are grounded in human nature, and thus he limits the extent to which 
moral reasoning can move from natural law to the moral obligations we have toward one 
another.  In chapter 9, I argue that Scotus distinguishes goodness from rightness, and explore the 
relationship between these concepts in Scotus’s ethics.  It will become clear from this discussion, 
that Scotus’s ethics as a whole face twin problems: the problem of rationality and the problem of 
nature.  While some scholars perceive a contradiction in Scotus’s ethics here, others try to 
explain away either the rationality or voluntarism in his ethical thought, casting him as either an 
absurd voluntarist or a crypto-Aristotelian whose ethics more closely resembles Aquinas and the 
mainstream Catholic tradition.  I provide some reasons for thinking that, while the two disparate 
accounts of morality make for uneasy bedfellows, they are not strictly contradictory, and both 
have much support in Scotus.   
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On the whole, I conclude the following from this study.  About being and goodness: 
Scotus holds [B]—that everything that exists, is good—and like the tradition that proceeded him, 
he uses [A]—the necessary connection between being and goodness—to support [B].  There are 
three important aspects of this account.  One, Scotus provides a novel way of accounting for the 
necessary connection of being and good by positing a formal distinction between them;6 two, 
Scotus adopts an Augustinian nature approach to being and goodness, arranging goodness 
hierarchically according to being.  However, Scotus drops much of Augustine’s Neoplatonism in 
the process, preferring instead to articulate his account in Aristotelian terminology (i.e., in terms 
of substance and its relationship to various categories of being). Three, while Scotus does speak 
about goodness in terms of an end—the Aristotelian version of the nature approach—he denies 
that the type of goodness which results from it is convertible with being.  For readers familiar 
with Aristotle and Aquinas, this move will seem novel; however, I will argue that it has 
precedence in Peter Lombard and his followers.    
Second, I conclude that Scotus separates rightness from goodness, whereby the former 
depends primarily upon the divine will and the latter upon a whole host of conditions to be 
spelled out over the course of the dissertation.  Because of this distinction, we will need to 
evaluate the ways in which Scotus was and was not a voluntarist about moral matters.  This 
separation of the goodness of an act from the rightness of an act will also undergird Scotus’s 
decisive break with the ethical eudaimonism of Aquinas, while simultaneously diminishing the 
role of natural law in moral deliberation—at least with respect to how we ought to treat one 
another.  
                                                 
6 I will carefully explain the formal distinction in chapter 2.  But for now, suffice it say that two things are formally 
distinct when they are identical in reality (read: metaphysically inseparable), but have distinct, mind-independent 
rationes.   
11 
 
  
 
CHAPTER ONE:  
CREATION AND NATURE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF BEING AND GOODNESS 
 
As we saw in the introduction, medieval theologians were infatuated with the relationship 
between being and goodness.  According to Scott MacDonald, all medieval accounts of being 
and goodness share the following two common features:  
[A] There is some sort of necessary connection between being and goodness which is 
fundamental to explaining the nature of goodness. 
[B] Everything which is is good.7   
Medieval accounts of the relationship between being and goodness differ in so far as they offer 
diverse accounts of [A] in order to support [B].  As I explained in the introduction, there are two 
distinct ways of conceiving the necessary connection between being and goodness: the nature 
approach and the creation approach.  The nature approach explains the goodness of an entity by 
an appeal to the entity’s nature as the type of thing it is.  On this view, “A thing is good to the 
extent to which it is a paradigm instance of its kind or nature; and since a thing has being to the 
extent to which it is a paradigm instance of its kind, each thing will be good to exactly the extent 
to which is has being.”8  In contrast, the creation approach—which has also been called more 
                                                 
7 Scott MacDonald, The Metaphysics of Goodness in Medieval Philosophy before Aquinas, 1.   
8 Scott MacDonald, The Metaphysics of Goodness in Medieval Philosophy before Aquinas, 19.   
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generally, a participation approach9— explains both the being and goodness of an entity by an 
appeal to God’s creative activity: just as an entity exists because God—Being itself—causes it to 
come into being, so also an entity is good because God—Goodness itself—causes it to have a 
secondary or derivative goodness.  On this view, both a thing’s being and its goodness are 
derived from and explained in terms of God’s being and goodness, usually in terms of a 
metaphysical and archetypal dependence—i.e., construed along Platonic lines.   
Drawing upon Scott MacDonald’s research, I’ll briefly survey various approaches to 
being and goodness.  I first examine two distinct sources of the nature approach, Aristotle and 
Augustine.  Second, I describe Boethius’s creation approach.  Third, I survey Aquinas’s attempt 
to reconcile the creation and nature approaches.  Finally, I briefly situate John Duns Scotus’s 
account of being and goodness as a development of, and a departure from, the nature approach.  
Scotus’s distinction between primary goodness and secondary goodness—only the former of 
which converts with being—will set the stage for the rest of the dissertation.    
The Nature Approach  
Aristotle 
Aristotle’s account of goodness arises naturally within the larger context of his discussion 
of human flourishing in Book 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics.  Aristotle conceives all action as 
teleological: agents act for the sake of some end conceived as good; hence Aristotle identifies the 
notion of good with the notion of an end.  In the context of this discussion, Aristotle criticizes 
Plato’s conception of goodness (1.6) and explains his own account (1.7).   
According to Aristotle, Plato believed that there is a common form of the good that 
                                                 
9 See MacDonald, “The Relationship between Being and Goodness,” in Being and Goodness: The Concept of the 
Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, 4.  
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inheres in all things that are said to be good.10  For example, we make the following claims about 
things that are said to be good: “that is a good knife,”  “that is a good dog,” and “that is a good 
human,” etc.  On Aristotle’s reading of Plato, the reason we can predicate goodness of dissimilar 
things like artifacts, animals, and humans is that each of these things has a common nature 
shared by all good things.  Aristotle criticizes this view with the following argument: 
(1) If the good were a common nature, it would be spoken of in only one way.  
(2) Good is spoken of in more than one way.  
(3) Therefore, it cannot be a common nature.11   
According to Aristotle, there is not some one thing that corresponds to the concept of goodness, 
but many things; goodness is thus a homonymous concept.   As Aristotle defines it, a homonymy 
exists when two objects share a common name but the definition of their being is different.12  In 
support of the above argument, Aristotle argues that the concept of good is predicated of various 
things that differ in their nature:  “Since things are said to be good in as many ways as they are 
said to be…clearly the good cannot be something universally predicated in all the categories but 
only in one.”13  According to MacDonald, when Aristotle identifies the good as homonymous, he 
means that “there is no one real nature or property in the world corresponding to the name 
‘Good.’  Being good is one property for one thing, being good is another property for another.”14   
On Aristotle’s conception of goodness, then, each type of thing has a unique kind of 
goodness determined by the thing’s nature.  Aristotle equates the goodness of a thing with the 
                                                 
10 Nicomachean Ethics 1096b7-12.   
11 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1096a17-29; MacDonald, The Metaphysics of Goodness in Medieval 
Philosophy before Aquinas, 29 
12 Categories, 1a1. 
13 Nicomachean Ethics, 1096a19-29.    
14 MacDonald, The Metaphysics of Goodness in Medieval Philosophy before Aquinas, 37.   
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thing’s end or completion of potentialities within its nature.  Hence this account falls within the 
nature approach to goodness because it appeals to an entity’s nature in order to account for its 
goodness.   
Augustine   
 While Augustine also adopts a nature approach to the relationship between being and 
goodness, the way in which he advances his account differs from Aristotle, as Augustine 
construes goodness within the context of a Neoplatonic hierarchy of being: ‘being’ is an ordered 
scale where God is identified with ‘Being’ itself and every other existent thing obtains its being 
from God, and has a lesser degree of being proportional to its grade of being.  In the City of God, 
he puts it this way:  
Since God is the Supreme Being, that is, he supremely is, he is therefore immutable.  God 
gave being to those things which he created out of nothing, but not Supreme Being like he 
himself has.  And he gave more being to some and less being to others; and so he ordered 
natures according to their grade of being.15    
   In De Natura Boni, Augustine develops this gradation conception of goodness 
specifically as a criticism of Manicheanism’s cosmic dualism.16  There he identifies God with the 
supreme, eternal, immortal, and unchanging Good.  In contrast, every created good is good by its 
own nature, as created by God.17  Goodness also comes in grades, dependent upon being: there 
exists an ordering of goods based on three natural properties given to objects by God, 
specifically, measure, form, and order.18  Where these properties are present to a high degree, the 
                                                 
15
 In De Civitate Dei, XII.2.  Patrologia Latina 41: “Cum enim Deus summa essentia sit, hoc est summe sit, et ideo 
immutabilis sit; rebus quas ex nihilo creavit, esse dedit, sed non summe esse, sicut ipse est; et aliis dedit esse 
amplius, aliis minus; atque ita naturas essentiarum gradibus ordinavit.” 
16 The Manicheans believed that good and evil are accounted for by the positing of a good God responsible for good, 
and a bad God responsible for evil.  Both deities—and good and evil—were posited as existent dueling substances.  
17 De Natura Boni, ii-iii.   
18 De Natura Boni, iii.   
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entity is a great good, and when there is a small degree of these properties, the entity is a small 
good.  Where there is an absence of these natural properties, there is no natural goodness and 
consequently, no being.19  Augustine describes God, at the zenith of this hierarchy, analogously 
as measure without measure, number without number, and weight without weight.20     
In the context of developing this position, Augustine exploits beliefs shared with the 
Manicheans in order to demonstrate problems with their dualism about good and evil: 
(1) There is a highest good.  
(2) All good things must come from the highest good. 
(3) Every nature is good insofar as it is a nature.  
(4) Therefore, every nature exists only by the highest good.21 
The Manicheans and Augustine both agree with premises (1) and (2).  Since they deny the 
conclusion, the crux of the argument is premise (3).  What does Augustine mean by ‘nature’ 
which occurs twice in this key premise (omnis autem natura in quantum natura est, bonum est)?   
MacDonald points out that Augustine sometimes uses ‘nature’ to refer to an essence.22  At other 
times, Augustine uses ‘nature’ to refer to a concrete individual.23  MacDonald suggests that both 
definitions of ‘nature’ are at work in this premise, and so it should be read as follows:  
(3*)      Every individual is good insofar as it has or exemplifies its nature.24 
Here MacDonald suggests an important way in which Augustine’s account does resemble 
                                                 
19 De Natura Boni, iii. 
20 De Genesi ad litteram, 4.3.7.  Augustine often uses ‘form’ and ‘number,’ and ‘weight’ and ‘order’ 
interchangeably.  See Lewis Ayres, “Measure, Number, and Weight,” in Augustine Through the Ages: An 
Encyclopedia ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999), 550-552. 
21 MacDonald, The Metaphysics of Goodness in Medieval Philosophy before Aquinas, 53-54; Cf. De Natura Boni.   
22 MacDonald, The Metaphysics of Goodness in Medieval Philosophy before Aquinas, 54-55.  Cf. On the Morals of 
the Manicheans II. 
23 Cf. De Trinitate v.2. 
24 MacDonald, The Metaphysics of Goodness in Medieval Philosophy before Aquinas, 56.   
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Aristotle’s.  If (3) is understood in terms of (3*),  
Then there must also be a sense in which human beings can exemplify the nature of a 
human being to a greater or lesser degree.  Augustine is claiming that all existing things 
have a nature or are natures in the first sense, and that different things of the same nature 
can exemplify that nature to different degrees.25   
While I agree with MacDonald that Augustine believes individuals can exemplify their natures to 
different degrees, unfortunately, that is not what is going on in this crucial third premise.  In 
other words, Augustine is not claiming that ‘nature’ in the first instance should be taken as 
‘concrete substance,’ but ‘nature’ in the second instance should be taken as a ‘kind-nature.’  
There are two reasons for denying this interpretation in favor of taking ‘nature’ as ‘individual 
substance’ in both uses of premise (3): textual and conceptual.   
 First, there are textual reasons for rejecting (3*).  In a parallel passage In On Free Choice 
of the Will, written only a few years earlier, Augustine uses the exact same wording as the De 
Natura Boni passage, but explains that by ‘nature’ he means ‘a substance.’  He states:  
Therefore, it is most truly said that every nature, insofar as it is a nature, is good (omnis 
natura in quantum natura est, bona est).  Because if it is incorruptible, then it is better than 
if it were corruptible.  But if it is corruptible, it is without a doubt good, because it becomes 
less good as long as the corruption [continues].  But every nature is either corruptible or 
incorruptible. Therefore, every nature is good.  What I call ‘nature’ is most usually called ‘a 
substance.’ Therefore, every substance is either God, or from God; for every good is either 
God or from God.’26 
So Augustine uses the exact same wording here as he does in De Natura Boni (omnis natura in 
quantum natura est, bona est), and yet, clarifies that by ‘nature’ he means ‘a substance.’  He 
does not mean kind-nature, nor does he hint at a different meaning in each use of ‘nature’ that 
                                                 
25 MacDonald, The Metaphysics of Goodness in Medieval Philosophy before Aquinas, 56. 
26 De Libero Arbitrio 3.13.36, Patrologia Latina 32: “Quapropter quod verissime dicitur, omnis natura in quantum 
natura est, bona est: quia si incorruptibilis est, melior est quam corruptibilis; si autem corruptibilis  est, quoniam 
dum corrumpitur minus bona fit, sine dubitatione bona est. Omnis autem natura aut corruptibilis est, aut 
incorruptibilis. Omnis ergo natura bona est: naturam voco quae et substantia dici solet. Omnis igitur substantia aut 
Deus, aut ex Deo; quia omne bonum aut Deus, aut ex Deo.”  
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MacDonald thinks exists in the premise.  Furthermore, he goes on to claim that every substance 
is either God or from God, thereby making the issue even clearer: he is referring to primary 
substances—concrete individuals—and not Aristotle’s notion of secondary substance.    
Confessions VII, which we will consider in a bit, also confirms this reading.  After 
making similar arguments against the Manicheans, he concludes that whatever exists, is good, 
and thus evil is not a substance.  He then claims that “if it were a substance, then it would be 
good: for either it would be an incorruptible substance and certainly a great good, or it would be 
a corruptible substance, which cannot be corrupted unless it is good.”27 So in these parallel 
passages, Augustine seems to take ‘nature’ as primary substance, and not secondary substance.        
 Conceptually, MacDonald’s account seems to confuse the entity’s existence within the 
hierarchy of being, imbued with certain properties that fix its location on the scale of existence, 
with the entity fulfilling its nature as the type of thing it is.  In other words, in MacDonald’s 
formulation of premise (3), he seems to conflate natural or metaphysical goodness with moral 
goodness.  This is important, because only the former plays a substantial role in Augustine’s 
arguments against the Manicheans for the conclusion that “every nature exists only by the 
highest good.”    
Augustine’s conception of natural or metaphysical goodness should not be confused with, 
nor identified with, moral goodness.  He states,  “It is possible that one nature even when 
corrupted may still be better than another nature which remains uncorrupted, because the one has 
a superior, the other an inferior measure, form and order.”28  For example, a corrupted rational 
                                                 
27 Confessions VII 12 (18).  Latin text is from the critical edition Confessions vol. I: Introduction and Text ed. James 
J. O’Donnell (New York: Clarendon Press, 1992): “quia si substantia esset, bonum esset.  Aut enim incorruptibilis 
substantia, magnum utique bonum, aut substantia corruptibilis esset, quae nisi bona esset, corrumpi non posset.” 
28 De Natura Boni, v. In Augustine: Earlier Writings, ed. and trans. By John H. S. Burleigh (Philadelphia: The 
Westminster Press, 1953).    
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spirit has more natural goodness than an uncorrupted irrational spirit because, proportionally, it 
has more measure, form, and order.  By adding this proviso, Augustine distinguishes natural 
goodness from moral goodness: an object can have more natural goodness but less moral 
goodness than another object by having more measure, form, and order, but a corrupted will.  As 
far as natural or metaphysical goodness is concerned, this goodness supervenes on the natural 
properties possessed by an object and the relations among those properties; it thus cannot be 
reduced to any one of them—any difference in these properties results in a difference in the 
object’s natural goodness.   
Consequently, something is naturally good proportional to the degree to which it has 
these properties, which are grounded in the entity’s nature, given to it by God.  This is what’s at 
stake in Augustine’s debate with the Manicheans, since they want to claim that badness has an 
independent existence in a way that mirrors substances.  In response, Augustine states that every 
existent thing (i.e., nature, substance) has its goodness proportional to its being, which can be 
hierarchically construed in terms of the entity’s measure, form, and order—the metaphysical 
principles of its being.29  Thus even entities lower down on the scale of existence have some 
minuscule amount of measure, form and order, and thus some proportionate—though 
minuscule—amount of goodness.30  So, I suggest that the premise should be reformulated as 
follows:  
(3**)    Every substance (nature) is good, in so far as it is a substance (nature). 
In support of (3**), Augustine first argues that either a nature (i.e., a substance) can be 
corrupted or it cannot be corrupted.  If a nature cannot be corrupted, then it is the supreme good 
                                                 
29 W.J. Roche, “Measure, Number, and Weight in Saint Augustine,” The New Scholasticism 15 (1941), 351.  
30 De Natura Boni, iii-viii. 
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(i.e., God).  If a nature can be corrupted, then it must have something good left in it, since 
corruption only harms by taking away something good in it.31  This hinges upon Augustine’s 
view of corruption as a privation of goodness.  If it is possible that some nature be corrupted, and 
corruption is a privation of goodness, it follows that the nature itself has some degree of 
goodness—or it would not be corruptible.32  But if it were incorruptible, then it would be the 
supreme good.  And since natures exist in only two ways—corruptible and incorruptible—(3**) 
is in fact true, and Augustine’s conclusion follows: every nature exists only by the highest good.   
In this context, the argument from corruptibility is taken as support for premise (3**), 
which is used to support the conclusion that every nature exists only by the highest good.  In 
Confessions VII, however, the corruptibility argument is used simply to demonstrate that 
“whatever things exist are good.” There Augustine expands this argument by claiming that if 
natures were deprived of every good, they would not exist at all.  But if they exist and are in 
principle corruptible, then they must have some degree of goodness left to be corrupted.  If not, 
they would not exist. Since they do exist, they must be good.  He concludes, “Whatever things 
exist are good.”33 
What then is the relationship between natural goodness and moral goodness?  Augustine 
claims that an object’s value is proportional to its being.  As a result, the greater measure, form, 
and order an object has, the more being it has, and consequently, the more value it has.  Moral 
goodness, Augustine claims, is a right ordering of love according to an object’s value.34  
                                                 
31 De Natura Boni, vi.   
32 See also Confessions VII. xii (18).   
33 Confessions VII. Xii (18).  
34 Letters, 137, V.17.  Patrologia Latina 31. He states, “Here is ethics: since a good and honorable life is formed in 
no other way than when one loves the things which ought to be loved in the way that they ought to be loved.” “Hic 
ethica, quoniam vita bona et honesta non aliunde formatur, quam cum ea quae diligenda sunt, quemadmodum 
diligenda sunt.” 
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Consequently, we ought to love things in accordance with their value, which is determined by 
their natural goodness, grounded in an object’s non-moral properties.  Moral goodness consists 
in loving things proportionally to their natural goodness, which follows their degree of being.  
He says,  
We must, however, observe right order even in our love for the very love by which we love 
that which is worthy to be loved, so that there may be in us that virtue which enables us to 
live well.  Hence, it seems to me that a brief and true definition of virtue is ‘rightly ordered 
love.’35 
So, on the scale of natural goods, which follows being itself, God has the most goodness.  Two 
things follow from this.  First, since the highest good is that good which all other goods are 
directed towards, and since our love for any object ought to be proportional to the object’s 
ontological goodness, God should be loved most as the highest good.  Because God is identical 
with Being itself, and consequently, Goodness itself, all human action should be directed toward 
this end.36   
Augustine often connects his metaphysics of goodness with his ethical eudaimonism, 
such that Augustine’s formal account of eudaimonia is infused with content that reflects his 
Christian Neoplatonism.  So he says that the search for God is synonymous with the search for 
happiness,37 that happiness is joy found in loving God for his own sake,38 that in seeking 
happiness, we are seeking none other than God,39 that we become happy by participating in 
                                                 
35 De Civitate Dei, XV.22.  In Augustine: City of God Against the Pagans, ed. and trans. R.W. Dyson (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998).  Augustine says in Letter 157,II.9  “The soul is carried wherever it is carried by 
its love, as if by a weight.” When added to his comments in De Trinitate VIII.5.8, that all love is love of the good or 
the blessed, Augustine believes that all action is motivated (i.e., “carried”) by love of something we think is good.  
36Letters, 137, V.17.   
37 Confessions, VI.xi (19). 
38 Confessions, X.xxiii (33).  
39 Confessions, X.20 (29): “Quomodo ergo te quaero, domine? Cum enim te, deum meum, quaero, vitam beatam 
quaero.”   
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God,40 and that God is the fountain of our happiness (fons nostrae beatitudinis) and is the end of 
all our longing (ipse omnis appetitionis est finis).41  In On the Morals of the Catholic Church, he 
states, “if virtue leads us to the happy life, then I would define virtue to be nothing at all except 
the highest love of God.”42  This is not surprising, since on a Neoplatonic model, “the supreme 
beatitude and the highest good are identical, because the very notion of perfection excludes two 
or more competitors for this position at the apex of the hierarchy of being.”43 
Second, if love for any object ought to be proportional to the object’s natural goodness, 
then moral wrongness consists in a wrong ordering of loves, where objects are not loved 
proportional to their natural goodness.  From this, Augustine believes humans can go astray in 
two ways: (1) in seeking happiness in the wrong things or (2) in seeking happiness the wrong 
way; the former misses the end, the latter attains the end for the wrong reasons. 
The first type of moral wrongness centers on a disproportionate loving of lesser goods 
instead of the highest good.44  We often seek goods (like friendship) that are lower goods in 
place of the highest good, God.  Thus Augustine thinks sin is immoderate inclination toward 
lower goods.45  Instead of proportioning our love for an object according to its natural goodness, 
we love these lesser goods more than they should be loved, and we love the highest good (i.e., 
                                                 
40 De Civitate Dei, VIII.5.  
41 De Civitate Dei, X.3. 
42 On the Morals of the Catholic Church , 1.15.25. Patrologia Latina 32: “Quod si virtus ad beatam vitam nos ducit, 
nihil omnino esse virtutem affirmaverim, nisi summum amorem Dei.” 
43 Henry Chadwick, Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 211.   See Consolation of Philosophy III for Boethius’s arguments for this.   
44 In De Civitate De VIII.5 Augustine says, “The rational soul ought not to worship as its god those things which are 
placed below it in the order of nature, nor ought it to exalt as gods those things above which the true God has 
exalted it.” In Augustine: City of God Against the Pagans.  And in Free Will he claims that sin is the turning of the 
mind away from finding enjoyment in God and toward what has been created by God.  De Libero Arbitrio 3.1.1.  
See also Confessions, I.xx (31).   
45 Confessions, II.V (10).  
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God) less than we ought to.  In doing this, we act against the natural order of things.46 
Second, moral wrongness consists in seeking happiness in the right end, but in the wrong 
way.  Here Augustine distinguishes uti (use) from frui (enjoyment), paralleling the distinction 
between means and ends.  Augustine says that “to enjoy a thing is to rest with satisfaction in it 
for its own sake.  To ‘use,’ on the other hand, is to employ whatever means are at one’s disposal 
to obtain what one desires, if it is a proper object of desire.”47  An ultimate end, a thing which is 
sought and loved for its own sake, must never be used, only enjoyed.  Since God is the ultimate 
end, only God himself is to be enjoyed.  Conversely, we must never enjoy lower goods that are 
means to God, but only use them appropriately. Thus it would be inappropriate, for example, to 
love or use God for the sake of gaining material possessions.48   
Thus we can go astray by either the enjoyment of lower goods, which ought to be used, 
or by using the ultimate good, God, rather than enjoying him.  The latter consists in using God as 
a means to enjoying something else—getting the teleological chain backwards.  This, once again, 
is grounded in Augustine’s hierarchy of goods: a certain direction exists among goods such that 
lesser goods are always to be used as means to the highest good and our final end—God—who is 
to be enjoyed and never used.  
Given this, we can see another connection between being and goodness: namely, 
substances can be corrupted (and thus deprived in some sense of their being) by acting morally 
badly, i.e., by loving goods disproportionate to their value.  So there is a sense in which 
Augustine thinks that rational substances can contribute to their own diminishing of their being 
                                                 
46 Hence Augustine says that evil is a not a substance, but a swerving of the will away from the Supreme Substance, 
towards lower goods.  Confessions, VII.X (16).  See also Confessions, II.V (10)-II.VI (14).  
47 De Doctrina Christiana, I.4, trans. J.F. Shaw, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers vol. 2, ed. Philip Schaff 
(Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers 2004).  
48 See De Civitate Dei, XI, 25.   
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and goodness, although it is difficult to imagine exactly how this might work.  Clearly, 
Augustine believes that sinning (a disproportionate loving of goods) results in a diminishing of 
our being, via a diminishing of our measure, form, and order.  But these terms have some fluidity 
in Augustine, so let’s try to get clear on what he means by them.     
Briefly, measure (mensura, modus) is the principle by which God limits and sets 
boundaries for created things, providing them their existence and place in the universe.49  Form 
(forma, species) or number (numerus) is the kind of thing it is, along with the quantitative and 
qualitative perfections of the entity.  Thus Augustine often trades between these two notions—
form and beauty—the kind of thing it is (species), and its beauty in terms of the number of its 
perfections.50  Finally, order (ordo) or weight (pondus) refers to God’s ordering all things to 
himself, and subsequently, the principle in creatures that moves them to rest and stability in 
God.51   
Measure, form, and order are not only ontological or metaphysical principles of every 
material being, they also order and direct the rational soul.  In De Genesi ad Litteram 4.4.8, 
Augustine claims that these principles govern not only the material world but also the immaterial 
soul: measure governs and limits actions, keeping them within their proper place; form or 
number in the soul refers to its affections and virtues, directing the soul to the form and beauty of 
wisdom; weight orders and moves the soul towards rest and stability in goods worth pursuing.52  
In De Natura Boni, Augustine claims the diminishing of measure, forma, and order occurs when 
                                                 
49 De Genesi ad Litteram 4.3.7.   
50 Roche, “Measure, Number, and Weight in Saint Augustine,” 355.  See De Natura Boni, xxiii; De Genesi ad 
Litteram 4.3-4.5.   
51 De Genesi ad Litteram, XII, VI, cap3-6.  Roche, “Measure, Number, and Weight in Saint Augustine,” 362.  
52 De Genesi ad Litteram 4.4.8; De Civitate Dei, XIX.13. See also C. Harrison, “Measure, Number, and Weight in 
Saint Augustine’s Aesthetics,” Augustinianum 28 (1988), 600-602.   
24 
 
there are less of these than there ought to be.53  And in On the Morals of the Manicheans, he says 
that by turning to lower-level goods, created beings diminish their goodness and rationality.54   
So when we act badly, there is a sense in which our being is diminished, by diminishing 
our measure, form, and order.  Thus there is a sense in which Augustine has two slightly 
different accounts: one is an ontological account of goodness, and the other a moral account—
both of which are necessarily tied to being, but the latter one only negatively.  This will become 
important with later thinkers (like Lombard and Scotus), who will follow Augustine in his 
ontological, hierarchical-nature account of being and goodness, while distancing themselves 
from the more Neoplatonic elements in Augustine, and conceiving moral goodness as an 
accident of being in the category of action and thus not convertible with being. 
So for Aristotle, substances are good to the extent that they fulfill their end which 
consists in actualizing potentialities in their nature.  Since every being has some degree of 
actuality, every being has goodness in some respect.  For Augustine, natures are good in so far as 
they exist—and their goodness is proportional to their grade of being: the more being, the more 
goodness.  Thus natures can be arranged according to their hierarchy of being.  Furthermore, if 
natures are susceptible to corruption, they must have some amount of goodness that can be 
corrupted.  If they can’t be corrupted, then either they don’t exist or they are the supreme good.  
In either case, every nature that exists is good.  Hence both Augustine and Aristotle appeal to an 
entity’s nature in order to explain the necessary connection between being and goodness.  
 
                                                 
53 De Natura Boni xxiii.  “Malus ergo modus, vel mala species, vel malus ordo, aut ideo dicuntur, quia minora sunt 
quam esse debuerunt, aut quia non his rebus accommodantur quibus accommodanda sunt; ut ideo dicantur mala, 
quia sunt aliena et incongrua.” 
54 On the Morals of the Manicheans 5.6-7.   
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The Creation Approach 
While the creation approach also uses [A] to explain and justify [B], it explains the 
necessary connection between being and goodness by an appeal, not to the nature and end of an 
entity, but to God’s creative activity as the First Good that created the being and goodness of the 
entity.  Boethius’s De Hebdomadibus is the paradigm creation approach, and particularly 
interesting considering that his framing of the problem presupposes the necessary connection 
between being and goodness, and yet nowhere mentions the nature approach’s solution—a 
solution Boethius was certainly familiar with in the writings of Augustine (particularly 
Confessions and De Trinitate) and Aristotle.55  Furthermore, Boethius’s solution to the problem 
he raises about being and goodness nicely demonstrates his vision of unifying the thought of 
Plato and Aristotle: while he uses specific Aristotelian terminology (i.e., substance, accident, 
etc.), his solution is decidedly Platonist.56   
De Hebdomadibus is a treatise written to John the Deacon in response to John’s question 
concerning how substances can be good when they are not substantial goods.  Boethius spends 
most of the treatise strengthening and motivating John’s question before providing his own 
answer.  He begins with an argument designed to show what everyone agrees to be the case—
that ‘everything that exists is good’:  
(1) Everything that exists tends toward good.  
(2) Everything tends only toward what it is like.  
(3) Therefore, things that tend toward the good are themselves good.  
                                                 
55 While the De Hebdomadibus is heavily influenced by Neoplatonism, particularly Proclus and his school, Boethius 
does show some influence of Augustine in his treatise: Boethius rejects the notion that God is beyond being, 
favoring instead the Augustinian conception of God as Goodness and Being.  Furthermore, Boethius says nothing 
about non-being and the One, which were prominent in Proclus and his followers.  See Chadwick, Boethius: The 
Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy, 207.   
56 See MacDonald, The Metaphysics of Goodness in Medieval Philosophy before Aquinas, 74-75.   
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(4) Therefore, everything that exists is good.57  
The way Boethius frames the initial problem already presupposes the necessary connection 
between being and goodness, i.e., [A].  Given this, the question is how it is the case that 
everything that exists is good, i.e., [B].58  It is at this point that the problem is raised in the form 
of a dilemma, neither horn of which seems palatable to Boethius, and which, if the premises are 
true, threatens the truth of (4):       
(5) If substances are good, they are good either by participation or by substance.  
(6) They are not good by participation.  
(7) They are not good by substance. 
(8) Therefore, substances are not good at all.59  
But (8) contradicts the commonsense view above (i.e., (4)), and so necessitates Boethius’s 
response as to how things are good.  Boethius’s solution will split the horns of the dilemma, 
providing a third option, and thus rejecting (5) in the process.  First, let’s consider why Boethius 
thinks that a thing’s goodness cannot be explained accidentally or substantially.  Boethius argues 
for the truth of (6) in the following way:  
(6a) If substances are good by participation, then they are in no way good in 
themselves.  
(6b) If they are in no way good in themselves, then they do not tend toward the good.  
(6c) But they do tend toward the good (1-3).  
(6d) Therefore, they are not good by participation.  
                                                 
57 “Things which are, are good.  For the common opinion of the learned holds that everything that is tends to good 
and everything tends to its like.  Therefore, things which tend to good are themselves good.”  De Hebdomadibus, 
Lines 56-60.  All translations of De Hebdomadibus (also known as Quomodo Substantiae) are from the Loeb edition 
unless noted otherwise.  Boethius: Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy, Loeb Classical 
Library, vol. 74, trans. H.F. Stewart, E.K. Rand, and S.J. Tester (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937).  My 
formulation of the argument relies heavily, but not exclusively, on MacDonald, The Metaphysics of Goodness in 
Medieval Philosophy before Aquinas, 77.      
58 De Hebdomadibus, L: 60-61: “We must, however, enquire how they are good…”  
59 MacDonald, The Metaphysics of Goodness in Medieval Philosophy before Aquinas, 79.  Cf. De Hebdomadibus, L: 
60-85.   
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And, given (5), 
(6e) Therefore, they must be substantial goods.60   
 
In (6a), Boethius means that when a substance is good by participation, it has goodness as an 
accident: i.e., its goodness is not a kind-defining feature of its nature.  In the same way that 
whiteness doesn’t characterize the nature of the object with that quality, if had accidentally, 
goodness wouldn’t characterize the nature of the substance that has it.  But if goodness didn’t 
characterize the nature of the substance itself, it would not be good in itself.  But then it would 
not tend toward the good.  But by stipulation, substances do in fact tend toward the good; 
therefore, goodness cannot be an accidental property of being, and consequently, substances 
cannot be good by participation.       
 Goodness must therefore be a substantial property of being.  As Aertsen explains, if 
things are good by their substance, “then things are good in virtue of their being.  This means 
that being and being good are identical in virtue of their being.”61  Boethius takes this to mean 
that being and being good are identical in substances: i.e., substantial goods lack metaphysical 
composition.  But if being and being good are identical in substances, then Boethius perceives 
the following problem:       
(7a) If they are substantial goods, then their being is identical with their goodness.   
(7b) If their being is identical with their goodness, then they are like the first good. 
                                                 
60 “We must, however, enquire how they are good—by participation or by substance.  If by participation, they are in 
no wise good in themselves; for a thing which is white by participation is not white in itself by virtue of its own 
being.  So with all other qualities.  If then they are good by participation, they are in no way good in themselves; 
therefore, they do not tend to good.  But we have already agreed that they do.  Therefore, they are good not by 
participation but by substance.”  De Hebdomadibus, L: 60-68.  
61 Jan Aertsen, “Good as Transcendental and the Transcendence of the Good,” in Being and Goodness: The Concept 
of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, ed. Scott MacDonald (Ithaca: Cornell university Press, 
1991), 61.  Cf. De Hebdomadibus L: 68-75.  
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(7c) Nothing is like the first good. 
(7d) Therefore they will be this first goodness itself. 
(7e) Therefore all things which exist are God. 
(7f)        It is not the case that all things which exist are God.   
(7g) Therefore, their being is not identical with their goodness.  
(7h) Therefore, they are not substantial goods.62    
Boethius seems to suggest that if things are substantially good, then their being and being good 
will be identical, which is just to say that they are metaphysically simple substances—a property 
only attributable to Being and Goodness itself, i.e., God.  Therefore, substances are not good (8), 
since they are neither accidentally nor substantially good.  And thus, premise (4) cannot be true.  
But Boethius wishes to maintain (4).      
His solution to the problem is to reject premise (5): namely, denying that goodness can 
only be a substantial or accidental property of being.  In order to do this, Boethius proceeds in 
two steps.  First, he provides a thought experiment whose goal is to demonstrate that without the 
First Good, there would be no creaturely goodness.  Suppose that there was no First Good and all 
created things that exist are good; namely, suppose [B] and no God—no First Good. 63  His goal 
is to consider how these created substances could be good if the First Good did not exist.  
Boethius argues that if created goods existed, their being and their being good would be 
                                                 
62 “Therefore, they are not good by participation but by substance.  But of those things whose substance is good the 
particular being is good.  But they owe their particular being to absolute being.  Their existence therefore is good; 
therefore mere existence of all things is good.  But if their existence is good, things which exist are good in virtue of 
their existence, and their existence is the same as the existence of the good.  Therefore they are substantial goods, 
since they do not participate in goodness. But if the particular being in them is good, there is no doubt but that since 
they are substantial goods, they are like the first good, and thereby they will be that good itself; for nothing is like it 
save itself.  Hence all things that are, are God—an impious assertion.  Wherefore they are not substantial goods, and 
so there is not in them good existence; therefore, they are not good in virtue of their existence.” De Hebdomadibus, 
L: 67-83.  
63 De Hebdomadibus, L: 86-96.   
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different, for if their being and their being good were identical, they would be the First Good (see 
(7a)-(7d)), which by stipulation, does not exist.   
But if their being and their being good are different, they are composite substances.  
However, composite substances stand in need of explanation concerning their composition, and 
this can only be explained if a simple substance existed—and in this case, a simple substance 
whose being is identical to his goodness.  Given that created goods lack metaphysical simplicity, 
Boethius concludes, “But since they are not simple, they could not even exist at all unless that 
which is the one sole good had willed them to exist.”64  The conclusion Boethius draws from this 
thought experiment is that if there is no First Good, then there can be no creaturely goodness at 
all, and hence, creaturely goodness depends upon the First Good, since composite substances 
stand in need of explanation by way of a metaphysically simple substance.   
Second, based upon this result, Boethius splits the horns of the dilemma in (5), arguing 
that creaturely goodness is accounted for in the same way that their being is, namely, because the 
First Good caused them to exist.  Hence creatures are good because they stand in a proper 
relation to the First Good.  He concludes,  
Therefore, they are called good because their being flowed (defluo) from the will of the 
Good.  For the First Good, because it exists, is good in virtue of its existence; but a 
secondary good is also good itself, because its goodness flows (fluo) from a being whose 
existence is itself good.  But the being itself of all things flows (fluo) from that which is the 
First Good and which is the type of good that is rightly called good in virtue of its 
existence.  Therefore, their being is good.65   
Thus metaphysically composite substances stand in need of explanation for the unity of their 
                                                 
64 De Hebdomadibus, L: 117-119.  
65 De Hebdomadibus, Line 119-127.  Translation mine. “Idcirco quoniam esse eorum a boni voluntate defluxit, bona 
esse dicuntur.  Primum enim bonum, quoniam est, in eo quod est bonum est; secundum vero bonum, quoniam ex eo 
fluxit cuius ipsum esse bonum est, ipsum quoque bonum est. Sed ipsum esse omnium rerum ex eo fluxit quod est 
primum bonum et quod bonum tale est ut recte dicatur in eo quod est esse bonum.  Ipsum igitur eorum esse bonum 
est.”  
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being and goodness.  Boethius supposes that without a simple substance whose being is identical 
to its goodness, no creaturely goodness would exist at all.  Furthermore, composite substances 
are not good by participation, nor are they substantial goods.  Rather, their being and goodness is 
explained relationally and causally, by the will of the First Good, in which Boethius uses 
metaphorical language suggestive of Neoplatonic emanationism.   
Notice that the solution still maintains the necessary connection between being and 
goodness, because everything which has being from the First Being also has goodness from the 
same Being who is the First Good.  This is a creation approach to goodness because it explains 
the necessary connection between being and goodness by an appeal to an entity’s creation by 
God and relation to God—whose goodness is his being.  Hence, goodness is neither an 
accidental property nor a substantial property, but a relational property.66  Thus Boethius offers 
an explanatory/relational account: goodness derives from standing in relation to the creator 
whose being is his goodness.  Since Boethius uses metaphorical language of creaturely goodness 
“flowing” from the first good, the ambiguity causes later schoolman to interpret this relational 
account various ways: Thierry of Chartres, for example, interprets this causally, while 
Clarenbald of Arras provides a more Platonic, participatory account of this relationship.67   
Aquinas’s Synthesis  
Aquinas also subscribes to [B] and he uses [A] as a means of support for [B].  In doing 
so, however, Aquinas utilizes aspects of both the nature and creation approaches to goodness.68   
                                                 
66 This is not the only time Boethius appeals to relations to solve debates of a similar nature.  See De Trinitate V for 
another use of relation in the context of Trinitarian individuation.  
67 See MacDonald, The Metaphysics of Goodness in Medieval Philosophy before Aquinas ,154-204.  
68 Thomas Williams, “From Metaethics to Action Theory,” in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. 
Thomas Williams (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 334 
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In support of the necessary connection between being and goodness, Aquinas argues that being 
and goodness are convertible because they are the same in reality (secundum rem) and differ 
only in sense (secundum rationem).69  Aquinas contends that the ratio of goodness is that of 
desirability, offering Aristotle’s dictum, “The good is what all things desire.”70  Now, a thing is 
desirable only insofar as it is perfect (perfectum), and everything desires its own perfection.  The 
Latin perfectum denotes the completeness of the thing—hence it refers to the thing’s end.71  A 
thing is perfect or complete only in so far as it is actual, where actuality implies the fulfillment 
(perfectum) of a thing’s potentialities.  But being or existence is what makes something actual; 
therefore, something is perfect only insofar as it is actual: “Hence it is clear that a thing is good 
insofar as it has being, for to be is the actuality of every thing.”72  Thus ‘to be’ is to be in 
actuality, and actuality is the completeness or perfection of the thing, and this perfection is its 
goodness.   
So whatever has being, has goodness.  Goodness differs from being only in its ratio, by 
adding the notion of desirability to the notion of being.  Since every being has some degree of 
actuality (since it exists), it has a certain amount of perfection, and thus has a certain amount of 
goodness.  Thus [B] is arrived at via [A].73  As we will see in the next chapter, Aquinas argues 
that being and goodness are really identical, but conceptually distinct: they are inseparable in 
                                                 
69 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q.5, a.1.   
70 Cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1094a1.   
71 See his Commentary on the Metaphysics II, where he makes the connection between the ratio of the good and the 
ratio of the end explicit: “Eadem enim ratio boni et finis est, nam bonum est quod omnia appertunt.”  
72 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q.5, a.1.  “unde manifestum est quod intantum est aliduid bonum, inquantum est 
ens, esse enim est actualitas omnis rei.” See also Summa Theologiae I, q.3,a.4 and Summa Theologiae I, q.4,a1.   
73 In Summa Theologiae I, q.5, a.3, Aquinas draws this conclusion as follows: “Every being, insofar as it is a being, 
is good.  For every being, in so far as it is a being is in actuality, and in a certain manner, perfect: for every act 
implies some amount of perfection.  But perfection has the notion of desirability and goodness…and so it follows 
that every being, insofar as it is a being, is good.”      
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reality, but separable in the mind. 
Up until this point, this approach has been distinctly a nature approach to goodness.  
However, Aquinas actually synthesizes the two traditions in at least two ways.  First, since 
goodness is equated with an end, and God is the ultimate end of all creatures, creaturely 
goodness must ultimately be explained in terms of the First Good.  In his commentary on De 
Hebdomadibus, Aquinas agrees with Boethius that created goods are good by their “stance” 
toward the first good, which Aquinas interprets as a cause.74  In De Veritate XXI.5, Aquinas 
argues that goodness has the character of a final cause, which is God, since he is the ultimate 
end.  He concludes that good cannot be said of a creature unless we presuppose the relation of 
Creator to creature.75  Second, Aquinas understands God’s act of creating as aimed at an end, and 
all things imitate or participate in God in so far as they act for the sake of ends as the fulfillment 
of their own potentialities and thus are like God in a certain respect.76  For example, in his 
Commentary on the Sentences, he writes, “It should be said that whatever things are good, only 
have their goodness insofar as they constitute a resemblance to divine goodness. And so it is 
fitting that when goodness is the ratio of delight and desire, all things are loved in order to the 
                                                 
74 Aquinas, Commentary on De Hebdomadibus.   
75 Aquinas, De Veritate, XXI.5. See Summa Theologiae I q.6 a.2, Aquinas connects Boethius’s metaphorical 
language of goodness “flowing” from the first good to created goods with the Aristotelian notion of desirability and 
perfection: “For Good is attributed to God…insofar as all desired perfections flow (effluuo) from him as from the 
first cause.”   
76 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q.6, a.1. “To be good belongs chiefly to God.  For something is good according to 
its desirableness. But everything desires its own perfection.   But the perfection and form of an effect consists in a 
certain likeness of an agent, since every agent brings about something similar to itself.  And so the agent itself is 
desirable and has the nature of the good, for that thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its likeness.  
Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of all things, it is obvious that the aspect of goodness and 
desirableness belong to him.”  In De Veritate XXI.4, he claims “Every agent is found to cause something similar to 
itself.  And so if the first good is the effective cause of all good things, then it is necessary that his likeness is 
imprinted in the things produced.  And so everything will be called good as an inherent form because of a similitude 
to the highest good implanted in it, and also because the first good is the exemplar effective cause of all created 
goodness.”  Translations mine.  
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first good.”77 
Thus Aquinas synthesizes the Aristotelian nature approach with the Boethian creation 
approach: good is connected with the notion of an end, and all things are good in so far as they 
perfect their nature with respect to their end.  But since God is the ultimate end of all creatures, 
creaturely goodness depends upon God as the First Good, ultimate end, and final perfection of 
creaturely natures.  And in so far as we act for the sake of an end, we imitate divine goodness in 
creation.  As will we see in this introduction and over the course of this dissertation, Duns Scotus 
is also a synthesizer of sorts; however, Scotus synthesizes the Augustinian and Aristotelian 
nature approaches while at the same time breaking with the tradition in an important respect.   
Scotus on Being and Goodness 
Fundamental to Scotus’s account of the relation between being and goodness is his 
distinction between two types of goodness: primary (essential) and secondary (accidental).  As 
we will see, in one sense, Scotus’s account of being and goodness fits perfectly in the tradition, 
for there is a necessary connection between primary goodness and being, since primary goodness 
is a proper attribute of being and is coextensive with it: goodness, like being, transcends the 
categories and so everywhere that being is found, there too will goodness be.78  On this score, 
Scotus fits within the Augustinian nature approach, interpreted through the Aristotelian 
categories: he conceives goodness as mapping onto the grade of being an entity has, so that the 
more being an entity has, the more goodness it will have.79  Goodness is also interpreted in terms 
                                                 
77 Aquinas, Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, ed. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929) I, d.1, q.3, a.1. Respondeo dicendum, 
quod quaecumque sunt bona, non habent bonitatem nisi inquantum accedunt ad similitudinem bonitatis divinae. 
Unde oportet, cum bonitas sit ratio dilectionis et desiderii, ut omnia amentur in ordine ad bonitatem primam.  See 
also Super Sent., I, d.8, q.2, a.2:  Aeternitas enim non est nobilior quam bonitas. Sed bonitas communicatur cum 
creaturis, ita quod a bono Deo creatura sit bona. Ergo videtur quod similiter aeternitas, ut alia ab ipso sint aeterna. 
78 Ordinatio I, d.8, pars 1, q.3.   
79 Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un., n.28.   
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of the perfection of an entity, and the perfection of an entity with respect to its primary goodness 
will be its form or being.80  Thus being and goodness are found in every category of being,81 and 
so everything that exists, in so far as it has being, will be good.  So in this sense Scotus agrees 
with tradition in terms of [B], providing an Augustinian nature approach of [A] in support of [B].   
However, as we will see in the next chapter, Scotus has a novel way of explaining the necessary 
connection between being and goodness.  Prior to Scotus, being and goodness were seen as 
conceptually distinct.  In contrast, Scotus argues they are formally distinct.  In doing so Scotus 
provides a new justification for [B] through his unique conception of [A]. 
Yet Scotus thinks that something can be perfected in two ways: one with respect to its 
form, one with respect to its end.82  And since goodness and perfection are the same, something 
can be good in two ways—one with respect to its form and one with respect to its end.83  
According to Scotus, the secondary or accidental goodness of an entity is explained in terms of 
the end, and other factors.84  Here, Scotus implements an Aristotelian nature approach that 
explains the goodness of an entity with the fulfillment of certain ends or goals delimited by the 
entity’s nature.  But as we will see in the following chapters, Scotus denies that this type of 
goodness is convertible with being.85 
Furthermore, while it is the case that the end plays a central role in the secondary 
perfection of something and thereby contributes substantially to its secondary goodness, Scotus 
                                                 
80 Ordinatio IV, d.31, q.un, n.13; Reportatio II, d.34, n.3 (Wadding).  
81 Ordinatio I, d.3, pars 1, q.3, n.134; Ordinatio III, d. 8, q. un., n.50; Ordinatio I, d.8, pars 1, q.3.   
82 Reportatio II, d.34,n.3 (Wadding);  Ordinatio IV, d.31, q.un., n.13.   
83 Ordinatio IV, d.31, q.un, n.13; Reportatio II, d.34, n.3 (Wadding).  
84 However, as it will become clear later in the dissertation, the only rational end that our nature directs us toward is 
the Infinite Good.   Whatever other obligations we have will be supplied by God’s will.   
85 Ordinatio II, d.40, q.un, nn.7-8; Ordinatio I, d.17, pars.1, q.1-2, n.55. 
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thinks that the fulfillment of the end alone isn’t sufficient for secondary goodness,86 partially 
because this goodness isn’t simply about an agent perfecting or actualizing his or her nature, but 
about what makes an act metaphysically good,87 and partially because Scotus thinks this type of 
goodness isn’t an absolute quality that maps onto being, but a relational notion that involves the 
harmony between a of number of conditions.88            
Secondary goodness, of which moral goodness is a species, is a relation between an act 
judged by right reason to conform to a number of circumstances, including the end, the manner, 
the time and the place.89  None of these alone is sufficient for an act to be morally good—not 
even the end.90  Whatever the reasons are that Scotus still wants to connect secondary goodness 
with perfection and end, Scotus’s denial that secondary goodness is necessarily connected with 
being breaks the intimate connection between being and being good held so dear by some of his 
medieval predecessors—at least in the sense of being good morally.  However, I will argue that 
the novelty of this distinction does not belong to Scotus, but to Peter Lombard and his 
followers—Peter or Poitiers, Philip the Chancellor, and Albert the Great.   
But before we see this, we must examine in detail Scotus’s conception of primary 
goodness and its relationship to being (chapters 2-3).  And here, Scotus holds a formal 
distinction between being and good, and uses his formal distinction in his account of [A] to 
explain and justify [B]—but in a manner slightly different from the previous tradition (chapter 
2).  Furthermore, Scotus argues that being comes in degrees of perfection, and so too does 
                                                 
86 Ordinatio II, d.40 q.un, nn.7-10; See also Ordinatio I, d.48, q.un., n.5. 
87 Quodlibet 18.1; Ordinatio I, d.17 pars.1, q.1-2, n.55; Ordinatio II, d.40, q.un, nn.7-10.  
88 Quodlibet 18.1; Ordinatio I, d.17; Ordinatio II, d.40. q.un, nn.7-10.    
89 Quodlibet 18.1. 
90 Ordinatio II, d. 40 q.un, nn.7-10.  
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goodness that necessarily supervenes upon being.  In doing so, Scotus holds an Augustinian 
nature approach to being and goodness interpreted in Aristotelian language, and devoid of many 
of the Neoplatonic elements (chapter 3).   
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THE CONVERTIBILITY OF BEING AND GOOD AND THE NATURE OF THE 
TRANSCENDENTALS  
 
 
Medieval philosophers generally thought that being and goodness were transcendental 
and convertible.  As transcendentals, they transcend Aristotle’s categories.  As convertible, they 
are extensionally equivalent.  On the traditional account (exemplified by Philip the Chancellor, 
Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas), being and good differ in concept but are identical in 
reference.  When taken extensionally, being and good are convertible or interchangeable.  Thus, 
[B] is often justified by a particular account of [A]; namely, being and good are really identical 
and only conceptually distinct—a mind-dependent distinction.  John Duns Scotus also claims 
that being and good are convertible; however, he insists that there is more than simply a 
conceptual distinction between them: good is a proper attribute of being, and as such, is formally 
distinct from it.  This chapter explores the implications of positing a formal distinction between 
being and good for the notion of convertibility, and subsequently, the two distinct 
justifications—what I’ll call “the conceptual account” and “the formal account”—for the claim 
that “everything that exists, is good.”  What’s at stake in this chapter is not the nature versus 
creation approaches per se, but various ways medievals—all working under various versions of 
the nature and creation accounts—justified [B]. 
On the traditional account, being and good are really identical but conceptually distinct.  
Scotus, however, posits a real identity and formal distinction, which amounts to necessary 
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coextension and not interchangeability in the strict sense.  Given this, one might think that 
Scotus departs substantially from the traditional account of convertibility.  I will argue, however, 
that both Scotus and the traditional account offer a deflationary description of convertibility: 
being and good are interchangeable only in the sense that they are necessarily coextensive 
concepts, although Scotus and the traditional account give different arguments for this necessary 
coextension.  For the tradition, convertibility amounts to necessary coextension.  For Scotus, of 
whatever being is predicated in quid, goodness is predicated in quale—as a coextensive attribute 
of being.  I conclude that when the referents of being and good are considered, both views 
amount to the same thing. When the concepts of being and good are considered, however, 
positing a formal distinction does make a good deal of difference, and a substantially distinct 
reason for the necessary connection between being and good.     
The Convertibility of Being and Good  
Scotus defines a transcendental as “whatever is not contained under any genus.”91  Four 
types of concepts fit this definition: (1) being, (2) proper attributes of being (one, true, good), (3)  
disjunctive attributes (such as infinite-or-finite, necessary-or-contingent), and (4) the “pure 
perfections,” which are attributes that are better to have than not to have.92  Scotus thinks that 
‘being’ is the first transcendental and is univocally predicated of everything of which it can be 
predicated in quid.  Being is an unqualifiedly simple (simpliciter simplex) concept that cannot be 
broken down or explained in terms of something more fundamental; every other concept 
presupposes the concept of being and cannot be conceived apart from being, while being can be 
                                                 
91 Ordinatio I, d.8, pars1, q.3, n.114.  “transcendens quodcumque nullum habet genus sub quo contineatur.” 
92 Ordinatio I, d.8, pars1, q.3, n.114.  A. Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of 
Duns Scotus (St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1946), 10-11 
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conceived distinctly without the aid of another concept.93   
Scotus describes ‘good,’ ‘one,’ and ‘true’ as proper attributes (passiones) of being.94  A 
proper attribute is formally distinct from its subject. The formal distinction falls in between a real 
distinction and a conceptual distinction: two realities are formally distinct when they are really 
identical but have different rationes rooted in some aspect of the thing itself.95  Two realities are 
really identical if and only if they are really inseparable. Thus, for any x and y, 
(RI)     x and y are really identical = df. (a) it is logically impossible that x exist in reality 
without y; and (b) it is logically impossible that y exist in reality without x.96    
Conversely, two realities are really distinct if and only if they are capable of separate 
existence, at least by divine power.  So, for any x and y, 
(RD)    x and y are really distinct = df. (a) it is possible (at least by divine power) that x 
exists in reality without y; and (b) it is possible (at least by divine power) that y 
exists in reality without x. 
So the medieval test for numerical identity is not complete sameness but inseparability.  
Once this is established, then we can further ask whether they are completely the same.  If we 
can think about the same thing in different ways, or form distinct concepts about it, the aspects of 
that thing are conceptually distinct.  Precisely, two realities are conceptually distinct when they 
are really identical (RI) and the distinction is caused by the mind alone.  So, for any x and y,  
                                                 
93 Ordinatio I, d.3, q.2. “Alius est conceptus simpliciter simplex, et alius est conceptus simplex, qui non est 
simpliciter simplex.  Conceptum simpliciter simplicem voco, qui non est resolubilis in plures conceptus, ut 
conceptus entis et ultimate differentiae.  Conceptus simplex, sed non tamen simpliciter simplex, est quicumque 
potest concipi ab intellectu actu simplicis intelligentiae, licet possit resolve in plures conceptus seorsum 
conceptibiles, sicut est conceptus definiti, vel speciei.” And, “Ens autem non potest concipi nisi distincte, quia habet 
conceptum simpliciter simplicem; ergo, potest ens est primus conceptus distincte conceptibilis.”  
94 See for example Quaestiones super Metaphysicorum Aristotelis VI, q.3, n.20; Odinatio II, d.1, q.4-5, n.273, and 
Reportatio II A, d.16.   
95 See Ordinatio I, d.8, p.1, q.4, n.193.   
96 Scotus thinks that real inseparability is both necessary for real identity (Ordinatio II, d.1, q.4-5, n.200-202) and 
sufficient for real identity (see Quodlibet 3, n.15).   See Peter King, “Scotus on Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Scotus ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 22-24; and Richard 
Cross, Duns Scotus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 149.   
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(CD)    x and y are conceptually distinct =df.  (1) x and y satisfy the conditions of (RI); 
and (2) x and y are only distinct insofar as (a) some mind has some concept that 
applies to x and not y; and (b) some mind has some concept that applies to y and 
not x. 
In other words, while x and y necessarily refer to the same reality, it is possible for the mind to 
conceive x without conceiving y, and conversely.  Hence they are inseparable in reality, but 
separable in the mind.  Morning Star and Evening Star, for example, are distinct concepts, but 
the terms ‘Morning Star’ and ‘Evening Star’ are extensionally equivalent: they refer to the same 
reality, namely, Venus.   
In contrast, two realities are formally distinct when they are really identical, but not 
entirely the same, and the difference between the two realities is not mind-dependent.  So, for 
any x and y,  
(FD)    x and y are formally distinct = df. (1) x and y satisfy the conditions of (RI); and (2) 
(a) the ratio of x does not include the ratio of y; and (b) the ratio of y does not 
include the ratio of x; and (3) (a) the ratio of x would not include the ratio of y 
and (b) the ratio of y would not include the ratio of x, even if there were no minds 
thinking about x and y.97   
Although two formally distinct realities are existentially inseparable, they have different 
rationes, not because the intellect thinks of the same thing in different ways, but because the 
                                                 
97 In “Ockham on Identity and Distinction” Marilyn Adams formulates clause (2) of Scotus’s formal distinction in 
the following way: “if x and y are capable of definition, the definition of x does not include y and the definition of y 
does not include x; and (3) if x and y are not capable of definition, then if they were capable of definition, then 
definition of x would not include y and the definition of y would not include x.”  Scotus too formulates the formal 
distinction in this way at times (See Ordinatio I, d.8, p.1, q.4, n.193).  On her schematization of the formal 
distinction, being and good would fall under clause (3) since they are incapable of a real definition in terms of 
Aristotelian classification—in terms of a genus, species, and differentia.  But then (3) is completely unhelpful in 
determining the relationship between being and goodness, since it would simply claim that if being and goodness 
were definable, the definition of being would not be included in the definition of good and vice versa.  It is helpful 
here to follow Peter King in noting that all definitions are rationes, but not all rationes are definitions.  Something 
can lack a real Aristotelian definition while still having a set of characteristics that make it what it is—i.e., a ratio.   
So instead of formulating the formal distinction in terms of definitions, I have formulated it in terms of rationes.  
See King, “Scotus on Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Scotus, 23; Adams, “Ockham on Identity and 
Distinction,” Franciscan Studies 36 (1976), 5-74.   
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intellect discovers a formal difference in the thing itself.98  In other words, while two formally 
distinct concepts refer to exactly the same reality, something about each thing’s respective ratio 
enables the mind to distinguish them.  And this distinction is not mind-dependent, but a feature 
of the thing itself (ex parte rei).99  On Scotus’s account, “two really identical but formally 
distinct realities will be something like distinct essential (i.e., inseparable) properties of a 
thing.”100  Since this formal distinction applies to being and its proper attributes,101 being and 
good are really identical in the sense that they are existentially inseparable and so ‘being’ and 
‘good’ refer to the same reality, but at the same time, something about that reality that allows the 
mind to distinguish its goodness from its being, and such a distinction would exist, even if there 
were no minds doing the distinguishing.102 
On the traditional account, as we will see, being and good are really identical (RI), but 
conceptually distinct (CD).  Scotus, however, posits a real identity and formal non-identity (FD).  
What are the implications of positing the formal distinction between being and good for the 
medieval doctrine of convertibility?  In other words, what substantive difference does it make 
when being and good are formally rather than conceptually distinct?  Well, to see this, we need 
                                                 
98 Ordinatio I, d.8, pars 1, q.4, n.193.  Richard Cross helpfully adds that “The formal distinction is the kind of 
distinction that obtains between (inseparable) properties on the assumption that nominalism about properties is 
false.”  See Cross, Duns Scotus On God (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005), 108.   
99 See Ordinatio I, d.8, pars 1, q.4, nn.172-193.   
100 Richard Cross, Duns Scotus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 149.   
101 Ordinatio III, d. 8, q. un., n.50.  “licet enim entitati absolutae sit idem realiter veritas et bonitas, et huic entitati 
haec veritas et haec bonitas, non tamen formaliter et quiditative, quia veritas et bonitas sunt quasi passiones entis, IV 
Metaphysicae.  Ita in realitate a qua accipitur genus et a qua accipitur differentia, et similiter de quiditate et de 
entitate individuali, et de aliis multis, de quibus frequenter tactum est de ista differentia ex parte rei, qua haec 
realitas non est formaliter illa, licet sit identice illa.”  See also Ordinatio I, d.3, pars 1, q.3, n.134: Following 
Aristotle, Scotus claims that just as lines and numbers contain proper attributes in virtue of being a line or a number, 
so also being contains proper attributes.     
102 Ordinatio I, d.2, pars 2, q.1-4, n. 390: “Et Intelligo sic ‘realiter,’ quod nullo modo per actum intellectus 
considerantis, immo quod talis entitas esset ibi si nullus intellectus esset considerans; et sic esse ibi, si nullus 
intellectus consideraret, ‘dico esse ante omnem actum intellectus.’”  
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to consider the leading accounts of the convertibility of being and goodness prior to Scotus.  
The Traditional Account of Convertibility  
Positing goodness and the like as necessary attributes of being formally distinct from it 
seems like a radical departure from the traditional account of convertibility.  And in some ways it 
certainly is.  However, as we will see, even on the conceptual account—exemplified by Philip, 
Albert, and Aquinas—the interchangeability of being and good really amounts to necessary 
coextension.  Let’s consider each of their accounts in turn.   
Philip the Chancellor 
Philip the Chancellor was the first to clearly articulate the doctrine of the transcendentals, 
and the first to devote an entire Summa to the topic of goodness.  In the first question of his 
Summa de Bono, Philip considers the comparison between being and good.  He begins by noting 
that even though being and good defy formal definition within the Aristotelian categorical 
system, these transcendental concepts can nevertheless be given certain descriptions 
(notificationes).  He argues for this in the following way: “good and being are interchangeable, 
because whatever is a being is good and the converse.  But being does not have a definitional 
account.  Therefore neither does good.”103  Being cannot be defined on an Aristotelian 
classificatory system because providing proper definitions involves giving a species, genus, and 
differentia—which can’t be given for being since it belongs to what Philip calls the 
“communissima.”  And since good is interchangeable with being, good also lacks a proper 
Aristotelian definition.   
                                                 
103 Philip the Chancellor, Philippi Cancellarii Summa de Bono, ed. Nicolai Wicki (Bern: Franke, 1985), 5, L: 2-4:  
“Bonum et ens convertuntur, quia quidquid est ens, est bonum et e converso.  Sed ens rationem non habet 
diffinitivam; ergo nec bonum.”   
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Nevertheless, Philip insists that three descriptions do apply to good, citing various 
authorities for each.  First, good can be described as an end or what is desired.  Second, good can 
be described as what multiplies or diffuses being.  Third, good can be described as the indivision 
of actuality from potentiality, either simpliciter or in some respect.104  Philip then argues that this 
third description is primary; thus God is the highest good since he is pure actuality, whereas 
creatures are good in some respect since they have a certain degree of actuality mixed with 
potentiality.  In his argument that being and good cannot be given a definitional account, Philip 
presupposes the convertibility of being and good.  If we look carefully at his reason for claiming 
that being and good are convertible, he says that they are convertible or interchangeable 
“because whatever is a being is good and the converse.”  In other words, Philip appeals to 
coextension as the grounding for interchangeability.   
Later in question 1 of the Prologue, Philip argues that describing good in terms of being 
does not prevent the convertibility of being and good.  He reasons that even though they are 
convertible in regard to the content and extent of their referents, good exceeds being 
conceptually, since goodness is indivisible from an end or actuality, which Philip calls 
“completion.”105  Here we see the beginning of the classic formulation of the relationship 
between being and good: they are conceptually distinct because they have different descriptions 
and meanings, but they refer to the same reality.  Notice once again, Philip expresses 
convertibility in terms of identity of reference and coextension: whatever referent has being will 
                                                 
104 Summa de Bono, 6, L: 17-22: “Habet autem notificationes quasdam, quia iuxta beatum Dionusium ‘bonum est 
quod desideratur ab omnibus’ et Aristoteles: ‘Omnia bonum exoptant.’  Item, de verbis beati Dionysii in libro De 
Divinis Nominibus in principio tractatus de bono potest hec extrahi: ‘Bonum est multiplicativum  aut diffusivum 
esse.’  Item, alia extrahitur ab Aristotele et aliis philosophis: ‘Bonum est habens indivisionem actus a potential 
simpliciter vel quodam modo.’” 
105 Summa de Bono, 8, L: 60-63: “Bonum et ens converti non impedit quin notificetur per ens, quia licet convertantur 
quantum ad continentiam et ambitum suppositorum, bonum tamen habundat ratione super ens, scilicet per hoc quod 
est indivisum a fine vel actu, qui dicitur complementum.” 
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also have goodness.  
Scott Macdonald notes that this is the first time that the concepts of being and good are 
distinguished from the referents of being and good:  “When the distinction has been drawn, the 
problem of the relation between being and goodness divides into the problem of the relation 
between the concepts and the problem of the relation between the referents of being and 
good.”106  The concepts of being and good are not convertible, since the concept of ‘good’ 
conceptually adds to being the notion of indivision of actuality from potentiality.  With respect to 
the referents, Philip envisions at least two ways of arguing that being and good have the same 
referents,107 and in both cases, his approach amounts to necessary coextension.   
The first approach appeals to the description of good in terms of actuality and 
completion.  As we have seen, Philip claimed being and good are referentially interchangeable 
because whatever is a being is good and conversely.  He then explained the description of the 
good in terms of actuality or completeness.  And since everything that exists has a certain degree 
of actuality, everything that exists is good in some respect. This is why when Philip claims that 
being and good are convertible, he appeals to their coextensive nature: whatever is a being has 
goodness and whatever has goodness is a being—since goodness denotes completion or 
actualization of a nature, which everything that exists has in some respect.  So interchangeability 
in reference amounts to necessary coextension.  
In the second approach, Philip explains why being and good have the same referents by 
an appeal to the notion of an end and final cause.  In question 7 of the Prologue, Philip discusses 
                                                 
106 See Scott MacDonald, The Metaphysics of Goodness in Medieval Philosophy Before Aquinas, 229.   In support of 
this, Macdonald cites Pouillon, “Le premier traite des proprietas transcendentales: La ‘Summa de bono’ du 
Chancelier Philippe,” Revue Neoscolastique de Philosophie 42 (1939), 51.   
107 MacDonald,  The Metaphysics of Goodness in Medieval Philosophy Before Aquinas, 229.  Cf. Summa de Bono, 
q.1 (5-8) and q.7 (26-27).   
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the flowing of things from the first good.  He begins by citing a problem raised by Boethius in 
the de Hebdomadibus: if all things flow from the nature of the first being because of his 
goodness, then why it is in accordance with the first being’s goodness—and not his justice or 
other attributes—that all things exist.  He responds:  
There are three characteristics concomitant with being: unity, truth, and goodness.  But 
unity is the first of these, truth second, and good third; for the efficient, formal and final 
causes can coincide in the same thing, but not the material cause.  Hence each essence, 
having these three kinds of causes, has three characteristics which are concomitant with its 
being, insofar as it is from the first being: from the first being qua ‘one’, every being is 
made one, from the first being qua ‘formal exemplar cause,’ every being is made true, from 
the first being qua ‘final cause,’ every being is made good.108  
Philip then argues that while one adds nothing to being except indivision, true and good 
do add something to being beyond indivision; namely, the notions of formal and final cause, 
respectively.109  Thus good is concomitant with being because everything that has being exists 
from God’s causal activity and is thus ordered to him as its final cause—which constitutes the 
thing’s goodness.  So in both of Philip’s explanations of why being and good are identical in 
reference, he appeals to their coextensiveness.  But on both accounts, he also claims that the 
concepts of being and good differ.  Thus in his defense of [B], he offers two approaches to [A], 
both assuming a real identity and conceptual difference between being and good.   
Albert the Great           
Albert the Great offers a similar account of interchangeability in the Sentences I, d.1, 
                                                 
108 Philip the Chancellor, Summa De Bono, 26-27, L:15-21: “ad hoc dicendum est quod sunt tres conditiones 
concomitantes esse: unitas, veritas, bonitas.  Unitas autem est prima illarum, secunda vertias, tertia bonitas; in idem 
enim possunt concidere efficiens, formalis, et finalis, sed materialis non.  Unde unaqueque essentia habens has tres 
rationes causarum tres habet conditiones que concomitantur esse eius secundum quod est a primo ente, ut a primo 
ente secundum rationem unius efficiatur unumquodque ens unum, ab ipso secundum quod est causa formalis 
exemplaris verum, secundum quod est finalis bonum.”  
109 Summa de Bono, 27, L: 26-28: “Sed non est sic de vero et bono, quia utrumque ponit in sui ratione preter 
indivision rationem alicuius cause, ut verum formalis, bonum finalis.”   
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a.20.  There he asks the question “whether everything which exists is good insofar as it has 
being.”  In his solution, he states that being and good can be considered in two different ways; 
either conceptually or extensionally.110  If considered conceptually, then (1) being is not 
convertible with good and (2) the dictum “everything which exists is good insofar as it has 
being” will be false.111  However,   
If being and good are considered extensionally, they are thus convertible: because although 
good concerns an agent insofar as he is good, and being concerns an agent insofar as he is a 
being, nevertheless because the agent acts only for an intended good, good therefore 
accompanies being itself and is not separated from it extensionally, even though it is 
separate conceptually: and the expression ‘insofar as’ [in the statement “everything which 
exists is good insofar as it has being”] indicates this extensional identity.112    
When Albert explains the sense in which being and good are convertible in the above passage, he 
claims that they cannot be separated extensionally—whatever has being, is also good.  So on 
Albert’s account, convertibility really amounts to necessary coextension.  Any stronger sense of 
interchangeability is precluded by the fact that being and good differ in their respective ratio; in 
other words, they are conceptually distinct: ‘good’ means something different from ‘being,’ even 
though they refer to the same reality.   
This is further confirmed from two passages in Albert’s Summa De Bono.  First, in 
addressing the same question—“whether everything which exists is good in so far as it has 
being”—Albert responds with the following comments:  
For every created good flows from the first good, insofar as he is an agent having within 
himself an end through an intention.  And on account of this, the being of a created thing is 
                                                 
110 Albertus Magnus, Sentences I, d.1, a.20: “Dicendum, quod bonum et ens dupliciter considerari possunt, scilicet 
secundum suas intentiones, vel secundum sua supposita.”  
111 Sentences I, d.1, a.20.  “Si considerentur secundum suas intentiones, tunc non convertuntur, nec erit verum quod 
omne quod est in quantum est, bonum est.” 
112Sentences I, D.1, a.20: “Si autem considerentur bonum et ens secundum supposita, sic convertuntur: quia licet 
bonum sit ad efficiens ut est bonum, et ens ad efficiens ut est ens, tamen quia non operator efficiens nisi per bonum 
semper ipsum ens, et non separator ab ipso secundum suppositum, licet separetur secundum intentionem: et hanc 
identitatem suppositorum notat quod dicitur ‘in quantum.’” 
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never separate from the notion of good, and nevertheless, for a created thing ‘being’ is not 
the same as ‘being good,’ because being is from an agent and good is from the end moving 
the agent.  And this is what Boethius says, that what is good [is such] because it is from the 
good, and being good is not the same as being, but is a necessary consequent of being, 
which is only separable from being by the intellect alone.113 
Albert contends that being and good do not exist apart from one another but are necessarily 
coextensive, although each has a different concept or ratio formed on the part of the intellect.   
He goes on to claim that the phrase “everything that exists is good insofar as it has being” has 
two different meanings: “this can mean two things, in virtue of the fact that the phrase ‘insofar 
as’ can denote the identity of the concepts (intentiones) of being and good, and taken in such a 
way the expression will be false, or it can note the identity or agreement of the referents, and so 
the expression will be true.”114  If the meaning is the latter, the statement is true because what-is 
and what-is-good will necessarily have the same referent.      
 In another passage of the Summa de Bono, Albert directly asks whether good is 
convertible with being.  There he considers the relationship between being and good in three 
different ways: in one way being is prior to good, in another way good is prior to being, and in a 
third way they are interchangeable.115  If the concepts of being and good are considered, then 
being is prior to goodness.  The reason, according to Albert, is that the concept of being is the 
simplest concept and cannot be broken down or analyzed in terms of something conceptually 
                                                 
113 Albertus Magnus, Summa De Bono (Aschendorff, 1959) , tr.1, q.1, a.7.  “Omne enim bonum creatum fluxit a 
bono primo, inquantum ipsum est efficiens in se habens finem per intentionem.  Et propter hoc esse creati numquam 
absolvitur a ratione boni, et tamen non est sibi idem esse quod bonum esse, quia esse est ab efficiente et bonum a 
fine movente efficientem.  Et hoc est quod dicit Boethius, quod bonum est, quia est a bono, et bonum esse non est 
idem quod esse, sed necessarium consequens ad esse, quod non est separabile ad ipso nisi intellectu solum…”  
114 Summa De Bono, tr.1, q.1, a.7. “Similiter cum dicitur: ‘omne quod est, inquantum est, bonum est’, haec est 
duplex ex eo quod li ‘inquantum’ potest denotare identitatem intentionis entis et boni, et sic falsa erit locution, vel 
potest notare identitatem suppositi vel convenientiam, et vera erit.” 
115 Summa De Bono, tr.1, q.1, a.6: “Solutio: Decendum, quod bonum uno modo est posterius ente et secundo modo 
est ante ipsum et tertio modo convertitur cum ipso.” 
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prior to it.  Goodness, however, can be analyzed in terms of something more fundamental; 
namely, being related to an end.116  Second, goodness is prior to being when the goodness 
considered is God’s and the being under consideration is a creature’s.117  Third, if being and 
good are considered extensionally or according to their referents, “then good and being are 
convertible because there is nothing which is not good either perfectly or imperfectly.”118  So 
when being and good are considered according to their referents, they are in fact interchangeable 
because they are necessarily coextensive—nothing that exists lacks the corresponding goodness.  
So the sense in which Albert uses the term ‘convertible’ is with respect to the referents of being 
and good, such that their convertibility amounts to necessarily coextension.  So throughout his 
discussion, Albert distinguishes the identity of the referents of being and good from the concepts 
of being and good.  As such, being and good are really identical (in what they refer to), but 
conceptually distinct.      
Thomas Aquinas  
In support of the necessary connection between being and goodness, Aquinas contends 
that being and good are convertible because they are the same in reality and differ only in 
sense.119  Aquinas claims that the ratio of goodness is that of desirability.  But a thing is 
desirable only insofar as it is perfect (perfectum), and everything desires its own perfection.  
                                                 
116 Summa De Bono, tr.1, q.1, a.6. “Si enim consideretur intentio boni et intentio entis, in unoquoque ens erit 
creatum primum et causa primaria, et bonum erit per informationem in ente et secundum.  Intentio enim entis est 
intentio simplicissimi, quod non est resolvere ad aliquid, quod sit ante ipsum secundum rationem. Bonum autem 
resolvere est in ens relatum ad finem.” 
117 Summa De Bono, tr.1, q.1, a.6. “Si vero considerentur bonum et ens non in quocumque, sed bonum in causa 
prima et ens in creatis, sic ens erit posterius bono.”  
118 Summa De Bono, tr.1, q.1, a.6:  “Si autem terio modo considerentur bonum et ens, scilicet secundum supposita, 
ut scilicet consideretur id quod est ens, et id quod est bonum, tunc bonum et ens convertuntur, quia nihil est, quod 
non sit bonum vel perfecte vel imperfecte…” 
119 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae  I, q.5, a.1.   
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Something is perfect or complete only in so far as it is actual, where actuality implies the 
fulfillment (perfectio) of a thing’s potentialities.  But being or existence is what makes 
something actual; therefore, something is perfect only insofar as it is actual.120  Thus ‘to be’ is to 
be in actuality, and actuality is the completeness or perfection of the thing, and this perfection is 
its goodness.  Since every being has some degree of actuality, it has a certain amount of 
perfection and thus has a certain amount of goodness.  Hence goodness and being are the same in 
referent, although the ratio of each concept differs. 
What kind of relation holds between the concepts of being and goodness?  His clearest 
articulation of this is found in De Veritate XXI, a.1, where he asks whether ‘good’ adds anything 
to ‘being.’  In reply, Aquinas notes that something can be added to something else in three ways: 
(1) accidentally, (2) in a limiting or determining manner, or (3) conceptually.121  Something is 
added to a thing accidentally when something outside the essence of the thing is added to it, as 
when the color whiteness is added to a body.  Something is added in a limiting manner when it 
makes some further specification within a class or genus.  For example, ‘rational’ adds 
something to the concept of animal: it belongs to the concept of animal to have a soul, but the 
concept is indeterminate with respect to whether that soul is rational or non-rational.  Hence 
adding ‘rational’ to the concept of ‘animal’ limits and determines the concept.  Finally, 
something is added conceptually when the addition is completely on the part of the mind.   
In which sense of “adds” does the concept of goodness add something (i.e., desirability) 
to being?  Aquinas argues that goodness only adds something to being conceptually:  
(1) Something can be added to another thing in only three ways: accidentally, in a 
limiting manner, or conceptually.  
                                                 
120 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q.5, a.1.  “unde manifestum est quod intantum est aliduid bonum, inquantum est 
ens, esse enim est actualitas omnis rei.” See also Summa Theologiae I, q.3,a.4 and Summa Theologiae I, q.4,a1.   
121 Aquinas, De Veritate XXI.1.  
50 
 
(2) Good cannot accidentally add anything to being.  
(3) Good cannot add anything to being in a limiting manner.  
(4) Therefore, either good adds nothing to being or it adds something to being 
conceptually.  
(5) It is not the case that good adds nothing to being.  
(6) Therefore, good adds something to being conceptually.122 
 
In support of (2), Aquinas notes that accidents by their very nature add nothing to the 
being of a thing, and so goodness could not be an accidental property of being.  In support of (3), 
Aquinas admits that in certain cases this type of limiting and determining does add something to 
being, as was the case with the example of ‘rational’ to ‘animal.’  However, this happens only in 
the same category in which the limiting occurs—‘rational’ adds to the being of ‘animal’ in the 
category of substance.  To limit something in this manner requires the subject’s existence in one 
category.  In other words, these limits are further specifications of being within the ten categories 
themselves and thus cannot be the type of addition to being that goodness adds, for both being 
and goodness transcend the ten categories.123  Thus Aquinas concludes that good must either add 
nothing to being or add something to being only conceptually.   
In support of (5), Aquinas enlists Avicenna’s claim that being is the first thing that is 
conceived by the intellect, and hence “every other noun must either be a synonym of being or 
                                                 
122 De Veritate XXI.1: “Non autem potest esse quod super ens universale aliquid addat aliquid primo modo, quamvis 
illo modo possit fieri additio super aliquod ens particulare; nulla enim res naturae est quae sit extra essentiam entis 
universalis, quamvis aliqua res sit extra essentiam huius entis. Secundo autem modo inveniuntur aliqua addere super 
ens, quia ens contrahitur per decem genera, quorum unumquodque addit aliquid super ens; non quidem aliquod 
accidens, vel aliquam differentiam quae sit extra essentiam entis, sed determinatum modum essendi, qui fundatur in 
ipsa essentia rei. Sic autem bonum non addit aliquid super ens: cum bonum dividatur aequaliter in decem genera, ut 
ens, ut patet in I Ethicor: et ideo oportet quod vel nihil addat super ens, vel addat aliquid, quod sit in ratione tantum. 
Si enim adderet aliquid reale, oporteret quod per rationem boni contraheretur ens ad aliquod speciale genus. Cum 
autem ens sit id quod primo cadit in conceptione intellectus, ut Avicenna dicit, oportet quod omne aliud nomen vel 
sit synonymum enti: quod de bono dici non potest, cum non nugatorie dicatur ens bonum; vel addat aliquid ad minus 
secundum rationem; et sic oportet quod bonum, ex quo non contrahit ens, addat aliquid super ens, quod sit rationis 
tantum.” 
123 De Veritate XXI.1.   
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add something at least conceptually.”124  Thus goodness at least adds something to being 
conceptually.  Aquinas is quick to note, however, that something can be added conceptually in 
two ways: as a negation or a relation.  While ‘one’ adds a negation to being, ‘true’ and ‘good’ are 
predicated positively and thus must add a relation to being: good adds to being the relation of 
perfection, specifically with respect an end.  In the reply to the objections, Aquinas once again 
emphasizes that the relation between being and goodness is only a conceptual relation—not a 
real relation, because real relations are confined to only one category.  But if goodness is 
convertible with being, then it must—like being—transcend the categories.   
Given this, in what sense does Aquinas think that being and good are interchangeable?   
Aquinas specifically addresses the interchangeability of being and good in two places: his 
Commentary on the Sentences I d.8, q.1, a.3 and De Veritate XXI, a.2.   In the Sentences, 
Aquinas  argues that the names ‘being’, ‘one’, ‘true’, and ‘good’ can be compared to each other 
in two ways, either extensionally or conceptually.  When taken extensionally, he claims that they 
are (1) convertible with each other, (2) the same in referent, and (3) coextensive (nec unquam 
derelinquunt se).125   Do these three facts about the extensional relation of being and good 
amount to the same thing, or are they distinct claims?  The answer hinges on how Aquinas 
understands convertibility, identity of reference, and coextensiveness, for necessary coextension 
doesn’t necessarily imply convertibility, nor does it necessarily imply an identity of reference.  
Furthermore, the type of interchangeability of being and good isn’t one of interchangeability 
salva veritate, but only in terms of their referents.  In this early work, the relationship between 
                                                 
124 De Veritate XXI.1, trans. by James V. McGlynn, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953).  
125 Aquinas, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum  I, d.8,q.1, a.3, “Respondeo dicendum, quod ista nomina, ens et 
bonum, unum et verum, simpliciter secundum rationem intelligendi praecedunt alia divina nomina: quod patet ex 
eorum communitate. Si autem comparemus ea ad invicem, hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel secundum suppositum; et 
sic convertuntur ad invicem, et sunt idem in supposito, nec unquam derelinquunt se; vel secundum intentiones 
eorum; et sic simpliciter et absolute ens est prius aliis.” 
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convertibility, identity of reference, and coextensiveness is vague.     
In De Veritate XXI, a.2, Aquinas explains convertibility of being and good in terms of a 
necessary identity of referents because being and good are necessarily coextensive concepts.  
Here, he asks whether being and good are interchangeable according to their referents.126  He 
answers affirmatively, and his reply is instructive for understanding his notion of convertibility.  
Aquinas replies that the characteristic (ratio) of the good consists in perfecting one thing by 
means of an end, but everything which has the characteristic of the end, has the characteristic of 
good.  But there are two characteristics of an end: namely, that things that have not obtained the 
end desire it, and second, the end is loved as enjoyable by those things which participate in the 
end.127  Aquinas then claims that these two characteristics of an end belong to being itself, 
because things that do not participate in being tend toward it by a natural appetite, while those 
that presently possess being desire to love and preserve their being with all their power.128  In 
short, the ratio of good implies the ratio of being, since good is perfective of a thing with respect 
to an end, and the ratio of the end implies the ratio of being.    
That’s only one side of the coin: proving the necessary coextension of being and good by 
means of biconditional entailment, Aquinas must show that the concept of good implies the 
concept of being and also that the concept of being implies the concept of good.  In the current 
passage, Aquinas demonstrates that the concept of good implies the concept of being.  Yet 
                                                 
126 De Veritate XXI.2.  “Secundo quaeritur utrum ens et bonum convertantur secundum supposita.” 
127 De Veritate XXI.2: “Dicendum, quod cum ratio boni in hoc consistat quod aliquid sit perfectivum alterius per 
modum finis, omne illud quod invenitur habere rationem finis, habet etiam rationem boni. Duo autem sunt de ratione 
finis; ut scilicet sit appetitum vel desideratum ab his quae finem nondum attingunt, et ut sit dilectum, et quasi 
delectabile, ab his quae finem participant.” 
128 De Veritate XXI.2: “Haec autem duo inveniuntur competere ipsi esse. Quae enim nondum esse participant, in 
esse quodam naturali appetitu tendunt; unde et materia appetit formam, secundum philosophum in I Phys. Omnia 
autem quae iam esse habent, illud esse suum naturaliter amant, et ipsum tota virtute conservant…” 
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Aquinas simply asserts that being also entails the ratio of good.  We can, however, supply the 
argument from other passages of the Thomist corpus.  Briefly, ‘to be’ is to be in actuality, and 
actuality is the completeness or perfection of the thing, and this perfection is a thing’s 
goodness.129   
After asserting that the ratio of being implies the ratio of good, Aquinas claims “just as it 
is impossible that there is some being that does not have existence, so also it is necessary that 
every being is good from the fact that is has being.”130  And since the ratio of the good also 
implies the ratio of being, we have the appropriate biconditional entailment.  Aquinas concludes 
that “it is impossible for anything to be good that does not have being, and so it remains that 
good and being are convertible.”131  The reason Aquinas concludes that being and good are 
convertible is due to their necessary coextension, grounded in the biconditional entailment of 
their rationes.  So, interchangeability, identity of reference, and necessary coextension amount to 
the same thing: being and good are extensionally convertible concepts referring to the same 
reality, which Aquinas explains in terms of the reciprocally entailing nature of their two rationes. 
Consequently, what-is and what-is-good refer to all and only the same entities.  Hence, [B] is 
justified by a particular account of [A], the heart of which centers on the claim that being and 
good are really identical, but conceptual distinct.    
 
 
                                                 
129 See Summa Theologiae I, q.5, a.1.   
130 De Veritate XXI.2: “Ipsum igitur esse habet rationem boni. Unde sicut impossibile est quod sit aliquid ens quod 
non habeat esse, ita necesse est ut omne ens sit bonum ex hoc ipso quod esse habet;” 
131De Veritate XXI.2: “Cum autem bonum rationem entis includat, ut ex praedictis patet, impossibile est aliquid esse 
bonum quod non sit ens; et ita relinquitur quod bonum et ens convertantur.” 
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Scotus: Being and Good are Formally Distinct  
Scotus—like his predecessors—does claim that being and good are convertible;132 
however, Scotus posits a formal distinction between being and good rather than a conceptual 
distinction.  In order to appreciate this divergence, let’s first consider his distinction between in 
quid and in quale predication, and second, his doctrine of unitive containment.  Once we grasp 
these further distinctions, we will see that being and good are convertible in the sense that they 
are necessarily coextensive concepts.  In some ways this transforms the tradition; in other ways, 
the account remains very similar.    
Following Porphyry, Scotus conceives of two types of predication: in quid predication 
and in quale predication.  In in quid predication, the predicate expresses the essence of a thing 
(either its genus or its species); such predication answers the question “what is it?”  By contrast, 
in in quale predication, the predicate expresses some further qualification of the essence (such as 
a specific difference, property, or an accident); such predication answers the question “in what 
way is it?”133  These distinctions are nothing new.  However, in Ordinatio I, d.8, Scotus applies 
the language of quid/quale predication to the transcendental order itself.134   
There the passage concerns whether Aristotle teaches the doctrine of the transcendentals.  
In answering the question, Scotus proposes several of Aristotle’s teachings that imply he does.  
First, he claims that Aristotle says that truth and being are predicated univocally of both God and 
creatures.  Second, Aristotle teaches that if being is predicated of God, it will be predicated in 
quid.  Scotus concludes that Aristotle implicitly teaches (1) univocity of being and (2) that some 
                                                 
132Ordinatio I, d.1, pars 1, q.2, n.56. “Dico quod bonum uno modo convertitur cum ente, et isto modo potest poni in 
quolibet genere.”   
133 See Allan B. Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus, 79. 
134 See Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus, 81 and Ordinatio I, d.8, 
pars 1, q.3, n.126-127.  
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transcendental predications are said in quid—he has in mind ‘being’—while other transcendental 
predications are said in quale.  Scotus gives ‘true’ as an example of the latter.135  On this scheme, 
being is predicated in quid, while true, good, and one are predicated in quale.  Since the latter are 
coextensive attributes of being, of whatever being is predicated in quid—namely, everything that 
exists—truth, goodness, and unity will be predicated in quale.  Positing the former answers 
“what is it?” and so everything that exists will be a being; positing the latter describes the way 
something is,136 and so everything that exists will have the qualities of unity, truth, and goodness.  
So the proper attributes of being, such as goodness, are necessarily inseparable qualifications or 
properties of being.  While unity, truth, and goodness are formal perfections of being itself, the 
terms signified by them refer to the same reality.  
Second, in his Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle IV.2, Scotus introduces the 
notion of unitive containment to explain the sense in which being and unity are convertible.  
Here, Scotus wishes to avoid two accounts of the relationship between being and its proper 
perfections.  On the one hand, Scotus insists that being and its perfections are not distinct 
realities from the essence of the subject—i.e., they are not really distinct from it, as if it were 
another nature, capable of independent existence.  On the other hand, Scotus maintains that being 
and the perfections unitively contained under it are not simply distinct on the part of the mind 
(i.e., conceptually distinct); rather, the attributes contained under being are real perfections of the 
                                                 
135 Ordinatio I, d.8, pars 1, q.3, n. 126: “Sed numquid Aristoteles ista praedicata generalia numquam docuit?  
Respondeo.  Ex VIII Metaphysicae docuit nihil dici de Deo ut genus (ex auctoritate praeallegata), et tamen docuit 
univoce dici de Deo et creatura ‘veritatem’ II Metaphysicae, sicut supra allegatum est (ubi dicit ‘principia 
sempiternorum esse verissima’); et in hoc docuit entitatem dici univoce de Deo et creatura, quia subdit ibi (II 
Metaphysicae) quod “sicut unumquodue se habet ad esse, sic se habet ad veritatem”; patet etiam—secundum eum—
quod si ens dicitur de Deo, hoc erit in ‘quid’.  Ergo implicite in istis docuit aliquod praedicatum transcendens dici 
‘quid’, et non esse genus nec definitionem, et alia praedicata transcendentia dici in ‘quale’ (ut verum), et tamen non 
esse propria nec accidentia secundum quod ista universalia competunt speciebus aliquorum generum, quia nihil 
quod est species alicuius generis competit Deo aliquo modo.”  
136 See Peter King, “Scotus on Metaphysics,” The Cambridge Companion to Scotus, 59, n.17. 
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essence.137  So the essence or being of a subject is really identical with, but formally distinct 
from, its proper perfections.  While Scotus appeals here to unitive containment of being and its 
perfections, his account remains rather cryptic.  He does, however, direct the reader to consult 
his other works concerning unitive containment.     
 Reportatio IIA d.16 comprises Scotus’s most mature treatment of unitive containment.138 
Appealing to Pseudo-Dionysius, he claims that when one thing is unitively contained in another, 
the “two things” are neither completely the same nor completely distinct.  Rather, unitive 
containment requires both unity and a distinction.139  One type of unitive containment occurs 
when a subject unitively contains things which are quasi-attributes.  For example, the attributes 
of being are not distinct things from being itself (i.e., capable of separate existence).  The reason 
for this, according to Scotus, is that being and its proper attributes are necessarily coextensive: 
no matter which one of these attributes is attributed to a thing, Scotus claims, that thing will be a 
being, true, and good.  Scotus concludes that these proper attributes are not things other than 
being itself.  However, he warns, just because these quasi-attributes are not completely distinct 
from being does not mean that they are part of the quiddity or essence of a thing.140  They are, 
                                                 
137 Quaestiones super Metaphysicorum Aristotelis IV, q.2, n.143: “Sustineri ergo potest illa opinio de identitate reali 
sic: quod sicut essentia divina infinitas perfectiones continet et omnes unitive, sic quod non sunt alia res, sic essentia 
creata potest alias perfectiones unitive continere. Tamen in Deo quaelibet est infinita; et ideo proprie non potest dici 
pars unius totalis perfectionis; nec ab aliquo potest sumi ratio generis et differentiae quae semper per se important 
partem perfectionis specie potentialem et actualem, et ideo perfection limitatem.  In creatura quaelibet perfectio 
contenta limitata est, et limitatior essentia continente secundum totalitatem considerata.  Ideo quaelibet potest dici 
pars perfectionis, non tamen realiter differens quod sit alia natura, sed alia perfectio realis—alienate, inquam, non 
causata ab intellectu, nec tamen tanta quantam intelligimus cum dicimus ‘diversae res’; sed differentia reali minori, 
si vocetur differntia realis omnis non causata ab intellectu.”   
138 The editors of Quaestiones super Metaphysicorum Aristotelis have included the Latin text (from cod. Oxon. 
Mert. 61, f.179v-180r) in footnote 165.  See Quaestiones super Metaphysicorum Aristotelis IV, q.2, n.143.   
139 Reportatio IIA, d.16, q.un: “De continentia unitiva loquitur Dionysius, 5 De divinis nominibus, quia continentia 
unitiva non est omnino eiusdem, ita quod idem omnino contineat se unitive, nec etiam omnino manentium distincte, 
requirit ergo unitatem et distinctionem.” 
140 Reportatio IIA, d.16, q.un: “Est ergo continentia unitiva duplex: uno modo sicut inferius continet superiora 
essentialia, et ibi contenta sunt de essentia continentis, sicut eadem est realitas a qua accipitur differentia in albedine 
et a qua genus proximum, ut color et qualitas sensibilis et qualitas, et quamquam essent res aliae, unitive 
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after all, predicated in quale and not in quid.  
The reason for Scotus’s claim that unitive containment requires both unity and distinction 
was left unexplored in Reportatio IIA, d.16.  He does, however, offer an explanation in 
Ordinatio IV, d.46, q.4.  In that passage, Scotus considers whether justice and mercy are 
distinguished in God.  In his solution, Scotus claims that the divine essence unitively contains the 
divine attributes:  
The essence unitively contains every actuality of the divine essence.  Now things that are 
contained without any distinction are not unitively contained, because there is no union if 
there isn’t any distinction.  Nor is there unitive containment of things that are unqualifiedly 
really distinct, because such things are contained in such a way that they remain many, that 
is, disparate. Therefore, this word ‘unitive’ implies some sort of distinction between the 
things that are contained – enough of a distinction that they can be said to come together in 
some union, though not the sort of union that rules out any composition or aggregation of 
distinct things.  This can obtain only if one posits formal non-identity along with real 
identity.141 
In this passage, Scotus offers some clear conditions for unitive containment.  Unitive 
containment requires some degree of sameness and some degree of distinction.  Scotus argues 
that this is only possible when a formal distinction is posited with a real identity; hence, a formal 
distinction between two things is a necessary condition of unitive containment.  
The reason is as follows: unities require parts or components.  On the one hand, if two 
things are really distinct (capable of separate existence), then there is no true unity in which one 
contains the other.  Furthermore, if two things are only accidentally united, then there is not a 
                                                 
continerentur in albedine.  Alia est continentia unitiva quando subiectum unitive continet aliqua quae sunt quasi 
passions, sicut passiones entis non sunt res alia ab ente, quia quaecumque detur, ipsa res est ens, vera, bona.  Ergo 
vel oportet dicere quod non sunt res aliae ab ente, vel quod ens non habet passiones reales, quod est contra 
Aristotelem, IV Metaphysicae expresse. Nec tamen magis sunt tales passiones de essentia, nec idem quiditati [Ms. = 
quiditatem] quam si essent res alia.” 
141 Ordinatio IV, d.46, q.4, n. 74: “Ad primum, divinum ‘esse’ unitive continet omnem actualitatem divinae 
essentiae. Unitive non continentur quae sine omni distinction continentur, quia unio non est sine omni distinctione; 
nec unitive continentur quae simpliciter realiter distincta continentur, quia illa multipliciter sive dispersim 
continentur. Hoc ergo vocabulum ‘unitive’ includit aliqualem distinctionem contentorum, quae sufficit ad unionem, 
et tamen talem unionem quae repugnat omni compositioni et aggregationi distinctorum; hoc non potest esse nisi 
ponatur non-identitas formalis cum identitate reali.” 
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true unity.  On the other hand, if the two realities are completely the same, then there isn’t a true 
unity because there is only one thing—it would lack the metaphysical composition needed.  So 
both a unity and a distinction are necessary, and this is only possible if the two realities are more 
than conceptually distinct.  A conceptual distinction isn’t enough because there is no real 
composition and so no real unity—but simply one thing.  So unitive containment requires (1) 
some type of essential unity and (2) some type of aggregation. Only the formal distinction allows 
for both (1) and (2).      
Thus unitive containment occurs when something—say, some essence E—contains 
realities that are formally distinct from each other and from E itself but are nevertheless really 
identical with each other and with E—i.e., the realities are incapable of separate existence and so 
the terms that designate those realities are identical in reference.  The divine essence, for 
example, contains formally distinct attributes that are united with it essentially, such that, for any 
attribute A and the divine essence E, A and E are really identical but formally distinct.  Any A 
contained in E can function as a distinct property bearer of E.  Given unitive containment, the 
divine attributes are essential properties of the divine nature distinct enough to form an actual 
unity when contained in the divine essence, but in such a way that they are incapable of separate 
existence.  In the same way, the soul unitively contains its faculties of intellect and will; intellect 
and will are formally distinct from each other and the soul itself, but they are incapable of 
separate existence and the terms that designate those realities are identical in reference.   
By the same token, being unitively contains its proper attributes of goodness, truth, and 
unity.  As such, being and its proper attributes form a unity, whereby the attributes of being (one, 
true, good) are essential properties of being formally distinct from being and each other, and yet 
truly united in such a way that they are incapable of separate existence and the terms that 
59 
 
designate the concepts are identical in reference.  This is why Scotus surmises that the 
conceptual distinction between being and goodness fails: there would exist only one thing 
without any true composition, since the distinction between the concepts is only a distinction of 
reason.  But the concept of being and its attributes are not simply distinct on the part of the mind, 
but are real perfections of an entity discovered by the mind.  Hence only unitive containment, 
whereby real-identity and formal difference is posited can account for both the relationship 
between the concepts of being and goodness and their referents.       
Scotus’s terminology concerning the proper attributes of being fluctuates in many places.  
Sometimes, he simply calls them ‘attributes’ (passiones) of being,142 occasionally ‘proper 
attributes’ (passiones propriae) of being,143 and often ‘quasi-attributes’ (quasi passiones).144   
Why the divergence in terminology?  It seems that Scotus wavers in his terminology in order to 
emphasize different aspects of the relationship between being and its attributes.  On the one 
hand, Scotus seems to call them ‘attributes’ or ‘proper attributes’ to emphasize (1) their 
necessary coextensiveness with being and (2) their real identity and formal difference with being. 
On the other hand, when Scotus refers to them as ‘quasi-attributes,’ he means to 
emphasize the peculiar relationship they have with being.  Since being isn’t a thing, it doesn’t 
have real attributes in the strict sense, but it does have metaphysical “add-ons.”  So in the case of 
being and its proper attributes like goodness, we are dealing with one further level of abstraction 
than from ordinary existent things.  Accordingly, in order to underscore their peculiar 
relationship with being, he calls them ‘quasi-attributes,’ emphasizing the fact that since being 
                                                 
142 See Odinatio II, d.1, q.4-5, n.273; Ordinatio I, d.39, q.1-5, n.13 (Appendix A in the Vatican edition vol VI). 
143 See Ordinatio I, d.3, pars 1, q.3, n.134. 
144 See Quaestiones super Metaphysicorum Aristotelis VI, q.3, n.20, Ordinatio III, d. 8, q. un., n.50, and Reportatio 
IIA, d.16, q.un.    
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isn’t strictly a “thing,” it can’t have real attributes.  Rather, it has ‘quasi-attributes’ which 
function for being in the same way that real attributes of a subject function.               
We can now draw the following conclusions about Scotus’s account: first, when Scotus 
claims that being and good are convertible, he means that they are necessarily coextensive 
concepts, and the terms that designate those concepts are extensionally equivalent—they refer to 
the same reality, such that of whatever being is predicated in quid, goodness will be predicated in 
quale.  Second, the concepts of being and good differ.  Scotus posits a formal difference in 
reality and not simply on the part of the mind: while goodness is unitively contained in being, 
goodness means something different because it adds a formal perfection to being.145  And it adds 
a perfection to being, not simply conceptually, but as a real property of it, unitively contained by 
it, and yet, formally distinct from it.  Thus while being and good mean different things because 
they have distinct mind-independent rationes, they are nevertheless convertible, but only in the 
sense that they are existentially inseparable from each other and are therefore necessarily 
coextensive properties of everything that exists.      
Conclusion 
So the standard, conceptual account of convertibility claims that being and goodness are 
intentionally distinct, but extensionally equivalent: the concepts mean different things but 
designate the same reality.  Hence the concepts of being and good are not convertible 
intentionally but only extensionally.  This is successful for Philip, Albert, and Aquinas because 
being and goodness are only conceptually distinct: they are not distinct in reality but only in the 
way we conceive the concepts.  Hence there is no problem with interchangeability—we are 
                                                 
145 For Scotus’s treatment of good as a formal perfection of being and the relationship between perfection and 
goodness, see Ordinatio IV q.31, q. un., n.13 and Reportatio II, d.34, n.3 (Wadding).   
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referring to the same reality conceived in different ways, and the way it is conceived is not on the 
part of the object or referent, but only on the part of the mind.  And since predicating being of 
something always and only refers to the same class of objects that good is predicated of, being 
and good are necessarily coextensive concepts.  Thus Philip, Albert, and Aquinas all provide a 
deflationary account of convertibility that suggests simply a necessary coextension of being and 
good: being and good are not convertible salva veritate, but only in terms of their referents.      
If this is correct, then Scotus’s view does amount to the same thing when considered 
extensionally: being and good are necessarily coextensive because they are really identical but 
formally (rather than conceptually) distinct.  In the end, both ways of conceiving being and good 
end in a rather deflationary account of interchangeability: being and goodness are 
interchangeable or convertible only in the sense that they are necessarily coextensive concepts; 
albeit for different reasons.  For Philip et al., extensional equivalence formulated in terms of real 
identity and conceptual difference amounts to necessary coextension.  For Scotus, extensional 
equivalence is grounded in a real identity and formal distinction, because good is a proper 
attribute of being, such that of whatever being is predicated in quid, goodness is predicated in 
quale.  In other words, the concepts of being and goodness differ, but being and being good refer 
to exactly the same reality.  Thus Scotus differs from the tradition in terms of the content of the 
concepts of being and good (i.e., how he conceives of [A]), while agreeing with the tradition in 
terms of the identity of their referents (i.e., [B]).  So while formal account and the conceptual 
account both hold [B], they do so for slightly different reasons, because they conceive of 
different ways in which the concepts are related to one another.  
So on both accounts being and goodness are not synonymous.  Furthermore, on both 
accounts, what-is and what-is-good refer to the same thing: they are extensionally equivalent.  
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On both interpretations, therefore, there is a necessary coextension between being and good.  
And while this is shared with his predecessors, Scotus’s reasons for this are very different: the 
concepts of being and good are not simply generated by the mind conceiving of the same reality 
in different ways—like the Morning Star and Evening Star—but are formally different rationes 
discovered by the mind.  Good does not simply add something to being conceptually, but 
formally: it is a quasi-attribute of being that exists in the world independently of our conception 
of it.  Goodness, on Scotus’s account, is a (formal) property of being.  Since this kind of 
goodness is convertible with being, it too transcends the categories.  And as we will see in the 
next chapter, this goodness is something positive and is characteristic of any positive thing 
according to the grade of being the entity has: the more entity, the more goodness, the less entity, 
the less goodness.146          
                                                 
146 Ordinatio II, d.7.  “… bonitatem naturalem volitionis quae competit sibi in quantum est ens positivum, quae 
etiam competit cuicumque enti positive secundum gradum sua entitatis (magis et magis, minus et minus).”   
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CHAPTER THREE:  
SCOTUS’S NATURE APPROACH:  
AN AUGUSTINIAN HIERARCHY OF GOODNESS  
 
 
As we saw in chapter 1, Augustine articulated a nature approach to explain the necessary 
connection between being and goodness.  Recall that the nature approach explains the goodness 
of an entity by an appeal to the entity’s nature as the type of thing it is.  Augustine’s nature 
account was influenced by a Neoplatonic theory of goodness in which an object’s natural or 
ontological goodness corresponds to its level or grade of being—the more being, the more 
natural goodness.  Furthermore, this hierarchical account of natural goods provides normative 
constraints on one’s love and desires, for Augustine argues one ought to love an object 
proportional to its grade of natural goodness.   
Given Scotus’s Aristotelianism, one might presume a complete rejection of such an 
account.  This presumption, however, would be false.  For one, the influence of Platonism and 
Neoplatonism on scholasticism even after the “rediscovery” of Aristotle is well noted.147   
Furthermore, scholastics in the 13th century felt the need to integrate not only Aristotle into their 
philosophy and theology, but also Augustine and Boethius—both of whom were heavily 
                                                 
147 See, for example, Raymond Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages: 
Outlines of a Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi (London: Warburg Institute, 1939); Carlos Steel, “Plato Latinus (1939-
1989),” in Rencontres de cultures dans la philosophie médiévale: traductions et traducteurs de l'antiquité tardive au 
XIVe siècle: actes du Colloque internationale de Cassino, 15-17 juin 1989, eds.  J. Hamesse and M. Fattori 
(Louvain-la-Neuve: Université catholique de Louvain), 301-316; and Jan A. Aertsen, “Platonism,” in The 
Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy vol. I, eds. Robert Pasnau and Christina Van Dyke (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 76-85.   
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influenced by Neoplatonism.148  As we will see,  Scotus adopts the Augustinian hierarchy of 
goodness that corresponds to being, but often articulates such an account in Aristotelian 
terminology.   
The argument of this chapter proceeds in three steps.  First, I explore Scotus’s claim that 
goodness and perfection (of being) are identical.  Second, Scotus thinks that being is arranged 
hierarchically.  This hierarchical ranking of being, based upon the magnitude or perfection of the 
thing’s nature, Scotus calls “an order of eminence.”149  Third, goodness, as a necessarily 
coextensive perfection of being, comes in degrees dependent upon the type of being, arranged in 
terms of the same hierarchy.  In contemporary terms, the connection between being and 
goodness expresses a form of weak supervenience.    
Goodness and Perfection 
Scotus believes that bonum and perfectum are the same.  Drawing upon Aristotle’s 
account of completeness or perfection in Metaphysics V.16, Scotus states that the word ‘good’ 
signifies perfection, but there are two different ways in which something can be perfect or 
complete and so two different ways something can be good.150  In one way, something is perfect 
(think completeness151) intrinsically by having a form or essence which constitutes the nature of 
the thing, i.e., its being.  In another way, something obtains its perfection by reaching the end 
                                                 
148 Even Thomas Aquinas—the Aristotelian par excellence—was influenced by neoplatonism on a number of issues.  
For an example from his doctrine of creation and its relationship to God’s goodness, See Norman Kretzmann, “A 
General Problem of Creation: Why Would God Create Anything at All?” In Being and Goodness: The Concept of 
the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, 208-228.   Moreover, some scholars even postulate such a 
hierarchy of being in Aristotle himself,  so it’s entirely possible that Scotus draws upon both these preeminent 
figures in formulating a hierarchical account of being.  See Donald Morrison, “The Evidence for Degrees of Being 
in Aristotle,” Classical Quarterly 37 (1987): 382-402. 
149 De Primo Pincipio I.7.   
150 See Ordinatio IV, d.31, q.un., n.4, Ordinatio IV, d.49, q.2, n.24, and Reportatio II, d.34, n.3.  
151 The Latin word ‘perfectum’ has both connotations.  
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delimited by the potentialities in the thing’s nature, and so this kind of perfection extrinsically 
perfects the entity.152  Scotus summarizes this difference in the following passage from the 
Reportatio: 
It is necessary to know what ‘good’ signifies.  I say that ‘good’ and ‘perfect’ are the same 
according to Aristotle in Metaphysics VI.  But ‘perfect’ is said in a twofold manner: in one 
way [it names] that to which nothing is lacking intrinsically, and this perfection is an 
essential and intrinsic perfection, or a primary perfection.  In another way, something is 
called ‘perfect’ by a secondary perfection.  Thus good is therefore said in a twofold manner: 
a primary way and a secondary way.  In a primary way, good cannot have a contrary, nor a 
privation in its nature, because contraries are suited to occur concerning the same 
thing…insofar as it is primary goodness, it names a perfection in itself and in reference to 
itself.  The good therefore, as primary goodness, has only a contradictory opposite, as the 
non-good; but the good according to the second way, that which is extrinsic, has badness as 
its privative opposite.153 
Scotus emphasizes that primary or essential goodness intrinsically perfects a thing “in itself and 
in reference to itself;”154 that is, as an absolute quality of a thing, there is no need to reference 
something outside the thing’s being to explain its goodness.  Furthermore, primary goodness is a 
necessarily coextensive property of being, formally distinct from it.  So everything that has being 
will have this corresponding goodness.  Scotus’s terminology for this type of goodness varies 
throughout his writings: in different places he calls the goodness that converts with being 
                                                 
152 Ordinatio IV, d. 31, q. un., n.13: “Ad questionem dico secundum Philosophorum V Metaphysicae cap. ‘De 
Perfectio’: Bonum et perfectum idem; duplex est autem perfectio: intrinseca forma; extrinseca finis, -- vel prima 
forma, secunda finis…” 
153 Reportatio II, d.34, n.3 (Wadding).  The reference to Book VI of Aristotle’s Metaphysics is wrong; Metaphysics 
V is the correct reference.  “…oportet scire quid bonum significat.  Dico quod bonum et perfectum idem sunt 6 
Metaph.  Perfectum autem dupliciter dicitur: uno modo, cui nihil deest, et hoc intrinsece, et illud est perfectum 
perfectione essentiali intrinseca, seu perfectione prima; alia modo dicitur perfectum perfectione secunda.  Sic igitur 
bonum duplex est: Primo modo, et secundo.  Bonum primo modo non potest habere contrarium, neque privativum in 
natura, quia contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem…inquantum primum bonum dicit perfectionem in se et ad se.  
Bonum igitur bonitate prima tantum habet oppositum contradictorie, ut non bonum; bonum autem secundo modo, 
quod est extrinsecum, habet malum oppositum privative.” 
154 Reportatio II, d.34, n.3.  “primum bonum dicit perfectionem in se et ad se.”  
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“primary goodness,”155 “natural goodness,”156 and “essential goodness.”157  Scotus often 
contrasts convertible goodness with “secondary”158 or “accidental”159 goodness, which 
corresponds to the second and extrinsic sense of perfection.   
In a later chapter I clarify this distinction, but let me briefly elaborate on it here.  Primary 
goodness characterizes a substance as good when the substance lacks nothing that makes it the 
type of thing that it is—i.e., its being.  In contrast, secondary goodness is accidental to the thing 
itself—it could continue in its existence without being good in the secondary sense.  Secondary 
goodness, as John Hare characterizes it, is in substances, whereas primary goodness 
characterizes them as substances.160  Having some virtue, for example, would be a secondary 
goodness, since the substance could exist without having the virtue in question.  This chapter 
focuses on primary or ontological goodness.  In order to understand the implications of this for 
Scotus’s hierarchy of value, let’s consider his hierarchical account of being.   
The Hierarchy of Substances  
Scotus holds that being is predicated univocally of everything that exists—both God and 
creatures.  Before being is divided into the ten categories, it is “quantified” under two modes, 
infinite and finite.  Finite being is then divided into Aristotle’s ten categories which represent 
                                                 
155 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.9 and Ordinatio IV, d.49, q.2, n.24.  
156 Ordinatio II, d.7, n.28 and Ordinatio II, d.40, n.7. 
157 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.9. 
158 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.9 and Ordinatio IV, d.49, q.2, n.24. 
159 See Ordinatio I, d. 17, nn.62-64, Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.9, and Ordinatio IV, d.49, q.2, n.24 
160 John F. Hare, “The Supervenience of Goodness on Being,” in Metaphysics and God: Essays in Honor of 
Eleonore Stump, ed. Kevin Timpe (Routledge, 2009), 152.   
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finite modes of being.161 When Scotus speaks of a “finitely quantified mode of being,” 
‘quantified’ does not refer to the category of quantity, but to the magnitude or greatness of 
being,162 which he connects to having some amount of perfection and from which a hierarchy of 
essences or natures can be constructed.163  This hierarchical ranking of being, based upon the 
magnitude or perfection of the thing’s nature, Scotus calls “an order of eminence.”164  Let’s 
consider each of these points in more detail. 
In Quodlibet Five, Scotus asks whether a relation of origin (such as Paternity in the 
Trinity) is formally infinite.  Scotus will deny that relations of origin are formally infinite; 
however, he procures the following argument for the affirmative:   
(1) Being is first divided into finite and infinite before it is divided into the ten 
categories. 
So, 
(2) Every being is either finite or infinite.  
(3) The relation of origin is not a finite relation.  
Premise (3) states that divine relations between Trinitarian Persons do not fall under that 
category of finite relation, since nothing finite can be predicated of an infinite being.  Given that 
the relation of origin cannot be a finite relation, the interlocutor concludes:    
(4) The relation of origin is formally infinite.165   
Scotus responds to the argument in a number of ways, but I’ll focus on one aspect of his 
                                                 
161 Ordinatio I, d.8, pars 1, q.3, n.113.  “Ens prius dividitur in infinitum et finitum quam in decem praedicamenta, 
quia alterum istorum, scilicet ‘finitum’, est commune ad decem genera.”  See also Lectura I, D.8, pars1, q.3, n.107.   
162 See Peter King, “Scotus on Metaphysics,” The Cambridge Companion to Scotus, 27.   
163 See for example Quodlibet V.58.  See also Ordinatio I, d.19, q.1, n.8.   
164 De Primo Pincipio I.7.   
165 Quodlibet V.3: “Ens dividitur per finitum et infinitum prius quam descendat in decem genera; ergo quodcumque 
ens, etsi non sit in aliquo genere, erit finitum vel infinitum; relatio originis non est finite, quia tunc non esset idem 
realiter essentiae divinae, finitum enim non potest esse idem realiter infinito; igitur ipsa est formaliter infinita.”   
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response relevant to our discussion.  He begins with conceding premise (1), that being is first 
divided into finite and infinite before dividing into the ten categories, such that finite and infinite 
are not further distinctions within some category of being; rather, finite and infinite are divisions 
of quantified being. 166  He then claims that finite and infinite, as proper attributes of being,167 
pertain to quantified being in terms of having some amount of perfection.  In other words, a 
thing’s perfection is measured by its quantity.  At the most general level, this quantity is either 
total (the infinite being) or partial (finite beings) in what Scotus calls a “hierarchy of essences.”  
Finite or partial quantity for some substance is indexed to its natural kind, such that each natural 
kind has a certain amount of perfection or quantity rooted in its form or being.168  Furthermore, 
no two natural kinds can have the same quantity or amount of perfection, and thus we can 
hierarchically arrange such natural kinds depending upon their grade of being.169  Let’s call this 
the ‘Principle of Inequality for Differing Natural Kinds,’ or ‘PI’ for short.   We can formulate 
(PI) as follows: for any two natural kinds, K1 and K2,   
  (PI):     K1 and K2 are equal in perfection if and only if K1 and K2 are the same kind.
170   
Scotus responds to the initial question by claiming that in order for there to be a comparison or 
ranking of natures, the ranking must occur between natural kinds (i.e., in the category of 
substance), and each entity of comparison must be either total or partial (i.e., the infinite being or 
some finite being).  But Paternity is neither a total nor a partial entity in this sense.   
                                                 
166 Quodlibet V.58.  
167 This probably refers to the transcendental attribute of finite or infinite that Scotus thinks is a proper attribute of 
being when predicated in disjunction.  See Ordinatio I, d.8, pars 1, q.3.   
168 Quodlibet V.58. 
169 Quodlibet V.58.  Also See De Primo Principio, 3.25:  “Duae Naturae eodem communi non habent gradum 
aequalem.  Probatur per differntias dividentes genus; si sunt inequales, ergo et esse unius erit perfectius esse alterius; 
nullum esse perfectius ipso necesse esse ex se.”  
170 This formulation comes from J.T. Paasch, Divine Production in Late Medieval Trinitarian Theology: Henry of 
Ghent, Duns Scotus, and William Ockham (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2012), 152. 
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  But the truth of (PI) in conjunction with the claim that not every existent entity has the 
same kind-nature entails that we can rank essences in terms of their grade of perfection.  Scotus 
calls this ranking an “order of eminence.”  In the Reportatio I-A d.19 and Quodlibet 6, Scotus 
clarifies his use of quantity as a measure of perfection by explaining a twofold sense of 
quantity—categorical quantity and transcendental quantity—connecting the latter with the 
magnitude of being grounded in the thing’s perfection.171    
According to Scotus, we can compare things to each other in three ways, by considering 
three different types of relations that can obtain between entities: identity, similarity, and 
equality.172  Relations for Scotus are accidents and “relative beings.” As accidents, they 
accidentally inhere in one of their relata;173 as “relative beings,” their existence depends upon an 
absolute category.  So relations accidentally inhere in one thing and refer to another.  Relations 
and absolutes differ, according to Scotus, in their rationes: the ratio of something absolute is ad 
se because it refers “to itself,” while the ratio of a relation is ad aliud—it, by nature, refers to 
something beyond itself.174  So absolute beings really have being, but relative beings only have 
being in a derivative sense: their existence depends upon their foundation in something absolute.  
These three relations—identity, similarity, and equality—have their foundations in the absolute 
                                                 
171 These texts are roughly contemporaneous.  The Reporatio is an examined report of Scotus’s lecture on the 
Sentences that began about 1303 or 1304 in Paris.  The Quodlibetal Questions were disputed in Paris for Advent in 
1306 or Lent in 1307. Since there are no substantial doctrinal differences in the relevant material, I’ll treat these 
works together.  The Latin for the Reportatio I-A is taken from Allan B. Wolter and Oleg V. Bychkov, John Duns 
Scotus: The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture, Reportatio I-A (St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 2004).  
The Latin and numbering for Quodlibetal Questions is taken from the Spanish-Latin semi-critical edition by Felix 
Alluntis, Obras del Doctor Sutil Juan Duns Escoto: Cuestiones Cuodlibetales, Edicion Bilingue (Madrid: Biblioteca 
De Autores Christianos, 1968).   
172 See Ordinatio I, d. 19, q.1. 
173 See Mark G. Henninger, Relations: Medieval Theories 1250-1325 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 68.   
174 See for example, Ordinatio II, d.1, q.5, n.244, textus interpolatus: “relatio, si non fundetur in alio, non est relatio; 
igitur, vel erit processus in infinitum, vel relatio tandem fundabitur in absoluto.  Sed ratio absoluti est quod sit ad se, 
ratio vero formalis relationis est habitudo ad aliud; non est autem eadem entitas formalis ‘ad se’ et ‘ad aliud;’ igitur 
etc.”    
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categories of substance, quality, and quantity, respectively.175  Accordingly, the foundation of the 
identity relation is a thing’s quiddity or substance; the foundation of the similarity relation is 
some accident in the category of quality; finally, the relation of equality is founded upon the 
category of quantity, in terms of having some magnitude of perfection.176   
In Reportatio IA, d.19, Scotus explains that each of the foundations of these relations can 
be taken in two different ways: either strictly or generally.  When taken strictly, the foundations 
belong only to the categories of substance, quantity, and quality.  But when foundations of the 
three relations are taken generally, they can be found in things that are not formally in these three 
categories.177  So according to Scotus, there are two types of relations, categorical and 
transcendental.   
Categorical relations are really distinct from their foundations178 and come in three broad 
categories: (1) numerical relations, (2) causal relations, and (3) relations concerning measure.179  
Transcendental relations, in contrast, are only formally distinct from their foundations and can 
                                                 
175 See Reportatio I-A, d.19, q.1-3, n.12.   
176 Ordinatio I, d.19, n.8: “De Secundo dico quod quodcumque ens in se est ‘quid’ et habet in se aliquem gradum 
determinatum in entibus et est forma vel habens forma; et secundum hoc, sicut tripliciter potest considerari 
quodcumque ens, ita etiam super ipsum potest fundari triplex relatio communiter sumpta: quia identitas super 
quodcumque ens in quantum est ‘quid’, aequalitas et inaequalitas super quodcumque ens in quantum habet 
magnitudinem aliquam perfectionis (quae dicitur ‘quantitas virtualis’, de qua dicit Augustinus IV De Trinitate quod 
“in his quae non sunt mole magna, idem est melius esse quod maius esse”), similitudo autem vel dissimilitudo potest 
fundari super quodcumque ens in quantum est ‘quale’ at qualitas quaedam…” 
177 Reportatio I-A, d.19, pars.1, q.1-3, n.12.  
178 See Quodlibet VI.82 and Ordinatio I, d.31, q.un, n.6: Videtur dicendum quod ad relationem realem tria sufficient: 
primo, quod fundamentum sit reale et terminus realis; et secundo, quod extremorum sit distincto realis; et tertio, 
quod ex natura extremorum sequatur ipsa talis relation absque opera alterius potentiae, comparantis unum extremum 
alteri.   
179 See Henninger, Relations: Medieval Theories 1250-1325, 69-72; Peter King “Scotus on Metaphysics,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, 36.  Scotus recognizes that this list, derived from Aristotle, is deficient, but 
are nevertheless the main types of relations.  Other relations will be viewed in terms of their similarities to these.  
See Quaestiones Super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis V, q.11, n.59.    
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apply to everything that exists, regardless of their relationship to the ten categories.180  Making 
this distinction between categorical and transcendental relations, and suggesting the “general” or 
“broad” use of quantity, seems like a novel move on the part of Scotus, but Scotus finds 
precedent for such a distinction in Aristotle and Augustine.181   
Scotus notes that Aristotle speaks of quantity and its attributes—such as great and 
small—as applied to things outside the actual category of quantity.  The names ‘great’ and 
‘small,’ in such a case, are “transferred” to things that exist beyond categorical quantity.182  
Augustine also appeals to a broader sense of quantity in De Trinitate 7, with respect to mass: to 
have a greater mass (in terms of goodness and perfection) is to be better.183  Do not miss what 
Scotus does here: he takes the Augustinian hierarchy of being—which Augustine had grounded 
in measure, form, and order—Neoplatonic principles—and he grounds them instead in the 
quantity or magnitude of the perfection of being respective to each thing—an Aristotelian 
concept. 
Scotus then shows that taking these foundations in a broader sense is also possible with 
the foundations of identity and equality.  With respect to identity, for example, “it is certain that 
identity is said of things other than those in the three categories, because it is convertible with 
                                                 
180 See Ordinatio II, d.1, q.4-5, n.260 for Scotus’s claim that transcendental relations are really identical but formally 
distinct from their foundations.  The discussion in the passage concerns the relationship between God and creatures.  
181 See also Quodlibet VI.13. 
182 For Scotus’s conception of categorical quantity, see Richard Cross, The Physics of Duns Scotus: The Scientific 
Context of a Theological Vision (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 116-170.   
183 Reportatio I-A, d.19, pars.1, q.1-3, nn. 13-14. It is clear from Scotus’s remarks on this Augustine quote in 
Quodlibet VI.13, that Scotus takes this as referring to mass in a “transferred” sense of greatness: “Augustinus autem 
VI De Trinitate cap.8 istam magnitudinem, quam Philosophus dicit translative dictam, dicit esse magnitudinem non 
molis sed bonitatis et perfectionis: ‘in his,’ inquit ‘quae non mole magna sunt, idem est maius esse quod melius 
esse.’  Patet ergo quod ‘magnum,’ primo modo secundum Aristotelem proprie dictum et secundum Augustinum 
‘magnum’ mole, non est in Deo nec in aliquo spirituali; Sed ‘magnum’, translative secundum Philosophum et 
‘magnum’ bonitate et virtute vel perfectionis secundum Augustinum, potest poni ibi, quia illud est transcendens, 
conveniens suo modo omni enti.”   
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being.”184  Since being transcends the categories, so too does the identity relation founded upon 
it, for everything that exits will be identical with itself.  He concludes that all of the foundations 
of these relations can be common to things other than those which are formally and really in 
these three categories.  
So when taken in a general sense, the foundations (substance, quality, quantity) and the 
subsequent relations (identity, similarity, and equality) are transcendental, for he claims that each 
thing, i.e., everything that exists, 
Can be considered as ‘what it is’ i.e., according to its own quiddity, and so can be the 
foundation of the relation of identity or diversity.  But when it is considered as having a 
certain grade of its own essential perfection and determinate grade of its virtual quiddity, 
taken in that way, it can be the foundation of the common relation of equality and 
inequality.  Or it can be considered as having some form or some perfection through some 
mode of the informing form according to which it is called a quality.  And in this way it can 
be the foundation of the relation of similarity or dissimilarity.185 
So when taken in the general sense, these three foundations and the three corresponding relations 
can be transcendental, since they apply to everything that exists.186     
Scotus then raises the problem of how these relations are transcendental when they do not 
necessarily convert with being.  He refers the reader to Ordinatio I, d.8, where he argues that the 
transcendentals include not only things that are convertible with being—such as good, true, and 
one—but also disjunctive attributes, pure perfections, etc.  The reason concerns Scotus’s 
definition of a transcendental.  In d.8, Scotus defines a transcendental as whatever is not 
                                                 
184 Reportatio I-A, d.19, pars.1, q.1-3, n.16. 
185 Reportatio I-A, d.19, pars.1, q.1-3, n.17: “Unde sciendum quod quaelibet res potest considerari ut quid est, id est 
secundum quiditatem suam, et sic potest esse fundamentum relationis identitatis vel diversitatis.  Sed ut consideratur 
secundum quod habet certum gradum perfectionis suae essentialis et determinatum gradum suae quiditatis virtualis, 
sic potest esse fundamentum communis relationis aequalitatis vel inaequalitatis.  Vel potest considerari ut habet 
formam aliquam vel perfectionem aliquam per modum formae informantis secundum quam dicitur qualis. Et sic 
potest fundare relationem communem similitudinis vel dissimilitudinis.”  
186 Reportatio I-A, d.19, pars.1, q.1-3, n.18. See also Quodlibet VI.13. With respect to magnitude or greatness, he 
claims: “Sed ‘magnum’, translative secundum Philosophum et ‘magnum’ bonitate et virtute vel perfectionis 
secundum Augustinum, potest poni ibi, quia illud est transcendens, conveniens suo modo omni enti.”   
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contained under any one category.187  These relations—and the foundations upon which they 
depend—fit that bill whether or not they are convertible with being, since they can be predicated 
of everything that exists (in the ‘general’ sense).   
Furthermore, Scotus conceives certain attributes, when predicated in disjunction (i.e., 
‘necessary or possible,’ ‘finite or infinite,’ ‘act or potency,’ etc.), as transcendentals because they 
are not contained under any one category and thus apply to every being that exists (i.e., every 
being is either ‘necessary or possible,’ ‘finite or infinite,’ etc.) and are thereby convertible with 
being when predicated in disjunction.188  Take any two beings that exist and it is true that that the 
second being of the comparison is either ‘identical or diverse,’ ‘similar or dissimilar,’ and ‘equal 
or unequal’—the first depends upon whether the latter being shares the same quiddity or nature; 
the second depends upon whether they share some quality and to what degree; the final depends 
upon whether that have the same magnitude.    
Given that we can now rank and compare natures depending upon their magnitude 
grounded in their quantity—or “virtual quantity” as Scotus sometimes puts it—the following 
question arises: can we include God in this hierarchical ranking?  The answer depends upon the 
distinction between strict and general usage of the terms in question, between categorical and 
transcendental quantity: when these three relations and their foundations are taken in the strict 
sense, as referring to the categories of substance, quality, quantity, they cannot be found in the 
divine nature because they imply limitation—these categories are proper only as divisions of 
finitely quantified being.189  But when taken in the general sense, magnitude or equality applies 
                                                 
187Ordinatio I, d.8, pars1, q.3, n.114.  “transcendens quodcumque nullum habet genus sub quo contineatur.” 
188 Reportatio I-A, d.19, pars.1, q.1-3, n.19. See also Ordinatio I, d.39, q.1-5, n.13 (Appendix A in the Vatican 
edition vol. VI). 
189 See Quodlibet VI.13; Reportatio I-A, d.19, pars.1, q.1-3, n.20; Ordinatio I, d.8, pars 1, q.3, n.113.   
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to every being prior to its division into the ten categories.190  Thus as transcendentals, these three 
relations and their respective foundations can be applied to the divine nature, since 
transcendentals apply to being prior to the division into finite and infinite.191   
One reason for this, according to Scotus, is that disjunctive transcendentals appropriately 
carve reality at its joints.  In each division of being, one member of the pair will be perfect and 
the other member imperfect.192  The pairs ‘necessary or possible,’ ‘infinite or finite,’ ‘act or 
potency,’ for example, are the fundamental ways something can be, and the former member of 
each pair is more perfect than the latter.  Consequently, in every pair of transcendental 
disjunctive attributes, the more perfect member of the disjunct can be predicated of the divine.193  
Since diversity, inequality, and dissimilarity are imperfections, the other corresponding disjuncts 
are thereby applied to God.  Furthermore, since magnitude corresponds to having some degree of 
perfection and the divine essence has “every grade of unqualified perfection as an infinite sea,” 
the divine essence has this infinite degree of magnitude.194 
                                                 
190 Reportatio I-A, d.19, pars.1, q.1-3, n.20.  See also Ordinatio II, d. 1, q.4-5, n.231: “Ad argumentum primum 
alterius opinionis dico quod nihil alicuius generis dicitur de Deo, sicut dictum est distinctione 8 primi libri; et sicut 
absoluta, ita et relations quae formaliter dicuntur ‘entis in communi’, quia quidquid convenit enti in quantum est 
indistinctum ad finitum et infinitum, convenit ei prius quam dividatur in genera, et ita transcendens.”  See also 
Ordinatio II, d. 1, q.4-5, n.277. 
191 Ordinatio I, d.8, pars 1, q.3, n.113.  “Ens prius dividitur in infinitum et finitum quam in decem predicamenta, 
quia alterum istorum, scilicet ‘finitum’, est commune ad decem genera; ergo quaecumque conveniunt enti ut 
indifferens ad finitum et infinitum, vel ut est proprium enti infinito, conveniunt sibi non ut determinatur ad genus 
sed ut prius, et per consequens ut est transcendens et est extra omne genus.  Quaecumque sunt communia Deo et 
creaturae, sunt talia quae conveniunt enti ut est indifferens ad finitum et infinitum: ut enim conveniunt Deo, sunt 
infinita, ut creturae, sunt finite; ergo per prius conveniunt enti quam ens dividatur in decem genera, et per 
consequens quodcumque tale est transcendens.”   
192 Reportatio I-A, d.19, pars 1, q.3, n.21.   
193 Ordinatio I, d.19, q.1, n.10: “De tertio dico quod sicut nullum genus nec aliquid alicuius generis dicitur de Deo 
formaliter, ita nec passio alicuius generis, et per consequens nec aliqua relationum communium secundum quod 
stricte sumuntur, ut scilicet sunt passiones generum determinatorum; sed quia end dicitur formaliter de Deo et 
quaecumque passio convertibilis cum ente, et passionum non-convertibilium—sed disiunctarum—semper extremum 
nobilius, idea hoc modo illud extremum dicetur do Deo quod vel dicit nobilitatem vel non repugnant nobolotati, sed 
reliquum repugnant.”   
194 Reportatio I-A, d.19, pars.1, q.1-3, 21-22.  Scotus goes on to answer the first question raised in the article 
concerning the equality of the divine persons by claiming that this magnitude is common to all the divine persons, 
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 Hence magnitude is the grade of perfection founded upon the essence or nature of the 
thing and the attributes contained therein.  Magnitude expressed in terms of quantity (in the 
‘general’ or transcendental sense) is a measure of a thing’s greatness on a scale of value, where 
God’s infinite magnitude sets the upper limit.195  Finite creatures are great according to their 
approximation to the divine.    
 Scotus’s argument for a hierarchy of being (HOB) can thus be summarized as follows:  
(HOB1) Magnitude measures the perfection of an essence or kind nature. 
(HOB2) Two kind natures are equal in perfection if and only if they are of the same 
kind nature (PI).   
(HOB3) Not every substance has the same kind nature.  
(HOB4) Therefore, kind natures can be hierarchically arranged in terms of their 
magnitude of perfection.  
When (HOB4) is combined with other claims that Scotus makes concerning perfection, we can 
plausibly fill out his hierarchy of being:  
(HOB5) Being is quantified under two modes, finite and infinite.196  
(HOB6) Infinite names the highest grade of perfection.197 
(HOB7) God has an infinitely quantified mode of being.  
(HOB8) Therefore, God is infinite in perfection. 
(HOB9) Finite beings can be ordered on this scale below the infinite being in terms   
of how much perfection they have grounded in their being.198    
We have arrived now at what has been commonly called the ‘Great Chain of Being,’ or what 
                                                 
since magnitude refers to the divine being itself and is thus not divided between the persons.  So all of the persons 
the divine nature have the “maximum and truest equality in magnitude.”  The reason is connected with his claims in 
Quodlibet V: the comparison and ranking of natures based upon magnitude occurs at the level of nature, not the 
level of persons or supposits.    See also Ordinatio I, d.31, q.un.   
195 Quodlibet V.57; Ordinatio I, d.3, pars 1, q.1-2, n.58; and Ordinatio I, d.8, pars.1, q.2.    
196 Quodlibet V.58. 
197 Ordinatio I, d.3, pars 1, q.1-2, nn.58-60. 
198 See Quodlibet V.57; Ordinatio I, d.3, pars 1 q.1-2, n.95-97.   
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Scotus often calls an “order of eminence.”   
The Hierarchy of Goodness  
In closing, I wish to summarize two points made in this and the previous chapter and 
draw one conclusion from them about the nature of goodness.  First, when Scotus posits the 
convertibility of being and goodness, he means that they are necessarily coextensive concepts, 
and the terms that designate those concepts are extensionally equivalent—they refer to the same 
reality.  The concepts of being and good, however, differ: Scotus posits a formal difference in 
reality and not simply on the part of the mind.  Goodness, on Scotus’s account, is a (formal) 
property of being.199  Second, every being has a quantity or magnitude which measures the 
thing’s perfection given its kind nature, and these kind natures can be arranged hierarchically, 
depending upon their magnitude of perfection.       
Finally, natural or primary goodness is characteristic of any existent thing according to its 
grade of being, such that the higher the grade of being, the more goodness; the lesser the grade of 
being, the less goodness.200  It is inferred from these points that since (primary) goodness is 
commensurate with the being of the entity as a coextensive property of it, and being comes in 
degrees or grades, primary goodness is a degreed property of a thing corresponding to its 
perfection of being, arranged according to the same hierarchical structure that being is organized.  
In other words, the order of value corresponds to the order of being.  On such an account, the 
grade of being determines the grade of goodness found in the entity and so goodness is a degreed 
property of a thing.   
                                                 
199 See for example Quaestiones super Metaphysicorum Aristotelis VI, q.3, n.20; Odinatio II, d.1, q.4-5, n.273; 
Ordinatio III, d. 8, q. un., n.50; and Reportatio II A, d.16.   
200 See for example Ordinatio II, d.7, nn.28.   
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In contemporary terms, Scotus’s characterization of being and goodness can (at least) be 
labeled a version of weak supervenience.201  As Kim characterizes it, for any two sets of 
properties A and B:  
(WS1) Necessarily, for any x and y, if x and y share all properties in B, then x and y 
share all properties in A—that is, indiscernibility in B entails indiscernibility 
in A.202   
We can reformulate (WS1) in a manner that aligns with Scotus’s own account.  For any two kind 
natures, K1 and K2, and properties B (being) and G (goodness): 
(WS2) Necessarily, for any K1 and K2, if K1 and K2 have the same amount of B, then 
K1 and K2 have the same amount of G—that is, indiscernibility in B entails 
indiscernibility in G.   
If K1 and K2 have the same amount of being, then they are in fact identical kind natures and will 
necessarily instantiate the same degree of goodness.  Furthermore, if K1 and K2 differ in their 
amount of being—say, K1 is dogness and K2 humanness—then they will necessarily differ in 
their degree of natural goodness.  Since no two kind natures can have the same amount of being 
(PI), every kind nature can be ranked according to its value.    
Given the transcendental nature of being and good, however, this supervenience relation 
can be extended beyond kind natures to everything that exists.  Here the scope is no longer 
limited to specific kind natures or substances in the hierarchy of being, but extends in such a way 
                                                 
201 I shall not offer Scotus’s account in terms of strong supervenience that ranges across possible worlds for two 
reasons.  First, that characterization hinges upon highly debated aspects of Scotus’s modal theory that are beyond the 
purview of this dissertation.  Second, at times Scotus seems completely comfortable claiming that the same kind 
nature could be imbedded with different powers and capacities.  If so, this could affect that nature’s degree of being 
and consequently, its goodness.  It seems to me however, that even if we grant this, a weak version of supervenience 
would still hold: given the amount of being for some kind nature (that could have been different than it is), it would 
still follow that goodness weakly supervenes on that degree of being.   
202 Jaegwon Kim, Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), 79.   
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that the supervenience of goodness on being can be quantified over everything that exists; in 
other words, over everything that has being.  So,  
(WS3) Necessarily, for any x and y, if x and y have the same amount of B, then x 
and y have the same amount of G—that is, indiscernibility in B entails 
indiscernibility in G.   
Thus any difference in the amount of being will necessarily result in a difference in the amount 
of goodness.  However, being and goodness are not simply coextensive with each other, but the 
values of each stand in a specific relation to each other, namely, one of dependence: value of G 
depends essentially on the value of B.203  In other words, the value of an entity directly correlates 
with the type of entity, rooted in its magnitude of being.   
 Since goodness is a necessarily coextensive property of being, and being first separates 
into finite and infinite modes before dividing into the ten categories, goodness similarly divides 
into two modes, finite and infinite.  Whereas infinite goodness is singular in nature (i.e., God), 
finite goodness further subdivides into Aristotle’s ten categories, since Scotus thinks that each 
category has some amount of being or existence, however small it might be.  Consequently, each 
category of being will contain an amount of ontological goodness that corresponds with the 
amount of being in that category: the more being, the more goodness.        
So in this sense Scotus agrees with tradition in terms of [B], providing an Augustinian 
nature approach to [A] in support of [B], but moving beyond tradition by postulating the formal 
distinction to explicate the precise relationship between being and good, and cashing out such an 
                                                 
203 The type of goodness under consideration here is primary or ontological goodness (also called essential/natural 
goodness by Scouts) and should not be confused with moral goodness.  Secondary goodness, of which moral 
goodness is a species, is a relation between an act judged by right reason (via knowledge of the nature of the agent, 
the agent’s causal powers, and the type of act) to conform to a number of circumstances, including the end, the 
manner, the time and the place.  Moral goodness, according to Scotus, is not convertible with being.  
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account within the context of the Aristotelian categories of being.  However, as stated above, 
Scotus thinks that something can be good in two ways; one with respect to its form (primary 
goodness), one with respect to its end (secondary goodness). 204  But since the order of value 
corresponds to the order of being, Scotus—like Augustine—argues that we ought to proportion 
our love for objects according to their primary or ontological goodness, and this will play a 
central role in determining and act’s secondary goodness—at least with respect to our 
relationship to God.205  But to see this, and how Scotus transforms such an account, it is first 
necessary to examine Scotus’s conception of secondary goodness in detail, which is the topic of 
Part III.   
                                                 
204 Reportatio II, d.34, n.3; Ordinatio IV, d.31, q.un. 
205 See for example Ordinatio III, d. 27, q.un., n. 14; Ordinatio III, d.29, nn.5-8.   
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
SECONDARY GOODNESS 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Scotus thinks that something can be perfected in two 
ways: in one way with respect to its form or being, and in another way with respect to its end.206  
And since goodness and perfection are the same, something can be good in two ways: one with 
respect to its form, the other with respect to its end.207  So in contrast to primary goodness, which 
intrinsically perfects a subject and converts with being—the topics of the previous three 
chapters—this other type of goodness, usually called secondary or accidental goodness, does not 
convert with being, but extrinsically perfects its subject.208  Generally, attributions of secondary 
goodness refer to the harmony or suitability (convenientia) of a thing to something else.  In 
Quodlibet 18, Scotus explains the distinction between these two types of goodness as follows:  
For just as primary goodness of being, which is called essential goodness, is the integrity or 
perfection of being in itself, conveys positively a negation of imperfection that excludes 
imperfection and diminution, so also secondary goodness of being, which is accidental or 
supervenient to the entity, is its perfect suitability to, or integral harmony with, something 
else with which it ought to be suitable, or of something else to it.209       
                                                 
206 Reportatio 2, d.34,n.3;  Ordinatio IV, d.31, q.un. 
207 Ordinatio IV, d.31, q.un.  In his moral writings, Scotus will qualify this a bit, because he thinks that there is more 
to this secondary perfection than simply the end (Ordinatio II, d.40, q.un), but the end does play a significant role.   
208 Lectura I, d.1, pars 1, q.2, n.63; Ordinatio I, d. 1, q.2;Ordinatio I, d.17, pars.1, q.1-2, n.55; Ordinatio II, d.40, 
q.un. 
209 Scotus, Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.9.  Cuestiones Cuodlibetales: Edicion Bilingue, ed. Felix Alluntis (Madrid, 1958): 
“Sicut enim bonitas primaria entis, quae dicitur bonitas essentialis, quae est integritas vel perfectio entis in se, 
importat positive negationem imperfectionis, per quod excluditur imperfection et diminutio sic bonitas entis 
81 
 
In this chapter I highlight four ways Scotus describes secondary goodness: (1) as a 
harmony or suitability (convenientia), (2) as a secondary perfection, (3) as a non-absolute 
quality, and (4) as similar in nature to beauty.  This discussion, I hope, will set the context for 
Scotus’s principal application of secondary goodness, namely, that moral goodness is a type of 
secondary goodness in the acts of rational agents.    
The Meaning of ‘Convenientia’ 
One of the central characteristics of secondary goodness is the fittingness or harmony—
convenientia—between various things that ought to stand in such a relationship to each other.   
In this section I explore Scotus’s usage of the term ‘convenientia’ in his theological and 
philosophical works.  I argue that convenientia, used as technical term, conveys a proper 
relationship among entities: a relation that should be there, given the entities that form its basis.    
 In Quodlibet 18, Scotus states that secondary or accidental goodness is a thing’s perfect 
suitability to or integral harmony with either (1) something else to which it ought to be suited, or 
(2) something else that ought to be suited to it.  He then claims that these two types of suitability 
(duae convenientiae) are commonly connected and explains the subtle difference between them.   
For clarity, I’ll distinguish the two types of suitability as ‘Suitability 1’ and ‘Suitability 2’, 
respectively. 
 Suitability 1 consists in thing’s perfect suitability or integral harmony with something else 
to which it ought to be suited.  For example, health is called a good for man, because it is fitting 
                                                 
secondaria, quae est accidentalis sive superveniens entitati, est integritas convenientiae vel integra convenientia eius 
alteri cui debet convenire vel alterius sibi.” 
82 
 
for him (quia est ei conveniens). 210 Here Scotus enlists Augustine for support: “Health without 
pain and exhaustion is good.”211  In other words, humans should be healthy: it’s appropriate for 
humans, when functioning properly, to be healthy.  Thus, health is suitable1 for a human being.      
 Suitability 2 obtains when a thing has a perfect suitability to, or integral harmony with, 
something else that ought to be suited to it.  Here Scotus lists two examples.  First, food is called 
good because it has a proper or fitting taste (quia habet saporem sibi convenientem).  In other 
words, food ought to taste good.  Second, quoting Augustine, Scotus claims that “Good is the 
face of a man with proportional features, graced with laughter, and a brilliant complexion.”212   
This refers to suitability 2 because “such a face is called good, by having those things which are 
fitting to it.”213  In this case, faces ought to look nice, and they are called good when they have 
qualities that make them such.   
 It seems as though the subtle difference Scotus wishes to make concerns what is being 
called good in each case: in the first case, the thing that is called good is suitable to something 
else (e.g., health for a human), but in the second case, the thing that is called good (e.g., food) is 
called such because it has other things that are suitable to it (e.g., appropriate taste).  So perhaps 
‘suitable’ means the same thing in both cases, but the basis of the attribution of goodness to a 
thing differs in the two cases: its being suitable to something else in the first case and having 
things suitable for itself in the second.  
 As we will see, Scotus goes on to claim that both types of suitability apply to acts: an act 
must be appropriate to the agent and also have the features suitable to itself as the kind of act that 
                                                 
210Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.9. 
211 Quodlibet 18.9.  ‘“bona’ inquit ‘valetudo sine doloribus et lassitudine.”’ See Augustine De Trinitate VIII.3. 
212 Ibid. See also Augustine De Trinitate VIII.3: “Et bona facies hominis dimensa pariliter, et affecta hilariter, et 
luculenter colorata.”  
213 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.9. “Quia talis facies dicitur bona, habendo illa quae sibi conveniunt.” 
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it is.214  But notice that in both cases convenientia conveys a relation between two entities that 
ought to be there, given their natures or types of things that they are.  Humans should be healthy, 
faces ought to look good, food should taste good, and acts ought to be appropriate to their agent 
and the kind of act it is.   
Scotus also adopts convenientia to explain proper relations between ideas, most notably 
in his commentaries on various works of Aristotle.  Scotus often asks whether Aristotle 
appropriately or correctly applies or defines something, or whether some definition suitably 
captures the things being defined.  In the case of the first, Scotus often asks whether Aristotle 
suitably or appropriately (convenienter) distinguishes concepts or posits the right answer to some 
philosophical issue.  For example, in his Questions on Aristotle’s Categories, Scotus asks 
“Whether Aristotle appropriately distinguished species of motion.”215  In his Questions on the 
Metaphysics, Scotus asks “Whether the Philosopher appropriately posits three modes of relations 
or relatives.”216  In the questions on the first book of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, Scotus asks 
whether differentia, which Aristotle assigns between letters and words and passions and things, 
is fitting or appropriate.217  In each of these cases and many others, Scotus uses the word 
‘convenientia,’ or its adverb form ‘convenienter,’ to ask whether Aristotle fittingly or 
appropriately uses some term or defines or distinguishes something correctly.  In typical fashion, 
                                                 
214 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.9.   
215 Scotus, Quaestiones Super Praedicamenta Aristotelis Q. 44, ed. R. Andrews, G. Etzkorn, G. Gal, R. Green, T. 
Noone, R. Wood (The Franciscan Institute: St. Bonaventure, 1999).  “Quaeritur utrum Aristoteles convenienter 
distinguat species motus.”  See also Q.43: “Circa istud quaeritur utrum   Aristoteles convenienter assignet modos 
prioris.” 
216 Scotus, Quaestiones SuperLibros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis V, Q.12, ed. R. Andrews, G. Etzkorn, G. Gal, R. 
Green, F. Kelley, G.marcil, T. Noone, R. Wood (The Franciscan Institute: St. Bonaventure, 1997). “Utrum 
Philosophus convenienter ponat tres modos relationis sive relativorum.” 
217Scotus, Quaestiones in Primum Libros Perihermenias Aristotelis Q. 4, ed. R. Andrews, G. Etzkorn, G. Gal, R. 
Green, T. Noone, R. Plevano, A Traver, R. Wood (The Franciscan Institute: St. Bonaventure, 2004).   
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Scotus then goes on to make various distinctions to answer the question.  But note the normative 
manner in which Scotus uses convenientia and its various cognates: Scotus wants to know if 
Aristotle uses some term or distinction appropriately given what’s involved in the issue.  
In these same philosophical works, Scotus uses convenientia to ask whether some 
distinction or definition is fitting or appropriate to the subject.  For example, in his Questions on 
the Metaphysics of Aristotle, he asks whether the division of unity into one in genus, one in 
species, one in number, and one in proportion is fitting (conveniens).218  We see the same usage 
of convenientia in his Questions on the Categories of Aristotle,219 and frequently in his Questions 
on the Book of Porphyry’s Isagoge.220  In these cases, ‘convenientia’ refers to the fittingness or 
properness of the definition or concept, given the nature of the terms involved. 
Finally, in Quodlibet 18.39, Scotus appeals to the concepts of truth and falsity to explain 
the nature of convenientia in its moral context by providing an analogy.  Falsity, he claims, 
expresses a disconvenientia.  In contrast, the concept of truth conveys the adequation of the mind 
to being, resulting in a convenientia or conformitas: when a thought or belief conforms to reality, 
the truth relation obtains.  Similarly, in the case of secondary goodness, a conformitas or a 
harmony (convenientia) obtains when the proper connection exists between certain things that 
should be related; namely, the nature of the act to the end, object, etc., as the agent’s right reason 
                                                 
218 Scotus, Quaestiones SuperLibros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis V, Q.4.   
219 Scotus, Quaestiones Super Praedicamenta Aristotelis Q. 30, Q.35, and Q. 38   
220 Scotus, Quaestiones in Librum Porphyrii Isagoge, ed. R. Andrews, G. Etzkorn, G. Gal, R. Green, T. Noone, R. 
Wood (The Franciscan Institute: St. Bonaventure, 1991).  Q. 15:  “Whether the definition of a genus is fitting 
(convenienter) to what has been given.” Q.17: “Whether ‘difference of species’ is fittingly (convenienter) posited in 
the definition of a genus.” Q.19: Whether ‘in quid’ is appropriately (convenienter) posited in the definition of a 
genus.”  Q.21: “Whether this definition of a species is fitting (conveniens): ‘A species is what is predicated of many 
numerical differences in virtue of the fact that it is a quiddity.”’ Q. 23: “Whether the first division of differences is 
fitting (conveniens).” Q.25: “Whether the first division of a difference, namely, ‘a difference is what a species 
surpasses from a genera’ is appropriately (convenienter) given.” Q.35: “Whether this definition of an accident is 
fitting (conveniens)…”  
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dictates.221  This highlights the relational aspect of secondary goodness.  When the appropriate 
relata are connected, a convenientia obtains: ‘a fittingness’ or a ‘conformity’ in both cases.222  
Thus the technical term ‘convenientia’ conveys a proper relationship among entities that ought to 
be related in some way, grounded in the nature of the things that should be related.   
Secondary Goodness as a Secondary Perfection  
 Scotus frequently claims that secondary goodness is a secondary perfection.  As we saw 
in chapter 3, a primary, proper, or essential perfection necessarily characterizes its subject: a 
primary perfection essentially qualifies something as the type of thing it is. 223  Transcendental 
goodness, for example, is a primary and proper perfection of being since it characterizes a 
substance as good when the substance lacks nothing that makes it the type of thing that it is—i.e., 
its being.  In contrast, secondary goodness accidentally perfects its subject—the entity could 
continue in its existence without being good in the secondary sense.  Having the virtue of 
courage, for example, would be a secondary perfection, since a human could exist—as a 
human—without the having the virtue.  Thus a secondary perfection qualifies a subject in an 
accidental way: it’s a real perfection, but the kind of perfection extrinsic to the nature of the 
                                                 
221 Scotus thinks that an agent’s right reason ought to make a judgment as to which acts are fitting to the agent in a 
particular set of circumstances.  The details of such an account are forthcoming.  But briefly, reason judges rightly 
when two conditions are met: First, a rational agent’s act requires not simply perceiving one’s end, as non-rational 
animals often do, but forming a judgment about the appropriateness or fittingness of the act with respect to the end.  
But, forming a judgment of an act requires two things.  First, it requires not just anyone’s judgment, but the 
judgment of the person doing the action.  I’ll call this the ‘autonomy clause.’  As we will see, this autonomy clause 
will play a crucial role in Scotus’s separation of rightness from goodness.  Second, this judgment must be derived 
from certain knowledge the agent has; specifically, knowledge of three relevant factors: the nature of the agent, the 
power according to which he acts, and the essential conception of the act.  Having all three relevant pieces of 
knowledge in place is thus individually necessary and jointly sufficient for an agent to pass judgment on the 
appropriateness of the act to the given circumstances.  See Quodlibet 18. 
222 Quodlibet 18, a.3, nn.39-40.  See also Lectura II, d.40, q. un, n.11, for Scotus’s correspondence theory of truth, 
i.e., truth is a conformity of something out in the world with the intellect.  
223 See also Quaestiones SuperLibros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis V, q.11, n.20.  
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thing, whereby the subject could exist without the secondary perfection.   
In this context, the ‘subject’ refers to the act of willing, and the perfection (goodness) 
adds to the act when the act conforms with certain conditions as the agent’s right reason dictates.  
Here, Scotus wishes to highlight secondary goodness’s accidental character – it’s added to an act 
as an accident is added to a subject.  It doesn’t constitute the act as such, but adds to it.  So all 
acts are good by virtue of the fact that they exist; that is, all acts have primary goodness, which 
converts with being.  But not every act is accidentally good.  As a secondary perfection, this 
goodness adds to an act only when the act suitably conforms to a number of external features or 
conditions.    
It might be helpful to see this distinction briefly play out in Scotus’s talk of badness. 
Badness, he claims, is not a privation of the primary goodness of being (transcendental 
goodness), but of secondary goodness:  
Badness is not opposed to the goodness that is convertible with being, but is opposed to the 
nature which it deprives, and it never deprives the entire nature, just as blindness is not 
opposed to just any nature, but to the power of vision in the eye, and so it is a lack of 
goodness in the eye which ought to be there.  And so that goodness, which is opposed to 
sin, is rectitude which ought to inhere in an act of willing, and its discord is its own 
badness.  And hence sin is a privation of goodness—not that is there, but that should be 
there.224   
Badness corrupts something good that should be there.  Blindness, for example, is privately bad 
because it deprives someone of some good which they ought to have, namely, sight.  Moral 
badness, which conflicts with secondary moral goodness, is not opposed to the transcendental 
goodness of being, since, in order for something to be bad, it must first be a thing that exists, but 
                                                 
224 Lectura II, d.34-37, q.1-5, n.61.  “Malum non opponitur bono quod convertitur cum ente, sed opponitur naturae 
quam privat, et numquam privat totam naturam, sicut caecitas non opponitur cuilibet naturae, sed virtuti visivae in 
oculo, unde est carentia boni in oculo quod deberet inesse. Ita bonitas ista, cui opponitur peccatum, est rectitudo 
quae deberet inesse actui voluntatis, et eius discordia est suum malum.  Unde peccatum est privatio boni non quod 
inest, sed quod deberet inesse.” 
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rather conflicts with the type of goodness that a will should have.  A will ought to behave rightly 
in the same way that eyes ought to see: there is a normativity to the goodness in question.  But if 
the entity, whether we’re talking about eyes or wills, were to lose that goodness that it ought to 
have, the entity wouldn’t cease to exist as the type of thing it is, but it would be defective 
nonetheless.  Hence secondary goodness accidentally perfects its subject.    
Secondary Goodness as a Non-Absolute Quality 
Scotus also claims that secondary goodness is not an absolute quality, but a relative one.   
As previously mentioned in a different context, relations for Scotus are “relative beings” because 
their existence depends upon an absolute category.  Relations and absolutes, according to Scotus, 
differ in terms of their rationes: the ratio of something absolute is ad se because it refers “to 
itself,” while the ratio of a relation is ad aliud—it, by nature, refers to something beyond 
itself.225  So relative beings depend upon their foundation in something absolute.  According to 
Scotus, only the first three of Aristotle’s categories are ‘absolute’ in the above sense: substance, 
quality, and quantity.  The other seven categories are ‘relatives’ because their existence depends 
upon their foundation in an absolute category (while referring to something else).  For example, 
consider the “taller than” relation: suppose John is taller than Bill.  The relation “taller than” 
inheres in the foundational category of John’s quantity, and refers to Bill.  The relation couldn’t 
exist without the foundation, but is nevertheless something over and above the foundation itself.  
Secondary goodness is relational in a similar sense: it’s not an absolute quality because it 
                                                 
225 See for example, Ordinatio II, d.1, q.5, n.244, textus interpolatus: “relatio, si non fundetur in alio, non est relatio; 
igitur, vel erit processus in infinitum, vel relatio tandem fundabitur in absoluto.  Sed ratio absoluti est quod sit ad se, 
ratio vero formalis relationis est habitudo ad aliud; non est autem eadem entitas formalis ‘ad se’ et ‘ad aliud;’ igitur 
etc.”    
88 
 
depends upon conditions from multiple categories, such as a substance, an act, etc., especially as 
right reason dictates:  “I say that the moral goodness of an act is from the aggregation of all those 
things which are fitting to the act, not an absolute quality from the nature of the act, but what is 
fitting to it according to right reason.”226  So when Scotus states that secondary goodness is a 
non-absolute quality, he emphasizes once again its relational nature: its ratio is ad aliud; like any 
relative or relation, its nature is directed at its relata and its existence essentially depends upon 
its foundation.  Thus secondary goodness cannot be explained solely in terms of the nature of the 
act as an act (i.e., in terms of an absolute quality), but necessarily refers to the act’s extrinsic 
relation to other things.  When the relation is proper or fitting (conveniens) to the act and the 
agent as dictated by right reason, the act obtains its secondary goodness.227   
Secondary Goodness in Comparison with Beauty 
Moral philosophers in the western tradition since Plato and Aristotle have often looked to 
analogies with health or medicine on the one hand, and aesthetics on the other, in order to 
explain certain features of the moral realm.  While Aquinas focuses his own analogies on health, 
many scholars have noticed Scotus’s appeal to aesthetics, and especially the similarities between 
goodness and beauty in describing a morally good act. 228  This connection with beauty, I hope, 
will shed some light on nature of secondary goodness.  
According to Scotus, the marks of beauty are the ordered arrangement and harmony 
                                                 
226 Ordinatio II, d.40, q.un, n.8: “De secundo, dico quod bonitas actus moralis est ex aggregatione omnium 
convenientium actui, non absolute ex natura actus, sed quae conveniunt ei secundum rationem rectam.”  
227 Just how acts obtain this secondary goodness will be the topic of a later chapter.  
228 See Mary Beth Ingham, The Harmony of Goodness: Mutuality and Moral Living According to Duns Scotus (St. 
Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2012), 96.   See also Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, 1098a9-10 
and 1103a34 for an analogy with a musician.  See Nicomachean Ethics I 1094a7, 1094b24, 1097a16-18 for 
analogies between morality and health.  
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among the parts that constitute the beautiful thing.  For example, Scotus claims that “light and 
color require a determined counterbalancing arrangement in a subject” and that “the beauty of a 
body is the symmetry of the parts with a certain attractiveness of color.”229  He claims that the 
“beauty of bodies…is the appropriate arrangement of the members.”230  
What is true for beautiful bodies is also true in the musical realm: the harmonious sound 
on a lyre delights the hearer, but when the same strings are plucked in a different order they 
make a different sound, and that change doesn’t always result in a delightful sound.  When such 
a change occurs, the transformation in the sense of hearing results from the sound itself, but its 
delightfulness “is not derived from the sound as it is a sound, but from its harmony and its being 
ordered in such a way.”231  Obviously, the sounds themselves provide the basis for hearing the 
sounds, but the organization and relation between such sounds make them beautiful to the sense 
of hearing.  So the beauty of a sound derives not merely from the sound, but from the ordered 
arrangement of the sounds functioning harmoniously.232   
In the parallel passage from the Ordinatio, Scotus provides an example from the beating 
of a percussion instrument:  
Similarly, a sound is more from the percussion of the sounding body than from the order of 
the percussion; but the sound's being agreeable to the sense of hearing is more from the 
order of the percussion than from the efficacy of the power that strikes [the object].  Indeed, 
                                                 
229 Ordinatio IV, d.49, q.15, n.1 (Wadding).  “Lux et color requirunt determinatam dispositionem contrariam in 
subject.”  “Pulchritudo corporis est partium congruentia cum quadam coloris suavitate.” 
230 Quaestiones Super Praedicamenta Aristotelis Q.36, n.89.  “Ad tertium dico decor et pulchritudo, loquendo de 
pulchritudine corporali quae est conveniens membrorum dispositio, sunt in quarta specie qualitatis.”  
231 Lectura I, d.17, pars. 1, q.un, n. 95: “Sonus harmonicus in cithara immutat auditum, delectationem causando; et si 
fiant eaedem notae, alio tamen modo ordinatae—ut si cordae percutiantur alio ordine—non causabit delectationem 
nec sonum delectabilem.  Quid est causa principalis istius immutationis? Certe sonus, et non convenientia aut 
proportio in sono, quia relation non est causa effectus; temen absolutum sub relatione potest esse causa effectus 
cuius non esset causa nisi haberet illam relationem…immutatio igitur auditus a sono est propter sonum, sed quod sit 
delectabilis, hoc non est a sono ut sonus est, sed ut harmonicus et sic ordinatus.” 
232 In the same way that a relation requires an absolute for its foundation but is nevertheless something over and 
above the things that it relates.   
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the power that strikes [the object] could be more efficacious and yet [the sound it produces 
could be] less agreeable, indeed not agreeable at all to the sense of hearing, because the 
sound isn't harmonious.233   
According to Scotus, just beating a drum doesn’t make the sound delightful or agreeable to the 
listener; rather, it’s the order and harmony imposed on the beats that makes the sounds produced 
beautiful.  Just making the sound louder—adding more being to the sound—doesn’t necessarily 
make the sound more beautiful or harmonious.234  While the beating or striking of the drum 
causes the sound itself, the beauty or agreeableness of the sound results from the complex and 
harmonious relation that various beats have to each other and the listener.235   
Scotus applies this same criterion not only to music and bodies, but to morally good acts, 
in which he draws a direct parallel.  For example, consider the two following passages:  
It can be said that just as beauty is not some absolute quality in a corporeal body, but is the 
aggregation of all things appropriate to such a body (such as magnitude, shape, and color), 
and the aggregation of all its aspects (which are all fitting of that body and to each other), 
so also the moral goodness of an act is a certain décor of the act, including the aggregation 
of proper proportion to all things to which it should be proportioned (such as the potency, 
the object, the end, the time, the location and the manner), and this specifically as what is 
                                                 
233 Ordinatio I, d.17, pars 1, q.1-2, n.152: “Similiter, sonus magis est ex percussione corporis sonantis quam ex 
ordine percussionis, et tamem ut acceptabilis auditui, magis est ex ordine percussionis quam ex efficacia potentiae 
percutientis; immo posset esse efficacior virtus percutiens, et minus acceptabilis; immo omnino non acceptabilis 
auditui, quia non est sonus harmonicus.”  
234 Note that this would be the case if beauty were an absolute, transcendental quality that is formally distinct with 
being. But this passage makes it clear that beauty is not such a quality.   
235 Although the two passages above don’t specifically speak of beauty, Scotus does speak of the harmony and order 
of the music delighting the hearer, and in other contexts, Scotus suggests that the proper response to beauty is 
delight.  In fact, the more beautiful the body, the more delight it brings. Ordinatio I, d.1, pars 2, n.133: “Magis enim 
necessario pulcherrimum visum delectat appetitum visivum quam minus pulchrum, et si ille appetitus posset se ferre 
in illum visum actu elicito, magis necessario se ferret vel ferretur in pulchrius visum quam in minus pulchrum.”  For 
Scotus’s connection between beauty and delight, see also Ordinatio III, d.34, q.un, n.55 (Quod si loquamur de 
divitiis in quantum sunt pulchrae, hoc est in quantum sunt bonum delectibile…); Ordinatio IV, d.49, q.15, n.1-2 
(Wadding).  Francis J. Kovach calls this Scotus’s subjective account of beauty and that “delight is the natural effect 
of beauty in the beholder” (447).  See Kovach, “Divine and Human Beauty in Duns Scotus’s Philosophy and 
Theology,” Deus et homo ad mentem I.  Duns Scoti.  Acta tertii Congressus scotistici internationalis.  Vindebonae, 
28 sept.-2 oct. 1970 (1972): 447.   
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dictated by right reason ought to pertain to the act…236 
And,  
I say that just as beauty in a body is derived from the aggregation of all things fitting to that 
body and the [relations] between them, for instance, the size, color, and shape…so also 
natural goodness—not that which is convertible with being, but that which has badness as 
its opposite—is a secondary perfection of a thing, whose completeness [is derived] from all 
the things fitting to it and the relations between those things.237 
Consider four things that will aid in our seeing Scotus’s connection between beauty and 
secondary goodness.  First, notice that in each of these passages,238 Scotus offers two 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for beauty in corporeal bodies: one, 
beauty in a body results from the combination or aggregation of all things that are fitting to that 
particular body (est aggregatio omnium comvenientium tali corpori).  He gives the examples of 
size (magnitude), color, and shape.  The size, color, and shape that make a giraffe beautiful will 
no doubt be different from the same qualities in a peacock.  So proper fittingness is indexed to 
particular types of bodies.   
But not only must the qualities fit particular kinds of bodies, the relations between such 
features themselves must also harmonize.  In other words, the parts that make up the beautiful 
body must also be proportioned suitably with each other.  For example, while a large nose might 
be fitting to some humans, if the size of the body was proportionally small to the nose, then the 
                                                 
236 Ordinatio I, d. 17, p.1, q.2, n.62: “dici potest quod sicut pulchritudo non est aliqua qualitas absoluta in corpore 
pulchro, sed est aggregatio omnium convenientium tali corpori (puta magnitudinis, figurae, et coloris), et aggregatio 
etiam omnium respectuum (qui sunt istorum ad corpus et ad se invicem), ita bonitas moralis actus est quasi quidam 
decor illius actus, includens aggregationem debitae proportionis ad omnia ad quae habet proportionari (puta ad 
potentiam, ad obiectum, ad finem, ad tempus, ad locum et ad modum), et hoc specialiter ut ista dicantur a ratione 
recta debere convenire actui…” 
237 Ordinatio II, d.40, q.un, n.7: “Dico quod sicut in corpore pulchritudo est ex aggregatione omnuim convenientium 
illa corpori et inter se, puta quantitatis, coloris et figurae…ita bonitatis naturalis—non illa quae convertitur cum ente, 
sed illa quae habet malum oppositum—est perfectio secunda alicuius rei, integra ex omnibus convenientibus sibi et 
sibi invicem.”  
238 See also Reportatio II, d. 40, q.un, n.4.   
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person in question wouldn’t be beautiful because the nose wouldn’t fit the face.  So while a large 
nose might be proper to Andre the Giant or Goliath, the same nose on a small woman would be 
disproportionate to her size, and thus, unfitting and not beautiful.  Likewise, acts must be fitting 
to their agent—as the type of agent and act—and harmonious with all the factors pertaining to 
the act as dictated by right reason.  
Second, beauty, like (secondary) goodness, is a secondary perfection of the thing, and so 
extrinsic to the body itself.  As we’ve seen, primary perfections essentially and intrinsically 
characterize substances as the types of thing that they are, and so primary perfections cannot be 
lost without changing the nature of the entity.  Secondary perfections are extrinsic and accidental 
perfections of the entity, because they extrinsically add something to the entity in question.  As 
Gerard Sondag puts it, “Both goodness and beauty are called perfectiones secundae, because an 
act can lose its goodness, and a body can be ugly natura stante, that is without any change in the 
proper nature of that being.”239        
Third, beauty, like secondary goodness, is not an absolute quality.  Here, ‘absolute’ can 
be taken in two senses, and I think both are appropriate.  First, absolute qualities characterize 
subjects without the need to refer to something beyond the nature of the subject to do so.  
Primary goodness, for example, would be such a quality.  In contrast, non-absolute qualities are 
relational in nature—they require reference to something beyond the nature of the subject for 
their content.  Beauty from the beating of the drum, for example, doesn’t depend simply on how 
hard one hits the drum, but upon the order and harmony imposed upon the beating by the 
drummer.240  Likewise, an act’s secondary goodness does not simply depend upon performing 
                                                 
239 Gerard Sondag, “The Conditional Definition of Beauty by Scotus,” Medioevo 30 (2005), 196.  
240 Ordinatio I, d.17, pars 1, q.1-2, n.152.   
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the act, but upon certain suitable conditions being present when the agent acts.241  So beauty and 
secondary goodness are non-absolute because whether they add to the act or the body depends 
upon other appropriate features.  And this implies a second way beauty and (secondary) 
goodness are not absolute qualities: they are not absolute, taking ‘absolute’ to mean ‘non-
composite.’  In other words, they are not simple qualities had by entities.242  The size of a body 
in terms of its quantity, for example, would be a simple quality in this sense.  But beauty can’t be 
simple in this way, since its existence depends upon the suitability and harmonious relations 
among a number of qualities, including color, size, and shape.  In other words, beauty is 
composite in nature.  The same holds true for secondary moral goodness, since its existence in an 
act depends upon the end, the object, etc., as dictated by right reason.   
Consequently, two human bodies can have an identical amount of being—and thus an 
identical amount of ontological goodness—while differing in their respective amounts of beauty, 
say, if one has disproportional features.  This shows that ontological goodness—i.e., 
transcendental goodness—is not really or formally identical with beauty.243  Similarly, two acts 
can have the same amount of being and thus the same amount of ontological goodness, say, 
because they are the same type of act, but differ in their secondary goodness.  For example, if 
one person were to give alms to the poor for the sake of vainglory, while another gave the same 
amount of alms out of love for humanity, the acts would retain the identical amount of 
ontological goodness as their respect types of acts, but the latter act would also have a secondary 
goodness that the former act lacked, since it aimed at a good end.  
                                                 
241 For example, whether the act of having sex with a woman has secondary goodness depends upon whether that 
woman is my wife or not, among other things.  
242 Cf. Gerard Sondag, “The Conditional Definition of Beauty by Scotus,” 197-198.  He thinks that this is the sole 
meaning of “pulchritudo non est aliqua qualitas absoluta in corpore pulchro.” 
243 I’ll deal with this issue in depth below, as some have mistaken beauty as one of Scotus’s transcendentals.  
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Fourth, I think it’s best to characterize both secondary goodness and beauty as 
supervenient properties.  In fact, Scotus himself likens beauty and goodness to a complex 
supervenient property in at least two passages.  In a passing comment in Ordinatio IV, Scotus 
states that “perfection supervenes on an act, just as beauty supervenes on a youth.”244  Since both 
beauty and secondary goodness are secondary perfections, secondary perfections supervene upon 
them—they add to each something over and above the nature of the things that ground them.   
We see this clearly in a passage distinguishing secondary from primary goodness: 
For just as primary goodness of being, which is called essential goodness and is the 
integrity or perfection of being in itself, conveys positively a negation of imperfection that 
excludes imperfection and diminution, so also secondary goodness of being, which is 
accidental or supervenient to the entity, is its perfect suitability to, or integral harmony 
with, something else which it ought to have or which ought to have it.245              
If we think carefully about beauty and goodness, we can see why Scotus wishes to characterize 
both of them in terms of supervenience: since such a body’s beauty depends upon the suitability 
of its size, shape, and color to that body, any change in these base properties will necessarily 
result in a change in its amount of beauty.  So if two beautiful bodies agree in their base 
properties, they will agree in their respective beauty.    
 Similarly, since an act’s secondary goodness depends upon its suitability to the agent and 
the circumstances surrounding the completion of the act, as right reason dictates, any change in 
these base conditions or circumstances results in a change in the act’s moral goodness.  
Furthermore, as we should expect in ethics, any two acts performed by the same type of agent 
under the same conditions and circumstances, should necessarily result in the same amount of 
                                                 
244 Ordinatio IV, d.49, pars. 1, q.4, n.197: “Perfectio superveniens operationi, sicut pulchritudo iuveni.” 
245 Scotus, Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.9: “Sicut enim bonitas primaria entis, quae dicitur bonitas essentialis, quae est 
integritas vel perfectio entis in se, importat positive negationem imperfectionis, per quod excluditur imperfection et 
diminutio sic bonitas entis secondaria, quae est accidentalis sive superveniens entitati, est integritas convenientiae 
vel integra convenientia eius alteri cui debet convenire vel alterius sibi.” 
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secondary goodness.    
An Aside: Beauty and the Transcendentals 
Astute readers may already know the answer to this question, but since it’s a 
controversial topic these days, it needs to be asked nonetheless: does Scotus think that beauty—
like truth, unity, and goodness—is transcendental?  In other words, is beauty a necessarily 
coextensive property of being?  Well, that seems to depend upon who you ask.  Some scholars, 
such as Kovach, argue that Scotus numbers beauty among the transcendentals.246  Others, such as 
Wolter, deny this.247  Some, like Jan A. Aertsen, remain silent on the topic.248  
According to Wolter, the answer is clearly, “no.”  In his seminal work on Scotus’s 
conception of the transcendentals, Wolter claims that “Unity, truth, and goodness are the 
transcendental attributes coextensive with being.”  He goes on to claim that “Unlike Alexander 
of Hales, who identifies beauty with the bonum honestum, Scotus does not attempt to add ‘the 
beautiful’ as a distinct member of the trinity of coextensive transcendentals.”249  Wolter’s 
argument hinges on the fact the Scotus never explicitly mentions beauty among the coextensive 
attributes of being.  Two considerations worth mentioning that make this claim inconclusive 
without corroborating evidence (which I intend to provide below): first, as an argument from 
silence, it is the weakest form of evidence.    
Second, while Scotus never explicitly lists beauty among the coextensive attributes of 
being, his claims about what counts as a coextensive attribute is ambiguous, for his wording 
                                                 
246 Kovach, “Divine and Human Beauty in Duns Scotus’s Philosophy and Theology,” 448 
247 Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus, 100.   
248 Jan A. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to 
Francisco Suárez (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2012), 371-432. 
249 Wolter, The Transcendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of John Duns Scotus, 100.   
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implies that goodness, unity, and truth are merely examples of coextensive attributes of being.  
For instance, Scotus says that being “has simple convertible attributes, such as (sicut) one, true, 
and good.”250  Elsewhere, he says that “being contains each attribute of being, such as truth, 
goodness, and unity” (ut veritatem, bonitatem, et unitatem).251 In book VI of Quaestiones super 
Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, he says that these transcendentals are “quasi-attributes of being, 
such as true, good, etc.” (ut verum, bonum, etc.).252   
Consequently, it’s unclear from these passages whether Scotus means to provide an 
exhaustive list of coextensive attributes (i.e., only those three) or simply examples—of which 
goodness, unity, and truth are the most common but not exclusive instances.  If these are merely 
examples, then ontological space would be carved out for beauty to function as a coextensive 
property of being.  In any case, demonstrating that beauty is in fact a coextensive property of 
being and thus transcendental requires more convincing evidence beyond the semantic ambiguity 
contained in ‘sicut’ and ‘ut.’  In other words, this merely shows that it’s possible Scotus had in 
mind more attributes of being than he mentions in the text; but it doesn’t show this is actually the 
case.  For that, more confirmation is needed.  So I’ll contend that Wolter is correct, but for the 
wrong reasons.  But first, what’s the supposed evidence from Kovach that Scotus takes beauty to 
be transcendental?  
Kovach suggests that there are two groups of texts that lend support for the claim Scotus 
envisions beauty as one of the transcendentals.  First, Kovach enlists texts purporting to show 
that “Scotus uses terms ‘beauty’ and ‘goodness’ interchangeably or, at least, emphasizes the 
                                                 
250 Ordinatio I, d.8, pars1, q.3, n.114.  “Ens non tantum passiones simplices convertibiles, sicut unum, verum, et 
bonum, sed habet aliquas passiones…” 
251 Odinatio II, d.1, q.4-5, n.273: “Ens contineat quamlibet passionem entis (ut veritatem, bonitatem, et unitatem).” 
252 Quaestiones super Metaphysicorum Aristotelis VI, q.3, n.20. 
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similarity of their natures.”253  Most of the work is done in a footnote, but the passages from 
Scotus supposedly showing that beauty and goodness are interchangeable or similar in nature are 
as follows:  
It can be said that just as beauty is not some absolute quality in a corporeal body, but is the 
aggregation of all things appropriate to such a body (such as magnitude, shape, and color), 
and the aggregation of all its aspects (which are all fitting of that body and to each other), 
so also the moral goodness of an act is a certain décor of the act, including the aggregation 
of proper proportion to all things to which it should be proportioned (such as the potency, 
the object, the end, the time, the location and the manner), and this specifically as what is 
dictated by right reason ought to pertain to the act…254 
And,   
[Moral goodness] has all its goodness from the circumstances, and this goodness is related 
in the same way that beauty is related to a body.  For beauty in a body is not from one 
quality alone, but from the proportion of many qualities to each other, and to the subject in 
which they inhere…Therefore beauty is not one absolute quality in a body, just as health is 
not [one absolute quality], but requires a fittingness or proportion…therefore moral 
goodness is perfect from a correspondence to right reason according to all of the 
circumstances…” 255 
According to Kovach, these two texts imply an interchangeability of the terms ‘goodness’ and 
                                                 
253 Kovach, “Divine and Human Beauty in Duns Scotus’s Philosophy and Theology,” 448.  
254 Ordinatio I, d. 17, p.1, q.2, n.62: “dici potest quod sicut pulchritudo non est aliqua qualitas absoluta in corpore 
pulchro, sed est aggregatio omnium comvenientium tali corpori (puta magnitudinis, figurae, et coloris), et aggregatio 
etiam omnium respectuum (qui sunt istorum ad corpus et ad se invicem), ita bonitas moralis actus est quasi quidam 
decor illius actus, includens aggregationem debitae proportionis ad omnia ad quae habet proportionari (puta ad 
potentiam, ad obiectum, ad finem, ad tempus, ad locum et ad modum), et hoc specialiter ut ista dicantur a ratione 
recta debere comvenire actui…” 
255 Reportatio II, d.40, q.un, n.2 (Wadding):  “…et ista habet universaliorem bonitatem ex circumstantiis, et talis 
bonitas se habet sicut pulchritudo ad corpus.  Pulchritudo enim in corpore non est ex una qualitate tantum, sed ex 
proportione multarum ad invicem, et ad subiectum in quo sunt, ita quod talis sit ibi, et talis ibi.  Pulchritudo igitur 
nihil unum absolutum est corpore, sicut nec sanitas, sed requirit convenientiam, vel proportionem humorum, et ideo 
excessus unuis causat infirmitatem, et cum iterum reducitur, redit sanitas, idea ad talia non is motus per se, 7. 
Physicorum.  Bonitas igitur moralis complete est ex correspondentia ad rationem rectam secundum omnes 
circumstantias.”   I find Kovach’s use of the Reportatio account here strange, when the parallel passage in the 
Ordinatio is critically edited.  The reason for the omission, I suspect, is that it contradicts Kovach’s argument, for 
the parallel passage in the Ordinatio explicitly says that the type of goodness that beauty is similar to is not the type 
of goodness that is convertible with being.  More on this later!  
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‘beauty’ and thus they “indicate that Scotus holds a real identity of ‘beauty’ and ‘goodness.’”256  
From this, he concludes the following:  
In brief, Scotus seems to teach the real identity and the formal or logical distinction 
between the good and the beautiful.  This, in turn, would mean the co-extensiveness of 
beauty with goodness and, since goodness is one of Scotus’s simple transcendentals, the co-
extensiveness of beauty with being.257 
Kovach’s argument seems to be something like this:  
(1) Being is transcendental.  
(2) Scotus claims that goodness is a coextensive property of being, and is thus 
transcendental.  
(3) Scotus claims that goodness and beauty are really identical and formally distinct.  
(4) Therefore, by the transitivity of identity, Scotus must think beauty is a 
coextensive property of being, and thus transcendental.    
Second, Kovach suggests a linguistic argument for postulating beauty as one of the 
proper attributes coextensive with being.  Kovach states that when Scotus refers to the proper 
attributes that are coextensive with being, “Scotus lists the one, the true, and the good not as the 
only three simple transcendentals but, instead, as being among those transcendentals or examples 
of them.”258  He concludes that Scotus must have in mind at least one more “absolute 
transcendental coextensive with being” and the best candidate is beauty.259  From the two 
arguments, Kovach reiterates his claim: “In the light of these arguments it is difficult to doubt 
that, to Scotus, the scope of beauty is identical with the scope of goodness, as both beauty and 
                                                 
256 Kovach, “Divine and Human Beauty in Duns Scotus’s Philosophy and Theology,” 449.   
257 Kovach, “Divine and Human Beauty in Duns Scotus’s Philosophy and Theology,” 449. 
258 Kovach, “Divine and Human Beauty in Duns Scotus’s Philosophy and Theology,” 450.  
259 Kovach, “Divine and Human Beauty in Duns Scotus’s Philosophy and Theology,” 450. 
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goodness are coextensive with being.”260 
Let’s take the second argument first.  The ambiguity in Scotus’s description cuts both 
ways: it neither provides support for the claim that there are no other proper attributes of being, 
as Wolter surmises; nor does it provide any rational support for the adding of beauty as Kovach 
suggests.  And in all of the authentic texts we have about the proper attributes of being, Scotus 
never mentions beauty as among these coextensive proper attributes.261  So Kovach’s claims are 
merely speculation, unless evidence can be substantiated for his first argument above.   
So, what about that first argument purporting to show the interchangeability of beauty 
and goodness?  Premises (1) and (2) are certainly true, and have been demonstrated in the first 
three chapters of this dissertation.  The crucial question is thus whether premise (3) is true; in 
other words, whether Scotus really claims that beauty and goodness are really identical and 
formally distinct.  Unfortunately, premise (3) of Kovach’s argument is simply false, for two 
reasons.  First, in the passages enlisted by Kovach above, Scotus nowhere claims that goodness 
and beauty are coextensive or identical; rather, he merely states that what makes something 
beautiful and what makes something morally good are similar in the sense that they are both non-
absolute qualities that require a harmony of a number of external conditions in order to obtain.    
Second, Kovach has not paid enough attention to the Subtle Doctor’s distinction between 
two disparate types of goodness.  As we have seen, Scotus makes a distinction between two 
types of goodness, only one of which is transcendental.  So we need to ask which type of 
goodness Scotus thinks beauty is similar to: primary goodness, which is transcendental and a 
                                                 
260 Kovach, “Divine and Human Beauty in Duns Scotus’s Philosophy and Theology,” 451. 
261 See Ordinatio I, d.3, pars 1, q.3, n.134; Ordinatio I, d.8, pars1, q.3, nn.114 and 126; Ordinatio I, d.39, q.1-5, n.13 
(Appendix A in the Vatican edition vol VI); Odinatio II, d.1, q.4-5, n.273; Ordinatio III, d. 8, q. un., n.50; 
Reportatio IIA, d.16, q.un; and Quaestiones super Metaphysicorum Aristotelis VI, q.3, n.20. 
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coextensive property of being, or secondary goodness, which is an accidental property of being?  
Well, as I have shown throughout this chapter, Scotus often links beauty with secondary 
goodness—the type of goodness that is not transcendental and is not a coextensive property of 
being.  So although Scotus connects beauty and goodness, this connection clearly concerns 
secondary goodness and not transcendental goodness.  Kovach’s argument trades on the 
ambiguity in the word ‘good,’ since Scotus means two entirely different things by it, and only in 
one sense is ‘good’ transcendental.  So, beauty, like secondary goodness is not a necessarily 
coextensive property of being and is thus not transcendental.   
Conclusion 
 In closing, I offer two final considerations.  First, in Scotus’s terminology, ‘goodness,’ as 
used indiscriminately between primary and secondary goodness, is an equivocal concept.  To see 
this, consider Scotus’s definition of a univocal concept:  
I call a concept univocal, which is so united that its unity is sufficient for a contradiction, by 
affirming and denying the concept of the same subject; a univocal concept is also sufficient 
for serving as a middle term in a syllogism, so that the extreme terms are united in the 
middle as one in such a way that the unity between them can be concluded without the 
fallacy of equivocation.262    
Let’s consider both of these “tests” for univocity in relation to “goodness.”  First, take the 
following two statements, (A) and (B), about some action C:  
(A) Action C is good.   
(B) Action C is not good.   
                                                 
262 Ordinatio I, d.3, pars 1, q.1-2, n.26.  “univocum conceptum dico, qui ita est unus quod eius unitas sufficit ad 
contradictionem, affirmando et negando ipsum de eodem; sufficit etiam pro medio syllogistico, ut extrema unita in 
medio sic uno sine fallacia aequivocationis concludantur inter se uniri.”  
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According to Scotus, if goodness is a univocal concept, then the conjunction of (A) and (B) in 
reference to C would result in a contradiction.  While the statements (A) and (B) seem prima 
facie to result in a contradiction, it really depends upon the meaning of ‘good’ in both contexts.  
As it turns out, (A) and (B) are not contradictory if one takes goodness in the two different 
senses Scotus has in mind.  Let “goodness 1” represent primary goodness and “goodness 2” 
represent secondary goodness.  We can now see why goodness is equivocal rather than univocal; 
namely, because there is at least one possible state of affairs, such that we can affirm and deny 
goodness of the same subject.  Consider, for example, 
(A*)     Action C is good 1. 
(B*)     Action C is not good 2.   
Since goodness1 refers to primary goodness, which is a transcendental property of being, 
everything that has being will also be good in this sense.  Since every act has some amount of 
being, it will be good in the sense of goodness1.  But not every act is good in terms of goodness 2, 
for many acts are disordered in some way.  For example, let action C be the act of murdering 
someone.  In such a case, action C would be good in the good 1 sense, but not good in a good 2 
sense.  So the concept of goodness is not univocal, but equivocal, since (A*) and (B*) do not 
result in a contradiction, when supplied with the appropriate concepts of goodness. 
Second, a univocal concept can serve as the middle term in a syllogism without resulting 
in the fallacy of equivocation.  So take the following syllogism:  
(1) Every good act is worthy of praise.  
(2) Action C is a good act.  
(3) Therefore, C is worthy of praise.   
If goodness were to have a univocal meaning, then it could serve as the middle term in such a 
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syllogism.  Indeed, as it stands it seems like it’s a valid argument.  However, as Scotus 
understands goodness, it cannot serve as a middle term in the above case.  For, suppose ‘good’ in 
premise (1) is taken in terms of ‘goodness 2,’ while ‘good’ in premise (2) is taken in terms of 
‘goodness 1,’ and action C was the act of murdering someone.  In such a case, both the premises 
could be true and the conclusion false, due to the fallacy of equivocation: premise (1) is only true 
if taken in the secondary sense of goodness, while premise (2) is true for any act whatsoever if 
taken in the primary sense of goodness.   
Therefore, goodness, as used indifferently to mean both primary and secondary goodness, 
is an equivocal concept: primary goodness is predicated in quale of whatever being is predicated 
in quid; secondary goodness accidentally and extrinsically perfects a subject and depends upon 
the obtainment of a number of external circumstances or conditions.  Furthermore, primary 
goodness is transcendental: it’s a necessarily coextensive formal property or perfection of being, 
such that every act, insofar as it exists as an act, has this ontological goodness.  In contrast, 
secondary goodness isn’t transcendental, it doesn’t convert with being (it is not a necessarily 
coextensive property of being), but depends upon a number of factors, and the act in which it 
ought to inhere could still exist and lack this secondary goodness.  
Second, secondary goodness is a kind of suitability or harmony of a thing to something 
else.  Suitability is grounded in the nature of the things that form its basis.  If primary goodness 
supervenes upon substances in accordance with their being, then secondary goodness can also be 
characterized by a complex supervenience relation.  But to see this, we need to look at secondary 
goodness in terms of an act.  The goodness of a moral act will be the aggregation of all things 
fitting to that act under the guidance of right reason.263  But Scotus—and the medieval tradition 
                                                 
263 For example see Ordinatio II, d.40, q.un, n.8.   
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that preceded him—does not have one type of secondary goodness, but varying levels of 
supervenient goodness that are added to an act based upon a number of conditions and 
circumstances.  Ultimately, this will result in a threefold hierarchy of secondary goodness in the 
acts of rational agents: generic, moral, and meritorious goodness.  In order to situate Scotus’s 
account in this long and varied history, in the next chapter (chapter 5) I explore this history prior 
to Scotus.  Then in chapter 6 we’ll look at Scotus’s own account of these three levels of 
secondary goodness, and finally (chapter 7), Scotus’s threefold account of badness that 
corresponds to this threefold level of goodness.
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
GENERIC, MORAL, AND MERITORIOUS GOODNESS PRIOR TO SCOTUS 
 
The distinction between primary and secondary goodness wasn’t formulated by Scotus in 
a vacuum.  Rather, he expands upon an earlier tradition that distinguished ontological goodness 
from moral goodness, and then further distinguished various levels of moral goodness: generic, 
circumstantial, and meritorious.  The context for Scotus’s claims on the matter is set by a long 
and convoluted history: it originates with some cryptic phrases of Peter Lombard, distinguishing 
ontological goodness from moral goodness, and then further distinguishing various levels of 
moral goodness in order to overcome an Augustinian worry as well as challenge Peter 
Abelard.  Peter of Poitiers, Lombard’s student, adds that the circumstances play a role in moral 
goodness, but does little to explain what role the circumstances actually play.  Philip the 
Chancellor explains why an act has generic goodness and distinguishes all three levels of moral 
goodness—generic, circumstantial, and meritorious.  Albert the Great expands upon Philip's 
threefold account by specifying the various circumstances that make an act circumstantially 
good.  Bonaventure reiterates the traditional account inspired by Lombard, but often calls 
ontological goodness ‘primary goodness,’ and moral goodness ‘secondary goodness,’ as Scotus 
will also do.  In contrast, Aquinas does not distinguish ontological goodness from moral 
goodness, and so his entire discussion of the metaphysics of goodness differs significantly from 
the tradition that preceded him.  Since little of the recent work on Scotus’s metaphysics of 
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goodness situates it within this long and convoluted history,264 this chapter aims to do just that.  
As will become clear over the next two chapters, Scotus articulates a more traditional approach 
to the metaphysics of goodness than Aquinas, and this will result in some surprising conclusions.   
Peter Lombard  
Peter Lombard’s discussion of the moral character of acts in Sentences II, d.34-42 forms 
the basis for later debates on the subject.  Like any good medieval topic, Lombard’s discussion 
begins with a distinction: a distinction between ontological goodness and moral goodness,265 and 
then by further distinguishing levels of moral goodness that will form the basis for later 
distinctions between generic goodness (bonum in genere), moral or circumstantial goodness 
(bonum ex circumstantiis), and meritorious goodness (bonum ex gratia).   
At the heart of this section in the Sentences is the topic of sin and an attempt to reconcile 
Augustine’s claim that “everything that exists is good insofar as it exists”’266 with the claim that 
certain actions are intrinsically evil; in other words, what’s at stake concerns the compatibility of 
                                                 
264 For example, Mary Beth Ingham’s The Harmony of Goodness: Mutuality and Moral Living According to John 
Duns Scotus (Saint Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2012) has an entire chapter devoted to Scotus’s 
account of moral goodness, and yet, not one author other than Scotus himself is mentioned.  Again, Thomas 
Osborne’s book, Human Action in Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham (Washington D.C: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 2014) does a fairly good job of situating Scotus’s views of goodness in 
the context of debates with Aquinas and Ockham, but fails to explain the origin or history of the views in question, 
which leads to the incongruous conclusion that Scotus transforms the “traditional views” of Aquinas.  I will show in 
the next chapter that this is false, precisely because Osborne does not take into account the history prior to Aquinas.   
A notable exception is Tobias Hoffmann’s article, “Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in Aquinas in 
Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Duns Scotus,” The Thomist 67 (2003), 73-94. The scope of this 
article, however, is limited to the end and object in this tradition, and not the various types of goodness that result 
from it.    
265 See for example Sentences II, d. 34, c.4; Sentences II d. 35, c.2.  All references from Lombard, Libri IV 
Sententiarum (Bonaventurae, 1916).   
266 See Augustine, Confessions VII, 12 (18): “Ergo si omni bono privabuntur, omnino nulla erunt: ergo quamdiu 
sunt, bona sunt.  Ergo quaecumque sunt, bona sunt, malumque illud quod quaerebam unde esset non est substantia, 
quia si substantia esset, bonum est.”   Augustine, Confessions Vol. 1: Introduction and Text, edited by James 
O’Donnell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 82.  See also Enchiridion, c11; De Natura Boni, i-iii.  
Lombard, Sentences II, d.34, c.4.  
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[B] with the existence of sinful acts.  If every being, in so far as it has being, is good, then every 
act, insofar as it has being, is good.  But if sinful acts are bad, then we seem to be committed to 
saying either that bad acts are good, or that not every act, in so far as it has being, is good.  This 
first option seems infelicitous; the second denies [B].  Hence neither of these options seems 
promising.  As we saw in the previous chapter, Scotus addressed this issue by distinguishing 
ontological goodness from moral goodness, and claiming only the former converts with being.  
As we will see in this chapter, Scotus inherits this solution from Lombard and his followers.  
In any case, Abelard’s bold claims a century earlier complicated this issue, as he 
distinguished sharply between the interior act of consent and the exterior, bodily act and 
emphatically claimed that only the interior act—the intention—matters for the act’s moral 
value.267  On Abelard’s account, the exterior act is neutral.268  Consequently, the agent’s intent 
makes an act good or bad, and not the exterior act itself or a conjunction of the interior and 
exterior acts.  Thus, as Lombard and his contemporaries read Abelard, no acts are good or bad in 
themselves; they gain their moral status solely by the intent of the agent.269    
In solving these twin worries, Lombard says Augustinians claim that all wills and actions, 
insofar as they are wills and actions, are good because they exist.  While all wills and actions 
have this ontological or natural goodness because they have being,270 they nevertheless can be 
                                                 
267 Peter Abelard, Scito Te Impsum, Petri Abaelardi Opera Theoligica IV, Corpus Christianorum CXC, ed. Rainer 
M. Ilgner ( Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2001), 9;  D.E. Luscombe, Peter Abelard’s Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1971), 14-15.   
268 Jean Porter, “Action and Intention,” The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, vol. 1, eds. Robert 
Pasnau and Christina Van Dyke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 507.  
269 Whether this accurately reflects Abelard’s views is a complicated question, and outside the purview of this 
dissertation.   
270 Once Aristotle’s Categories and Metaphysics are reintroduced in the West, this ‘ontological goodness’ is called 
‘transcendental goodness,’ because it transcends Aristotle’s categories: everything that exists, in so far as it exists, 
necessarily has this goodness.  
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bad when they are disordered or lack a proper end.271  In this context Lombard adds a different 
kind of goodness—moral goodness: 
[Augustinians] say that all actions, that is, insofar as they are (exist), are good by their own 
essence. But some actions, insofar are they are done inordinately, are sinful.  And they add 
that some actions are not only good by their essence, but are also generically good, such as 
to feed the hungry, which is an act of the category (genus) of works of mercy.272    
Here we see the beginning of the standard formulation of the division in the metaphysics of 
goodness between the goodness an act has because it has being and the goodness it receives (or 
doesn’t receive) from other factors involved.  Acts have an ontological goodness insofar as they 
exist or have being.  In contrast, some acts have an additional type of goodness that Lombard 
calls “generic.”  While Lombard doesn’t tell us what actually makes an act generically good, 
Lombard enlists generic goodness in order to argue against Abelard that some acts have a 
categorical goodness apart from the agent’s intention and so the intent cannot be the sole 
determinant of an act’s moral value.     
Furthermore, Lombard says that these (Augustinian) authorities add a further level of 
goodness to an act beyond its ontological goodness and generic goodness, which he calls 
“perfect” or “absolute” goodness.  An act has perfect goodness when it meets the following 
conditions: (1) it has ontological goodness from its nature as an act; (2) it is generically good, (3) 
it has a good cause and a good end.273  All acts, because they have being, meet (1); that is, all 
acts have a transcendental or ontological goodness in virtue of their existence.  Acts have a 
                                                 
271 Peter Lombard, Sentences II d. 35, c.2. 
272 Peter Lombard, Sentences II, d.36, c.6: “qui dicunt, omnes actus essentia sui, id est, in quantum sunt, esse bonos, 
quosdam vero, in quantum inordinate fiunt, peccata esse. Addunt quoque, quosdam non tantum essentia, sed etiam 
genere bonos esse, ut reficere esurientem, qui actus est de genere operum misericordiae.”  Some manuscripts contain 
the phrase “in genere” which becomes the standard way of phrasing generic goodness.  
273 Sentences II, d.36, c.6: “…quosdam vero actus absolute ac perfecte bonos dicunt, quos non solum essentia vel 
genus, sed etiam causa et finis commendant, ut sunt illi qui ex voluntate bona proveniunt et bonum finem 
metiuntur.” 
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secondary level of goodness when they are generically good, though Lombard provides no 
account of the conditions that must be met in order for an act to be generically good.  Acts have a 
further level of goodness when they have a good cause (i.e., a good will) and a good end or 
intention.  So while the intention of the act matters, contra Abelard, it is not the only determining 
factor involved—in fact, generically good acts can have a degree of moral goodness irrespective 
of their end or intention.274      
Lombard’s distinction between the ontological goodness of an act and the moral 
goodness of an act sets the precedent for future discussion of the metaphysics of goodness in at 
least two ways.  First, Lombard construes moral goodness as accidental to the act, since acts can 
exist and lack the appropriate moral goodness.275  He contrasts this with the act’s ontological or 
natural goodness, which is essential to the act: any act, insofar as it exists, has ontological 
goodness.  But not every act is morally good.  Moral goodness requires not only the act’s 
existence, but a good will aimed at a good end added to the act’s generic goodness.  Thus [B] is 
not incompatible with sinful acts, so long as we distinguish the act’s ontological goodness in 
terms of its being, from its sinfulness in terms of its disorder.   
Second, although his discussion of the levels of moral goodness—generic and perfect—
remains terse, vague, and largely unhelpful, it will nevertheless form the starting point for later 
discussions.  This “perfect goodness,” for example, will subsequently be called “moral 
goodness,” “virtuous goodness,” or the goodness an act receives from its circumstances (bonum 
ex circumstantiis).  When Philip the Chancellor writes his Summa De Bono, he glosses 
                                                 
274 Lombard doesn’t specify the role of the end in the metaphysics of the act, and this ambiguity will persist in 
subsequent authors, and ultimately lead to a divergence of views.  On the one hand, Philip the Chancellor, Albert the 
Great, and Duns Scotus will argue that the end is one of the circumstances of the act, and therefore factors into the 
act’s circumstantial goodness.  In contrast, Aquinas takes the end as the object of the interior act, and so it seems to 
apply more to an act’s generic goodness.  
275 Lombard, Sentences II, d.36, c.6. 
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Lombard’s account by adding a third level of goodness—goodness ex gratia.  Before considering 
Philip’s elaborate approach, let’s consider an early disciple of Peter Lombard, Peter of Poitiers, 
who wrote one of the first commentaries on the Sentences, and as Chancellor at Paris, can be 
credited with the success of incorporating the Sentences into the new dialectic method of 
theology in the schools and the prosperity of the Scholastic movement that was already on the 
horizon.276  
Peter of Poitiers  
Like his teacher Peter Lombard, Peter of Poitiers also feels the need, on the one hand, to 
respond to the problem of how everything that exists is good when clearly bad acts exist,277 and 
on the other, to respond to Abelardian worries concerning the indifference of every (exterior) act, 
and Abelard’s overemphasis on the intent of the agent.278  In responding to such worries, Peter 
follows the Augustinian position of his teacher by distinguishing between the ontological 
goodness an act has simply by existing, and the moral goodness or badness of an act.  Peter 
argues that badness can only exist as a privation of something good, such that the act, because it 
is an act, is ontologically good, without negating the act’s sinfulness.279  If badness had an 
independent ontological foundation, as the Manicheans thought, then it would mirror the 
relationship good has to the form of the Good by having a form of the Bad: since things are good 
by participation in the highest Good, bad things must be bad by participation in the highest Bad.  
                                                 
276 See Philip S. Moore and Marthe Dulong, “Introduction,” in Sententiae Petri Pictaviensis I, (Notre Dame: 
Univeristy of Notre Dame Press, 1943), v-vii.     
277 Peter of Poitiers, Sententiae Petri Pictaviensis II, ed. Philip S. Moore, Joseph N. Garvin, and Marthe Dulong 
(Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame, 1950), Q.12.   
278 Sententiae Petri Pictaviensis II, QQ.13-16. 
279 Sententiae Petri Pictaviensis II, Q.12, L.76-78: “Ex predictis igitur patet quaniam malum non est nisi in bono et 
quod peccatum in quantum est actus bonum est.”   
110 
 
But some ultimate form of the Bad is impossible.  So, evil cannot exist.  It must be a privation or 
corruption of something good.280   
But what about bad acts like homicide and adultery?  If homicide and adultery are acts, 
and every act is in some sense from God, then it seems as though God is the author of homicide 
and adultery.   Peter’s argument runs something like this:  
(1) For all x, if x exists (i.e., has being), then x is from God.281  
(2) Acts exist (i.e., have being).  
(3) Therefore, every act is from God.   
(4) Homicide and adultery are acts.  
(5) Therefore, homicide and adultery are from God.  
Peter responds to such a worry with the following distinction: the name of the defect, say, 
‘homicide,’ has a twofold signification; namely, (1) the act, and (2) the deformity or corruption.  
The act, as an act, is good.  But the act is bad in terms of its deformity or corruption.  So the 
sinful act, qua act, is good.  The sinful act, qua disorder, is bad.  This allows Peter to claim that 
acts are entities that exist and therefore have ontological goodness, the foundation of which 
stems from God, without committing him to the view that the act’s badness, as a consequence of 
its disorder, is caused by God.282  Thus he too staves off the worry about the compatibility of [B] 
                                                 
280 Sententiae Petri Pictaviensis II, Q.12.  For his long and complicated argument about this, and why there cannot 
be a form of badness, see Q.12, L.76-240. 
281 The phrase “from God” (i.e., “homicidium est a Deo”) should be understood in terms of its origin, in the sense 
that God would be its author.  For example, Peter uses the following as an equivalent: “God is the author of 
homicide.”  The equivalency is made clear in the context of this argument: “homicidium est actus.  Sed omnis actus 
est a Deo; ergo, homicidium est a Deo; ergo Deus est auctor homicidii.” 
282 Sententiae Petri Pictaviensis II, q.12, L.241-254.  “Nobis autem hoc fatentibus obiciunt: homicidium est actus.  
Sed omnis actus est a Deo; ergo, homicidium est a Deo; ergo Deus est auctor homicidii.  Ad quod dicendum quod 
huiusmodi nomina volunt intelligi per reduplicationem sic: adulterium, id est in eo quod est adulterium; similiter, 
homicidium, id est in eo quod est homicidium.  Unde cum dicitur: Homicidium est a deo, intelligitur: in eo quod est 
homicidium; quod falsum est.  Similiter cum dicitur: idolum est corpus, et omne corpus est naturale; ergo idolum est 
naturale, hoc nomen idolum intelligitur per reduplicationem.  Nomina autem vitiorum duo notant, scilicet actum et 
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with sinful acts.       
But what makes an act disordered?   According to Peter, the end usually determines this.  
Some acts, however, are generically or categorically good or bad, given the description of the 
act.  Other acts, acts that are neither unqualifiedly good or nor unqualifiedly bad, become good 
or bad by their end.  In order to see this, we need to attend closely to the two roles the end plays 
in the metaphysical goodness of an act.    
First, in the case of acts that are morally neutral in terms of their genus, the end 
individuates morally bad acts from good acts.  Following Lombard closely, he states,  
And so it should be known that some say that every action, insofar as it is, is good.  But 
they distinguish actions as follows: some actions are generically good, such as feeding the 
poor; other actions are generically bad, such as killing a human; but some actions are 
neither good nor bad simpliciter, but the end commends or deforms them, such as 
wandering through the streets.  For if someone wanders through the streets in order to care 
for the sick and the poor, such an end commends such an action.  But if one wanders 
through the streets in order to look at women, the end renders the act deformed and 
reprehensible. In the case of these [neutral] actions, you will have to have some further 
discussion about which ends make the actions blameworthy or praiseworthy.283 
So according to Peter, some acts are good or bad generically or categorically or simpliciter—in 
these types of actions there is no need to talk about ends at all.  They are intrinsically good (bona 
est in se) or intrinsically bad.  Other acts, however, are neutral (such as ‘to wander through the 
streets’).  In these cases, the bare act is indifferent to good and bad unless an end— the purpose 
for which the act was done—is added.  When the act is neutral, the intent of the agent determines 
                                                 
deformitatem sive corruptionem. Actus quidem bonum est, sed corruptio illius, qua ipse deformatur, vitium est et 
non est aliquid.”   
283 Sententiae Petri Pictaviensis II, q.13, L.8-19.  “Sciendum est itaque quod aliqui dicunt omnem acctionem in 
quantum est bonum esse.  Actiones autem ita distinguunt: actionum quedam sunt genere bone, ut reficere pauperes; 
actionum quedam genere male, ut interficere homines; quedam vero nec bone nec male simpliciter sed eas finis 
commendat vel deformat, ut circuire plateas.  Si enim aliquis circueat plateas ut egros et pauperes reficiat, talis finis 
talem actionem commendat.  Si vero circueat plateas ut videat mulieres, finis actionem reddit deformem et 
reprehensibilem.  De his actionibus agendum erit quas finis vel reprehensibilem vel commendabiles facit.” 
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how the act should be morally judged.  Furthermore, what ends are relevant will depend upon the 
morally neutral action in question: what makes neutral type X morally praiseworthy or 
blameworthy may not in fact be the same ends that make neutral type Y praiseworthy or 
blameworthy.  So in the case of morally neutral acts, in order to make a moral judgment about 
the act in question, one must get specific about which ends make individual acts of different 
neutral types either praiseworthy or blameworthy.  Peter, however, does not provide any 
guidance about how to determine which ends will make a particular kind of morally neutral act 
good or bad. 
Second, sometimes the end can render an otherwise generically good act bad.  For 
example, if one feeds the hungry in order to boast about it, that act is rendered bad on account of 
the bad end.284  But can a good end make a generically good act better or a bad end make a 
generically bad act worse?  In other words, does a good end add another level of goodness to a 
generically good act, or a bad end another level of badness, as Peter Lombard suggested?  It is 
unclear from Poitiers’s account.    
 Peter does note, however, that one must pay careful attention to the circumstances to 
fully evaluate an act’s moral worth: 
For in certain cases the willing is the greater sin, whereas in others the act is the greater sin.  
For all the circumstances [need to be] considered carefully: by whom something is brought 
about, namely, whether by a layman or a priest, and what location and what time, and other 
circumstances of this kind.285 
Here Peter identifies a few of the morally relevant circumstances: ‘who,’ ‘where,’ and ‘when.’  
But the role of circumstances in the various levels of goodness (generic and circumstantial) isn’t 
                                                 
284 Sententiae Petri Pictaviensis II, Q.16, L.151: “Ergo si iactantie causa pascitur pauper, illa actio mala est quia 
malus est finis, et ex hoc ipso peccat homo maledictioni et subiacet.” 
285 Sententiae Petri Pictaviensis II, Q.14, L.104-111: In quibusdam enim maius peccatum est voluntas, in quibusdam 
actus.  Attendende enim sunt omnes circumstantie: a quo scilicet aliquid fiat, an a laico an a sacerdote, et quo loco et 
quo tempore, et huiusmodi.   
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specified by Peter of Poitiers.286  The mentioning of specific circumstances, however, is an 
important note picked up by subsequent authors.  In order to understand the relationship of 
circumstances to generic goodness, and the origin and development of the threefold account of 
accidental goodness—generic, moral, and meritorious—we must consider the works of Philip the 
Chancellor and Albert the Great.  
Philip the Chancellor  
Although almost contemporaries, Philip the Chancellor is well aware of Lombard’s 
metaphysics of goodness and relies on the Master at various points in developing his own 
account.287   Following Lombard, Philip divides the goodness of an act into the natural or 
ontological goodness that an act has in virtue of its being, and the moral goodness of an act, 
which Philip further subdivides into various levels or grades reminiscent of Lombard’s account, 
but with greater clarity and thoroughness.  On Philip’s account, an act can have three levels or 
grades of goodness depending upon various relevant features: generic goodness, circumstantial 
goodness, and the goodness of grace:  
[T]here is a certain distinction of goodness in an act.  For a certain act is called generically 
good, such as feeding a hungry person; furthermore, [an act] is called good from the 
circumstances, such as giving to a needy person whatever amount is sufficient for him or 
however much he needs; and in addition, [an act] is called good by the infusion of grace.288  
Philip begins his discussion of generic goodness (bonum in genere) by puzzling over the 
                                                 
286 For a history of the role of circumstances in medieval theology before Poitiers, see D.W. Robertson, Jr., “A Note 
on the Classical Origin of ‘Circumstances’ in the Medieval Confessional,” Studies in Philology 43, N.1 (1946): 6-
14.  See also Stanley B. Cunningham, Reclaiming Moral Agency: the Moral Philosophy of Albert the Great 
(Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 63.     
287 Philip the Chancellor, Philippi Cancellarii Summa de bono, 329, L: 59-68.   
288 Philip the Chancellor, Summa De Bono, 327, L: 4-7:  “Primo autem notanda est quedam differentia bonitatis in 
actione. Dicitur enim quedam actio bona in genere, ut reficere esurientem; dicitur etiam bona ex circumstantia, ut 
dare isti indigenti quantum ei sufficit vel quanto indiget; dicitur etiam bona ex infusion gratie…” 
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meaning of ‘genus’ in this moral context.  This is a step in the right direction, since previous 
authors like Lombard and Poitiers used the term without any explication of its meaning.  After 
dismissing various meanings of ‘genus,’ Philip cites Lombard’s cryptic remark about the generic 
goodness of feeding a hungry person, and then considers whether genus should be taken as a 
form.    
Here Philip uses an analogy of form and matter and asks if either of these is sufficient for 
generic goodness.  In this context, the form of the act represents the type of act or category of act.  
Having sex, for example, is a type or kind of act.  Philip argues that the kind of act is not 
sufficient for an act to have generic goodness, because acts that are generically good and 
generically bad often share the same form or kind of act.  For example, having sex with one’s 
wife, a single person, or someone else who is not one’s spouse all share the same form: namely, 
sex.  But the latter two examples, according to Philip, are obvious cases of acts that are 
generically bad.  Since generically good and bad actions can share the form (i.e., the kind of act), 
the form of the act is an insufficient condition for an act’s generic goodness.289   
Philip then considers whether an act receives its generic goodness from its matter.  Here 
‘matter’ can be taken in two ways, either in terms of the matter from which something is made 
(materia ex qua), or the matter with which the act is concerned (materia circa quam): namely, its 
object.  The materia ex qua is irrelevant to the discussion, since the place of material causes rests 
in the domain of natural philosophy and hylomorphic composition.  What about the object?   Is 
the object sufficient to make an act generically good?  Here Philip contends that the object 
(materia circa quam) is a necessary condition for generic goodness, citing Lombard’s example 
                                                 
289 Philip the Chancellor, Summa De Bono, 329-330, L: 78-82: “Preterea, communicant ad invicem bonum in genere 
et malum in genere in forma actionis, ut cognoscere coniugatum vel suam et cognoscere solutam vel non suam; 
communicant enim in eo quod est cognoscere et ita in forma actionis.  Ergo forma actionis non dicetur genus, cum 
illa differant in genere et in forma actionis conveniant.”  
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of feeding a hungry person: feeding is the type of act; a hungry person is the object.  But the 
object alone is not sufficient for generic goodness, according to Philip, because generically good 
and bad acts often agree in their object.  For example, the generically good act of saving a man 
and the generically bad act of killing a man both have ‘a man’ as their object.  So the object 
alone does not give an act its generic goodness.290 
Philip concludes that the generic goodness or badness of acts derives from a combination of 
the form of the act in conjunction with the object:  
And it should be said that a genus is taken in the present case from the conjunction of the 
form of the act with the matter of the act [the object]; for ‘to feed’ names a certain form, 
and ‘the hungry’ names the object, and so [generic] goodness is derived from a conjunction 
of the two.291   
So the form of the act in conjunction with its object determines the moral genus of the act.  But 
what is the difference between generically good acts and generically bad acts?  According to 
Philip, it depends upon whether the object is appropriate or suitable (materia debita) to the type 
of act.292  Generically good acts have objects suitable to the type of act and the agent.  For 
example, take ‘sex’ as the form or kind of act: having sex with one’s spouse is a generically good 
                                                 
290 Philip the Chancellor, Summa De Bono, 330, L:83-92: “Neque videtur  hic dici genus secundum quod materia 
dicitur genus.  Communicant enim aliquando bonum in genere et malum in genere in materia circa quam, ut salvare 
hominem et interficere; hoc autem non esset si a bonitate materie diceretur bonum in genere.  A materia autem ex 
qua non videtur dici bonum in genere; cum enim dicitur reficere esurientem, tangitur tantum generis actus et propria 
materia circa quam est actus et non materia ex qua.  Dicitur autem bonum in genere hoc, scilicet reficere esurientem.  
Ergo non est bonum huismodi a materia ex qua, sed potius a materia circa quam.  Sed materia non videtur sufficere, 
quia dictum est una erit materia et tamen unum erit bonum in genere, alterum malum, ut patet in diversis actibus, 
salvare hominem, interficere hominem.”     
291 Philip the Chancellor, Summa De Bono, 330, L: 97-99:  “Et est dicendum quod genus accipitur hic ex 
coniunctione forme actus cum materia actus; reficere enim dicit formam quandam, esurientem dicit materiam, at 
tamen trahitur bonum ex coniunctione huius ad illud.”  
292 Philip the Chancellor, Summa De Bono, 333, L: 181-183: “Propter hoc notandum quod genus accipitur pro 
materia seu pro actu coniuncto cum materia debita.  Et sic locum habet bonum in genere in illis, in quibus explicite 
vel implicite determinatur actus cum materia, ut dictum est.”  See also Summa De Bono, 330, L: 103-105: “Nam 
bonum in essentia dicitur quantum ad causam efficientem a qua est esse, bonum autem in genere ex coniunctione 
generis actus cum genere quod est materia actus cum fuerit materia debita actui vel e converso.” As we will see 
later, Scotus offers an almost identical account, but prefers convenientia instead of debita materia.   
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act, because it has an appropriate object; having sex with another person’s spouse would 
constitute a generically bad act, since the object of the act is inappropriate.  Generically good 
acts are acts conjoined to appropriate objects; generically bad acts are acts conjoined to 
inappropriate objects. 293   
 Not only is Philip the first to provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for an act’s 
generic goodness, he is also the first to explain the levels of goodness gestured at by Lombard:  
But first, it should be noted that there is a certain distinction of goodness in an act.  For a 
certain act is called generically good, such as feeding a hungry person; in addition, [an act] 
is called good from circumstance, such as giving to a needy person whatever amount is 
sufficient for him or however much he needs; furthermore, [an act] is called good by the 
infusion of grace and from an appropriate intention.  Actually, goodness from the 
appropriate intention ought to be placed under the goodness [arising] from the 
circumstances; for this is good from the end that is intended.294 
Notice here that circumstantial goodness, which Philip sometimes calls “moral goodness,” adds a 
level of goodness to the act.  Furthermore, Philip only specifies a few of the circumstances that 
add the further level of goodness: the appropriate intention/end.  In the example of circumstantial 
goodness, however, he claims that giving to a needy person the amount he or she needs is a 
circumstance; that is, while giving any food to a needy person would count as a generically good 
act, circumstantial goodness adds to the act only when the person and their condition are taken 
into consideration, since the act accounted for more relevant features of the situation.   
For example, suppose I’m hiking in some remote wilderness and come across a severely 
                                                 
293 Although Philip remains silent on this, it is obvious from his examples that the type of act and the agent will 
determine which objects are appropriate.  For example, if the form of the act was ‘sex’, then according to Philip, the 
only appropriate object would be one’s spouse.  On the other hand, if the form of the act was to feed, and the object 
was people who are hungry, the act would have a wider scope.  
294 Philip the Chancellor, Summa De Bono, 327, L: 4-9: “Primo autem notanda est quedam differentia bonitatis in 
actione.  Dicitur enim quedam actio bona in genere, ut reficere esurientem; dicitur etiam bona ex circumstantia, ut 
dare isti indigenti quantum ie sufficit vel quanto indiget; dicitur etiam bona ex infusione gratie et ex debita 
intentione.  Vel collocandum est bonum ex debita intentione sub bono ex circumstantia; hoc est enim bonum ex fine 
qui intenditur.”   
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dehydrated climber in desperate need of liquid.  A generically good act might be to give him 
something (anything) to drink.  But it wouldn’t have the further level of circumstantial goodness: 
circumstantial goodness in an act arises when the agent uses right reason to determine the 
amount and kind of liquid needed for the given situation.  And in this case, the ailing climber 
needs water and lots of it.  So while Philip counts the end/intention and other factors as 
circumstances that bring about the act’s circumstantial goodness, he doesn’t name or explain all 
the various circumstances that might apply; that will be the work of Albert the Great.295   
 But Philip grounds his three levels of goodness in Lombard’s cryptic account by glossing 
it to support his own more developed stratification of goodness:  
So let us take up the previously stated division of the genus and ask about such good 
actions as giving to the needy and feeding the hungry.  For these are called good in genere, 
as the Master says in Book II of the Sentences in that chapter (II, d.36, c.6)… For he says 
“they say that all acts are good by their essence insofar as they are, but some acts are sinful 
insofar as they are inordinate.  And some add that acts are good not only by their essence 
but also good in genere, such as feeding the hungry, which is an act of the genus of a work 
of mercy; but they say some actions are absolutely or perfectly good, which are not only 
essentially or generically good, but also the cause and the end commend it, as they are those 
things which come from a good will and achieve a good end.”  In that he touches on both 
the goodness from circumstances and the goodness from grace.296   
Philip’s gloss at the end of the previously discussed passage from Lombard shows two things.  
First, that he is well aware of Lombard’s account and much indebted to it.  Second, while Philip 
unquestionably moves beyond Lombard by providing specific conditions for generic goodness 
                                                 
295 Later thinkers will name the current circumstance of giving a person the appropriate amount, the ‘manner’ or 
‘mode.’ 
296 Philip the Chancellor, Summa De Bono, 329, L: 59-68.  “Sumamus ergo divisionem generis predictam et 
queramus de huiusmodi bonis dare indigenti, reficere esurientem; hec enim vocantur bona in genere, sicut dicit 
Magister in II libro Sententiarum in illo capitulo…Dicit enim “Dicunt omnes actus essentia sui in quantum sunt 
bonos esse, quosdam vero in quantum inordinate fiunt peccata esse.  Addunt quoque, quosdam non tantum essentia, 
sed in genere bonos esse, ut reficere esurientem, qui actus est de genere operum misericordie; quosdam vero actus 
absolute ac perfecte bonos esse dicunt, quos non solum essentia vel genus, sed etiam causa et finis commendat, ut 
sunt illi, qui ex bona voluntate proveniunt et bonum finem metiuntur.”  In quo tangit et bonum ex circumstantia et 
bonum ex gratia.”    
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and the threefold stratification only hinted at in Lombard, Philip grounds his account in the work 
of the Master.  In Lombard’s vague remarks, Philip sees an opportunity to make a distinction and 
an elaboration: when Lombard mentions perfect goodness, Lombard was gesturing at the further 
stratification of circumstantial goodness and the goodness of grace. 
  Philip’s development of Lombard’s account deserves further treatment, especially 
concerning the relationship between circumstantial goodness and generic goodness.  What 
exactly is the role of circumstances in the metaphysics of the act?  Here it seems as though Philip 
offers two distinct roles that circumstances play: (1) to individuate generically good acts; and (2) 
add a further level of goodness to the act.   
 Sometimes it seems as though Philip uses generic goodness itself as an abstract genus in 
which the moral goodness from the circumstances stamp out different species of acts.  Taken in 
such a way, it seems as though generically good acts are broad action-types, which have no 
directly corresponding act-tokens; in other words, they seem completely abstract, and only 
become concrete actions when circumstances are added.297  One reason for this interpretation is 
Philip’s insistence that the end is a circumstance that, along with other specifications, adds 
goodness ex circumstantia to an act.  So generically good acts don’t seem to have an end.  But it 
seems difficult to have a generically good act-token—a concrete act—that doesn’t have an end.  
Without an end, goal, or intention of the agent, the act doesn’t seem to be moral, but haphazard.   
Consider one of Philip’s examples of generically good acts (acts in which the form is 
conjoined to an appropriate object): conjugal relations.  In the case of marital relations, the form 
of the act is sex, and if it is a generically good act, the act ought to have an appropriate object: 
namely, one’s spouse.  We can think of all kinds of ends for which a spouse might perform the 
                                                 
297 Philip the Chancellor, Summa De Bono, 347-348. 
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act of sex with the appropriate partner: for procreation, for the happiness of the other, for one’s 
own pleasure, the release of stress, in order to bond with one’s partner, etc.  But it seems odd to 
claim that there could be a concrete moral action token—an actual act—without such an end.  
The end could be disordered, no doubt.  But performing such an act without an end seems to 
eradicate it from the category of moral altogether.298   
So to put the problem bluntly: if there are generically good act-tokens (concrete acts), 
they lack circumstances and thus lack ends, since the end is a circumstance.  Thus they do not 
seem like human moral acts in which praise or blame may be assigned.  So maybe it’s best to 
characterize generically good acts as mere act-types, abstract kinds of acts, that become concrete 
only when the relevant specifying circumstances—like the end—are added.    
That is problematic, however, because Philip often talks as though generically good acts 
can be concrete act-tokens.  First, to see this, we need to consider the second role he assigns 
circumstances.  Circumstances play the role of adding a further level of goodness to a generically 
good act, and this seems to imply adding levels of goodness to concrete acts, and not simply 
individuating abstract kinds of acts.  Circumstances add a further level of goodness for two 
reasons.  First, there is a greater level of specificity when the agent takes into account more data 
in deciding how to act, in other words, when taking into account the various circumstances or 
conditions that surround the performing of the act.  For example, suppose the generically good 
act of feeding the hungry was done, but I didn’t give the person an amount sufficient to fulfill his 
or her needs.  Giving the person an amount that satisfies his or her needs adds more goodness 
than simply giving the person some food—but giving the person some food is still a generically 
good act.  And this implies a concrete act at each level.   
                                                 
298 Scotus finds this case altogether plausible.  He calls an act that is generically good, but lacks an end altogether a 
generically good, but morally indifferent act.  
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Second, Philip associates each level of goodness with a principium or source.  Generic 
goodness results from a free choice of an agent performing a kind of act with the debita 
materia—the appropriate object.  Circumstantial goodness results from the agent’s right reason 
connecting the generic goodness with the appropriate circumstances, most notably for Philip, an 
appropriate intention.  For goodness ex gratia, the principium is God’s grace that enables one to 
perform such an act from the virtue of charity.299  Since each source can be stratified in terms of 
its importance, the goodness that results from the principium can also be stratified.  So the 
stratification of goodness implies that for each level of goodness a concrete act was performed 
and not simply an abstract act-type, since each level has a distinct principium that accounts for 
its existence.   
Second, the way Philip characterizes generic goodness suggests more than simply 
abstract action types.  This is obvious from the previous discussion about the nature of generic 
goodness itself, since he claims that generic goodness results from a combination of the form or 
kind of act with the act’s object (materia circa quam).   If we take Philip’s form/matter analogy 
seriously, then kinds of acts are the abstract action types, individuated by their materia or 
objects, in the same way that forms are individuated by matter in hylomorphic composition.  
Thus generically good acts can’t be merely abstract types of action, but are concrete action-
tokens.  So if the kind of act is taken as a form, and the act’s object the matter that individuates, 
as Philip suggests, then we have a generic concrete action-token and not merely an action-type.   
If circumstances don’t individuate abstract kinds of acts, then what role is left for them?  
                                                 
299 Philip the Chancellor, Summa De Bono, 342, L: 11-17: “Triplex erat gradus bonitatis in actionibus: primus erat 
boni in genere et secundus boni moralis, tertius boni gratie.  Bonum quidem nature, de quo opponitur, non pertinet 
ad operationes; et hee quidem secundum ordinem se habent et similiter principia horum.  Erit ergo natura 
convenienter principium actionis bone in genere, et dico naturam liberum arbitrium, ratio autem recta boni moralis, 
gratia autem boni gratuiti.”    
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As stated above, they do much work in Philip’s stratification of goodness: they add a level of 
specificity to the act, and thus when the agent via right reason, takes into account these 
circumstances in determining how to act, it adds a level of goodness (or badness) to the generic 
act.  And while we should not take circumstances or circumstantial goodness to individuate 
abstract kinds of acts in the strict sense, I think we can see what Philip means: forms or kinds of 
acts are principally individuated by their objects (materia circa quam), but circumstances can 
add further differentiations and clarifications within some class of generically good or bad acts.  
Take the generically good act of feeding someone in need of food: the kind of act is feeding and 
the object is a person in need.  Suppose I come across a hiker who tells me he’s in need of food.  
Handing him a handful of trail mix would constitute a generically good act.  But knowing the 
circumstances surrounding his need provides the opportunity for right reason to judge the 
appropriate response, and to further differentiate the extent of the need and how good the 
subsequent act will be: did the hiker simply bonk and needs a bit of energy to make that next hill, 
or has he been without food for days and in dire straits?  Differentiating the conditions or 
circumstances under which the act is carried out shifts the moral paradigm: surely the urgency 
and generosity with which I act will diverge when the circumstances differ.   
We can see this more clearly, I think, in cases of circumstantial badness.  Suppose I 
simply know that the person on the trail needs food, and I do the generically bad act of 
withholding my supply from him.  Knowing the person has not eaten in days and will surely die 
soon without sustenance compounds the badness of such an act.  Likewise, knowing the hiker 
just needs a little energy to reach some nearby and non-necessary summit lessens the badness of 
withholding my food.  So circumstances further separate the kind of act, and in doing so, clarify 
the weightiness of the act and its moral ramifications.  In other words, circumstances add a level 
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of goodness or badness to the act.  
Philip’s account of goodness is important in a number of respects.  First, Philip specifies 
exactly what makes an act generically good, something heretofore not done.  Lombard and Peter 
of Poitiers use the term ‘generic goodness,’ but never fully explain what they mean by the 
concept.  In contrast, Philip explains that a generically good act occurs when the form or kind of 
act conjoined with a suitable object (materia debita).  Second, Philip explains—albeit 
imperfectly—the role of circumstances and argues that they specify and individuate generically 
good acts, and thereby add a further degree of goodness.  Third, this is the first time all three 
types of an act’s moral goodness are specified together: generic, moral, and meritorious.  As we 
will see, this will become the standard way to evaluate an act’s moral worth in the following 
centuries, culminating in the work of Duns Scotus.    
Fourth, Philip explains why each level of goodness adds a further degree of goodness to 
the act, by linking each type of goodness to its source or principium.  Generic goodness results 
from a free choice of an agent performing a kind of act with the debita materia—the appropriate 
object.  Circumstantial goodness results from the agent’s right reason connecting the generic 
goodness with the appropriate circumstances, most notably for Philip, an appropriate intention.300  
But he doesn’t explicate the exact nature of circumstantial goodness: he fails to provide a list of 
circumstances, and wavers as to where place the end.   
Finally, Philip offers an account of how God’s grace factors into human action.  His 
Augustinian predecessors, ever wary of the slippery slope into Pelagianism, were often unclear 
                                                 
300 Philip the Chancellor, Summa De Bono, 327. Although, since for generic goodness, right reason must judge 
correctly that the materia for this act-type is debita, and for circumstantial goodness, right reason must judge which 
circumstances are appropriate, the difference between the principium of generic goodness and the principium of 
circumstantial goodness seems blurred. 
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about the respective human and divine roles.301  Philip provides a very nice way of 
demonstrating how acts can have a greater value when accompanied by grace, and yet, how one 
can still call the acts of unregenerate persons ‘good,’ even though they do not attain the highest 
level of goodness possible and thus do not receive merit.  
Albert the Great 
Albert the Great’s account of moral goodness resembles that of Peter Lombard and Philip 
the Chancellor; indeed, Albert relies on these illustrious Masters in both his early treatises on 
goodness—De Natura Boni and De Bono—as well as his later commentary on the Sentences.302  
As we will see, Albert’s explication of the various circumstances that specify the act provides a 
                                                 
301 An excellent example of this is Bernard of Clairvaux’s (1090-1153) De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, PL 182.     
Bernard posits three kinds of free choice: freedom of nature, of grace, and of life or glory (C.III).  However, he goes 
on to argue that everything, no matter its cause or type of freedom, is the work of divine grace (C.XIV).  
Consequently, the previously stated divisions of types of freedom are irrelevant: creation, reformation, and 
consummation are all the work of divine grace and not of human free choice.  He states: “Igitur qui recte sapiunt, 
triplicem confitentur operationem, non quidem liberi arbitrii, sed divinae gratiae in ipso, sive de ipso. Prima, creatio; 
secunda, reformatio; tertia est consummatio. Primo namque in Christo creati sumus in libertatem voluntatis: secundo 
reformamur per Christum in spiritum libertatis; cum Christo deinde consummandi in statum aeternitatis.”  For more 
on this see John Marenbon, Early Medieval Philosophy (480-1150): An Introduction (Boston: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1983), 143-144.  An earlier and more extreme example is found in the works of the infamous Gottschalk of 
Orbais (808- ~868).  Gottschalk argued that without the grace of God, humanity could do nothing good, and only 
after being made anew by God’s grace, did one have any true sense of free will.  Thus every act of an unregenerate 
human was evil.  See Gottschalk of Orbais, De Praedestinatione, in Oeuvres théologiques et grammaticales de 
Godescalc d’Orbais, ed. Dom C. Lambot (Leuven, 1945).  For a history of the controversy concerning grace and 
free will between Augustine and the Parisian masters, see Jaroslav Pelikan, The Growth Of Medieval Theology (600-
1300), vol. 3 of The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1978), 80-95.    
302 Unlike later Masters who often began their writing career by commenting on the Sentences of Lombard, Albert 
the Great writes both of his treatises on goodness—De Natura Boni and De Bono—before he comments on 
Lombard’s Sentences—well, at least before he comments on books II-IV, since Albert’s Sentences II-IV contain 
numerous references to these earlier treatises.  De Natura Boni was probably written in the late 1230s; De Bono was 
probably written sometime between 1240 and 1244.  For a discussion of the dating, see Stanley B. Cunningham, 
Reclaiming Moral Agency: The Moral Philosophy of Albert the Great, 36-37; De Natura Boni, ed. Ephrem Filthaut 
O.P., in Alberti Magni Opera Omnia vol. 25, (Munster: Aschendorff, 1974), Prolegomena, vi;  De Bono, ed. 
Henricus Kule, Carolus Feckes, Bernhardus Geyer, and Wilhelmus Kubel, in Alberti Magni Opera Omnia vol. 28 
(Munster: Aschendorff ,1951), Prolegomena, xi-xiii; O. Lottin, “Nouveaux problèmes concernant la ‘Summa de 
creaturis’ et le Commentaire des Sentences de saint Albert de Grand,” Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe 
siècles,  vol.6, 273-84.    
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substantial contribution to the present discussion.303  
Like his predecessors, Albert distinguishes ontological goodness from moral goodness: 
ontological or natural goodness converts with being and so is found in every category and is thus 
a transcendental.304  Albert then further subdivides ontological goodness along Augustinian lines 
into mode, species, and order.305  In contrast, moral goodness is an accident of the act and is 
therefore not transcendental.306 Albert then divides moral goodness into two categories: the 
goodness of habits and the goodness of grace—roughly along the lines of whether the source of 
the goodness lies within the agent’s natural powers or whether it depends upon supernatural aid.  
In De Bono, the goodness of grace is mentioned, but not discussed.  Rather, Albert desires to 
address a purely natural account of goodness, informed in part from the theological Masters (i.e., 
Augustine, Philip the Chancellor, and Lombard), and in part from the recently translated corpus 
of Aristotelian ethical texts and commentaries.307   
After dividing moral goodness into the goodness of habits and the goodness of grace, 
                                                 
303 Since De Natura Boni is incomplete, and does not comprise Albert’s mature ideas on the nature of goodness, I 
will ignore this text in favor of the more systematic, and what scholars believe to be Albert’s most important ethical 
treatise, De Bono, as well as the relevant material from Albert’s commentary on the Sentences.  See Cunningham, 
Reclaiming Moral Agency: The Moral Philosophy of Albert the Great, 30-37.   
304 Albertus Magnus, Sentences II, d.36, a.7: “Ad ultimum decendum, quod bonum per essentiam, est idem bonum 
quod convertitur cum ente in quantum est, et non addit super end nisi relationem ad finem.  Bonum autem in genere 
dicitur dupliciter, scilicet proportione actus ad materiam debitam, vel a generali forma, sicut patet ex praedictis.” For 
Albert’s account of transcendental goodness, also see Sentences I, d.1, a.20, and De Bono, tract.1, q.1, a.6-7.   
305 Albertus Magnus, De Bono, Tract. 1, q.2, a.4, n.40: “Consequenter quaeritur de divisione boni. Est autem prima 
divisio in bonum naturae et in bonum moris, et utrumque horum dividitur.  Sed primo quaeremus de divisione boni 
naturalis, quod dividitur in…numerum, pondus, et mensuram, et ab Augustino in modum, speciem et ordinem.” See 
also Augustine, De Natura Boni, 3.  
306 Albertus Magnus, Sentences II, d.40, a.1: “Dicendum, quod bonitas et militia accidunt actioni.”  
307 Albertus Magnus, De Bono, Tract. 1, q.2, a.4, n.50.  In separating goodness of habits from the goodness of grace, 
Albert uses the Latin word ‘consuetudo’ for ‘habit,’ which Cunningham has argued corresponds to the natural 
virtues in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  He concludes that “‘Consuentudo,’ a term found in the Ethica vetus, and 
normally translated as ‘custom,’ ‘practice,’ ‘habit,’ and ‘usage,’ was already used by medieval writers in the twelfth 
and early thirteenth centuries to situate the naturally acquired virtues.” See Stanley B. Cunningham, Reclaiming 
Moral Agency: The Moral Philosophy of Albert the Great, 116-117.   
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Albert further subdivides the goodness of habits into generic goodness, circumstantial goodness, 
and political virtue.308  The first two of these concern us here.  Albert begins his discussion of 
generic goodness by alerting the reader that ‘genus’ is used metaphorically here, in a way 
analogous to matter/form in hylomorphic composition.309  As such, it is a “first potency” in 
moral matters; in other words, through its individuating circumstances, it can be specified or 
formed in various ways, just as a genus can through its species in hylomorphic composition.310   
Like Philip the Chancellor, Albert takes the kind of act as the form.  So what exactly is 
the materia?  Also like Philip the Chancellor, Albert puzzles over the materia in this moral 
context.  Albert says that ‘materia’ can be taken in three ways: “the matter from which 
something is made” (materia ex qua), i.e., its material cause, “the matter in which something is” 
(materia in qua), and “the matter concerning which” (materia circa quam), i.e., the object.  
Following Philip, Albert then specifies that ‘materia’ should be taken in this third sense, as the 
object.311  A generically good act has an appropriate object, which Albert takes to mean “the 
right proportion of the act to the object according to its nature [as an act].”312 
So according to Albert, a generically good act is an act with a suitable or appropriate 
                                                 
308 Albertus Magnus, De Bono, Tract. 1, q.2, a.4, n.50: “Consequenter, quaerendum est de bono moris.  Dividitur 
autem in bonum consuetudinis et gratiae.  Bonum autem consuetudinis consuevit dividi in bonum in genere et in 
bonum ex circumstantia et in bonum virtutis politicae.” The connection between political virtue and the other two 
types of natural moral goodness isn’t clearly stated, but I think the connection is obvious: an act of courage that has, 
say, generic and circumstantial goodness, if repeated over time, will become a virtue, and thus obtain virtuous 
goodness. 
309 Albertus Magnus, Sentences II, d.36, a.6; De Bono, Tract. 1, q.2, a.5, n.54. 
310 Albertus Magnus, De Bono, Tract. 1, q.2, a.5, n.54: “Dicendum, quod genus sumitur hic pro materia et ad 
similitudinem generis in natura et species similiter.  Et sumitur hic secundum illam diffinitionem: ‘species est, quae 
abundat a genere.’”  
311 Albertus Magnus, De Bono, Tract. 1, q.2, a.4, n.52.   
312 Albertus Magnus, De Bono, Tract. 1, q.2, a.4, n.52, ad. 8: “Cum enim dicitur actus super debitam materiam, 
debitum nihil amplius importat quam rectam proportionem actus ad materiam secundum sui naturam, sicut reficere 
proportionatur esurienti et docere ignoranti et consolari tristanti et sic de alliis.  In malo autem in genere indebitum 
importat priationem huius proportionis.”   
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object: 
It should be said without prejudice, that “good in genere” is called such through a metaphor 
in terms of a genus which is the first subject and first potency: but generic goodness in 
morals is an act of the will united with an appropriate object according to its nature, such as 
to ‘feed’ concerning ‘the hungry,’ ‘to give’ concerning ‘the needy,’ and so on.313  
Notice how closely Albert’s account of generic goodness resembles Philip’s, in terms of the kind 
of act united with an appropriate object.  In fact, Albert often employs the identical language 
Philip used to express the concept of an appropriate object; namely, the phrase ‘debita 
materia.’314  Furthermore, Albert also follows Philip closely by claiming that the kind or nature 
of the act matters in determining the suitability of the act to the object.315  
 Albert then distinguishes generic moral goodness from circumstantial moral goodness.  
Generic goodness results from the kind of act conjoined to the appropriate object.  In contrast, 
circumstantial goodness results from the act and appropriate object in conjunction with the 
specifying/individuating circumstances.316  In order for an act to be completely good, all of these 
conditions must be appropriate to the agent and the act (including the object and the 
circumstances).  Following pseudo-Dionysius, who claimed that “Goodness is derived from one 
complete cause, but badness results from any particular defect,” Albert claims that any one 
                                                 
313Albertus Magnus, Sentences II, d.36, a.6: “Dicendum sine praejudicio, quod bonum in genere, dicitur per 
metaphoram ad genus quod est subjectum primum et potential prima: hoc autem in moribus est actus voluntatis 
comparatus ad materiam circa quam debet esse secundum suam naturam, ut reficere circa esurientem, et dare circa 
indigentem, et sic de aliis.” 
314 For example, see Albertus Magnus, Sentences II, d.36, a.6; Sentences II, d.36, a.7; Sentences II, d.40, a.2; De 
Bono, Tract. 1, q.2, a.4, n.52 (ad.8).  Cf. Philip the Chancellor, Summa De Bono, 333, L: 181-183: “Propter hoc 
notandum quod genus accipitur pro materia seu pro actu coniuncto cum material debita.  Et sic locum habet bonum 
in genere in illis, in quibus explicite vel implicite determinatur actus cum materia, ut dictum est.  See also 330, L: 
103-105: Nam bonum in essentia dicitur quantum ad causam efficientem a qua est esse, bonum autem in genere ex 
coniunctione generis actus cum genere quod est materia actus cum fuerit materia debita actui vel e converso.” As we 
will see later, Scotus offers an almost identical account, but prefers convenientia instead of debita materia.   Scotus, 
Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.9; Ordinatio I, d. 17, pars.1, q.2, n.62; Ordinatio II, d.40, q.un, n.8. 
315 Albert says, “act of the will united with an appropriate object according to its nature.”  Albertus Magnus, 
Sentences II, d.36, a.6. 
316 Albertus Magnus, Sentences II, d.36, a.7.   
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defect suffices to render the entire act bad.317 
In De Bono, Albert raises the question of whether the circumstances give the act its 
being.  In response, Albert argues that the circumstances do not give an act its being, insofar as it 
is an act, but give the act its being insofar as it is praiseworthy or blameworthy.  As such, while 
the circumstances are extrinsic to the act itself, they are not extrinsic to making the act 
praiseworthy or blameworthy.318  So the circumstances can be said to inform the act, but only in 
terms of making the act praiseworthy or blameworthy.319 
At this point Albert unites some older lists of circumstances pertinent to adjudicating 
blame in a court of law—found in Cicero’s De Inventione320 and Boethius’s De Differentiis 
Topicis321—with the circumstantial goodness of Philip the Chancellor.322  It’s not that these lists 
of circumstances were unknown—actually, far from it.  But their usage prior to Albert’s 
theoretical appropriation of them here was more of a practical application, either in terms of 
judicial proceedings in the realm of rhetoric for Cicero and Boethius, or in terms of canon law 
and pastoral care for other medieval practitioners.323 
Following Cicero and Boethius, Albert divides the circumstances into attributes of the 
                                                 
317 Albertus Magnus, Sentences II, d.41, a.2; De Bono, Tract. 1, q.3, a.1, n.63, ad.6.  “Bonum est ex una et tota 
causa, malum autem ex particularibus defectus.” Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, C.4, §31, Patrologia 
Graeca 3.  
318 Albertus Magnus, De Bono, Tract. 1, q.3, a.1, n.63, ad.1: “Dicimus ergo ad primum, quod ista talia non dant esse 
actui, inquantum actus est, sed dant esse ei, inquantum honestus vel vituperabilis est, et propter hoc, licet sint 
extrinseca actui, non tamen sunt extrinseca honesto vel vituperabili.” 
319 Albertus Magnus, De Bono, Tract. 1, q.3, a.1, n.63.   
320 See Cicero De Inventione L.1, c.24-27, nn.34-41.  
321 See Boethius, De Differentiis Topicis I.4, Patrologia Latinae 64 1212D.  See also Boethius’s De topicis 
differentiis, trans. Eleonore Stump (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 89-95.   
322 Albertus Magnus, De Bono, Tract. 1, q.3, a.2, n.64. 
323 See Cunningham, Reclaiming Moral Agency: The Moral Philosophy of Albert the Great, 128.  D. W. Robertson 
Jr., “A Note on the Classical Origin of ‘Circumstances’ in the Medieval Confessional,” Studies in Philology 43 
(1946), 7. 
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person and attributes of the action.  The circumstance of persons is ‘who,’ while the 
circumstances of an action are ‘what,’ ‘why,’ ‘when,’ ‘where,’ ‘in what way,’ and ‘with what.’ 
In other words, who did the act, what was done, the intention of the act, the time, the location, 
the manner, and the means, respectively.324  At this point Albert transitions to using the 
circumstances in a manner different from Cicero and Boethius, by applying them to the 
ontological nature of the act, rather than merely rhetorical devices used in a court of law.325  
After explaining these circumstances in the manner described by Cicero, he states, “But 
according to us, the appropriate circumstances make the act morally virtuous.”326  As 
Cunningham explains,  
This statement, deceptively simple, signals a major shift in the theoretical focus from the 
linguistic domain of judgment and statements to the ontology of moral acts: opus virtutis 
civilis.  Albert is saying that circumstances are not just words, rhetorical qualifiers, that 
figure in moral arguments or courtroom exchange: on the contrary, the circumstances will 
now be treated as formal constituents of concrete moral actions, as elements of moral 
behavior.327 
 So Albert’s novelty is twofold: first, he takes the discussion of circumstances implied 
(but not explicated) by Philip and fills out an account about which circumstances are relevant to 
an act’s moral goodness.  Second, Albert does so by an appealing, on the one hand, to rhetorical 
discussions in the court of law by Cicero and Boethius, and linking these with the use of 
circumstances already in practice in pastoral care, namely, the manner in which one would 
confess one’s sins to a priest.328  But Albert takes these circumstances and applies them to the 
                                                 
324 Albertus Magnus, De Bono, Tract. 1, q.3, a.2, n.64. 
325 Cunningham, Reclaiming Moral Agency: The Moral Philosophy of Albert the Great, 130. 
326 Albertus Magnus, De Bono, Tract. 1, q.3, a.2, “Secundum nos autem convenienties circumstantiae efficient opus 
virtutis civilis.” 
327 Cunningham, Reclaiming Moral Agency: The Moral Philosophy of Albert the Great, 130. 
328 D. W. Robertson Jr., “A Note on the Classical Origin of ‘Circumstances’ in the Medieval Confessional,” 7. 
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ontology of the act itself, showing that they specify and individuate generically good acts, with 
the result of a second level of goodness in acts which take into account these relevant 
circumstances.   
Consequently, Albert’s account can be summarized as follows: ontological goodness is a 
transcendental property of being, distinct from moral goodness, which is an accident of acts.  
Moral goodness then divides into two broad kinds, deriving from their source or principium: the 
human will or divine grace.  The former further subdivides into generically good acts, consisting 
of the kind of act with an appropriate object, and circumstantially good acts which require not 
only a fittingness between the act of the will and the object, but also the appropriateness of all 
the relevant circumstances.  Furthermore, Albert conceives the end of the act—the intent—as 
one of the circumstances of the act.   
Bonaventure  
 Bonaventure’s description of the metaphysics of goodness can be summarized rather 
succinctly, as his account of such matters is only treated briefly in his commentary on the 
Sentences and his Apologiae Pauperum, and remains fairly typical in its content.  Like Lombard 
and company, Bonaventure divides goodness into natural or ontological goodness and moral 
goodness.329  Natural goodness converts with being and thus is found in every category, and in 
every act.  Bonaventure names this goodness “essential goodness,” a name aptly adopted by 
Scotus himself.330  Bonaventure contrasts essential or natural goodness with moral goodness, 
which he claims is added to an act like an accident is added to a subject.  Furthermore, in 
                                                 
329 Bonaventure, Sentences II, d.37, a.2, q.3. Opera Omnia vol. 3 (Quaracchi: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 
1865).   
330 Scotus, Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.9. 
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reference to an act, each type of goodness results from difference sources: natural goodness 
results from some power in the agent that brought the act about, whereas moral goodness results 
from free choice of the will.331  
In keeping with previous tradition, the moral goodness of an act remains Bonaventure’s 
primarily concern.  In his commentary on the Sentences, Bonaventure divides moral goodness 
into three types: generic, circumstantial, and perfect.  Two things are odd about this topic in the 
Sentences.  First, it lacks a discussion about the meaning and nature of each type of goodness.  
Second, Bonaventure equates perfect goodness with goodness in se but says little to nothing 
about it.  Is this a reference to Lombard’s perfect goodness, the one that Philip the Chancellor 
glossed as goodness ex circumstantia and goodness ex gratia, or something else?  In the 
Sentences all of this remains fairly muddled. 
In his Apologiae Pauperum, Bonaventure elaborates on how act receives each type of 
goodness or corresponding badness: an act has generic goodness when the act was carried out 
with a suitable object in mind.332  Conversely, an act performed with an inappropriate object 
makes the act generically bad.333  Going to church and giving alms are listed as examples of the 
former, and killing a human as an example of the latter.  While Bonaventure doesn’t explain 
generic goodness in the intricate detail of Philip the Chancellor and Albert the Great, he gestures 
                                                 
331 Bonaventure, Sentences II, d.41, a.1, q.1: “Actio deliberativa nata est habere duplicem bonitatem: scilicet 
bonitatem naturae, in quantum est actio procedens ab aliqua virtute; et bonitatem moris, in quantum est procedens a 
libero arbitrio, sive voluntate. Cum ergo quaeritur utrum bonitas et militia circa actionem habeant repugnantiam, ita 
quod ipsam dividant tanquam membra opposita, dicendum quod hoc non est verum de bono, prout dicitur bonitate 
essentiali, vel naturali: sic enim bonum non est differentia actionis; imo convertitur cum ente, et reperitur in omni 
actione.”  
332 Bonaventure, Apologiae Pauperum, Responsionis Primae, Caput 1, Opera Omnia vol. 14 (Quaracchi: Editiones 
Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1868).  “Bonum namque in genere, est actus transiens super materiam debitam, ut ire ad 
ecclesiam, dare eleemosynam.”  
333 Bonaventure, Apologiae Pauperum, Responsionis Primae, Caput 1.  “Malum, inquam, in genere, dicitur actus 
transiens super materiam indebitum, sicut occidere hominem.”  
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in that direction (actus transiens super materiam debitam).334   
Goodness ex circumstantia involves performing an action informed by praiseworthy or 
appropriate circumstances.  So take the generically good act of almsgiving: the act has a further 
level of goodness when an appropriate amount of alms has been given according to the 
circumstances, such as the persons involved, the location, and the time.335  In a similar fashion, 
an act is bad ex circumstantia when the act is informed by disordered or inappropriate 
circumstances, such as “to eat a meal outside the appointed time”—a situation the Minister 
General of the Franciscans probably dealt with regularly from “unruly” friars.336  Both 
generically and circumstantially good acts can be made bad through “other” corruptive 
circumstances, and primarily through inordinate intentions.  For example, acts normally 
characterized as generically good, such as going (the act) to church (the debita materia), fasting, 
or giving alms, would be generically bad if they were carried out with dubious intentions, such as 
in order to receive praise or human glory.337   
At this point that Bonaventure clarifies what he meant in the Sentences by the third type 
of goodness, namely, goodness in se.  Unlike generic and circumstantial goodness, bonum in se 
cannot be bad or be made bad.  The reason, according to Bonaventure, is that acts that are good 
in se are acts of virtue proceeding from charity.  Given this, I think it’s safe to assume that what 
                                                 
334 Bonaventure, Apologiae Pauperum, Responsionis Primae, Caput 1.  Cf. Albertus Magnus, Sentences II, d.36, a.7: 
“Bonum autem in genere dicitur dupliciter, scilicet proportione actus ad materiam debitam…”   
335 Bonaventure, Apologiae Pauperum, Responsionis Primae, Caput 1.  “Bonum ex circumstantia, est actus 
laudabilibus circumstantiis informatus, sicut dare eleemosynam servatis debitis circumstantiis circa dantem, datum 
et accipientem, quantum ad loca, tempora et personas.”   
336 Bonaventure, Apologiae Pauperum, Responsionis Primae, Caput 1.  “Malum ex circumstantia, dicitur actus 
informatus deordinata circumstantia, ut comedere extra horam.”   
337 Bonaventure, Apologiae Pauperum, Responsionis Primae, Caput 1.  “Et haec duo bona depravari possunt per 
alicujus circumstantiae defectum, et maxime propter inordinationem intentionis, utpote si quis in dando 
eleemosynem, vel jejunando, vel eundo ad ecclesiam, hoc faciat, ut gloriam capiat humanam.”   
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Bonaventure calls goodness in se refers to the same type of goodness as Philip’s goodness ex 
gratia, for two reasons.  First, in Book III of the Sentences, Bonaventure connects bonum ex 
gratia with the theological virtue of caritas.338  Second, Bonaventure—like the medieval 
tradition generally—thinks that charity is a theological or infused virtue, and such theological 
virtues always proceed from grace.339    
So when Bonaventure calls this third type of goodness ‘perfect goodness’ or ‘goodness in 
se,’ and claims that acts proceeding from the virtue of charity (which is infused by God) have 
this goodness, he has in mind the same third characterization of goodness ex gratia as Philip and 
Albert.  This also explains why acts of perfect goodness cannot be made bad: if an act has perfect 
goodness, the performed act proceeds from the virtue of charity, which God himself infuses 
efficaciously into one’s will.         
 
Thomas Aquinas: A Different Approach 
Instead of distinguishing and contrasting ontological goodness with moral goodness, and 
noting that the former is essential to acts and the latter is accidental—as the entire tradition had 
done—Aquinas emphasizes the similarity and identity of these two types of goodness by 
focusing on the convertibility of being and good.  In fact, the convertibility of being and good 
overshadows Aquinas’s entire account of the metaphysics of goodness.  First, I’ll briefly 
reconsider Aquinas’s account of convertibility, and then, how this account applies to the case of 
                                                 
338 Bonaventure, Sentences III, d.28, a.1, q.6.  Opera Omnia vol. 4 (Quaracchi: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 
1865).   
339 Bonaventure, Expositio in Evangelium S. Joannis, XV.  Opera Omnia vol.11 (Quaracchi: Editiones Collegii S. 
Bonaventurae, 1867).  “Et ad istud respondendum sine praejudico, quod est loqui de charitate, prout est in diversis 
subjectis; et sic est major, et minor, secundum quod est major et minor gratia data a Deo.  Vel est loqui de charitate 
in eodem subjecto, et in eadem anima.   Et sic est loqui de ipsa simpliciter, vel quantum ad suam essentiam; est enim 
habitus gratuitus a Deo infuses.” 
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moral goodness.      
The Convertibility of Being and Good  
As we saw in chapter 2, Aquinas conceives a necessary connection between being and 
good: he argues that being and good are convertible because they are the same in reality and 
differ only in sense.340  Aquinas contends that the ratio of goodness is that of desirability.  A 
thing is desirable only insofar as it is perfect, and everything desires its own perfection or 
completeness.  Something is perfect or complete only in so far as it is actual, where actuality 
implies the fulfillment of a thing’s potentialities.  But being or existence is what makes 
something actual; therefore, something is perfect only insofar as it is actual.341  Since every being 
has some degree of actuality, it has a certain amount of perfection and thus has a certain amount 
of goodness.  Hence goodness and being are the same in referent, although the ratio of each 
concept differs; in other words, being and good are conceptually distinct.  
The Application of Convertibility to Acts  
 Instead of contrasting ontological or transcendental goodness which coverts with being 
with moral goodness, as all of the previous authors discussed have done, Aquinas applies his 
doctrine of convertibility to the moral realm.  In Summa Theologiae I-II, q.18, a.1, Aquinas asks 
the question of whether every human act is good.  He responds by claiming that we ought to say 
the same thing concerning good and bad in actions that we do about good in bad in things.342  
Since being and good are convertible, each thing has as much goodness as it has being.  
                                                 
340 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q.5, a.1.   
341 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q.5, a.1.  “unde manifestum est quod intantum est aliduid bonum, inquantum est 
ens, esse enim est actualitas omnis rei.” See also Summa Theologiae I, q.3,a.4 and Summa Theologiae I, q.4,a1.   
342 The reason, according to Aquinas, is that each thing produces actions that are like the thing itself.  This will be 
important later, since Aquinas wants to focus on the agent who acts, rather than the act isolated from the agent’s will 
and virtue 
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Naturally, only God alone has the plenitude of his being in a unitary and simple way, and as 
such, has complete goodness.  In contrast, creatures, lacking metaphysical simplicity, have their 
plentitude or fullness of being through a variety of features.  Because of this, things can have 
some amount of being but lack the fullness of being that would be appropriate for them.  In 
humans, the fullness of being requires a composite of body and soul, which includes having all 
the powers and instruments of cognition and motion.  If there is a deficiency in any of these, that 
person would lack the fullness appropriate for a human being and so lacks some commensurate 
goodness.  So a blind person has some goodness because he is alive (i.e., has some being), and 
he has badness because he lacks sight.343  
Aquinas then draws the parallel with actions:  
So therefore it should be said that every action, insofar as it has some amount of being, to 
that extent it will have goodness: but insofar as it lacks some plentitude of being which is 
appropriate for a human action, it lacks goodness and so is called bad.  For example, if it 
lacks some determinate quality according to reason, or an appropriate location, or other 
[conditions] of this kind.344        
So according to Aquinas, just as goodness in things is proportionate to being, so also in actions, 
goodness is proportionate to the plentitude of being appropriate for the human action, which is 
determined primarily by reason.  Aquinas describes badness as a lack of fullness of being, in 
                                                 
343 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.18, a.1 (Turin: Marietti, 1950).  “Respondeo: Dicendum quod de bono et 
malo in actionibus oportet loqui sicut de bono et malo in rebus: eo quod unaquaeque res talem actionem producit, 
qualis est ipsa.  In rebus autem unumquodque tantum habet de bono, quantum habet de esse: bonum enim et ens 
convertuntur, ut in Primo dictum est.  Solus autem Deus habet totam plenitudinem sui esse secundum aliquid unum 
et simplex: unaquaeque vero res alia habet plenitudinem essendi sibi convenientem secundum diversa.  Unde in 
aliquibus contingit quod quantum ad aliquid habent esse, et tamen eis aliquid deficit ad plenitudinem essendi eis 
debitam.  Sicut ad plenitudinem esse humani requiritur quod sit quoddam compositum ex anima et corpore, habens 
omnes potentias et instrumenta cognitionis et motus: unde si aliquid horum deficiat alicui homini deficit ei aliquid 
de plenitudine sui esse.  Quantum igitur habet de esse, tantum habet de bonitate: inquantum vero aliquid ie deficit de 
plenitudine essendi, intantum deficit a bonitate, et dicitur malum: sicut homo caecus habet de bonitate quod vivit, et 
malum est ei quod caret visu.”   
344 Summa Theologiae I-II, q.18, a.1: “Sic igitur dicendum est quod omnis actio, inquantum habet aliquod de esse, 
inquantum habet de bonitate: inquantum vero deficit ei aliquid de plenitudine essendi quae debetur actioni humanae, 
inquantum deficit a bonitate, et sic dicitur mala: puta si deficiat ei vel determinata quantitas secundum rationem, vel 
debitus locus, vel aliquid huiusmodi.”  
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terms of what should be judged appropriate by reason for perfecting one’s will.  Given Aquinas’s 
explicit connection between being and goodness, it seems clear that moral goodness, then, refers 
to ontological or transcendental goodness applied in the category of action: to the extent the act 
perfects the agent and thereby actualizes his or her being, the act is good.  To the extent that the 
agent’s action fails in doing so, the act is bad.  And the determination of whether a certain act 
perfects the agent’s nature is made by right reason.  This novelty is unprecedented.   
 For the tradition starting with Lombard and running through Albert the Great, ontological 
goodness differs from moral goodness in kind: ontological goodness is a transcendental property 
of being, and as such, is found in every category, including action, such that every action is 
ontologically good since every action has some amount of being.  Moral goodness is an 
accidental feature of human actions, because many actions exist—have being—and lack such 
goodness.345  Furthermore, moral goodness results from an act’s having generic goodness 
combined with the appropriate circumstances.  So bad actions have ontological goodness and 
lack moral goodness, because they are disordered in some way.  In contrast, no such distinction 
is found in Aquinas.  Disordered human actions lack being or perfection, and so, to that extent 
lack some ontological goodness (in the category of action).  We will see this clearer if we follow 
Aquinas’s account further, as he shows specifically how actions can have or lack the plentitude 
of being required for moral goodness.     
 In Summa Theologiae  I-II, q.18, a.2, Aquinas asks whether a human action receives its 
goodness or badness from its object.  In reply, he first reiterates that goodness and badness in 
actions is a matter of their fullness of being, in the same way that goodness and badness in things 
                                                 
345 See Lombard Sentences II, d.35, cap. 2, Sentences II, d.36, cap. 6; Sentences II, d.37, cap. 1;  Albertus Magnus, 
Sentences II, d.40, a.1 and Sentences II d.41, a.1, q.2;  
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is a matter of their fullness of being.  In articles 2-4, Aquinas then specifies three conditions that 
pertain to bringing about fullness of being—in both actions and things, once again demonstrating 
the connection.  In article 2, Aquinas claims that a thing’s species is the first thing that pertains to 
its fullness of being.  He then draws a further parallel:  
Just as a natural thing has its species from its form, so also an action has its species from its 
object, just as motion from its terminus.  And therefore just as the first goodness of a 
natural thing is derived from its form, which gives it its species, so also the first goodness 
of a moral action is derived from an appropriate object; and so it is called by some “generic 
goodness.”346    
So in natural things, one thing needed for its fullness of being (and thus goodness) is the 
appropriate form, and the same is true in actions: an action has its form from its object.  Aquinas 
continues the parallel by claiming that just as the first badness in natural things results when the 
thing generated doesn’t realize its specific form (such as if a human isn’t generated but 
something else in its place), so too the first badness in moral actions results from the object.  
Aquinas goes on to say that taking someone else’s possessions is an example of “generic 
badness,” and that ‘genus’ means ‘species’ here in the same way that the whole human species is 
called the “human genus.”347   
  The second condition pertinent to an action’s fullness of being and thus its goodness is 
the circumstances of the act.348  Once again, Aquinas begins with natural things and then applies 
                                                 
346 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.18, a.2: “Sicut autem res naturalis habet speciem ex sua forma, ita action 
habet speciem ex obiecto; sicut et motus ex termino.  Et ideo sicut prima bonitas rei naturalis attenditur ex sua 
forma, quae dat speciem ei, ita et prima bonitas actus moralis attenditur ex obiecto convenienti; unde et a quibusdam 
vocatur bonum ex genere....”   
347 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.18, a.2: “Et sicut in rebus naturalibus primum malum est, si res generata non 
consequitur formam specificam, puta si non generetur homo, sed aliquid loco hominis; ita primum malum in 
actionibus moralibus est quod est ex obiecto, sicut accipere aliena.  Et dicitur malum ex genere, genere pro specie 
accepto, eo modo loquendi quo dicimus humanum genus totam humanam speciem.” 
348 For Aquinas, the circumstances that add fullness of being is accidental; for the tradition, the goodness itself—
informed by the circumstances—is accidental.  This is a subtle difference, but as I will show in the next chapter, one 
with some profound implications.   
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his findings to acts.  In natural things, the total plenitude of being is not determined simply from 
the natural thing’s form that gives the thing its species, but also from accidents supervening on 
the thing’s substantial form.  For example, in humans, accidents such as shape and color add to 
the person’s fullness of being.  When a human lacks a suitable proportion of these accidents, it 
results in a lack of fullness that ought to be there and thus a degree of badness.  So even though 
these additional features are outside the essence of the natural thing, they nevertheless add to the 
thing’s fullness of being and thus its goodness.349   
 According to Aquinas, actions follow the same pattern: the plenitude of being and thus 
goodness in an action is not only determined by the action’s species (i.e., its object), but also by 
the circumstances pertaining to the act,350 which are like accidents to the act: they are not 
essential to the act as such, but add some fullness of being (and thus goodness) to the act.  And 
so if anything that is required for the appropriate circumstances is lacking, the act will be bad.351  
Aquinas is quick to note, however, that circumstances are like per se accidents: while 
circumstances are not contained in the essence of the action itself, they are nevertheless essential 
to some actions.352  Take the act of ‘giving alms to the needy.’  A circumstance of the act might 
be the time or the place of the action.  While these factors or conditions are not contained in the 
description or essence of the act (i.e., ‘to give to the needy’), they nevertheless (1) add some 
fullness of being and thus goodness when the appropriate circumstances are present, and (2) are 
                                                 
349 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.18, a.3: “Dicendum quod in rebus naturalibus non invenitur tota plenitudo 
perfectionis quae debetur rei, ex forma substantiali, quae dat speciem; sed multum superadditur ex supervenientibus 
accidentibus, sicut in homine ex figura, ex colore, et huiusmodi; quorum si aliquod desit ad decentem habitudinem, 
consequitur malum.”   
350 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.7, a.3. 
351 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.18, a.3:  “Ita etiam est in actione.  Nam plenitudo bonitatis eius non tota 
consistit in sua specie, sed aliquid additur ex his quae adveniunt tanquam accidentia quaedam.  Et huiusmodi sunt 
circumstantiae debitae.  Unde si aliquid desit quod requiratur ad debitas circumstantias, erit actio malo.”   
352 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.18, a.3, ad.1-2.   
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essential to the act.   
In ad 3, Aquinas once again reiterates the applicability of his convertibility thesis to the 
moral realm: since being and good are convertible, and being is attributed to a thing substantially 
and accidentally, goodness is also attributed to things according to their essential being and 
accidental being.  He then claims that this is true for both natural things and moral actions.353    
So once again it’s clear that Aquinas’s view of the convertibility of being and goodness applies 
not only to natural things, but also to actions—and this is a significant deviation from tradition. 
 The third condition pertaining to the fullness of being is the end.  Once again Aquinas 
starts with the relationship between things and their being and goodness before considering acts: 
a thing stands in relation to its goodness in the same way as it stands in relation to its being.  
Aquinas then distinguishes two types of things: things whose being depends upon something 
else, and things whose being depends upon themselves alone.  In the case of the former, in order 
to understand their being and subsequent goodness, one must look to the cause upon which their 
being depends.  In the case of the latter, there is no need to reference anything beyond their being 
considered absolutely.  Given this distinction in the way things have being, since being and good 
are convertible, Aquinas claims that a distinction is needed in the way things have goodness.  
Since divine persons do not depend upon anything beyond themselves, they do not derive their 
goodness from an end that they depend on.  But in things whose being depends upon another, 
such as humans, their actions derive some goodness from the end upon which they depend.354   
                                                 
353 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.18, a.3, ad. 3: “Cum bonum convertatur cum ente, sicut ens dicitur secundum 
substantiam et secundum accidens, ita bonum attribuitur alicui et secundum esse suum essentiale, et secundum esse 
accidentale, tam in rebus naturalibus, quam in actionibus moralibus.”  
354 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.18, a.4. “Respondeo dicendum quod eadem est dispositio rerum in bonitate, 
et in esse.  Sunt enim quaedam quorum esse ex alio non dependet: et in his sufficit considerare ipsum eorum esse 
absolute.  Quaedam vero sunt quorum esse dependet ab alio: unde oportet quod consideretur per considerationem ad 
causam a qua dependet.  Sicut autem esse rei dependet ad agente et forma, ita bonitas rei dependet a fine.  Unde in 
Personis divinis, quae non habent bonitatem dependentem ab alio, non consideratur aliqua ratio bonitatis ex fine.”  
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Thus in each case, Aquinas draws a direct parallel between the ontological and moral 
realms, and argues that the relationship between being and goodness is identical in both cases.  In 
the natural realm, a thing’s goodness depends upon its being; in the moral realm, a person’s 
moral goodness depends upon this actualization of various potentialities judged by reason to 
fulfill or complete its rational nature. 
Conclusion 
Throughout this history, we see two strands of thought developing: the traditional 
account of the metaphysics of goodness began with Lombard’s attempt to reconcile Augustine’s 
claim that “every act is good in so far as it exists” with sinful acts, and to construct an ethic that 
overcame Abelard’s challenges concerning the sole importance of the intent of the agent in 
determining the act’s moral value.  This traditional account, rooted in these two concerns, is 
occasional in nature—written to address specific problems—and so naturally focuses on the 
substance of the act itself to deal with these worries.355  This approach begins with a distinction 
between ontological or natural goodness, which converts with being, and moral goodness, which 
is an accidental feature of (some) acts.  Moral goodness and badness are then stratified according 
to various factors and conditions that add levels of worth to good acts, and levels of blame to bad 
                                                 
355 The Abelardian threat to traditional moral theology was alive and well in Paris and fresh on Lombard’s mind 
when he writes the Sentences in the 1150s.  Abelard had returned to Paris to write and teach in 1136 and not long 
after encountered theological opposition from Barnard of Clairvaux—an early supporter and benefactor of 
Lombard—and William of St. Thierry.  About this same time, at the urging of Bernard of Clairvaux, Lombard 
begins his study under the tutelage of Alberic, a well-known critic of Abelard in the Cathedral School of Reims.   
After an examination of Abelard’s Ethics and other writings, a synod convened to hear the case in 1140.  Abelard 
appealed to Pope Innocent II.  In route to Rome, Abelard and his writings were condemned by Innocent II at the 
behest of Bernard of Clairvaux.  Abelard’s shocking intentionalist ethic was still a “hot topic” in Paris in 1145 when 
Lombard accepted the role as canon of Notre Dame, and Abelard’s ideas, still on the lips of his students, were still a 
nuisance 10 years after Abelard’s condemnation, about the time Peter Lombard writes his Sentences.  See Marilyn 
McCord Adams, “Introduction,” in Peter Abelard: Ethics Writings trans. Paul Vincent Spade (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1995), vii-ix; D.E. Luscombe, Peter Abelard’s Ethics, xxx; Peter Lombard, The Sentences: 
Book I: The Mystery of the Trinity, trans. Giulio Silano (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2010), ix-
x; Marcia L. Colish, Peter Lombard, vol.1  (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 16-17.   
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acts: generic, moral, and meritorious.  This traditional approach adequately overcomes both the 
Augustinian conceptual worry and the Abelardian intentionalist worry.  It escapes the 
Augustinian problem by admitting that every act, in so far as it has being, is in fact good—in the 
ontological sense, i.e., [B]—while at the same time realizing that sinful acts fail to have moral 
goodness on account of some defect.  Thus moral goodness and badness are accidental to acts.  
Furthermore, it overcomes the Abelardian concern by demonstrating that some acts have a 
categorical or generic goodness apart from the agent’s intention, and so the intention of the agent 
is not the sole determinant of an act’s moral value.    
Aquinas, in contrast, writing in the heyday of the Aristotelian renaissance, focuses 
instead on the role of the act in the agent’s perfection.  This provenance, along with Aquinas’s 
transcendental obsession, leads him to posit his convertibility thesis of being and goodness in the 
moral as well as the metaphysical realm.  The tradition before Aquinas conceived acts as a 
special sort of thing, and the analytical tools we apply to the natural realm were seen as 
insufficient for analyzing the moral realm—primarily because of the Augustinian worry about 
sinful acts.  In contrast, Aquinas’s naturalism is rather striking and thoroughly pervasive.  It 
seems as though Aquinas’s well-known claim that the domain of grace is in full continuity with 
the domain of nature has its analogue in the claim that the domain of reason is in complete 
continuity with domain of sub-rational nature.  So while Aquinas sometimes uses the same 
terminology (e.g., bonum in genere, bonum ex circumstantiis), he provides a new meaning to 
these concepts, because the moral goodness of acts converts with being.  In other words, genus 
and species language are not simply helpful metaphors for speaking about various kinds of acts 
and objects that have an accidental goodness over and above their being; the language actually 
characterizes their nature as acts.  As we will see in the next chapter, Scotus prefers the 
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traditional act-centered account over Aquinas’s agent-centered approach.  This makes a 
substantial difference in how we read and understand Scotus’s metaethics, and his place in 
history as a moral philosopher. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  
SCOTUS ON GENERIC, MORAL,  
AND MERITORIOUS GOODNESS  
 
 
 This chapter extends the previous chapter’s account of generic, moral, and meritorious 
goodness through Duns Scotus, and draws some conclusions concerning the ways in which 
Scotus and Aquinas align with tradition.  Before I do so, I need to show just how Scotus 
conceives the relationship between secondary or accidental goodness and moral goodness.  
Secondary Natural Goodness 
Secondary or accidental goodness, as we saw in chapter 4,  does not convert with being, 
but secondarily and extrinsically perfects its subject.  Generally, secondary goodness refers to the 
harmony or suitability (convenientia) of a thing to something else.  One type of suitability 
involves the suitability of the act to its end and agent.356  Not all acts, however, are rational acts.  
Scotus conceives an entire spectrum of acts directed at ends, depending upon the level of 
cognition in the agent—using ‘acts’ and ‘agents’ loosely.  Non-rational entities have a certain 
suitability of their nature to their end which they are directed towards, thereby obtaining a certain 
kind of secondary goodness of nature when those ends are reached.  Since these non-rational 
                                                 
356 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.9. “Actus autem natus est convenire agenti, et etiam habere aliquam conditionem sibi 
convenientem; utoque igitur modo habens illam potest dici bonus bonitate accidentali.  Et hoc verum est generaliter 
de actu etiam naturali, et per consequens bonitas ista in habendo illud quod sibi convenit, non tantum est bonitas 
accidentalis, sed naturalis.”  
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agents lack reason and will, they are unable to judge what acts and ends are suitable given their 
natures, and so their acts are determined by purely natural causes or—if one wants to identify an 
intellect or will—by God’s intellect and will (not their own), insofar as he moves everything in 
creation.357   
Even animals, which in some way apprehend the suitability of the end, do so without a 
conscious judgment of the end as such, and thus, Scotus infers that they do not move beyond a 
secondary natural goodness.358  Hence secondary natural goodness belongs to natural acts 
directed at suitable ends in agents that cannot form a judgment of the suitability of the thing’s 
nature to its connatural end.359  Since the type of cognition of the agent (‘agent’ taken in its 
broadest sense) determines one’s ability to judge what is suitable, a non-rational agent’s 
secondary natural goodness can be construed in terms of the fulfillment of potentialities latent 
within its nature, in line with various levels of Aristotelian “soul.”  First, inanimate objects—like 
a rock—will exhibit secondary natural goodness when it finds rest at the center of the earth;360 an 
acorn exhibits secondary natural goodness when it “acts” to become a mature oak; and an animal 
exhibits secondary natural goodness when it acts to survive and procreate.361  In each of these 
                                                 
357 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.10: “Aliquod agens, de eo quod convenit actui suo, non iudicat nec illud in potestate sua 
habet, sicut est agens sine intellectu et voluntate; et ibi, vel ex solis causis mere naturalibus determinatur quid 
conveniat actui, et ex eis inclinator agens ad agendum; vel si ultra illud sit iudicium alicuius intellectus et motio 
alicuius voluntatis, hoc non est nisi ipsius Dei, inquantum est universalis director et motor totius naturae; et ista 
bonitas in actu agentis sine intellectu erit mere naturalis.” 
358 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.11: “et quaedam cum cognitione sensitiva tantum, quae aliquo modo apprehendunt 
convenientiam obiecti, sive iudicent de convenientia actus sive non, saltem non transcendunt bonitatem naturalem.”  
359 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.4.  See Ordinatio II, D.40, q.un, n.7: “Actus autem naturalis natus est convenire causae suae 
efficienti, obiecto, fini et formae: tunc igitur bonus est naturaliter, quando habet omnia convenientia, quantum ad 
ista quae nata sunt concurrere ad ‘esse’ eius.”  
360 Ordinatio III, d.17, Q.un., n.13. 
361 By natural goodness, Scotus does not mean the goodness that everything has in virtue of its being—i.e., primary 
goodness.  It is true that Scotus does call primary goodness “natural goodness” at times (see Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un., 
n. 28), leaving Allan Wolter to puzzle about it (Wolter, Duns Scotus on the Will and Mortality, 212), but in at least 
one passage Scotus plainly tells us that he has two types of natural goodness: one that is convertible with being, and 
one that is a secondary perfection in non-rational agents.  He says: “I say that just as beauty in a body is derived 
from the aggregation of all things fitting to that body and the [relations] between them, for instance, the size, color, 
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cases, the suitability (convenientia) between the nature of the agent and the appropriate ends that 
fulfill various potentialities in its nature brings about the thing’s secondary natural goodness.  
In order for the act to rise above secondary natural goodness, the agent must make a 
judgment about the act’s suitability.  Only then is the act considered moral.  So secondary 
goodness concerning acts can be taken as a “quasi-genus” in which there are two species: acts of 
non-rational agents that are fitting to certain ends consonant with their natures, and acts of 
rational agents who judge acts suitable to certain ends appropriate to them as rational agents—
the former Scotus calls “secondary natural goodness”; the latter he calls “moral goodness” and 
only concerns those entities who possess a rational soul.362       
Moral Goodness: Regulated by Recta Ratio 
“The moral goodness of an act,” Scotus claims, “consists in the harmony of all those 
things that the agent’s right reason judges ought to be appropriate to the act or to the agent 
acting.”363  So a rational agent’s act requires not simply perceiving one’s end, as non-rational 
animals often do, but forming a judgment about the appropriateness of the act with respect to the 
end and other conditions.  And forming a judgment of this kind involves intellectual cognition.  
                                                 
and shape…so also natural goodness—not that which is convertible with being, but which has badness as its 
opposite—is a secondary perfection of a thing, whose completeness [is derived] from all the things fitting to it and 
the relations between those things.” Ordinatio II, d.40:  “Dico quod sicut in corpore pulchritudo est ex aggregatione 
omnuim convenientium illa corpori et inter se, puta quantitatis, coloris et figurae…ita bonitatis naturalis—non illa 
quae convertitur cum ente, sed illa quae habet malum oppositum—est perfectio secunda alicuius rei, integra ex 
omnibus convenientibus sibi et sibi invicem.”  Marilyn McCord Adams seems to also follow Wolter in this 
confusion.  See Adams, “Duns Scotus and the Goodness of God,” Faith and Philosophy 4 (1987): 488.   
362 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.10.    
363 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.8: “De primo, bonitas moralis actus est integritas eorum omnium, quae recta ratio operantis 
iudicat debere ipsi actui convenire vel ipsi agenti in suo actu convenire.” 
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Only now, Scotus claims, have we arrived at moral goodness.364  In other words, without the 
judgment of a rational agent, we have not moved out of the realm of natural.365  Human acts, as 
characterized distinctively by reason, are thus moral acts.  Morally good acts are ones in which 
the agent judges the appropriateness or fittingness (convenientia) of the given the act, object, etc.      
According to Scotus, a “judgment” is not some vague sense that such an act was 
appropriate, but a technical term requiring two things.  First, it requires not just anyone’s 
judgment or the potential to make a judgment, but the actual judgment of the person doing the 
action.  In this context, Scotus makes a very interesting claim:  
But it is not sufficient for [moral goodness], that in the agent there is the potential to 
adjudicate the appropriateness of his actions, but it is necessary that in acting rightly he 
makes a judgment concerning the act, and carries out the act in accordance with that 
judgment.  For if one’s own judgment is erroneous, even if the person acts in conformity 
with the right judgment of another person, he is not acting rightly, because such an agent is 
suited to regulate his own action through his own judgment and [in this case] he does not 
act according to his judgment, but against it.366   
Let’s call Scotus’s first condition for passing judgment “the autonomy clause.”  According to 
Scotus, it is not enough for a person to act in accordance with correct judgment made by 
someone else; rather, the person acting must make the appropriate judgment for herself: she must 
reason to the appropriateness of the act by her own rational powers.     
For example, suppose I’m backcountry snowboarding in a whiteout and lose my sense of 
direction.  It’s getting late, and, as my partner and I have no overnight gear, we have to get back 
                                                 
364 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.11: “Alia agunt ex cognitione intellectiva, quae proprie sola est iudicativa de tali 
convenientia, et talia nata sunt habere regulam intrinsecam rectitudinis in suo actu, et in solis istis potest esse actus 
bonus habens bonitatem moralem”  
365 For Scotus, natural powers in agents aren’t free powers because they are determined to their natural ends.  See 
Ordinatio III, d.17, Q.un., nn.12-18.    
366 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.12: “Sed non sufficit ad illam, quod in agente sit potentia iudicativa de convenientia sui 
actus, sed oportet quod actu recte iudicet de actu et secundum illud iudicium actus fiat.  Si enim cognitio propria sit 
erronea, licet agatur conformiter cognitioni rectae alterius cognoscentis, quia tamen tale agens natum est regulari in 
suo actu per propriam cognitionem et secundum illam non agit sed contra illam, ideo non recte agit.”    
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to the car before dark.  Furthermore, my partner and I both agree that we need to travel south to 
reach the car.  But in my disoriented state, I wrongly judge that south is directly in front of us—
the direction we are currently traveling.  Suppose further that I made such a judgment from 
plausible reasoning: from the direction of the forecasted and now observed wind, and my 
(unbeknownst to me) faulty digital compass.  In such a case, I form a reasonable but nevertheless 
erroneous judgment about the course of action, namely, which way we should go.  Suppose 
further that after a lengthy discussion (in which I’m still convinced my judgment is correct), I 
defer to my partner for navigating us back to the car—and she judges that we must turn one 
hundred and eighty degrees and go in the opposite direction.    
Suppose further that she correctly chose the course of action and we make it back safely.  
In such a case, I have not acted in accordance with my own rational powers, and I’ve acted 
against my (albeit) faulty judgment.  Scotus says that in cases like this, I didn’t act rightly.367  
But this seems puzzling, for in one sense I clearly acted rightly, since I deferred my judgment to 
the one who choose the right path home!  A few lines down Scotus clarifies what he means by 
not acting rightly: I may have chosen the right or correct action, but I didn’t act in such a way 
that the act can be evaluated as good.368  So I might act rightly in one sense, by making the right 
decision, but not in the sense that my act can be evaluated as good, because rational agents are 
naturally suited to regulate their own actions.369  And so even if one were to act rightly in the 
                                                 
367 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.12 “Si enim cognitio propria sit erronea, licet agatur conformiter cognitioni rectae alterius 
cognoscentis, quia tamen tale agens natum est regulari in suo actu per propriam cognitionem et secundum illam non 
agit sed contra illam, ideo non recte agit.”  
368 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.12: “Sic igitur patet qualiter bonitas moralis actus est convenientia iudicata secundum rectam 
rationem operatis.”  
369 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.11: “Alia agunt ex cognitione intellectiva, quae proprie sola est iudicativa de tali 
convenientia, et talia nata sunt habere regulam intrinsecam rectitudinis in suo actu, et in solis istis potest esse actus 
bonus habens bonitatem moralem.”   
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sense that the correct outcome was accomplished, if that person failed to pass the judgment for 
himself, the act cannot be evaluated as good, even if the correct choice was made (though the 
person did not form the judgment that the choice was correct).  Each rational agent must pass 
judgment on the appropriateness of their own actions for those actions to be evaluated as morally 
good.370  Here we begin to see one of the Subtle Doctor’s most important distinctions: the 
separation of goodness and rightness.  Rightness concerns the matter of what we ought to do;371 
moral goodness is an evaluation of how well we do what we ought to do.                    
Deferring judgment in a storm illustrates the nature of the autonomy clause when that 
decision is not about something of moral concern.  I cannot defer the decision to another, but 
must pass the appropriate judgment myself on the correct course of action—unless the other 
provides rational reasons accepted or judged by me for the change of plans.  But what kind of 
information must an agent have in order to make autonomous judgments in moral matters?  In 
other words, what kind of judgment is needed for an act to be evaluated as morally good?   
This leads us to Scotus’s second condition.  A rational agent’s  judgment must be derived 
from certain knowledge the agent has, specifically, knowledge of three relevant factors: (1) the 
nature of the agent, (2) the causal powers involved in carrying out the act, and (3) the essential 
nature of the act.  Having all three relevant pieces of knowledge in place is thus needed for an 
agent to pass judgment on the appropriateness of the act.372 
As far as the nature of the agent, Scotus holds the generally Aristotelian view that certain 
potentialities in our nature direct us towards fulfilling certain ends.  Various natures have various 
                                                 
370 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.12: “Sic igitur patet qualiter bonitas moralis actus est convenientia iudicata secundum rectam 
rationem operantis.”  
371 See for example Ordinatio III, d.37.   
372 Quodlibet 18.1, a.1, n.13.    
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potencies that enable the fulfilling of such ends, which are good for us because they perfect or 
complete our natures.373  Scotus doesn’t talk much about all this, but certainly these would 
include the various levels of soul on an Aristotelian picture: the nutritive, sensitive, and rational 
souls, and their respective functions, i.e., growth, perception, and thought, respectively.    
Natures need powers to fulfill their respective functions and thereby obtain the ends 
latent within them.  Hence Scotus says that in order to pass judgment on an act, the agent must 
know his or her own causal powers which pertain to the act.  So natures have powers that enable 
them to act to fulfill various functions.  If I want to go to the grocery store, it’s not in my nature 
to fly; I must walk.  Likewise, it’s not in the nature of a dog to use a compass for orienteering—it 
must use instinct and the senses.  As a rational animal, humans use their senses along with 
rational powers to act.374   
Finally, the agent must know the essential nature of the act (ratio quidditativa actus).375  
By that, Scotus means the type of act or kind of act in question.  For example, a sexual act would 
have certain characteristics or features that make it what it is—and these features or 
                                                 
373 For Scotus’s agreement with this Aristotelian conception of completion, see Reportatio II, d.34, n.3 (Wadding).   
“Oportet scire quid bonum significat.  Dico quod bonum et perfectum idem sunt 6 Metaph.  Perfectum autem 
dupliciter dicitur: uno modo, cui nihil deest, et hoc intrinsece, et illud est perfectum perfectione essentiali intrinseca, 
seu perfectione prima; alia modo dicitur perfectum perfectione secunda.  Sic igitur bonum duplex est: Primo modo, 
et secundo.  Bonum primo modo non potest habere contrarium, neque privativum in natura, quia contraria nata sunt 
fieri circa idem; igitur quod non est natum inesse alteri, non habet contrarium, neque privative oppositum; sed 
bonum seu perfectum perfection prima, inquantum primum, non est natum alteri inesse.  Etsi enim quantum ad id 
quod est, posset alteri inesse, dicendo quod accidens aliquot modo est perfectum perfection prima, vel intrinseca 
perfectine, quia est essentialis, tamen inquantum primum bonum dicit perfectionem in se et ad se.  Bonum igitur 
bonitate prima tantum habet oppositum contradictorie, ut non bonum; bonum autem secundo modo, quod est 
extrinsecum, habet malum oppositum privative.”  See also Ordinatio IV 31 q. un., n.4; De Primo Principio, 3.56.  
For Scotus’s connection between natures, powers, and ends, see Ordinatio I, d.1, pars. 1, q.2, n.60.  
374 It’s not clear to me, however, whether Scotus thinks that rational animals have both kinds of secondary 
goodness—natural and moral—as distinct evaluations of their actions, or whether the rational nature supersedes and 
uses these non-rational aspects.  The former view has been supported by Thomas Williams, “Reason, Morality, and 
Voluntarism in Duns Scotus: A Pseudo-Problem Dissolved,” The Modern Schoolman 74 (1997): 79.  Williams 
argues that humans can have both a secondary natural goodness that all animals have, and moral goodness that is 
unique to rational agents.    
375 Quodlibet 18.1, a.1, n.13.    
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characteristics would make the act different from other kinds of acts.  So in order to pass 
judgment on the appropriateness of an act, in addition to knowing the agent’s own nature and 
causal powers needed to complete the act, the agent must know what exactly the act involves 
doing.   
Scotus provides the following example in order to explain how an agent might use the 
relevant knowledge to make a judgment about an appropriate object.  From the nature of a 
human, and the act of eating—an act meant to restore one’s energy—one should judge that 
eating a stone would be an inappropriate object for restoring a human.376  Furthermore, one 
should judge that some foods, even those appropriate to animals, would be inappropriate for 
humans.  For example, grass or raw meat might be appropriate for satisfying animal hunger and 
replenishing their energy, but unsuitable for humans.  So once we have these conditions—
agent’s nature, causal powers, and the kind of act—right reason determines an appropriate 
object.  And this appropriate object makes the act generically good.      
Here, Scotus follows Lombard and his followers by further subdividing moral goodness 
into three grades arranged in a hierarchical fashion so that each higher grade of goodness 
presupposes the lower grade of goodness:   
I say that beyond the natural goodness of a willing, which pertains to it insofar as it is 
something positive, which also pertains to any positive being according to the grade of its 
being (the more being, the more goodness; the less being, the less goodness)—besides this 
[natural goodness], there is a threefold moral goodness according to its grade: the first is 
called generic goodness; the second can be called virtuous goodness or circumstantial 
goodness; and the third [is called] meritorious goodness or gratuitous goodness, or the 
goodness ordered to a reward by virtue of divine acceptance.377  
                                                 
376 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.14.  “Ulterius: Ex rationibus istorum trium concludi potest quid sit obiectum conveniens tali 
actui, ut est talis agentis; puta de actu comedendi, quod convenienter transeat super cibum restaurativum deperditi, 
non autum super illud quod non est natum esse nutrimentum, sicut lapis vel aliquid huiusmodi, quod licet alii 
animali esset nutrimentum non tamen homini.”  
377 Ordinatio II, d. 7, q. un., n.28. “De primo dico quod ultra bonitatem naturalem volitionis quae competit sibi in 
quantum est ens positivum, quae etiam competit cuicumque enti positivo secundum gradum suae entitatis (magis et 
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So every act, because it has being, has natural or transcendental goodness coextensive with its 
being.  Notice, however, that the natural goodness mentioned here is not the same as secondary 
natural goodness, but rather a form of primary goodness.  As we saw in depth in a previous 
chapter, Scotus contrasts this primary or transcendental goodness with moral goodness as a 
secondary or accidental goodness that adds varying degrees of goodness to some acts.  As we 
will see, each level of goodness builds upon the lower level, so that virtuous goodness 
presupposes generic goodness, and meritorious goodness presupposes both generic goodness and 
virtuous goodness, but not the other way around.   
Generic Goodness  
Given the agent’s nature, causal powers, and the type of act in question, the agent can 
thereby determine which objects are morally appropriate, for not all acts the agent passes 
judgment on are moral acts.  Rather, the type of object determines whether the act is moral.378  
The object sets the boundary of what types of acts are moral acts, and so Scotus calls this 
“generic goodness,” which is the broadest category of moral goodness—something like a 
genus.379  
So like his predecessors, Scotus emphasizes the genus/species relation between these 
various levels of goodness in a manner similar to matter/form.  In various places, Scotus 
                                                 
magis, minus et minus), -- praeter illam, est triplex bonitas moralis, secundum gradum se habens: quarum prima 
dicitur bonitas ex genere, secunda potest dici bonitas virtuosa sive ex circumstantia, tertia autem bonitas meritoria 
sive bonitas gratuita sive bonitas ex acceptatione divina in ordine ad praemium.”   
378 Ordinatio III, part 1, q.2; Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.14.  See also Ordinatio II, d.43, q.un., n.3.  There Scotus claims 
that such acts ought to depend not only on the object, but whether the act and object are fitting (convenientia) with 
the faculty.   
379 Quodlibet 18.1, a.1, n.14.  
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describes generic goodness as “quasi-matter,”380 “quasi-formable,”381 and “quasi-potential”382 
with respect to other aspects of goodness.  In doing so, Scotus emphasizes that generic goodness 
is kind of like a genus that needs specification from various circumstances (resulting in 
circumstantial or specific goodness).  By emphasizing “quasi,” Scotus acknowledges that it’s not 
a real hylomorphic composition: acts don’t really have a matter/form structure, but the structure 
of acts in terms of generic and specific goodness provides a nice analogy. 
In Ordinatio II, Scotus claims that when right reason deems an object appropriate, it 
moves an act into this generic category of moral goodness.383  In other words, making a correct 
judgment about the appropriateness of the object opens up the act for further moral specification 
and evaluation: 
The determination of the object is the first determination pertaining to the category (genus) 
of morals.  The nature of the object does not determine the act’s moral species, but only the 
potential to receive moral determination, because when an act has an object that is fitting 
(conveniens) to the agent and the act, then it is capable of moral determination according to 
the circumstances.  Because of this, an act is said to have generic goodness from its object, 
because just as a genus is in potential with respect to differences, so also the goodness that 
results from the object is first in the category (genus) of morals…and is capable of specific 
goodness in the category of morals.384   
A generically good act has an object appropriate to the act and the agent.385  Scotus provides the 
common example of giving alms to the poor.386  In this case, the kind of act is ‘giving’ (alms) 
                                                 
380 Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un., n.29.   
381 Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un., n.29.   
382 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.14 and Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un., n.29. 
383 Ordinatio II, d.7. 
384 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.14: “Ista determinatio obiecti est prima determinatio quae pertinet ad genus moris, non 
tamquam differentia determinans ad aliquid in illo genere, sed tanquam potentiale receptivum determinationis 
moralis; quia quando actus habens obiectum conveniens agenti et actioni, tunc est capax determinationis moralis 
secundum circumstantias ordinatas; propter quod dicitur ex obiecto actus habere bonitatem ex genere, quia sicut 
genus est potentiale respectu differentiarum, sic bonitas ex obiecto est prima in genere moris, praesupponens solam 
bonitatem naturae, et capax omnis bonitatis specificae in genere moris.” 
385 Ordinatio II, d.40, n.9. 
386 Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un., n.32.   
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and the object is the poor person in need.    
Recall that for Philip the Chancellor, generic goodness and badness result from a 
combination of the form of the act (i.e., the kind of act) in conjunction with the object (materia 
circa quam).387  When the object is appropriate or suitable (materia debita) to the kind of act, the 
act is generically good.388  For Scotus, an act is generically good when the object is appropriate 
or suitable (conveniens) to the kind of act (ratio quidditativa actus), the nature of the agent, and 
the causal powers that brought about the act.  So Scotus would agree with Philip that the kind of 
act and the appropriate object are necessary for the act’s generic goodness.  However, Scotus 
augments such a description with a more robust Aristotelian account of action, emphasizing that 
agents have natures directing them to fulfill certain ends and the appropriate causal powers to do 
so.  I call this an augmentation, rather than transformation, because this information already 
seems implicit in Philip’s own account.389  And while Philip doesn’t explicitly claim this, his 
account is moderately Aristotelian, at a time when Aristotle’s moral and metaphysical writings 
were just being reintroduced into the West.  His account shows some familiarity with 
Aristotelianism, but not on the level and sophistication we see in the thirteenth century.  But 
Philip’s account remains basically the same: generic goodness arises when the right kind of act 
conjoins with a fitting object—tacitly assuming that the nature of the agent and her causal 
powers facilitate which acts are fitting.           
                                                 
387 Philip the Chancellor, Summa De Bono, 330, L: 97:  “Et est dicendum quod genus accipitur hic ex coniunctione 
forme actus cum materia actus; reficere enim dicit formam quandam, esurientem dicit materiam, at tamen trahitur 
bonum ex coniunctione huius ad illud.”  
388 Philip the Chancellor, Summa De Bono, 333, L: 181-183: “Propter hoc notandum quod genus accipitur pro 
materia seu pro actu coniuncto cum materia debita.  Et sic locum habet bonum in genere in illis, in quibus explicite 
vel implicite determinatur actus cum materia, ut dictum est.  See also 330, L: 103-105: Nam bonum in essentia 
dicitur quantum ad causam efficientem a qua est esse, bonum autem in genere ex coniunctione generis actus cum 
genere quod est materia actus cum fuerit materia debita actui vel e converso.” 
389 See Philip the Chancellor, Summa De Bono, 330fl., L:83-113.   
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Once an act has generic goodness, it opens the act to further evaluation and specification, 
because generically good acts are formable through the relevant moral circumstances within the 
“genus” of morality, because the object is appropriate.390  For example, take the act of “having 
sex,” and the object as “my wife.”  Since my wife is the appropriate object for this act, the act is 
now brought under the realm of moral (generically good) and can now be evaluated further 
concerning the circumstances that specify the act’s goodness.  If the object was not my wife, but 
someone else, then the act would be brought under the genus of morally bad (generically bad), to 
be further evaluated in light of the circumstances in which the bad act was performed.391   
For both generically good and bad actions, these specifying circumstances can add levels 
of goodness or badness to the act.  For example, the generically bad act of stealing from someone 
would be worse and hence incur more blame if the “someone” was poor rather than rich, or if I 
stole a large amount of money rather than a small amount.  But in each case, the act remains a 
generically bad act of stealing.392  As Scotus sees it, all acts have an object, and thus all acts must 
be either generically good or bad: “There can be no act without an object, and the object must be 
either appropriate or inappropriate to the act: and so it is necessary that either a fitting object 
makes the act generically good, or an inappropriate object makes the act generically bad.”393  
This implies that there can be no generically indifferent acts.   
 
 
                                                 
390 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n. 14.  Ordinatio II, d.7, n.29.  
391 See the next chapter for Scotus’s account of moral badness.   
392 I owe the example to David Gallagher, “Aquinas on Moral Action: Interior and Exterior Acts,” Proceedings of 
the American Catholic Philosophical Association 64 (1990), 119. 
393 Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un., n. 36. “quia actus non potest esse quin transeat super obiectum, et illud necessario est 
conveniens vel disconveniens actui: et ita necessario actus bonus ex genere, ex obiecto conveniente, vel actus malus 
ex genere, ex obiecto disconveniente.”  
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Specific Goodness 
Once the act is considered a moral act (i.e., once it has generic goodness), it is then open 
for additional evaluation in light of the circumstances under which the act is performed, and this 
Scotus labels “specific goodness.”394  Elsewhere, Scotus calls this “circumstantial goodness,”395 
“moral goodness”396 or “virtuous goodness.”397  In regard to specific/circumstantial goodness, 
Scotus emphasizes two things.  First, circumstantial goodness contains the moral differences that 
specify or individuate generically good acts, in the same way that species specify various entities 
in some genus.398   
Second, specific goodness results from choosing the act under the circumstances that 
right reason dictates.399  In other words, the appropriateness of the object to the agent and the act 
are insufficient for specific goodness: one must also form a judgment about the appropriateness 
of the circumstances under which the act is carried out.  So while having sex with one’s spouse is 
a generically good act, doing so at an inopportune time, location, or for the wrong reasons would 
make the act bad.  Partaking in such an act at an appropriate time, location, and for a good end 
(say, for procreation) would make the act circumstantially or virtuously or specifically good.        
According to Scotus, four circumstances are relevant in determining the act’s specific 
goodness: the end, the manner, the time, and the place.  As medieval see things, there are 
basically two senses of ‘ends’: (1) the end(s) that our nature directs us towards, and (2) the end 
or goal of a particular act itself.  Scotus takes both to be descriptive, normative, and closely 
                                                 
394 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.15; Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un., n.30.  
395 Ordinatio II, d.40, q.un., n. 9; Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un., n. 28;  Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.15.   
396 Reportatio II, d.41, n.2 (Wadding); Ordinatio I, d.17, q.1-2, nn.62-64.   
397 Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un., n. 28. 
398 Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un., n. 30; Ordinatio II, d.40, q.un., n.9. 
399 Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un., n. 30; Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.15-16.   
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related.  In the descriptive sense, natures have certain ends that they actually and naturally 
pursue.  But there is a normative sense of ends: namely, we ought to pursue or fulfill those ends 
which our nature directs us towards.  The use of ‘end of a particular act’ is descriptive in the 
sense that it describes some actual end or goal of some particular act of an agent.  But the latter 
can be evaluated in terms of how well or poorly it actually aligns with the former, i.e., with those 
teleological goals established by one’s nature.  According to Scotus, the two are intimately 
connected in evaluating an act’s moral worth, for the end of a particular act gains its moral worth 
when right reason judges that the end should be carried out given the nature of the agent, the type 
of act, and the object:  
The first goodness [of the circumstances] seems to be from the circumstance of the end, 
because from the nature of the agent, the action, and the object, it is immediately concluded 
that such an act ought to be performed by some agent for such an end, and it ought be 
chosen and sought after on account of such an end.400  
So when right reason judges appropriateness of some object, the act would gain generic 
goodness; when right reason concludes that some end ought to be sought, the action obtains 
circumstantial goodness (provided that the other relevant circumstances are appropriate and the 
act was carried out).   
In terms of the end of the act, Scotus makes three further points.  First, in the context of 
the ‘end of the act,’ the ‘act’ refers to the interior act.  Following tradition, Scotus makes two 
broad distinctions concerning acts of rational agents: the distinction between natural and moral 
acts, and the distinction between interior acts and exterior acts.  One, as we have seen, Scotus 
makes the distinction between a natural act and a moral act, the latter being the result of reason 
and will.  Natural acts and moral acts can overlap in terms of having the same object: take the 
                                                 
400 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.15: “Prima bonitas videtur esse circumstantia finis, quia ex natura agentis et actionis et 
obiecti statim concluditur quod talis actus non debet competere tali nisi in ordine ad talem finem, et debet eligi et 
appeti propter finem talem.”  
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natural act of cutting someone.  In such a case, the end or intent of the agent, along with the 
object, determines whether that act is a species of good acts or bad acts, depending upon whether 
I’m cutting someone open in order to save them, say, or whether I’m cutting them open to kill 
them.401  In such cases, the natural act remains the same but there would be two moral acts—one 
good and one bad.  Furthermore, since the natural act is an act, and every act has some amount 
of being, that act will have some ontological or primary goodness.  Whether the act has 
additional accidental or secondary goodness of the moral variety will depend upon whether the 
act has an appropriate object and end, among other things.402   
Two, after distinguishing between natural and moral acts, Scotus distinguishes two types 
of moral acts—interior and exterior.  The distinction is most clearly seen in examples: suppose I 
decide to rob a bank, but my plot is foiled before or during its execution.  My choice to rob the 
bank would be the interior act, and the exterior act would be my bodily powers executing the 
command made by my will.  Or suppose I decide to go to church but am hindered along the 
way—say, I get a flat tire.  In these types of cases, we have interior acts without their 
corresponding exterior acts; in other words, sometimes we decide to act, but fail to carry out our 
intended act.  The interior act can still be good or bad even if it is not accompanied by the 
exterior act—intending to go to church and intending to rob a bank are good and bad 
respectively, even if the intended acts never reach fruition.  The exterior act, however, cannot 
even exist without the interior act.  
As Scotus sees it, the two are distinct acts because they are governed by different causal 
powers: the will directly governs the interior act, whereas the exterior act is governed by some 
                                                 
401 The example is from Osborne.  Thomas M. Osborne Jr., “The Separation of the Interior and Exterior Acts In 
Scotus and Ockham,” Mediaeval Studies 69 (2007): 112.   
402 Ordinatio I, d.17, q.1-2, nn.62-64; Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un, n.28. 
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other powers external to the will (such as bodily powers) that are commanded by the will.403  We 
can see the importance of these distinctions by returning to Scotus’s discussion of the 
circumstance of the end.  According to Scotus, the circumstance of the end pertains not to the act 
as actually carried out or not, but only to the act as willed by the subject; in other words, Scotus’s 
discussion about the moral quality of an act in terms of generic and specific goodness belongs to 
the interior act of will—not the exterior act.  For Scotus, the interior act—choosing to act in a 
certain way with the appropriate object for the right end—is good even if the act doesn’t 
succeed.404  
Second, Scotus insists that even if act has an appropriate end, it is not sufficient for an 
act’s circumstantial goodness without the appropriateness (convenientia) of other relevant 
circumstances.405  A few examples will suffice in making Scotus’s point.  One, take the act of 
having sex with my wife (appropriate object) in order to procreate (an appropriate end): but 
suppose I do so in an inappropriate location, say, a crowded room.  The end might be good and 
the object appropriate, but the wrong location or even the right location at the wrong time (when 
other people are present) negates the act’s goodness.  Two, take going to church (the act406) out 
                                                 
403 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.3: “Ista questio habet maiorem difficultatem de bonitate actus morali, quia de bonitate actus 
naturali manifestum videtur, quidquid per illam intelegatur, quod ipsa est alia et alia alterius naturae.  Patet autem 
quod alia est natura actus interioris et exterioris; imo isti actus eliciuntur immediate a diversis potentiis: interior a 
voluntate, exterior a potentia aliqua exteriori, licet per imperium voluntatis.”  
404 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.15:  “Et ista circumstantia non est ipsius actus, ut in esse reali positi vel non positi praecise 
sic, sed est ipsius actus ut voliti et per actum voluntatis ad talem finem relati; imo, non minus est electio bona, quae 
sit propter finem debitum, esto quod per actum illum elicitum extra non attingatur finis electionis quam si 
attingeretur.” 
405 Ordinatio II, d.40, q.un., n.10.  See also Ordinatio I, d.48, q.un., n.5.  
406 It’s unclear in this example what the object of the act is: if ‘going’ means ‘walking,’ then the object would be the 
building or event itself.  If ‘going to church’ is used more in its colloquial sense of attending a church service, then 
the object could be construed as the building or maybe even God himself. My example presupposes the latter.  But 
medievals often used this example like the former, as in actually walking to church.  In one sense, this highlights the 
ambiguity of these descriptions for the moral realm: precisely how the object is described can alter how the act is 
evaluated.   
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of love for God (an appropriate end), but in the wrong way.  For example, suppose I went to 
church out of love for God, but sat on the roof listening to Bad Religion while devouring Lays 
Potato Chips and imbibing 101-proof Wild Turkey Bourbon, instead of, say, partaking in Mass.  
In such a case, the manner and the location were inappropriate for the act in question—even if 
the act had a good end.  Finally, take giving alms (the act) to the poor (an appropriate object) out 
of love for my neighbor (a fitting end), but not giving to him what he needs (incorrect manner): 
suppose he needs water and I give him a Pabst Blue Ribbon—or suppose he need monetary help 
and I give him a handful or worthless Confederate dollars.  
These examples make two of Scotus’s points.  First, even when an act has an appropriate 
end and object, the act might not necessarily be good.  In other words, an appropriate end is 
necessary but not sufficient for an act’s circumstantial goodness.  So an act cannot be 
circumstantially good without a good end, but a good end isn’t enough to make the act 
completely good.  Second, it only takes one inordinate circumstance to render the entire act 
bad.407  We’ll see this in more detail in the next chapter.   
Third, sometimes we act for various reasons or ends.  For example, I may go to church 
for all of the following good ends: (1) to fulfill an obligation of justice because I made some sort 
of vow to go to church; (2) in order to pray and worship God out of love for him; (3) to edify my 
friend out of love for him or her.  All of these disparate ends could count as why I went to 
church, and all of these ends could make the act morally good, provided the other circumstances 
were fitting.  According to Scotus, the more of these appropriate motives for acting there are, the 
                                                 
407 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n. 16. 
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better the act is.408  So even one of these good ends serves to make the act morally good (again, 
provided that the other circumstances are fitting), but more of these good motives would make 
the act even better.409   
Scotus mentions only briefly the following three circumstances already discussed a bit 
above: the manner, the time, and the place.  As for these three circumstances, Scotus only has a 
few general points to make.  First, these other circumstances are less important than the end for 
at least two reasons.410  One, the end concerns the very reason the act was undertaken in the first 
place, so it rightly plays a more important role in the act’s moral goodness or badness.  Two, the 
end is more important because the more good ends, the better the act can be.  This is not true for 
the other circumstances, which are “all or nothing” circumstances: the manner is either good or 
bad—same with the time and the location.  But there can be many good reasons for the act, and 
“the more the merrier” in determining just how good the act actually is.  Hence the end plays the 
most important role in an act’s moral goodness.  
The next circumstance is the manner or mode (modus) of the act.411  Sometimes Scotus 
                                                 
408 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n. 22: “Ex dicitis sequitur corollarium quod in eodem actu substrato potest esse multiplex 
bonitas moralis, quia idem actus potest esse recte circumstantionatus, non solum multis circumstantiis particularibus, 
quae non sunt multae bonitates sed integrant unam bonitatem, sed etiam potest idem actus esse circumstantionatus 
complete, omnibus circumstantiis pertinentibus ad unum virtutem; et ita secundum dictamina diversa perfecta 
prudentiae, respectu multorum finium propriorum.  Exemplum: vado ad ecclesiam ex iustitia, quia teneor per 
oboedientiam vel ex voto; vado etiam ex caritate ad Deum, ut orem vel ut exhibeam Deo cultum latriae; et vado 
etiam ex caritate fraterna, ut aedifidem proximum. Et, breviter, in quocumque actu, sive bono tantum bonitate morali 
sive ultra bonitate meritoria, quanto concurrunt plura motiva ordinate agendi, tanto melior est.”  
409 As we will see in the next chapter, this is also true for badness too: the more bad motives for an act the worse it 
would be.  For example, say I murdered my neighbor not only because I was having an affair with his wife and 
wanted her as my wife, but also because I wanted to steal the husband’s possessions.  This would make the act 
worse than if I just murdered him for his possessions.   
410 In Ordinatio I, d.48, n.5, Scotus flat out states that the end is most important: “Bonitas autem voluntatis non 
dependet a solo obiecto, sed ab aliis omnibus circumstantiis, et potissime a fine: Propter quod notandum est quod 
omnis nostra volitio potissime ordinata est ad finem ultimum, qui est alpha et omega, principium et finis, cui sit 
honor et gloria in saecula sauculorum. Amen.”  
411 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.15.   
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calls this the form of the act.412  His point here is that style matters: acts ought to be carried out in 
a fitting manner proper to the agent, act, and situation.  According to Scotus, all or some of the 
previous considerations determine how the act should be carried out, i.e., the nature of the agent, 
the type of act, the agent’s causal powers, the object, and the end.  From these conditions, the 
agent determines how to perform the act in an appropriate manner (debito modo).     
The final two circumstances are more extrinsic to the act than the rest: the time and the 
location.  Scotus says little to nothing about the timing of acts,413 other than that an agent should 
carry out the act only at a time when the act can attain such an end,414 and admits that the 
location of the act often plays no role at all.415  For example, while location might play a role in, 
say, where I have marital relations with my spouse, it may play no role in where I ought to give 
alms to those in need.   
And here, Scotus once again uses his standard example of giving alms: a generically 
good act would be giving alms (the act) to the poor (the appropriate object).  An example of 
morally/virtuously/circumstantially/specifically good act would be giving alms (the act) to the 
poor (the appropriate object) from one’s own resources (the appropriate manner or mode), in the 
appropriate place (the right location) and out of love for my neighbor (an appropriate end).   
In order for an act to be perfectly good, that act must be faultless on all of the above 
                                                 
412 Ordinatio II, d. 40, q.un., n. 10. 
413 One exception to this is his discussion of the fall of the Devil in Ordinatio II, d.6, q.2, nn.52-52, where Scotus 
postulates that happiness with respect to the ‘time’ condition of specific goodness could have caused Lucifer’s fall: 
right reason failed to form the proper judgment about the timing of happiness, because God wanted Lucifer to be 
happy at a later time, but Lucifer wanted it immediately. 
414 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n. 15: “Postea, concludi potest de tempore, quia tali agenti talis actio propter talem finem etiam 
talem habens modum non debet semper convenire, sed pro tempore pro quo ordinabilis est ad talem finem vel pro 
quo potest talem finem hebere.” 
415 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.15: “Ultima autem omnium videtur circumstantia loci; imo, multi sunt actus quorum etiam 
bonitas completa moralis non determinat locum.” 
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conditions.  Quoting Pseudo-Dionysius, Scotus says that “Goodness derives from one complete 
cause, but badness results from any particular defect.”  Scotus glosses this quote by claiming that 
by “complete cause,” Pseudo-Dionysius meant “all of the circumstances.”416  The complete 
goodness of an act occurs when an agent choses the act in accordance with right reason’s 
determination about the appropriateness of the act to the agent, the object, the end, the manner, 
the time and the place.   
 
Meritorious Goodness    
Finally, “meritorious goodness” constitutes the last and highest level of goodness, which 
Scotus also calls “gratuitous goodness” or the “goodness obtained by an act that is ordered to a 
reward by reason of divine acceptance.”417  According to Scotus, meritorious goodness has four 
conditions or aspects: the preconditions of the act, merit, charity, and divine acceptation.  Let’s 
consider each of these.  
First, in order for an act to be meritoriously good, the act must also be generically and 
specifically/circumstantially/virtuously good.  That is to say, the kind of act must be appropriate 
to the agent, his nature, his causal powers, and be performed with an appropriate object in mind, 
for one or many good ends, in the right manner, time, and place.  So an act must be completely 
good for it to be meritoriously good, but that is not sufficient.418  In order for it to be 
meritoriously good, the act also requires merit, charity, and divine acceptation.  
                                                 
416 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n. 16: “Sic, igitur, patet de pluralitate eorum quae recta ratio decat debere convenire actui, quia 
ad hoc ut sit perfecte bonus, debet habere, secundum descriptionem iam positam, omnium istorum integritatem.  
Unde Dionysius De divinis nominibus parte 4: ‘Bonum est ex una et tota causa, malum autem ex particularibus 
defectus’; tota, inquit, causa, hoc est, integra ex omnibus circumstantiis.” See Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis 
Nominibus, C.4, §31, Patrologia Graeca (3,732).   
417 Ordinatio II, d.7, n. 28. 
418 Ordiantio II, d.7, n. 31.  
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Second, the act must be elicited in conformity with the source of merit (conformiter 
principio merendi), which Scotus identifies as the theological virtue of charity.419  The 
difference, then, between an act’s simply having specific goodness and its having meritorious 
goodness stems from the act’s right relationship with an appropriate end: namely, God.420  
Suppose I give alms (the act) to the poor (the appropriate object) from my own resources (the 
appropriate manner or mode), in the appropriate place (the right location) and I do it because I 
love God in addition to loving my neighbor (also an appropriate end).421  My intention changes 
the level of the act’s goodness.  But it does not do so when the act was performed simply from a 
natural love for God that would have been possible in the state of innocence.  I must do so from a 
special kind of love—caritas.422 
Love, or caritas, is a habit or disposition that inclines the agent to act in certain ways.  In 
other words, caritas is a virtue.  For medieval theologians, the virtue of charity is not a moral 
virtue, like prudence or courage, that can be acquired through practice, habituation, and 
education.  In contrast, charity—along with faith and hope—are termed theological virtues. 423  
These theological virtues are like the moral virtues in that they are habits or dispositions, but 
differ with the moral virtues because they have God as their end,424 and in the present state are 
                                                 
419 Ordiantio II, d.7, n. 31.  “Tertia bonitas competit actui ex hoc quod, praesupposita duplici bonitate iam dicta, ipse 
eliciter conformiter principio merendi (quod est caritas vel gratia) sive secundum inclinationem caritatis.”  
420 Ordinatio II, d.41, q. un., n.9: “meritum videtur esse ex relatione ad finem debitum, quae relatio fit a charitate in 
exsistente.”  
421 Ordiantio II, d.7, q. un., n. 32.   
422 Ordinatio II, d.7, q. un., n.32. “Exemplum de tertio: istud opus facere non tantum ex inclinatione naturali, sicut 
potuit fieri in statu innocentiae (vel forte adhuc modo posset fieri a peccatore, si adhuc peccator existens et non 
poenitens ex pietate naturali moveretur ad proximum), sed ex charitate, ex qua faciens est amicus Dei, inquantum 
respicit opera eius.” 
423 See Ordinatio III, d.26.   
424 While Aquinas would say that the theological virtues have God as their object rather than end (see Summa 
Theologiae I-II, Q.62, a.1), it is clear from his other discussions that for an interior act, the object of the act is the 
end itself (See for example Summa Theologiae I-II, q.19, a.9).   
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acquired by God supernaturally infusing them in us.425       
Is the theological virtue of charity necessary for an act’s meritorious goodness?  And if 
so, are meritorious acts then caused by the will of the person acting, or by the disposition of 
charity infused in the person by God, or both?  These are difficult questions that Scotus spends 
much time on.426  In Lectura I, d.17 and Ordinatio I, d.17, Scotus outlines and rejects a number 
of positions of others in the context of providing his own answers to these questions.  Let’s 
consider a few of these views here, as it will aid in seeing the context of Scotus’s own position.  
Henry of Ghent427 argues that since theological virtues are virtues, they are dispositions 
similar in nature to the natural virtues.428  This much Scotus agrees with.429  However, Henry 
argues that because they are supernatural in nature, they are more effective at eliciting a response 
than a natural virtue—so much so that the supernatural virtue of charity in itself suffices for 
bringing it about that the agent acts in such a way that he or she loves God.430  Scotus rejects this 
view for obvious reasons: one, it seems to make the virtue its own sort of willing or causal power 
over and above the agent’s will—a little will of its own (potentia volitiva).  Unfortunately,  
virtues are dispositions, whereas the will is a power.  They are thus distinct types of things, and 
                                                 
425 See Scotus, Lectura I, d. 17, pars.1, q. un, n.75. “Sed licet caritas sit habitus supernaturalis, non tamen mutat 
rationem habitus…” 
426 See Lectura I, d.17, pars. 1, q. un; Ordinatio I, d.17, pars. 1.  See also A. Vos et al., Duns Scotus on Divine Love: 
Texts and Commentary on Goodness and Freedom, God and Humans (Burlington: Ashgate, 2003), 108-129.   
427 Those familiar with Scotus’s writings may find it peculiar that Henry of Ghent is only now making an appearance 
in the dissertation.  Henry is, after all, Scotus’s primary theological sparring partner.  I offer two reasons for Henry’s 
absence.  First, unlike his peers, Henry never composed a commentary on Lombard’s Sentences, which is where 
much of the medieval debates about the metaphysics of goodness appear.  Second, while Henry started to compose a 
Summa, the part dealing with moral theology was left unwritten when he died.  So unlike many issues, Henry didn’t 
write much on moral theology, and thus, Scotus doesn’t mention him as much as he does on other controversial 
topics of the day.  He did, however, write on the virtue of charity, which explains his inclusion here.   
 
428 For Henry’s view, see Henrici De Gandavo, Quodlibet IV, q.10, nn.15-290.  In Henrici De Gandavo Opera 
Omnia VIII, eds. Gordon A. Wilson and Girard J. Etzkorn (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2011).   
429 Lectura I, d. 17, pars.1, q. un, n.75. 
430 Lectura I, d.17, pars.1, q.un., n.45. 
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Henry’s view muddles the two.431  Two, this seems to put all of the causality on the divine agent 
and none on the human agent.  If we have a part to play in meriting the goodness of an act, 
Henry’s view leaves no room for it.  Thus no human willing of a meritorious act will be free.432  
Furthermore, Henry’s view produces the unwanted conclusion that a person with the virtue of 
charity can never sin.433  But this is false.  So according to Scotus, Henry’s view is obviously 
wrong.  
In contrast, Godfrey of Fontaines argues that a supernatural habit doesn’t give the act its 
causality, but its intensity.434  So the act, qua act, derives from the will as its cause; but the act 
receives its intensity from the disposition of charity.  So according to Godfrey, each has a distinct 
role in bringing about the act’s meritoriousness.  The ‘intensity’ of an act concerns how 
passionate one feels in the act.  So if the end of the act were ‘loving God,’ the intensity would 
concern how much one loves God in doing the act.     
The discussion of the intensity of an act—what scholastics called the intension and 
                                                 
431 Ordinatio I, d.17, pars.1, q.1-2, n. 22; Lectura I, d.17, pars.1, q.un., n.45. 
432 Ordinatio I, d.17, pars.1, q.1-2, n.24:  “Praeterae, operatio non elicitur libere, cuius principium activum est mere 
naturale; seb habitus cum non sit formaliter voluntas, nec per consequens formaliter liber, si est principium activum 
erit mere naturale; ergo, operatio eius non erit mere libera, et ita nullum ‘velle’ erit liberum si elicitur ab habitu ut a 
totali principio activo.”  
433 Lectura I, d.17, pars.1, q.un., n.50: “Si caritas det voluntati esse supernaturale et agere, numquam poterit voluntas 
habere actum meritorium nisi prius caritas habeat actum, quia non poterit tunc voluntas sic agere nisi praeagente 
caritate, quae est causa quasi superior et principium eius operandi meritorie; igitur voluntas in actu suo sequitur 
inclinationem caritatis; cum igitur caritas supernaturaliter et modo naturali inclinatur in bonum postquam est, 
voluntas tunc numquam poterit in actum malum inclinari; igitur semel habens caritatem, numquam peccabit!” 
Ordinatio I, d.17, pars.1, q.1-2, n.25: “Praeterea, tunc homo semel habens charitatem, nunquam posset peccare 
mortaliter, quod est inconveniens.  Probatio consequentiae, quia habens formam aliquam activam praedominantem 
sibi, nunquam potest moveri contra inclinationem illius formae praedominantis, sicut numquam corpus mixtum 
grave potest ascendere contra inclinationem terrae dominantis; sed caritas—si est totale principium activum—
praedominatur ipsi voluntati, quae non potest in actum illum; ergo voluntas sequitur semper inclinationem caritatis 
in agendo, et ita numquam peccabit.”    
434 See Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet XI, q.4.   In Les Quodlibets onze-quatorze De Godefroid De Fontaines.  Les 
Philosophes Belges, Tome V, Fascicules I-II, ed. J. Hoffmans (Louvain: Editiones de L’institut Superieur De 
Philosophie, 1932). Cf. Ordinatio I, d.17, pars.1, q.1-2, n.27; Lectura I, d.17, pars.1, q.un., n.51. 
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remission of forms—has its normal setting in the domain of natural philosophy.  There, 
medievals puzzled about the whether the numerically identical form could vary in its intensity.  
For example, consider an amount of warmth and a shade of color.  When water is heated, as it 
warms up, must we posit multiple forms at varying temperatures to account for the change, or is 
there simply one form that intensifies when heated and remits as it cools back down?  Or take the 
color white.  Is there simply one form of whiteness or many forms of whiteness for each of the 
varying degrees of brightness that are possible?  Scotus rejects the need to posit multiple forms 
to account for such differences.  Rather, some forms come in degrees.435  In such cases, Scotus 
posits a modal distinction between the form and its degree of intensity.  As Peter King puts it, 
“two different degrees of heat seem to differ not in kind but in degree.”436 As modally distinct, 
the form and its intensity are really identical but vary in degree.   
Drawing upon his notion of grades of intensity in forms and the modal distinction, Scotus 
advances a number of arguments against Godfrey’s position.  First, Scotus argues that Godfrey’s 
proposal of an aggregation of the potency and the virtue of charity derives from extrinsically 
distinct sources in an act and thus produces merely an accidental unity between the potency (the 
will) and the virtue (charity).  But intension and remission are not extrinsic differences in the act, 
but are intrinsic grades within the same act, such that the grade of intensity in an act requires an 
essential unity within the act itself.  Therefore, an act’s intensity must be produced by the will 
itself and not some external or extrinsic source.437  Second, Scotus argues that if the virtue of 
                                                 
435 Lectura I, d.17, pars.2, q.1, nn.140-143;  Ordinatio I, d.17, pars.1, q.1-2, n.28.   
436 Peter King, “Scotus on Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, 32.    
437 Lectura I, d.17, pars.1, q.un., n.52.  “Intensio et remissio in actu non sunt differentiae extrinsecae in actu, sed sunt 
gradus intrinseci in eodem actu, et utrumque est ‘per se unum,’ ita quod gradus intensus est quid unum simpliciter 
sicut gradus remissus; igitur sicut sunt distincta er per se faciunt unum cum actum, ita habent principia distincta et 
per se entia.  Actus igitur intensus habebit principium, quod est ens per se unum; sed aggregatum ex caritate et 
potential non est unum nisi per accidens; ergo, etc.” 
166 
 
charity produces the intensity in the act of the will, then we would always have an equal intensity 
in the act of loving God—which is simply false, because we do not always love God with an 
equal intensity.438  
Third, Scotus argues that in the case of God, the infinite will without any habit produces 
an infinite grade in its act, so that each act is infinitely intense.  Since the intensity derives from 
the infinite will in such a case, why should it be different for finite agents?  The intensity 
possible for finite agents ought to conform to one’s nature and ability to act, as was true for God.  
So the intensity of the power stems from the nature of the agent acting—the more perfect the 
will, the greater the intensity possible.  He concludes,  
A finite power, in every grade of its perfection, can provide to an act only the intensity 
compossible with the act, so that the intension and remission in the act is derived from a 
more perfect or less perfect will, and not from the habit, just as an infinite act’s intensity is 
from the infinite will without any habit producing the degree [of intensity].439      
In short, Scotus thinks that intensity is a circumstance of the act, under the category of 
manner/mode, and thus originates solely by the agent’s own causal powers.  Consequently, an 
act’s intensity more directly concerns moral goodness than how an act receives meritorious 
goodness.440   
 Given that a meritorious act requires the theological virtue of charity, and yet charity 
doesn’t produce the intensity of the act, nor does it solely determine one to love God by causing 
                                                 
Cf. Ordinatio I, d.17, pars.1, q.1-2, n.28: “Contra istud arguo, quia intensio actus non est aliquod extrinsecum, 
accidens actui, sed gradus intrinsecus actui, ita quod actus intensus est quoddam ‘per se unum’ sicut huiusmodi 
individuum in specie.  Non ergo potest esse aliud principium substantiae huiusmodi actus, et intensionis suae, quia a 
quo est hoc individuum, ab eodem est gradus intrinsecus proprius huic individuo: non enim post recipere naturam ab 
aliquot, et ‘hanc naturam’ signatam, quin recipiat eam in certo gradu.”   
438 Lectura I, d.17, pars.1, q.un., n.53.  Ordinatio I, d.17, pars.1, q.1-2, n.29.  
439 Lectura I, d.17, pars.1, q.un., n.55. “Igitur, potentia finita, in quocunque gradu perfecta, potest dare actui tantum 
intensionem compossibilem actui, ita quod intensio et remissio in actu sit ex voluntate perfectioniore vel minus 
perfecta, non ex habitu, sicut actus infinitus ex infinita voluntate sine omni habitu dante gradum.” Cf. Ordinatio I, 
d.17, pars.1, q.1-2, n.31.  
440 For Scotus’s claim that the intensity of the act is a circumstance of the act, see Ordinatio I, d.48, q.un., n.4.  
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the agent’s affection, what role does charity play in a meritorious act?  Perhaps, Scotus suggests, 
the will alone causes the act’s meritoriousness, but its acceptance by God results from the 
disposition of charity in the agent.  Such a disposition, then, would be a kind of “ornament of the 
soul.”441  For example, suppose someone who loves God petitions God by a natural cause, and 
God accepts the act on account of her inner beauty as one who loves God.  In such a case, Scotus 
says, “when charity is an ornament of the soul and beautifies the soul, so also the act is heard and 
accepted by God loving the soul on account of the beauty of the virtue.”442     
In some ways, this suggests the opposite Henry of Ghent’s view, because it places the 
will as the cause of the act’s meritoriousness, even if it is only accepted by God because the 
agent has the virtue of charity.  Scotus finds this proposal problematic because if this were the 
case, then no act could be indifferent and there would be no venial sins, since God accepts the 
act.  And divine acceptation implies a sin-free act.  But people who merit eternal life do in fact 
have venial sins.  So Scotus concludes this proposal doesn’t take this into account.443 
In light of this discussion, Scotus concludes that neither the act alone nor the virtue of 
charity alone causes a meritorious act, but that both the act and the virtue of charity concur to 
bring about the act’s meritoriousness.444  In order to show this, Scotus examines the “act as an 
act,” and the “nature of a meritorious act,” in turn.  By “act as an act” Scotus means to examine 
                                                 
441 Lectura I, d.17, Pars.1, q.un, n.58: “Et forte videri quod sola voluntas sit causa actus merirorii, ut tamen est sub 
habitu, quia habitus quamvis non habet causalitatem respectu actus meritorii, est tamen ornatus animae et facit eam 
acceptam deo, et actum similiter, tamen voluntas est causa actus.”  
442 Lectura I, d.17, Pars.1, q.un, n.59: “Exemplum: sicut petition, a sola natura causata, acceptatur propter 
pulchritudinem eam, et actus eius ex hoc exauditur et acceptatur a Deo diligente animam propter pulchritudinem 
virtutis.”  
443 Lectura I, d.17, Pars.1, q.un, n.60: “Si ita esset, nullum esset peccatum veniale: quia dicitur ‘si habet habitum 
caritatis, eius actus acceptatur,’ nullum erit peccatum veniale, nec etial actus indifferens.  Et ideo ponitur caritas-
habitus respectu actus meritorii, et non respect actus indifferens.”  
444 Lectura I, d.17, Pars.1, q.un, n.61.  Cf. Ordinatio I, d.17, pars.1, q.1-2, nn.32, 69, and 73. 
168 
 
not only the essence of the act, but also those other aspects of the act, excluding only what makes 
it meritorious.  In other words, the “act as an act” will also include discussions of the intensity of 
the act, its moral aspects (ratio moris), and others of this kind.445  I take ‘moral aspects’ to 
include those things discussed above concerning moral goodness, since those were previously 
stated preconditions for the act’s meritoriousness.   
Scotus argues that the will and the virtue of charity conquer as two partial agents in 
eliciting an act of love, resulting in its meritoriousness.  According to Scotus, each cause is 
perfect in itself as a cause, and so both causes are independent of the other.  However, one of the 
“agents” in the act is more perfect and the principal agent, while the other is less perfect and less 
principal.446  Even though caritas is a supernatural disposition, it is still a disposition, and so it 
behaves accordingly.  Scotus argues that dispositions cannot use a power, but a power which has 
a disposition uses that disposition.  Thus the will—as the operative power—is not moved by the 
disposition to love.447  Thus Scotus concludes that the principal mover or agent is the will, while 
the disposition to love is the second and less principal cause in the act, but nevertheless makes 
the act more perfect than it would have been with merely the will acting.448  Scotus concludes:  
It is said that charity is “the weight of the will,” for the will is free and it has charity as a 
certain kind of weight, which is in itself naturally inclining it to love God; but [charity] is 
not the total cause of an act of loving God, but presupposes that the act of the will of the 
agent is free, so that however much a will elicits a perfect act, charity causes more 
                                                 
445 Lectura I, d.17, Pars.1, q.un, n.69. Cf. Ordinatio I, d.17, pars.1, q.1-2, n.142.   
446 Lectura I, d.17, Pars.1, q.un, n.71:”Et dico ad primum quod voluntas cum habitu caritatis concurrunt ut duo 
agentia partialia ad actum diligendi eliciendum qui est meritorius.  Et concurrunt ut duo agentia perefecta in 
causalitatibus suis, ita quod causalitas unius non est ab alia, nec unum est perfectio alterius in agendo secundum 
causalitatem suam; sed tamen sunt duo agentia quorum unum est perfectius et principale, et secundum imperfectius 
et minus principale.”   
447 Lectura I, d.17, Pars.1, q.un, n.75.   
448 Lectura I, d.17, Pars.1, q.un, n.76-80.  As we will see, the reason why the act is accepted by God will be the 
reverse: primarily because the act was done in accordance with a disposition of charity, and secondarily because of 
the agent’s will. 
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perfection in that act.449   
So while the act’s cause is primarily due to the will and the agent’s freedom, the act is better 
(more perfect/complete) if it is also accompanied by the disposition of charity.   
But what exactly makes the act meritorious?  Here, Scotus claims that while the act’s 
cause derives more from the will, the act’s being meritorious and accepted by God results more 
from the virtue of charity than the will.450  In other words, the causes of the agent’s acts are 
reversed in importance: the act’s meritoriousness stems more from the act’s being accompanied 
by the virtue of charity and secondarily because the act is freely elicited: 
I say that the will is determined to the meritorious feature of the act more from charity than 
from itself.  And so what is meritorious of the act is more from charity than from the will, 
and therefore in eliciting a meritorious act as it is meritorious, the will is the follower, but 
not in eliciting the act absolutely.  And hence with respect to the act that is meritorious, the 
will is the principal cause; but the acceptation of the act by the divine will, on account of 
which is it called “meritorious,” is more because of the virtue of charity than on account of 
the will.451   
One final aspect of a meritorious goodness needs consideration: divine acceptation.  
According to Scotus, an act is meritorious not simply because it was brought about by the co-
causes of will and charity, but because of the act’s being related to the right end, namely God—
                                                 
449 Lectura I, d.17, Pars.1, q.un, n.87.  “Sic in proposition dicitur quod caritas est ‘pondus voluntas,’ nam voluntas 
libera est et habet caritatem ut pondus quoddam, quae quantum est ex parte sui naturaliter inclinat ad diligendum 
Deum; sed non est tota causa actionis libere, ita quod quantumcumque voluntas elicit actum perfectum, adhunc 
caritas causet maiorem perfectionem in actu illo.” 
450 Lectura I, d.17, Pars.1, q.un, n. 94.  Cf. Ordinatio I, d.17, pars.1, q.1-2, nn.130, 146-147, 151-152.     
451 Lectura I, d.17, Pars.1, q.un, n. 94. “Dico quod voluntas determinatur ad esse meritorium in actu a caritate magis 
quam a se.  Unde quod sit meritorious actus, magis est caritate quam a voluntate, et ideo in eliciendo actum 
meritorium ut meritorious, voluntas est pedissequa, sed non in eliciendo actum absolute. Unde voluntas respectu 
actus qui est meritorious, est causa principalis; sed acceptation istius actus a voluntate divina, propter quam dicitur 
actus meritorius, magis est propter habitum caritatis quam propter voluntatem.”  
Cf. Ordinatio I, d.17, pars.1, q.1-2, nn. 151-152: “Sed accipiendo actum secundum rationem meritorii, potest dici 
quod ista condicio principaliter competit actui ab habitu et minus principaliter a volantate: magis enim acceptatur 
actus ut dingus praemio quia est elicitus a caritate, quam quia est a volunate libere elicitus, quamvis utrumque 
necessario requiratur.”  
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and God’s accepting it as such.452  In other words, the divine will plays a central role in 
conferring merit (and thus meritorious goodness) on an act.  So the act must be done in a way 
that satisfies the conditions of generic and specific goodness, and furthermore, the act must be 
done for the sake of, or out of love for, the end—God himself—and from the concurrence of the 
will and charity.  But, God must also accept the act as such.453   
Must God accept any and all acts that fall under these conditions, or is he free to reject 
such actions?  And can an act that lacks said conditions be accepted by God for merit?  At first it 
seems hard to say.  On the one hand, Scotus states that freely willed acts performed with God as 
the end and with the virtue of charity are the ones in which God will grant as meritorious.  But 
on the other hand, Scotus’s voluntaristic tendencies abound, and even here, “God’s granting” 
seems to play a central role:  
I say that the meritorious act is one acceptable to God in a special way, viz., as worthy of 
reward.  I say “in a special way” because God accepts all acts with a general acceptation.  
He loves them according to the measure of their goodness and orders them to himself as 
their last end.  A meritorious act, however, he accepts with reference to some good which 
ought to be justly rewarded it.  “Meritorious,” then, implies two additional relations in the 
act, one to the accepting will, the other to the reward that the will has assigned to the act.454 
He goes on to claim that these two relations “arise solely through the act of the will accepting 
it.”455  This has caused some confusion on the part of scholars,456 since, in conjunction with these 
strong voluntaristic claims, Scotus says things like “if God were to accept that someone’s lifting 
                                                 
452 Lectura I, d.17, Pars.1, q.un, n. 90.   
453 Ordinatio I, d.17, pars.1, q.1-2, n.129.   
454 Scotus, Quodlibet 17, a.2, n.6.  In John Duns Scotus: God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions, trans. Felix 
Alluntis and Allan B. Wolter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 389.  Cf. Ordinatio I, d.17, pars.1, q.1-
2, n.129. 
455 Scotus, Quodlibet 17, a.2, n.6. 
456 For more discussion on this, See Andrew S. Yang, “Scotus’s Voluntarist Approach to the Atonement 
Reconsidered,” Scottish Journal of Theology 62 (2009), 421-440.   
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a straw, that would be a meritorious act.”457  And here it seems like the nature of the act itself has 
no importance, and only the divine will matters. 
In order to understand these confusing and seemingly contradictory claims, we must 
examine Scotus’s well-worn distinction between God’s absolute power (potentia absoluta) and 
his ordained power (potentia ordinata).  According to Scotus, the distinction runs as follows: 
God’s absolute power concerns what God can do in the strongest sense of the term,‘can.’  By 
God’s absolute power, God can do anything that doesn’t involve some type of contradiction.  So 
God can’t square the circle or bring about the state of affairs that married bachelors exist.  But 
other than restrictions of logic, God can literally do anything in terms of his absolute power.  By 
God’s ordained power, Scotus means what God can do in keeping with the laws and ordinances 
he has already established.458   
For example, suppose God ordains that humanity is saved only by the merit of Christ and 
good works.  Could God save someone via some other means?  Well, according to Scotus, that 
depends upon whether we’re talking about God’s ordained power or absolute power.  By God’s 
absolute power, Scotus would say, ‘yes,’ God could save someone through some means other 
than Christ.459  By his absolute power, for example, God could have saved someone by having 
                                                 
457 Lectura I, d.17, Pars.1, q.un, n. 89.  “Unde si Deus acceptasset quod quis levaret festucam, hoc esset meritorium.”  
458 Ordinatio I, d.44, q.un., n.7.  “Deus ergo, agere potens secundum illas rectas leges ut praefixae sunt ad eo, dicitur 
agere secundum potentiam ordinatum; ut autem potest multa agere quae non sunt secundum illas iam praefixas, sed 
praeter illas, dicitur eius potential absoluta: quia enim Deus quodlibet potest agere quod non includit 
contradictionem, et omni modo potest agere qui non includit contradictionem (et tales sunt multi modi alii), ideo 
dicitur tunc agere secundum potentiam absolutam.”  
459 This example commits one to a rejection on Anselm’s view that Christ’s death was necessary for atonement.  But 
it seems as though Scotus rejects such a view anyways, and in the 13th century, a rejection of Anselm’s view was 
commonplace: Bonaventure and Aquinas also agree with Scotus against Anselm.  See Richard Cross, Duns Scotus, 
129-132, and Douglas C. Langston, “Scotus’s Departure from Anselm’s Theory of the Atonement,” Recherches de 
theologie ancienne et medieval 50 (1983), 227-241. For Anselm’s view, see Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, in Sancti 
Anselmi Opera Omnia ed. P Franciscus Salesius Schmitt (Munster: Verlag Der Aschendorffschen 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1936).  See also Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams, Anselm (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 213-239; Jasper Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1972), 188-198; and Paul Helm, in Calvin at the Centre (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
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them lick the moss on the north side of pine trees on Wednesdays.  But given God’s pre-
established plan, God could not save someone via some other means in terms of his ordained 
power.  In other words, what God can do vis-à-vis his ordained power is limited by his previous 
decisions for how he wants the world to operate.    
Scotus applies this same distinction to the question of whether human volition 
accompanied by charity is necessary for a meritorious act, and whether the divine acceptation 
alone is sufficient.  By God’s absolute power, God could in principle accept any act and assign it 
for merit—even an act as mundane as lifting a straw.460  But given God’s ordained power, since 
God has decided to assign for merit only those acts done with him as the end and through the co-
causes of a free will and charity, God cannot accept some other act as meritorious.  So while God 
initially determines which acts will be assigned for merit, namely, those done with God as the 
end and from a free will acting with the virtue of charity, once God established this, he’s not 
going to change it.  If he were to change it, it would no longer be part of his absolute power, but 
of some newly established ordained power.461  But in the current “dispensation,” God has 
decided to accept only these acts as meritorious.  Scotus concludes:  
Furthermore, it ought to be known that, although in terms of God’s ordained power, the will 
can only have a meritorious act if it is informed by charity, it nevertheless can have a 
meritorious act in virtue of God’s absolute power, because he predestined that soul before it 
had the virtue of charity; and hence, he first wills the beatitude of the soul, and in virtue of 
this—after that—he wills it to have the virtue of charity by which it can obtain beatitude, 
just as a doctor first wills the health [of the patient] before willing the potion that induces 
health.  Therefore, since this ordering is not necessary for the end in an absolute sense, just 
as if the doctor could make someone healthy in some other way than through the potion, 
                                                 
163-195.  For Aquinas’s views, see Summa Theologiae III, q.1., a.1-4; qq.46-49; Sentences III, d.19-20; Eleonore 
Stump, “Atonement According to Aquinas,” In Philosophy and the Christian Faith, edited by T.V. Morris, (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 61-69.  For Bonaventure, see Sentences III, d.18-20.   
460 Lectura I, d.17, Pars.1, q.un, n. 89.  Cf. Ordinatio I, d.17, pars.1, q.1-2, n.160.  
461 See Lectura I, d.17, Pars.1, q.un, n. 89. Scotus provides an actual example of this change, when he claims that in 
the Old Testament Law, sacrificing animals to God was meritorious, because at the time God accepted such acts.  
But now such acts are not meritorious because they are no longer accepted by God.   
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God can accept the soul for beatitude according to its own nature even though he did not 
give the soul the virtue of charity.   
But even so, in terms of God’s ordained power, the will and charity concur to elicit a 
meritorious act accepted by God.462       
Thus while God could in principle have chosen a different means to save humanity, he has 
ordained that it should come about through the concurrence of the will and charity, and thus 
accepts such acts for merit and reward.    
Finally, each of these three types of goodness has distinct principia: free choice (generic), 
right reason (specific) and God’s grace (meritorious).  Principia in the medieval tradition are 
kind of like causes; in fact, causes are one sort of principium.  So, the reason or cause of each 
type of goodness stems from the way in which it was brought about.  Generic goodness has its 
source in free choice judging the object appropriate given the nature of the agent, 
moral/circumstantial goodness has its source in the agent’s right reason judging that various 
circumstances ought to be appropriate or fitting for the act and the agent; meritorious goodness 
has its source in God granting that the act is meritorious, given that its more immediate source 
stems from the agent’s free will acting in conjunction with the virtue of charity (which is infused 
in the agent by God).    
                                                 
462 Lectura I, d.17, Pars.1, q.un, nn.102-103.  “Ulterius est sciendum quod, licet de potentia ordinata voluntas non 
habeat actum meritorium nisi informetur caritate, potest tamen de potentia Dei absoluta, quia prius praedestinavit 
ipsam animam quam ipsam habere habitum caritatis; unde primo vult animae beatitudinem, et propter hoc vult 
sibi—post—habitum caritatis, quo potest pervenire ad beatitudinem, sicut medicus prius vult sanitatem quam 
potionem inducentem sanitateml igitur cum iste ordo non sit necessarius ad finem necessitate absoluta, sicut si 
medicus alio modo quam per potionem posset inducer sanitatem; Deus potest acceptare animam secundum naturam 
suam ad beatitudinem licet non det sibi habitum caritas.   
Verumtamen de potentia ordinata voluntas et caritas concurrunt ad eliciendum actum meritorium et Deo acceptum.” 
Cf.   Cf. Ordinatio I, d.17, pars.1, q.1-2, n.164: “Quantum ergo ad istum articulum, non est necessarium ponere 
habitum supernaturalem gratificantem, loquendo de necessitate respiciente potentiam Dei absolutam (praecipue cum 
posset dare beatitudinem sine omni merito praecedente), licet tamen hoc sit necessarium loquendo de necessitate 
quae respicit potentiam Dei ordinatam, quem ordinem colligimus in Scriptura et ex dictis sanctorum, ubi habemus 
quod peccator non est dingus vita aeterna et iustus est dignus.”  
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Implications 
As I see it, we can draw a number of interesting conclusions from Scotus’s metaphysics 
of goodness.  First, in certain postmodern circles of philosophy, it is often assumed that Scotus is 
the progenitor of the transformation in the tradition, in regard to being, in terms of ethics, and a 
whole host of related issues,463 and in some ways this is certainly true.  But on the metaphysics 
of goodness, Aquinas and not Scotus transforms the tradition.  Aquinas is so focused on the 
agent of the act and her perfection, that the moral goodness of the act is treated within the 
context of the perfection of the agent’s being, and consequently, its convertibility with being.  In 
contrast, Scotus remains fairly traditional on the metaphysics of goodness.  It is the connection to 
rightness and God’s law where Scotus departs, as we will see in a few chapters.  Surprisingly, we 
can see that in some ways Aquinas transforms the tradition, and in other ways Scotus is less 
“voluntaristic” than Aquinas.  
 One, if we consider the distinction between act-centered and agent-centered accounts of 
ethics, where the former focuses on “the morality of specific willed actions,” while the latter 
emphasizes the agent’s moral character,464 we can easily see how Aquinas’s moral philosophy 
differs from the tradition.  Aquinas is wholeheartedly committed to Aristotelian virtue picture 
and the moral perfection of the agent rather than an in depth analysis of the act—and when the 
act is treated, it is done in the context of the agent and her perfection.  While it is true that 
Aquinas is concerned about the act itself, as Dave Horner has recently shown,465 it is mainly in 
                                                 
463 This is mainly the case in the Radical Orthodoxy movement, who see Scotus’s position on (univocity of) being 
and its relationship to goodness and other divine attributes as fundamentally flawed and completely detrimental to 
the theological enterprise.  For example, See Catherine Pickstock, “Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary 
Significance,” Modern Theology 21:4 (2005): 543-574; Matthew Levering, Participatory Exegesis: A Theology of 
Biblical Interpretation (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 17-35. 
464 See John Laird, “Act-Ethics and Agent-Ethics,” Mind 55 (1946), 113.   
465 David A. Horner, “Is Aquinas an Act-Ethicist or an Agent-Ethicist?”  The Thomist 70 (2006), 237-265.   
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the context of the agent and the role of the act in the agent’s perfection.466  So the act of the agent 
is only important insofar as the act works towards fulfilling the potentialities in the agent.  In 
fact, that is the sole way Aquinas evaluates moral acts.467  
Two, Aquinas differs from the tradition on his account of moral goodness.  For Aquinas, 
moral goodness converts with being.  On the traditional account, moral goodness is an accident 
added over and above the goodness an act has in virtue of its being.468  Aquinas is unambiguous 
about this: at almost every conceivable point in his discussion about moral goodness, Aquinas 
goes out of his way to state that actions have their goodness in the same way that things have 
their goodness—that is, according to their respective amount of being.469  Thus Aquinas 
conceives moral goodness as some species of transcendental goodness.  In contrast, Scotus—
following the tradition of Peter Lombard, Philip the Chancellor, Albert the Great, and 
Bonaventure—distinguishes an act’s ontological goodness from its accidental goodness, since 
many acts have ontological goodness and lack moral goodness.        
We can see this difference from the direction of absolute and relative qualities.  
According to Scotus, every variety of secondary goodness is a non-absolute quality.470  Recall 
that absolute qualities necessarily characterize their subject without the need to reference 
something beyond the nature of the subject itself.  Relative or non-absolute qualities, on the other 
                                                 
466 As Gallagher says, “A good action is good not merely for the good it produces in the world, but also, and perhaps 
even more importantly, for the good or perfection it causes in the agent himself.”  See David Gallagher, “Aquinas on 
Moral Action: Interior and Exterior Acts,” 124. 
467 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.18, a.1.   
468 See for example, Lombard Sentences II, d.35, cap. 2, Sentences II, d.36, cap. 6; Sentences II, d.37, cap. 1; 
Albertus Magnus, Sentences II, d.40, a.1 and Sentences II d.41, a.1, q.2; Bonaventure, Sentences II, d.37, a.2, q.3, 
Scotus, Quodlibet 18, a.1,  
469 See for example, Aquinas Summa Theologiae I-II, q.18, a.1, a.2, a.3, a.4, a.10.    
470 Ordinatio II, d.40, q.un, n.8: “De secundo, dico quod bonitas actus moralis est ex aggregatione omnium 
convenientium actui, non absolute ex natura actus, sed quae conveniunt ei secundum rationem rectam.”  
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hand, necessarily refer to, and depend upon, something beyond the nature of the thing which they 
characterize.  Whiteness, for example, would be an absolute quality of a snowflake, whereas 
larger-than-some-other-snowflake would be a relative quality of the flake in question.  As we 
have seen, Scotus naturally applies this distinction to primary (transcendental) and secondary 
(accidental) goodness, such that primary goodness is an absolute quality that necessarily 
characterizes its subject depending upon the amount of being that subject has,471 while secondary 
goodness is non-absolute quality of the act itself, and depends upon the act’s relationship to a 
number of external factors or conditions, such as the agent’s nature and causal powers, the 
object, end, and other circumstances.472  And this seems true for the tradition before Scotus as 
well, since they argue that moral goodness differs in kind from ontological goodness of the 
act.473  
For Aquinas, however, moral goodness must be an absolute quality—if it converts with 
being—since being is an absolute quality and only differs conceptually from goodness.  In fact, 
Aquinas speaks of moral goodness in terms of the being it provides the act.  For example, in 
Summa Theologiae I-II, q.18, a.1, he explicitly makes this connection by claiming that “the same 
thing should be said about good and bad actions as it is said for good and bad in things” and that 
in things, “each thing has as much goodness as it has being, because good and being are 
convertible.”  He goes on to claim:  
                                                 
471 See chapters 2-4.   
472 Ordinatio I, d. 17, p.1, q.2, n.62: “dici potest quod sicut pulchritudo non est aliqua qualitas absoluta in corpore 
pulchro, sed est aggregatio omnium comvenientium tali corpori (puta magnitudinis, figurae, et coloris), et aggregatio 
etiam omnium respectuum (qui sunt istorum ad corpus et ad se invicem), ita bonitas moralis actus est quasi quidam 
decor illius actus, includens aggregationem debitae proportionis ad omnia ad quae habet proportionari (puta ad 
potentiam, ad obiectum, ad finem, ad tempus, ad locum et ad modum), et hoc specialiter ut ista dicantur a ratione 
recta debere comvenire actui…” 
473 See Lombard, Sentences II, d.36, c.6, 334; q.13; Peter of Poitiers, Sententiae Petri Pictaviensis II, L.8-19; Philip 
the Chancellor, Summa De Bono, 5-8, L: 1-80; Bonaventure, Sentences II, d.37, a.2, q.3; Albertus Magnus, 
Sentences II, d.40, a.1 and Sentences II d.41, a.1, q.2.   
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So therefore it should be said that every action, insofar as it some amount of being, to that 
extent it will have goodness: but insofar as it lacks some plentitude of being which is 
appropriate for a human action, it lacks goodness and so is called bad.  For example, if it 
lacks some determinate quality according to reason, or an appropriate location, or other 
[conditions] of this kind.474        
Thus moral goodness is an absolute quality, and the same in kind as transcendental goodness—or 
more precisely, moral goodness is transcendental goodness in the category of (human) action.   
This radical transformation of the traditional account is tied to his agent-centered approach to the 
metaphysics of morals: for Aquinas, the Aristotelian notion of perfection (i.e., completion) of the 
agent’s potentialities is central to his understanding of goodness: something is good to the extent 
that it perfects its nature as the kind of thing that it is.  And the more perfect something is, the 
more being it has.  Scotus (and the tradition) would agree about the centrality of the agent’s 
nature, but the order of importance seems to be reversed and its role reduced: the nature of the 
agent is only one of the many considerations the agent must consider when determining whether 
some act is morally good. 
Three, while Aquinas and tradition agree that the object sets the bounds for what’s moral, 
they differ on two important points: first, for interior acts, Aquinas thinks the object is the end,475 
whereas the tradition claims the object is “matter of the act,” or the person or thing that the act is 
directed towards (i.e., one’s wife, neighbor, God, etc.).  Second, the ‘end’ on the traditional 
account is ambiguous, but it is most often treated as a circumstance added to the act.  In other 
words, the end does not concern the essence of the act, but does add or detract from the act’s 
circumstantial goodness.  So the end and object are identical for interior acts of will, according to 
                                                 
474 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.18, a.1: “Sic igitur dicendum est quod omnis action, inquantum habet aliquod 
de esse, inquantum habet de bonitate: inquantum vero deficit ei aliquid de plenitudine essendi quae debetur actioni 
humanae, inquantum deficit a bonitate, et sic dicitur mala: puta si deficiat ei vel determinata quantitas secundum 
rationem, vel debitus locus, vel aliquid huiusmodi.”  
475 See Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.18, a.6 and Summa Theologiae I-II, q.19, a.1, ad.1.  
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Aquinas, but not for the traditional account.      
What difference does all this make?  Well, for the tradition, excluding Aquinas and 
including Scotus, the same kinds of acts will have the same amount of being and thus same 
amount of goodness: so killing a human will have the same amount of natural or ontological 
goodness in every case, whether it’s a good or bad action—since it will have the same amount of 
being.  The difference between justified killing and unjustified killing results from other factors, 
and those factors will determine if some further accidental goodness or badness will be added to 
the act.  According to Aquinas, however, the same kinds of acts can have different amounts of 
being and thus different amounts of goodness, depending upon whether the act perfects, 
completes, or actualizes one’s nature.  So homicide and self-defense will have differing amounts 
of being, even though it is the same kind of act.    
Second, another surprising conclusion emerges when we ask the following question in 
light of the preceding discussion: is willing in conformity with the divine will sufficient for an 
act’s moral goodness?  At first glance, given Scotus’s proclivity toward theological voluntarism, 
it seems that Scotus would unequivocally answer in the affirmative, while Aquinas, given his 
insistence on natural law and the role human nature plays in establishing moral norms, would 
answer negatively.  Ironically, the opposite is true: Scotus denies that conformity of an act of will 
with the divine will suffices for the moral goodness of an act, while Aquinas affirms it.  And the 
reasons for each respective position stems from the discussions in these last two chapters.    
Aquinas examines this topic in an article under the question concerning interior acts of 
willing.476  According to Aquinas, there are two kinds of voluntary acts (interior and exterior) 
                                                 
476 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.19, a.9. Question 18 of Summa Theologiae I-II examines the goodness and 
badness of acts in general; question 19 examines the interior act of the will; question 20 examines the exterior act of 
the will.  Article 9 of question 19 asks, “Whether goodness of the will depends upon conformity to the divine will.” 
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and each has its own object.477  For the interior act of the will, Aquinas says that the end is the 
object.  In contrast, the object of the exterior act is “what the act has to do with.”  According to 
him, whether or not an act is moral depends upon the object.  As Martin Rhonheimer explains,  
The object of an act must therefore be understood as the end of an act of will, and thus as a 
practical good, presented by reason to the will.  Consequently, in the moral context, no 
opposition exists between the notions of “object” and “end.”  The object is, precisely, a 
particular type of end, that is, that toward which, primarily and fundamentally, the act of 
the will from which an action originates tends.478 
So the end of the interior act of the will and the object are the same.  But since the ultimate end 
of the human will is the supreme good, God himself, an interior act of the will is morally good 
according to Aquinas, when it wills in conformity with the divine will.479  Aquinas argues as 
follows:  
The goodness of the will depends upon the intention of the end.  But the ultimate end of the 
human will is the highest good, which is God, as it has been said above.  Therefore the 
goodness of the human will requires that it is ordered to the highest good, which is God.  
But this good is primarily and essentially compared to the divine will as its proper object.  
But that which is the first in any category is the measure and rule of all those things which 
are in that category.  But everything is right and good insofar as it attains to its proper 
measure.  Therefore, in order for the human will to be good, it must be conformed to the 
divine will.480          
In contrast, Scotus answers negatively to the initial question: willing in conformity to 
with the divine will is insufficient for an act’s moral goodness.  As we have seen, an act’s 
                                                 
477 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.18, a.6.   
478 Martin Rhonheimer, “The Perspective of the Acting Person and the Nature of Practical Reason: ‘The Object of 
the Human Act’ in Thomistic Anthropology of Action,” in The Perspectives of the Acting Person: Essays in the 
Renewal of Thomistic Moral Philosophy ed. William F Murphy Jr. (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 2008), 196.    
479 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.19, a.9.   
480 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.19, a.9: “Bonitas voluntatis dependet ex intentione finis.  Finis autem ultimus 
voluntatis humanae est summum bonum, quod est Deus, ut supra dictum est.  Requiritur ergo ad bonitatem humanae 
voluntatis, quod ordinetur ad summum bonum, quod est Deus.  Hoc autem bonum primo quidem et per se 
comparator ad voluntatem divinam ut obiectum proprium eius.  Illud autem quod est primum in quodlibet genere, est 
mensura et ratio omnium quae sunt illius generis.  Unumquodque autem rectum et bonum est, inquantum attingit ad 
propriam mensuram.  Ergo ad hoc quod voluntas hominis sit bona, requiritur quod conformetur voluntati divinae.” 
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complete moral goodness depends not only on the type of object (which makes an act generically 
good), but also on the various circumstances that specify the act.481  So in answering the current 
question, Scotus first insists that an act’s complete goodness stems from all of the circumstances 
being appropriate to the agent and the act.482    
Next, Scotus offers a “conformity of wills” thought experiment aimed at showing that 
willing in conformity with the divine will is insufficient for an act’s moral goodness.  Scotus 
asks us to imagine a finite intellectual being conformed to the divine will involving all the 
circumstances having to do with moral goodness.  Scotus argues that even if the created will 
conformed in every respect, so that the two wills willed the same thing in the same manner, and 
so on for all the other circumstances, the created will would still not be good in the way that the 
uncreated will is good, because where the agents’ natures differ, the circumstances proper to 
their respective actions differ.483  
Why is this so?  Recall that in forming a judgment via right reason about which actions 
are appropriate, Scotus insists that rational agents must know three certain things: the nature of 
the agent acting, the agent’s causal powers, and the essential nature of the act.  And in knowing 
these, the agent forms a judgment about which objects are appropriate, and so on.  But in 
forming such a judgment, the agent should realize the intensity needed for the act.  And here is 
                                                 
481 See for example Ordinatio II, d.40; Quodlibet 18, a.1.   
482 Ordinatio I, d.48, q.un., n.3: “Secundum Dionysium De divinis nominibus 4 cap., bonum est ex causa integra, et 
secundum Philosophum II Ethicorum oportet simul omnes circumstantias concurrere in actu quocumque morali, ad 
hoc quod sit bonus moraliter; sufficit tamen defectus unius et cuiuscumque circumstantiae, ad hoc quod sit malus 
moraliter.”  
483 Ordinatio I, d.48, n.4: “Voluntas ergo create, conformis voluntati divinae in substantia actus, sive in substantia ut 
circumstantionata quacumque una circumstantia, sive sit conformis sibi in omnibus circumstantiis pertinentibus ad 
bonitatem moris (et forte si esset sibi conformis in omnibus circumstantiis, puta quod propter idem vellent et eodem 
modo, et sic de omnibus aliis circumstantiis), adhunc non oporteret eam esse bonum, sicut voluntas increata est 
bona, quia non congruunt eaedem circumstantiae actui ut actus est diversorum agentium. Non enim voluntati creatae 
congruit ita intense velle aliquod bonum, sicut voluntati increatae, et intensio actus respectu obiecti in agente creato 
et increato, est differens multum in eis.”  
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where the difference lies: suppose God loves some appropriate object.  God, by nature, is an 
infinite being and so his causal powers are also infinite.  So the intensity of God’s actions, 
therefore, are also infinite—since only a modal distinction exists between God’s willing and the 
act’s respective intensity.  So all of God’s actions are done with an equally infinite intensity; 
hence, whatever object God loves, he loves it with an infinitely intense affection.   
But a created will is not suited to love an object as intensely as the uncreated will.  In 
fact, it’s impossible for any finite creature to have an infinitely intense willing, since such a 
creature would lack the respective mode of being necessary for an infinitely intense action.484  So 
if all of the circumstances must be appropriate to the agent and the act, and the divine will wills 
with an infinite intensity, it would not be appropriate for a finite rational agent to will such an 
act—any act—with an infinite intensity.  Elsewhere, Scotus bolsters this claim by arguing that 
well-ordered volitions (i.e., those willed in accordance with right reason) depend not only on 
their object, but also on the appropriateness (convenientia) of the act and the object to the 
respective nature that has that power (i.e., the faculty), such that some acts concerning some 
objects might be appropriate for one will, but inappropriate for another.485  Thus the nature of the 
will of the agent determines which objects and circumstances are fitting to that agent.       
Therefore the goodness of an act for any creature cannot simply be conformity with the 
divine will: appropriate circumstances for the divine will are inappropriate for any created will.  
                                                 
484 Recall that Scotus holds the being is predicated univocally of everything that exists—both God and creatures.  
Before being is divided into the ten categories, it is ‘quantified’ under two modes, infinite and finite.  Finite being is 
then divided into Aristotle’s’ ten categories which represent finite modes of being.  Finite and infinite are modes of 
being.  See Ordinatio I, d.8, pars 1, q.3, n.113.  “Ens prius dividitur in infinitum et finitum quam in decem 
praedicamenta, quia alterum istorum, scilicet ‘finitum’, est commune ad decem genera.”  See also Lectura I, D.8, 
pars1, q.3 n.107.   
485 Ordinatio II, D.43, q.un, n.3: “Quia ordinatum ‘velle’ non est ex solo obiecto, sed ex convenientia actus et obiecti 
circa illam potentiam: potest enim comvenire uni voluntari aliquis actus circa aliquod obiectum, qui non convenit 
alii.”  It is clear from the context of this passage that Scotus has in mind a created nature and God.   
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In short, it’s impossible for an agent to act in conformity with the divine will in such a way that 
could make his or her act morally good.  Moral goodness is indexed to the agent’s nature and 
causal powers in such a way that determines how one ought to act.  Thus moral goodness cannot 
be reduced to willing in conformity with the divine will.  So on the question of moral goodness, 
Aquinas is more “voluntaristic” than Scotus.   
This kind of problem haunts almost every contemporary discussion of thirteenth-century 
philosophy: when one begins the discussion of moral goodness with Aquinas, and then considers 
what Scotus says, it seems as though Scotus is the progenitor of the transformation in the 
tradition.486  But when one places the discussion within the larger context—extending back to its 
origin in Peter Lombard and his followers—Scotus seems rather traditional on how an act 
receives its goodness, while Aquinas is the odd man out, focusing more on the agent rather than 
the act, and claiming that moral goodness converts with being.   
Furthermore, Scotus does not seem to be a theological voluntarist about goodness at all; 
i.e., he is not an axiological voluntarist —he is not a voluntarist about value.  Value does not 
directly depend upon the divine will, but derives from the complex interchange between an 
agent’s nature and causal powers, on the one hand, the ends and circumstances right reason 
dictates ought to accompany an act.   As we will see in a later chapter, I will argue that Scotus is 
a quasi-theological voluntarist about other aspects of the moral realm, most notably, contingent 
moral laws.  But before I address that topic, one final aspect of goodness needs consideration in 
the next chapter: the various ways in which creatures can fall short of secondary goodness.   
                                                 
486 A perfect example of this is Thomas M. Osborne Jr.’s recent book, Human Action in Thomas Aquinas, John Duns 
Scotus, and William of Ockham (Washington D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014).  As Thomas 
Williams notes in his review of Osborne’s book, “Moreover, the fact that every discussion begins with Aquinas 
tends to make Aquinas’s views seem like the default, any deviation from which requires explanation—and 
explanation, inevitably, in (or over against) the terms that Aquinas himself sets.”  Reviewed by Thomas Williams, 
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 7-16-2014.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  
BADNESS 
 
As we have seen in chapters 2-6, Scotus provides a long and complex taxonomy of the 
various kinds of goodness.  Since goodness and badness are in some sense contraries, we should 
expect to find an equally multifaceted account of badness that plots along the same trajectory as 
goodness, but as a mirror opposite.  In that vein, we’ll first consider the possibility of primary 
badness, followed by secondary badness.  Because Scotus conceives of two kinds of secondary 
goodness—secondary natural goodness and secondary moral goodness—we should expect to 
find two kinds of secondary badness; namely, natural and moral.  With respect to moral badness, 
Scotus envisions two different ways some entity can lack the appropriate suitability—contrarily 
and privatively.  With these distinctions in mind, we can then see how some rational agent can 
go astray with respect to generic, moral, and meritorious goodness.     
Badness and Primary Goodness  
Recall that primary goodness intrinsically and essentially characterizes the thing in which 
it inheres; that is, as an absolute quality of a thing, there is no need to reference something 
outside the thing’s being to explain its goodness.  As such, primary goodness is a necessarily 
coextensive property of being, formally distinct from it.  So everything that has being will have 
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this corresponding goodness.487  Because of this, primary goodness cannot have a privation or 
contrary in reality.488  As Thomas Williams explains,  
Primary goodness, unlike an accident, is not something that an entity has; it is what the 
entity is.  Whiteness (for example) is present in a white thing.  Consequently, it is possible 
for the thing to continue to exist but to receive a contrary form.  Thus, non-white can exist 
in reality.  But primary goodness neither is present in nor bears some relation to any other 
thing.  Therefore, there cannot be any non-good in reality.  To put this point more simply, 
nothing can be without primary goodness, since to be without primary goodness is not to be 
at all.489 
In other words, ontological badness does not exist.  Thus there can be no contrary of primary 
goodness other than lack of being, and consequently, lack of existence.490    
Badness and Secondary Goodness 
In contrast to primary goodness, which intrinsically perfects a subject and converts with 
being, secondary goodness is an accidental quality, does not convert with being, and extrinsically 
perfects its subject.491  Generally, attributions of secondary goodness refer to the suitability 
(convenientia) of a thing to something else.  Consequently, (secondary) badness turns out to be 
lack of suitability.   
Secondary Natural Badness  
Badness applies to anything which lacks the suitability that ought to be there, but since 
                                                 
487 See Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.9; Reportatio II, d.34, n.3. 
488 Reportatio II, d.34, n.3 (Wadding). 
489 Thomas Williams, “Reason, Morality, and Voluntarism in Duns Scotus: A Pseudo-Problem Dissolved,” The 
Modern Schoolman 74 (1997), 75.   
490 As we saw in chapter 1, this line of thinking was the well-entrenched philosophical position on the metaphysics 
of badness since Augustine.  His argument, grounded in his privation view of evil, runs as follows: if natures were 
deprived of every good, they would not exist at all.  But if they exist and are in principle corruptible, then they must 
have some degree of goodness left to be corrupted.  If not, they would not exist.  Since they do exist, they must be 
good.  Hence ontological badness has no existential import.   See Augustine, Confessions VII.2. 
491 Lectura I, d.1, pars 1, q.2, n.63; Ordinatio I, d. 1, q.2; Ordinatio II, d.40.   
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there are two kinds of suitability depending upon the agent’s cognition (non-rational and 
rational), there can be two kinds of badness – natural and moral.  Non-rational entities have a 
certain suitability of their nature to their end which they are directed towards, thereby obtaining a 
certain kind of secondary goodness of nature when those ends are reached.492  When these non-
rational agents fail to obtain the ends that their natures direct them towards, their “acts” would be 
considered secondarily naturally bad, since they lack the suitability necessary for their acts to be 
deemed secondarily naturally good.  For example, when an acorn fails to become an oak, it 
would be secondarily naturally bad.  Scotus does not explicitly speak of this kind of badness, but 
it is an obvious deduction from what he does say about secondary natural goodness, and what 
makes an act bad.  Scotus’s focus, however, concerns secondary moral badness, that is, the 
various ways in which rational agents’ acts fall short of moral goodness.  
Secondary Moral Badness  
 Scotus begins his account of moral badness with a distinction.  He states that just as 
moral goodness results from the presence of suitability (between the agent, the act, the object, the 
end, etc.), so also moral badness results from lack of suitability.  However, moral badness can be 
opposed to the moral goodness of an act in two distinct ways: namely, privatively and contrarily.  
Privative badness, according to Scotus, is the lack of something that ought to be present for the 
appropriate suitability.  In contrast, badness as a contrary concerns the presence of something 
incompatible with suitability.493  Thomas Williams formalizes the distinction as follows: 
x is privatively bad=df. for any positive property f that x has, (i) it is possible that (x has  
f & x is good), and (ii) x is not good. 
                                                 
492 Quodlibet 18, a.1, nn.9-10. 
493 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.21: “Breviter igitur: sicut bonitas moralis est integra convenientia, sic malitia moralis est 
disconvenientia et malitia quidem privativa disconvenientia privativa, hoc est, carentia convenientiae debitae; 
malitia autem contraria est disconvenientia contraria, hoc est conditio aliqua repugnans convenientiae.”  
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x is contrarily bad=df. there is some positive property f such that x has f, and it is not 
possible that (x has f & x is good).494 
So according to Scotus, a human would be privatively bad if he or she lacks some goodness he or 
she ought to have, even without having some corresponding vice.  On the other hand, a human 
would be contrarily bad if he or she not only lacked some perfection pertaining to suitability, but 
contained some imperfection incompatible with suitability itself—such as a vice.495   
Scotus applies this distinction to moral acts in the following way.  Recall that for an act to 
have complete moral goodness, the agent, her act, and her causal powers must be suitable with 
all of the appropriate circumstances: the end, the manner, the time, and the place.  An act would 
be privatively bad if the act was performed in such a way that one (or some) of the circumstances 
were not unfitting or unsuitable, but simply lacking when they should be present.  Consider a 
case where some moral act was performed but directed at neither a good or bad end.  For 
example, suppose I give alms to the poor, but I don’t do it for one of the many appropriate or 
suitable reasons, such as out of love for God or pity for the poor.  But suppose further that I 
didn’t give alms for some bad end, like vainglory.  In such a case, the act would be privatively 
but not contrarily bad: the act would lack something needed for (circumstantial) moral goodness, 
but the act would not have some positive character or condition that made the act incompatible 
with such goodness.496  So when Pseudo-Dionysius claims that the absence of one circumstance 
                                                 
494 Thomas Williams, “Reason, Morality, and Voluntarism in Duns Scotus: A Pseudo-Problem Resolved?” 81.   
495 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.18: “Uno modo, potest malitia opponi privative bonitati in actu; alio modo, contrarie; sicut 
enim homo dicitur malus contrarie quando habet habitum vitiosum, qui est habitus quidem positivus licet cum 
privatione perfectionis debitiae; alio modo dicitur malus privative tantum, scilicet quia caret bonitate quam deberet 
habere, licet non habeat habitum vitiosum contrarium positivum.”  
496 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n. 20: “Potest autem aliquis agere non cum circumstantia debita, et tamen non cum 
circumstantia indebita; puta quando non ordinat actum ad finem debitum, nec tamen ipsum ordinat as finem 
indebitum; tunc ille actus est malus privative, non contrarie, sicut ille qui ordinatur ad finem indebitum, et ex multis 
talibus actibus generatur habitus consimilis in malitia, scilicet privativa, non contraria. Exemplum huius: dare 
eleemosynam non propter finem bonum, scilicet amorem Dei vel subventionem proximi, non tamen propter malum 
finem, puta vanam gloriam vel nocumentum alicuius, est actus malus privative, non tamen contrarie.”  
187 
 
suffices to make the act bad, Scotus interprets this as pertaining to privative badness.497     
In contrast, an act is contrarily bad when the act has some feature or condition that is 
incompatible with the required suitability.  In this case, the act has some positive feature or 
circumstance that involves a deformity, making it impossible for the act to be suitable.  For 
example, suppose I give alms to the poor for a bad end: I give alms to the poor because I want 
people to see what a generous person I am, and I want them to praise me for it.  If so, I have not 
only performed an act that lacks a suitable end; I’ve performed an act for an inappropriate end—
vainglory.498 
Thus moral acts can go awry in two distinct ways, either by lacking some suitable feature 
needed to make the act completely good, or by having some feature incompatible with the act’s 
being suitable.  With this distinction in mind, we are now in position to see how moral acts at 
each of the corresponding levels—generic, moral (circumstantial), and meritorious—can be bad.            
Generic Badness.  Generic goodness, as we have seen, results when the proper 
suitability relation obtains between the agent, the act, and the proper object.  When the object is 
appropriate (conveniens) to the agent, his causal powers, and the type of act, the act is 
generically good; when the object is inappropriate, the act is generically bad.  According to 
Scotus, every act has an object, and thus every act must be either generically good or generically 
bad: “There can be no act without an object, and the object must be either appropriate or 
inappropriate to the act: and so it is necessary that either a fitting object makes the act generically 
                                                 
497 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n. 20: “De malitia privativa loquitur Dionysius quod quicumque defectus particularis 
cuiuscumque circumstantiae necessario requisitae reddit actum sic malum.”  
498 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n. 20: “Sed malus contrarie non est nisi habeat circumstantiam positivam habentem aliquam 
deformitatem.”  
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good, or an inappropriate object makes the act generically bad.”499 
 Given Scotus’s insistence that every act has either an appropriate or inappropriate object, 
it is easy to see why there can be no merely privately bad generic acts, but only contrarily bad 
generic acts: in order for a generic act to be privately bad, it would have to lack an object, which 
Scotus sees as impossible.  If an act has an object, it’s going to be either appropriate or 
inappropriate; if the latter, then it is not merely privately bad, but contrarily bad.  And so there 
can be no middle ground.500  Thus every moral act will either be generically good or contrarily 
bad.  In other words, no generic act can be indifferent.  
In some cases it’s fairly easy to see Scotus’s point.  Take the act of having sex: given 
who I am as the agent acting, and the type of act, the appropriate object is initially obvious—my 
wife.  And since I’ve promised fidelity to her through a sacred act of marriage, Scotus suggests 
that all other objects for the act in question would be inappropriate.  In other words, there is no 
middle ground: the act of sex is either generically good—when the object is my wife—or 
generically bad—when the object is anyone else.  If good, the act can be further evaluated in 
light of the circumstances in which the act was carried out—and the same if it were bad.  
But in other cases, it’s hard to see how this could be true.  Take the act of eating, whose 
nature is meant to restore energy: when the object of the act is healthy food, such as a piece of 
fruit, there seems to be no problem.  And when the object is a rock, it’s obvious that the object is 
unsuitable.  But what about cases where the object is in fact food, but a type of food that at least 
occasionally seems unsuitable, such as cake or a bag of potato chips?  One cannot say that such 
                                                 
499 Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un., n. 36. “quia actus non potest esse quin transeat super obiectum, et illud necessario est 
conveniens vel disconveniens actui: et ita necessario actus bonus ex genere, ex obiecto conveniente, vel actus malus 
ex genere, ex obiecto disconveniente.”  
500 Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un., n. 36: “Sed malitia ex genere, contrarie accepta et privative, convertuntur, et ideo sicut 
inter privationem et habitum immediatum non est medium, ita bonum ex genere et malum ex genere sunt contraria 
immediate.”  
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acts are neither suitable nor unsuitable, since Scotus explicitly ruled out that possibility because 
all acts have objects and every object must be suitable or unsuitable.  But in certain cases, this 
seems difficult to substantiate: take some junk food, that at certain times seems suitable and at 
other times unsuitable.  How can we find Scotus’s claims plausible?  I see three possible ways.    
One possibility would be to limit the scope of moral acts and thus moral objects in such a 
way as to rule out the possibility of objects that seem neither fitting nor unfitting.  This solution 
does have some support in Scotus, as he does state that not every act is a moral act.  For an act to 
be moral, it will depend on the type of object.501  So tying one’s shoes would be an act (with an 
end), but not a moral act—since ‘one’s shoes’ isn’t a moral object.  Here, the object doesn’t 
seem to involve morality at all.502  In any case, some objects bring an act under the heading of 
moral, but others do not.  So all acts have an object, but some objects may make the act non-
moral, and thus Scotus’s claim that every object is either fitting on unfitting would not apply. 
At first glance, this seems to stave off the initial worry about all generic acts having 
either suitable or unsuitable objects, since some objects do not bring the act into the moral realm.  
And at least initially, eating seems to be a non-moral example.  So eating cake seems to be non-
moral, and thus Scotus’s claim about all objects being either suitable or unsuitable (and thus all 
acts being generically good or bad) seems to make sense, but only applies to those objects that 
make the act a moral act.  But what about overeating?  Or obsessively tying and retying one’s 
shoes three hundred times a day?  It seems like any act could be evaluated morally if the object 
and act are done in some inordinate manner.  
Another plausible suggestion comes from Thomas Williams.  He suggests that junk food 
                                                 
501 Ordinatio II, d.43, q.un., n.3; Ordinatio III, part 1, q.2; and Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.14.   
502 We should also distinguish non-moral acts from non-human acts; where the latter are not done in conjunction of 
reason and will, such as scratching one’s beard or blinking.   
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is sometimes a suitable object (e.g., birthday cake on one’s birthday), and at other times 
unsuitable (say, when one is morbidly obese and it’s not a special occasion).  He infers from this 
that “convenientia corresponds roughly to permissibility” of the object; namely, when some 
object is suitable, it is permissible for one to partake in it.503  However, permissibility seems too 
weak, since Scotus emphatically states that every object is either suitable or unsuitable, and 
Scotus’s use of ‘suitable’ implies some object should be pursued.  Suitability, as I have argued in 
a previous chapter, is a normative relation between two entities, so that they ought to be 
conjoined in that way, rather than merely the permissibility or possibility that the two entities 
may go together, i.e., that they are compatible.  So reducing suitability to permission and 
unsuitability to impermissibility seems too weak to capture all that Scotus means by ‘suitable.’  
However, Williams’s suggestion that certain foods would be sometimes suitable and at other 
times unsuitable seems right.  The question concerns how we could derive this from the 
conditions present in a generically good act: the nature of the act, the agent’s causal powers, the 
type of act, and the object.  That leads us to our third possibility.   
Finally, if we take Scotus’s claims about the suitability of the agent’s nature with the act 
a bit more broadly than simply its prima facie reading—i.e., an Aristotelian notion of secondary 
substance504—but extend the account to include the agent’s personal history as an agent, or we 
take “the object” a bit more narrowly construed, then this might help explain the seemingly 
tough cases.  For instance, if an agent has an overall high fitness level, is in good shape, the 
object of a slice of pizza might be an appropriate object for him; whereas if the agent was 
morbidly obese, even a slice of pizza might be an inappropriate object.  So in this type of case, 
                                                 
503 Thomas Williams, “Reason, Morality, and Voluntarism in Duns Scotus: A Pseudo-Problem Resolved?” 81-83.   
504 See J. Ackrill, Aristotle: Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 74-76 for 
the prominent interpretation of a substance as a nature or essence.  
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every object could be construed as morally appropriate or inappropriate—if enough background 
detail about the acting agent is taken into consideration.   
It’s unclear to me, however, whether Scotus might have had something like this in mind.  
On the one hand, when medievals use the term ‘nature,’ it is almost always a technical term 
referring to the kind of thing something is.  Thus to broaden the concept to include one’s 
personal history as a moral agent, seems to be taking too much liberty on the notion of “nature.”  
This is especially true of Scotus, who as far as I can tell, always uses ‘nature of the agent’ in the 
moral context to differentiate various species of entities and what follows from their respective 
natures: non-rational, human, angelic, and divine, respectively.505    
On the other hand, however, precedent for this sort of thing can be found in Aristotle’s 
discussion of the virtues.  Virtues, according to Aristotle, are states of character.  Their role: 
avoid both excess and deficiency in the passions.  How does one accomplish this?  Reason 
identifies the mean between the excess and deficiency—a mean that is relative to the individual 
and the situation.506  Ed Viesturs climbing of Everest without supplemental oxygen, for example, 
requires a mean consisting in a much higher caloric intake than my average Saturday watching 
The University of South Florida lose its regionally uninteresting college football game.  So 
what’s an excess to me is a deficiency to Ed.  So given Ed’s nature as a world-class mountaineer, 
pizza (and lots of it) may be appropriate to restore his energy, but inappropriate to restore mine 
because I’m too fat and don’t exercise enough.  So while there is precedent for this sort of thing, 
Scotus doesn’t cite Aristotle as support, nor does he ever gesture in this direction.   
Instead, medievals—including Scotus—often used the description of the object to take 
                                                 
505 See for example, Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.8-14; Ordinatio I, d.48, n.4; Ordinatio II, D.43, q.un, n.3; Ordinatio II d.6 
q.2, nn.52-52.   
506 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.6, 1106a24-1106b6.   
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such particular features into account; in other words, they would describe the object in such a 
way that its description includes enough particular details in order to overcome these types of 
problems.  So take the morally bad act of having sex: the morally inappropriate object would not 
be “a woman,” but more narrowly described as “someone who is not my spouse.”  This seems to 
escape the worry, when we define objects with enough specific details so as to make every one 
of them appropriate or inappropriate.  For instance, cake could be an appropriate object when 
described in more detail, such as ‘a slice of birthday cake.’ In contrast, cake would be an 
inappropriate object when the description included other details, such as ‘an entire cake’ or ‘my 
fourth slice of cake.’   
But then the problem seems to concern the determination of which details become 
morally relevant without deciding such in an ad hoc fashion; for instance, why does “one who is 
not my spouse” morally matter as an inappropriate object of sex, rather than “a hot redhead”?  
What facts do we include, and which ones should be left out?  In one sense, this highlights the 
ambiguity of these descriptions for the moral realm: precisely how one describes the object can 
alter the act’s evaluation.  This isn’t merely a problem for Scotus, but actually haunts every 
medieval discussion of the object.  In any case, Scotus sees no room for morally indifferent 
generic acts: either the object is appropriate or inappropriate.  Why he thinks this is the case is 
somewhat peculiar.  His focus, however, is more appropriately on moral and meritorious 
actions—good and bad.   
Moral Badness.  In the case of moral/circumstantial/specific goodness, Scotus says that 
these acts can be either privatively or contrarily bad.  Acts are privatively morally 
(circumstantially) bad when the act has generic goodness, but lacks some of the circumstances 
right reason dictates ought to be present for the act’s complete goodness.  Suppose I give alms to 
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the poor (a generically good act), and I give the person an appropriate amount, and at an 
appropriate time, but I do so for neither an appropriate or inappropriate end.   
For example, suppose I’m walking down the street, deep in thought about univocity of 
being and the shortcomings of Radical Orthodoxy.  I’m so caught up in whether being can be 
predicated univocally of God and creatures (and whether Scotus’s view on the matter actually 
ruined the world as we know it), that I hear a poor person asking for help, but I’m not truly 
paying attention to her.  In my quandary about the meaning of Milbank’s latest tirade against 
onto-theology, I hand the penurious person twenty bucks and continue merrily on my way.  In 
such a case, I did not give her money for an appropriate end—say, because I felt pity on her or 
because I love God.  But I also didn’t give her money for a bad end, like vainglory.  In fact, 
neither an appropriate nor inappropriate end ever factored into my consideration.507  In these 
types of cases, the act in question is privatively bad.   
In contrast, an act is contrarily morally (circumstantially) bad when the act has certain 
circumstances or conditions that are incompatible with the act’s being suitable, like when the act 
has a bad end, or manner, or time, or location.  Consider the example of giving alms to the poor 
for the sake of vainglory: the end or goal of my act would be incompatible with what right reason 
ought to judge appropriate, namely, doing such an act for a good end, like pity for a fellow 
human, or love for God.  But ‘ends’ are not the only circumstances that can make an otherwise 
generically good act contrarily morally bad.  Recall the example from the previous chapter: the 
                                                 
507 Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un., n.37: “Malitia privative accepta in secundo modo, et contrarie, non convertuntur.  Potest 
enim aliquis actus carere circumstantia requisita, ad perfectionem actus virtuosi, et tamen non elici cum 
circumstantia repugnante, quae redderet illum actum ‘vitiosum’: puta, si det eleemosynam pauperi non ex 
circumstantia finis (quia non considerat), nec secundum alias circumstantias requisitas ad actum virtuosum; iste 
tamen actus non est bonus vel virtuosus moraliter, nec tamen malus contrarie, quia non ordinatur in finem 
indebitum, sicut faceret qui daret eleemosynam pauperi propter vanam gloriam vel propter aliquem alium finem 
indebitum.” 
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act of going to church (generically good act) out of love for God (an appropriate end), but I did 
so by drinking bourbon, eating chips, and listening to Bad Religion on the roof, rather than 
partaking in Mass.  In this case, I not only lack some circumstance needed to make the act 
(morally) circumstantially good, such as being inside the church and consuming the 
transubstantiated body and blood of Christ, but the act has characteristics that are fundamentally 
contrary to that act—like being on the roof and drinking bourbon.  In this case, my act is 
contrarily bad.   
What do we call a generically good act—such as giving alms—that is privatively bad; 
that is, a generically good act that lacks some circumstances needed for moral/circumstantial 
goodness?  According to Scotus, this is the definition of an indifferent moral act: while it is in 
the genus or category of morals, it lacks the individuating circumstances that stamp out 
differences between good and bad into its various moral species (as is the case when an act has a 
good end or a bad end).508  So acts of this kind are generically good, privatively bad, and morally 
indifferent.     
Collapsing privative badness and morally indifferent acts, however, seems to be a misstep 
on Scotus’s part.  By equating privative badness with morally indifferent acts, Scotus seems to 
be saying that these kinds of acts are in the genus of a morally good act, but lack some specifying 
circumstances to make them completely morally good, and so they are neither morally good nor 
morally bad.  But why not simply say that in lacking some of the requisite circumstances (being 
privatively bad), the act is morally good but not completely so: for example, suppose I give alms 
to the poor (generically good) in such a way that all of the circumstances right reason dictates 
were met, save for one: suppose I give the poor person money, but not enough of it.  In this case, 
                                                 
508 Thomas Williams, “Reason, Morality, and Voluntarism in Duns Scotus: A Pseudo-Problem Resolved?” 73-94.   
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my act lacks an appropriate manner.  Assume for example, the amount of money to suffice right 
reason’s demand concerning the manner of this particular act is twenty dollars, but I only offer 
the poor person fifteen.  In cases like this, Scotus says that the act is a morally evaluable act, in 
the genus of good acts, and yet is neither morally good nor morally bad—it’s indifferent or 
neutral.   
A more plausible explanation would be that the act is in fact morally good—since it is 
giving alms—but just not completely morally good, because the manner in which it was elicited 
was lacking what was appropriate.  Scotus, however, insists that acts of this kind are morally 
neutral, rather than partially morally good.  Yet given the complexities of human action and the 
circumstances that surround them, and the fact the humans rarely fulfill such a high standard for 
moral goodness (i.e., all of the circumstances being perfectly met), in reducing privately bad 
actions to indifferent actions, Scotus’s position seems to transfer an entire swath of human action 
into the realm of indifferent; i.e., into the realm where acts cannot be evaluated as morally good 
or morally bad, nor can such acts be praised or blamed.  Indeed, on such a model, it seems like 
most human acts turn out to be morally indifferent, since it’s rarely the case the we meet right 
reason’s stringent standards for perfect moral goodness.  Thus a reduction of privative badness to 
moral indifference makes too many human acts neither morally good nor bad.   
But even so, it may be helpful to contrast Scotus’s account of moral indifference with 
Aquinas.  According to Scotus, a morally indifferent act is a particular act that lacks some 
necessary circumstance to make the act completely good, such as an end.  In contrast, Aquinas 
rejects the view that individual or particular (i.e., concrete) acts can be morally indifferent.  For 
without and end, Aquinas doesn’t think the act is properly human and thus morally evaluable.  
On Aquinas’s account, while it is possible for kinds of acts to be indifferent, it is impossible for 
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particular concrete acts to be so.  The difference stems primarily from Aquinas’s insistence that 
every human act has an end.509  So consider once again the otherwise good act giving alms to the 
poor: suppose I performed such an act in a way that met all of right reason’s demands, save for 
one—the end.  Suppose I gave alms to a poor person but I didn’t deliberate about why I gave 
alms.  I just instinctively responded to the request for aid.  In these types of cases, Scotus 
surmises that the (particular) act was generically good and morally indifferent because I didn’t 
act for the sake of a suitable end.   
In contrast, Aquinas would deny the possibility of the entire situation, and thus deny the 
possibility of particular moral act’s being neutral, mainly because he thinks that every human act 
is chosen for an end that is either reasonable or unreasonable.510  In contrast, Scotus argues that 
humans can act in morally evaluable ways, even when failing to deliberate fully on the 
appropriate course of action—and one way to fail at a fully deliberate action would be to fail to 
deliberate about the end.511  Thus Scotus accepts that moral acts can be “neutral, singular 
[particular], and indifferent,”512 while Aquinas denies the possibility and only recognizes the 
                                                 
509 See Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.18, a.8-9; Sentences II, d.40, q.1, a.5; De Malo, q.2, a.4-5. 
510 See Osborne Jr., Human Action in Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, & William of Ockham, 192-193.  Aquinas 
emphatically makes this claim in Summa Theologiae I-II, q.18, a.9: “Dicendum quod contingit quanoque aliquem 
actum esse indifferentem secundum speciem, qui tamen est bonus vel malus in individuo consideratus. Et hoc idea, 
quia actus moralis, sicut dictum est, non solum habet bonitatem ex obiecto, a quo habet speciem; sed etiam ex 
circumstantiis, quae sunt quasi quaedam accidentia; sicut aliquod convenit individuo hominis secundum accidentia 
individualia, quod non convenit homini secundum rationem speciei. Et oportet quod quilibet individualis actus 
habeat aliquam circumstantiam per quam trahatur ad bonum vel malum, ad minus ex parte intentionis finis.  Cum 
enim rationis sit ordinare, actus a ratione deliberativa procedens, si non sit ad debitum finem ordinatus, ex hoc ipso 
repugnat rationi, et habet rationem mali.  Si vero ordinetur ad debitum finem, convenit cum ordine rationis: unde 
habet rationem boni.  Necesse est autem quod vel ordinetur, vel non ordinetur ad debitum finem. Unde necesse est 
omnem actum hominis a deliberativa rationem procedentem, in individuo consideratum, bonum esse vel malum.” 
Si autem non procedit a ratione deliberativa, sed ex quadam imaginatione, sicut cum aliquis fricat barbam, vel movet 
manum aut pedem; talis actus non est, proprie loquendo, moralis vel humanus; cum hoc habeat actus a ratione.  Et 
sic erit indifferens, quasi extra genus moralium actuum existens.”  
511 See Lectura II, d.41, q.un., n.10 and Reportatio II, d.41, q.un, n.2 (Wadding).   
512 Reportatio II, d.41, q.un, n.2 (Wadding). 
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existence of indifferent acts in terms of abstract kinds of acts (e.g., having sex, giving alms, etc.).  
To further complicate things, Scotus would agree that abstract kinds of acts could be indifferent, 
but as soon as an act is conjoined with an object, resulting in a particular concrete generic act, 
that act must be generically good or bad, because every object is either suitable or unsuitable, 
and thus no generic act can be indifferent.  So while every act must be generically good or bad, 
particular moral acts could be morally indifferent, according to Scotus.  
Meritorious Badness.  For an act to be meritoriously good, recall that the act must first 
be generically and morally good, but also must be elicited with the principle of merit—charity—
and accepted by God as deserving of reward.  How might an act go bad here?  First and 
foremost, because of the hierarchical structure of moral acts in which each grade of goodness 
presupposes the previous grade, we should expect to see the same thing with badness, so that, 
any generically or circumstantially bad act is sinful, and thus will be a meritoriously bad act—
i.e., God assigns the act for demerit.  So any act that is contrarily bad at the generic or 
circumstantial levels will be meritoriously bad as well.513 
 But what about acts that are generically and circumstantially morally good?  How might 
they fall short of meritorious goodness?  According to Scotus, an act that is morally 
(circumstantially) good can be privatively meritoriously bad when the act meets the conditions 
for moral goodness (i.e., the kind of act is in fact appropriate to the agent, his nature, his causal 
powers, and be performed with an appropriate object in mind, for one or many good ends, in the 
right manner, time, and place), but that act wasn’t elicited from the virtue of charity.  In such a 
case, the act would be generically and morally good, but privately meritoriously bad—in other 
                                                 
513 Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un., n.39: “Si habet actum malum secundo modo, planum est quod ille est demeritorius 
(semper enim malitia prior infert secundam, non e converso, et secunda tertiam, non e converso). Si autem est 
malus, et habet actum malum secundo modo, peccat illo actu.”   
198 
 
words, the act would be indifferent to merit, since it wasn’t chosen in some way that contradicts 
merit either.514    
For example, suppose someone gave alms to the poor in such a way that all of the 
circumstances were appropriate—say, the correct amount, at the right time and place, and out of 
pity for the poor person (an appropriate end), but he didn’t elicit the act from the theological 
virtue of charity.  In this case, the act is indifferent to meritorious goodness since the act lacks 
the appropriate conditions for merit.  This situation differs from the same act done for an end that 
is incompatible with charity itself—say, hatred of God.  In the latter case, the act would be 
contrarily meritoriously bad rather than privately meritoriously bad, because it not only wasn’t 
elicited from caritas, but was chosen from a state incompatible with it.  In the case of the former, 
the morally good act lacks charity privatively but not contrarily, and so these types of acts can be 
indifferent at the meritorious level.  
Scotus also notes another way a class of acts could be neutral with respect to merit and 
demerit: namely, those acts elicited in the state of innocence.  In a state where grace is 
unnecessary, a person could have acted in such a manner that fulfills all of the requirements for 
moral (circumstantial) goodness, and yet act in a way that was neither contrary to merit nor in 
accordance with it:  
Similarly, not only on account of neutrality of the act in the second way can an act be 
neutral in the third way (that is, neither good nor bad taken as contraries), but on account of 
the disposition or state of the agent.  For example, if someone in a state of innocence were 
to act rightly without grace, such an act would have been perfectly good in the second way 
[i.e., morally good], and not in the third way [i.e., meritoriously good], because the person 
                                                 
514 Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un., n.38: “Malitia vero tertio modo, contrarie et privative accepta, non convertuntur, quia 
actus potest esse malus privative (ita quod non eliciatur ex gratia), et tamen non esset demeritorius: quod patet ex 
secundo modo membro, quia actus qui est bonus simpliciter in genere moris, non est meritorious, et tamen non 
omnis talis actus est demeritorious et ita tam in secundo membro quam hic, videtur poni ‘actus indifferens’, qui licet 
sit malus privative, non tament contrarie (quia indifferens), et de hac indifferentia dicetur alias.” 
199 
 
did not have the principle of merit [i.e., charity], but neither was the act contrarily bad.515 
However, Scotus is quick to suggest that in our present state—post fall—only one kind of neutral 
act exists between meritorious goodness and badness: namely, circumstantially good acts that 
were not elicited in accordance with the virtue of charity.  Scotus grounds this claim in the 
following reasoning: each person is either in a state of grace or a state of sin.  If in a state of 
grace, and the act is morally (circumstantially) good, then Scotus surmises that grace will also 
incline the agent to elicit the act in question, and so, the act will not only be morally good, but 
meritoriously so.  If however, a person in a state of grace performs a morally bad action, then the 
act is also meritoriously bad (since contrary badness in the moral grade results in badness and the 
meritorious grade).516    
 On the other hand, if a person in a state of sin performs a morally (circumstantially) bad 
act, the act will be sinful and thus meritoriously bad as well.  In contrast, if a person in a state of 
sin performs an act that is morally (circumstantially) good, such an act would be privatively 
meritoriously bad, but not contrarily so, and thus neutral to merit and demerit—and consequently 
a meritoriously indifferent act.  So in this passage (Ordinatio II, d.7), Scotus suggests that the 
only meritoriously indifferent act results from a person outside a state of grace who performs a 
morally (circumstantially) good act, because such an act is privatively meritoriously bad—it 
lacks elicitation in accordance with the principle of merit, but isn’t incompatible with it.  Hence 
                                                 
515 Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un., n.38: “Similiter, non solum propter neutritatem actus in secundo modo, potest esse neuter 
in tertio modo (id est nec bonus nec malus, accipiendo ista contrarie), sed propter dispositionem ipsius operantis: 
puta, si in statu innocentiae—absque gratia—aliquis recte egisset, fuisset quidem ille actus perfecte bonus secundo 
modo et non bonus tertio modo, quia non habuit principium merendi nec fuit malus contrarie.”  
516 Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un, n.39: “Forte tamen in statu isto non est aliquis actus neuter inter bonun et malum sumpta 
tertio modo, nisi in uno casu, quando scilicet actus est bonus ex circumstantia, ad quem tamen non inclinat caritas. 
Et ratio est, quia modo quilibet vel est in gratia vel in peccato. Si in gratia, et habet actum bonum secundo modo, 
ergo gratia inclinat ad illud et ita est meritoius; si habet actum malum secundo modo, planum est quod ille est 
demeritorius (semper enim malitia prior infert secundam, non e converso, et secunda tertiam, non e converso).”  
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only persons in a state of sin that perform a morally good act can elicit an act indifferent with 
respect to meritorious goodness.517  In the case of people either in a state of grace or sin who 
perform a contrarily morally bad act, failure at the moral level results in blame at the meritorious 
level.   
All of this makes sense, save for one claim: namely, that persons in a state of grace who 
perform morally good actions always do so in accordance with the principle of merit—charity—
and thus receive merit.  Isn’t it possible, however, for someone in a state of grace, who has the 
theological virtue of charity, to perform a morally (circumstantially) good act that wasn’t elicited 
from the principle of merit, but also wasn’t contrary to such a principle?  In such a case, it seems 
possible for someone in a state of grace to perform a meritoriously indifferent act.  In this 
passage, Scotus seems to discount that possibility: the presence of charity as a virtue in someone 
in a state of grace who performs a morally good act will ensure the performance of an act that 
merits reward.   
In other passages, however, where he specifically addresses the topic of indifferent acts, 
Scotus provides an answer that seems to suggest a person in a state of grace can perform a 
morally good act that is privatively but not contrarily bad, and thus perform a meritoriously 
indifferent act.  For example, in Ordinatio II, d. 41, Scotus first argues that merit results from a 
proper relationship with an end that stems from charity in the agent.  As Scotus conceives it, an 
act can be referred to an end through the virtue of charity in three distinct ways: actually, 
virtually, and habitually.  An act is referred to an end through charity ‘actually’ when the agent is 
actually thinking of the end charity directs one toward, and loves it.  Charity ‘virtually’ refers an 
                                                 
517 Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un., n.39: “Si autem est malus [in peccato], et habet actum bonum secundo modo, ille non est 
bonus tertio modo nec malus tertio modo: igitur neuter, quantum ad bonum et malum ut sunt ‘contraria’ tertio modo, 
nec tame nest neuter loquendo de secundo modo.” 
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act to an end when from knowledge of, and love for the end, the agent wills some means to 
achieve the end—even if the agent no longer thinks about the final end that the means were 
willed for.  An agent ‘habitually’ is referred to an end through charity when virtue remains in the 
agent as a habit, even if the agent is not acting upon it.518   
According to Scotus, when charity in the will actually refers the act to the end, the act is 
meritoriously good.  When charity in the will virtually refers the act to the end, as when some 
means is chosen for that end, it is sufficiently probable the act is meritoriously good.519  In the 
third case however, Scotus admits the possibility of someone in a state of grace (i.e., a person 
who has the theological virtue of charity) acting in such a way that his action is morally good and 
yet not meritoriously so, because one didn’t act on the virtue of charity.   
For example, suppose that I’m in a state of grace and thus have the theological virtue of 
charity.  Furthermore, suppose I once again go out for a walk in order to ponder univocity of 
being, when I encounter someone begging for money.  I’m fairly caught up—and fed up—with 
Radical Orthodoxy, such that my thinking isn’t as clear as normal.  But I see the person in need, 
and quickly taking into account the various circumstances, I give the person twenty bucks and 
continue on my way.  But suppose this time, in the midst of my quandary about Milbank, I see 
the sad look on the beggars’ face and feel pity on her.  In that moment, I act for the sake of a 
morally good end—pity for my fellow humanity.  While such an act is morally (circumstantially) 
                                                 
518 Ordinatio II, d.41, q.un., n.10: “Potest autem actus referri ex caritate in finem debitum, tripliciter: uno modo 
actualiter, sicut cogitans actualiter de fine, diligit illum et vult aliquid propter ilum; alio modo virtualiter, sicut ex 
cognitione et dilectione finis deventum est ad volitionem huius entis ad finem, puta ex cognitione et dilectione Dei, 
pertinente ad portionem superiorem, portio inferior condiserat talem actum (puta poenitentiae) esse assumendum, et 
postea illum exsequitur volendo, non tamen tunc referendo in finem, quia nec tunc actualiter cognoscitur nec 
diligitur; tertio modo habitualiter, puta si omnis actus referibilis in finem, manens cum caritate quae est principium 
referendi, dicatur referri habitualiter.” See also Quodlibet 17, a.2, n.[5] 12.  
519 Ordinatio II, d.41, q.un., n.12: “De duobus primis, certum est quod primus actus est meritorius et satis probabile 
est de secundo.”  
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good, I did not act from the co-causes of free choice and charity, but only from the former, and 
so my act was not directed at God.  In other words, I did not act on the virtue of charity and out 
of love for God as one of my reasons for giving alms.  Instead, I did it out of pity.  But notice 
that the act wasn’t elicited from some dubious motive, nor did it contain circumstances contrary 
to it being a morally good act.   
In this type of case—where the person is in a state of grace and has the virtue of charity 
and doesn’t act on it, but nevertheless acts in a morally upright manner—Scotus sees the 
possibility for a meritoriously indifferent act.  The reason for this, according to Scotus, is 
twofold.  First, the act wasn’t sinful.  Second, God does not require every act by a person in a 
state of grace to be directed at him, actually or virtually.  But without being directed at God 
actually or virtually by means of charity, the act cannot be meritoriously good.520  Hence it is a 
meritoriously indifferent act.  So this latter passage seems to suggest, contra Scotus’s account in 
Ordinatio II, d.7, that individuals in a state of grace can elicit meritoriously indifferent acts 
(which would be privatively but not contrarily meritoriously bad). 
Conclusion 
Scotus’s account of badness can be summarized succinctly as follows:  since primary 
goodness converts with being, anything that has being has primary goodness.  Thus ontological 
badness cannot exist.  Since Scotus defines secondary goodness as suitability, secondary badness 
reduces to unsuitability, both natural and moral.  In the natural realm, when some entity fails to 
                                                 
520 Ordinatio II, d.7, d.41, q.un., n.14: “Secundum dictum modum probabile videtur ponere tales actus indifferentes, 
quia non habent sufficientem rationem malitiae pertinentem ad peccatum veniale, quia possibile est nullam 
deordinationem esse in eis quae sufficiat ad rationem peccati; non enim tenetur homo, nec tentione necessitates 
(contra quam sit peccatum mortale), semper referre omnem actum suum in Deum actualiter vel virtualiter, quia Deus 
non obligavit nos as hoc.”  
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obtain those suitable ends latent within their natures, they would have a secondary natural 
badness.   
In contrast, rational agents are suited to judge which acts and objects are appropriate to 
them as rational agents.  Agents can fail to do so in two ways, contrarily and privately.  Since 
generically good acts are ones in which the agent judges the object as appropriate, generically 
bad acts are acts with an inappropriate object.  Since every act has an object, every act is either 
generically good or generically bad—in the contrary sense.  Acts of rational agents are 
privatively morally bad when they lack a circumstance needed for them to be suitable; acts are 
contrarily morally bad when they include some inordinate circumstance incompatible with 
suitability.  Morally indifferent acts are generically good acts that are privately bad.   
Finally, acts are meritoriously bad in the contrary sense when either (1) they are morally 
bad or (2) when they contain some feature that is incompatible with the principle of merit—such 
as hatred of God.  Acts are privatively meritoriously bad when they are morally good, but not 
elicited by the virtue of charity, either because the agent is not in a state of grace, or because the 
agent is in a state of grace but didn’t act upon the infused virtue.  As such, this latter possibility 
allows for a class of acts that are morally good but meritoriously indifferent.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT:  
DIVINE COMMANDS, NATURAL LAW,  
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MORAL NORMS 
 
 
I begin this chapter with a question: was Duns Scotus a theological voluntarist?  Well, 
that seems to depend upon who one asks.  On the one hand, some scholars place him securely 
within the divine command tradition.  For example, Anthony Quinton summarizes Scotus’s 
ethics as follows: “Things are good because God wills them and not vice versa.”521  According to 
Quinton, Scotus believes that God does not command something because it already has intrinsic 
moral value, but rather moral value derives solely from the command of God itself.522   
On the other hand, some scholars find no voluntaristic tendencies in Scotus’s ethics.  
Efrem Bettoni, for example, rightly notes that many aspects of Scotus’s thought have been 
misinterpreted, especially the “relationship between the divine will and created things.”523  This 
misconception centers upon the belief that Scotus thought that the divine will arbitrarily and 
capriciously determined moral value: God can will whatever he wants, and whatever he wills is 
right, true, and good, etc.  In response, Bettoni offers a fundamental principle of Scotus’s 
philosophy: Deus est rationabilissime et ordinatissime volens: “God wills in a most reasonable 
                                                 
521 Anthony Quinton, “British Philosophy,” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: The 
Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1967), 1:373.   
522 For a similar approach, see also Janine Marie Idziak, Divine Commands and Morality: Historical and 
Contemporary Readings (New York: Edwin Mellon Press, 1979), 51-54. 
523 Efrem Bettoni, Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of His Philosophy (Washington, D.C: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1961), 160.    
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and orderly manner.”  Because of this well-attested principle, God never wills capriciously, since 
operari sequitur esse (action flows out of essence).  Consequently, Bettoni argues that God’s 
nature determines moral value, and as such, God’s will never determines what is good or right.  
Rather, things are willed by God because of their goodness grounded in divine goodness.   
Mary Beth Ingham and Allan Wolter also conclude that Scotus is not a theological 
voluntarist.524  They come to this conclusion by focusing on the role right reason plays in the 
moral goodness of acts: since moral goodness involves a complex relationship between the 
agent, the act, right reason’s judgment, the object, and the various circumstances that specify the 
act, the act’s moral worth clearly does not derive from some divine willing or command.  
Suffice it to say, antithetical interpretations of Scotus’s ethics exist.  On the one hand, 
Quinton offers strong divine command theory or theological voluntarism—whereby God’s 
willing or commanding grounds the value of actions.  On the other hand, Bettoni, Ingham, and 
Wolter offer a non-vonluntaristic interpretation of Scotus’s ethics.  One problem, I suspect, in 
adjudicating the conflict between these rival interpretations, is that various scholars have not 
been clear on what they mean by the various terms, and specifically how those terms relate to 
Scotus’s moral theory.  So, let’s begin with some clarificatory remarks.  
Divine Dependence  
At its most basic level, a theological voluntarist theory of ethics claims that morality in 
some sense depends upon some type of divine act.  According to Philip Quinn, the general claim 
that morality depends upon God must address three issues:   
                                                 
524 See Thomas M. Osborne Jr., Love of Self and Love of God in Thirteenth-Century Ethics (Notre Dame: Notre 
Dame University Press, 2005), 174; Mary Beth Ingham, “Scotus and the Moral Order,” American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly 67 (1993): 127-150, “Letting Scotus Speak for Himself,” Medieval Philosophy and 
Theology 10 (2001): 173-216;  Allan B. Wolter, “Introduction,” Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality (Washington, 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 3-29. 
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(DC)      Moral status M stands in dependency relation D to divine act A.525     
 
Let’s call this the ‘Dependency Claim’ (DC).  All forms of theological voluntarism accept (DC).  
Yet differing solutions to M, D, and A in our above schema generate different ethical theories, 
depending upon what exactly M ranges over, in what way M depends upon A, and the nature of A 
itself.  Let’s consider each of these briefly, as clarity about these various distinctions should 
illuminate the nature and extent of Scotus’s voluntarism.   
How shall we understand moral status M in our above schema?  There are two options: 
either M ranges over the entire class of moral statuses, or M ranges over only a subset of moral 
statuses.  Let us say that a theory is an unrestricted DC (U-DC) if and only if all moral statuses 
fall under M.  On the other hand, a theory is a restricted version of DC (R-DC) if and only if M 
only ranges over a subset of the class of moral statuses.  Thus a U-DC claims that all moral 
statuses M stand in dependency relation D to A; while the R-DC makes the more modest claim 
that only a subset of evaluative/moral notions fall under dependency relation D to A.526  One 
prominent way to restrict DC usually involves the restriction to only obligation-type 
properties.527  If M ranges over only a subset of moral statuses, then we’ll need to specify which 
                                                 
525 Philip L. Quinn, “Divine Command Theory,” in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, 2nd edition, ed. Hugh 
LaFollette (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 82.   
526 Mark Murphy, "Theological Voluntarism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/voluntarism-theological/>. 
527 See Robert Merrihew Adams, “Divine Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation,” Faith and Philosophy 4 
(1987), 262-275; Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
231-276 (esp. 250-251); Philip L. Quinn, “Divine Command Ethics: A Causal Theory,” in Janine Marie Idziak, 
Divine Command Morality: Historical and Contemporary Readings (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1979), 305-
325.  I should note that while both Adams and Quinn wish to restrict morality to obligation type properties, Adams 
provides a metaethical account, while Quinn rejects a metaethical divine command theory in favor of a normative 
divine command theory.  At one time, Quinn also defended an axiological account, where moral goodness and 
badness also depended upon God.  See Philip L. Quinn, Divine Commands and Moral Requirements (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1978), 67-73.  
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ones and why.  As I’ll argue below, this is crucial to understanding Scotus’s theological 
voluntarism.  
Supposing morality depends upon some divine act A, I see two relevant options for the 
type of act: divine willing and divine commanding.528  One might initially protest that these two 
options amount to the same thing; however, it seems at least initially possible that God might 
will something he doesn’t command (e.g., a supererogatory act), or even command something he 
doesn’t will (e.g., Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac).  So let’s keep these types of divine acts 
separate.  Let us say that some moral status M stands in dependency relation D to a divine 
command if and only if the divine command necessarily determines the moral status of M.  So, if 
M were unrestricted, then all moral concepts would depend for their value on whether or not God 
commands such.  If M were restricted, then whatever that subset of moral concepts M contains, 
that set would depend for its value on God’s command.  In either case, God’s commands could 
be construed along the lines of speech-acts that do not merely express God’s intentions but are 
performative utterances that create an obligation on the part of the hearer.  In contrast, let us say 
that some moral status M stands in dependency relation D to a divine willing if and only if the 
divine will necessarily determines the moral status of M.  If M were unrestricted, then all moral 
statuses would depend for their value on the divine will.  If M were restricted, then whatever that 
subset of moral statuses M contains, that set would depend for its value on God’s will deciding.   
Finally, in what relation D does moral status M stand to the divine act A?  In other words, 
what sort of dependence does the moral realm (or some subset of it) bear to God?   In recent 
                                                 
528 Robert M. Adams is a prominent defender of a (restricted) divine command interpretation, while Mark C. 
Murphy  and Philip Quinn favor a divine will interpretation.  See Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 258-270; and 
“Divine Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation,” Faith and Philosophy 4 (1987), 262-275; Murphy, 
“Divine Command, Divine Will, and Moral Obligation,” Faith and Philosophy 15 (1998), 3-27.  Philip L. Quinn, 
“Divine Command Theory,” 82-85. 
208 
 
literature on theological voluntarism, there have been a number of interesting and divergent 
proposals: causal, supervenience, analysis, and reduction.529  According to the causal view, the 
obtaining of certain (or all) deontological states of affairs530 (i.e., that p ought to be done; that p 
ought not to be done, that p is permissible but not obligatory) necessarily depends upon God’s 
choosing or causing such states of affairs to have the moral status that they in fact have: 
obligatory, prohibited, and permissible.531  A second type of dependence is supervenience: moral 
facts or states of affairs supervene on divine commands, such that, there could be no difference at 
the moral level without a difference in the commands/willing, which function as the moral 
realm’s “quasi-base properties.”  On this view, the commands do not function as the cause of the 
moral facts, but the moral facts themselves are neither reduced to commands nor explained in 
terms of commands, but rather in some way supervene upon commands.532   
By contrast, an analysis view attempts to analyze deontological states of affairs in terms 
of God’s commands (or will).533  Robert Adams held this view in his earlier works, as seen in the 
following passage:  
I could say that by “X is ethically wrong” I mean “X is contrary to the commands of a 
loving God” (i.e., “There is a loving God and X is contrary to his commands”) and by “X is 
ethically permitted” I mean “X is in accord with the commands of a loving God” (i.e., 
                                                 
529 I am generally following Mark Murphy’s excellent overview of these positions.  Mark Murphy, "Theological 
Voluntarism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/voluntarism-theological/>. 
530 I shall talk in terms of ‘states of affairs’ obtaining or not obtaining in this section because many of the prominent 
defenders of divine command theories choose to cash out their positions in this way.  But these theories could just as 
easily be cashed out in terms of deontological propositions and truth value.  As we will see, the latter will be the 
preferred method for Scotus.  
531 This view has been primarily articulated and defended by Philip L. Quinn, “Divine Command Ethics: A Causal 
Theory,” 305-325; “An Argument for Divine Command Ethics,” in Michael D. Beaty, Christian Theism and the 
Problems of Philosophy (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1990), 289-302; and “Divine Command 
Theory,” 82-85.  
532 John E. Hare gestures in that direction in God’s Call: Moral Realism, God’s Commands, and Human Autonomy 
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001).   
533 See Robert M. Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Conception of Ethical Wrongness,” in Religion and 
Morality ed. G. Outka and J.P. Reeder (Doubleday: Garden City, 1973), 318-347.   
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“There is a loving God and X is not contrary to His commands).”534 
So on this view, moral terms (such as ‘wrong’) are defined in terms of theological terms (such as 
‘contrary to the commands of a loving God’).535  Finally, a reduction view seeks to reduce 
deontological states of affairs to theological states of affairs, such that ‘being morally obligatory’ 
is identical with the property of ‘being commanded by a (loving) God,’ and ‘being morally 
wrong’ is identical with the property of ‘being prohibited by a (loving) God.’536   
For our purpose here, we need not worry about the respective merits of each option at 
each junction.  Rather, we ought to recognize that there are various ways in which morality (or 
some subset of it) may depend upon some divine act, and differing solutions produce differing 
versions of theological voluntarism.  Thus we ought to keep these distinctions in mind when 
discussing Scotus’s account, lest we simply assume he holds a particular formulation of it.  In 
what follows, I will attempt to situate Scotus’s account into this contemporary discussion by 
demonstrating how Scotus would answer each aspect of (DC).  I shall argue that Scotus holds a 
restricted-causal-will-theory, where (only) contingent deontological propositions depend upon 
God’s will for their moral status/truth value as obligatory, prohibited, or permissible.  
Unrestricted and Restricted Divine Command Theories  
A U-DC will claim that for any M, M has no intrinsic moral value apart from some divine 
act (such as the will of God or a divine command).  This can be articulated as follows, 
(1) M is morally good/right if and only if God commands/wills M.   
                                                 
534 Robert M. Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Conception of Ethical Wrongness,” 323.   
535 See Quinn for a criticism of this view, which he thinks amounts to the (super)naturalistic fallacy akin to Moore’s 
naturalistic fallacy.  Quinn, “Divine Command Ethics: A Causal Theory,” 306-308. 
536 Robert M. Adams, “Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again,” in The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in 
Philosophical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 133-142; Finite and Infinite Goods, 252-258.  I 
place ‘loving’ in parenthesis, because this iteration of the view is particular to Adams’s account.   
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Consequently, a necessary condition for the goodness or rightness of any action, moral property, 
moral obligation, etc., rests solely on God commanding/willing it.537  
Why accept this thesis?  One significant motivation is its alleged entailment from God’s 
aseity, which I’ll define as the conjunction of two propositions:  
(2)  God does not depend on anything distinct from himself to be what he is, 
 
and, 
(3)   Every entity distinct from God depends upon God to be what it is. 
It seems (3) is the relevant premise here.  If (3) is accepted, along with (4), that  
(4) Actions, moral properties, etc., have their moral value intrinsically 
then the following problem is generated: if God commands/wills M because M has intrinsic 
moral value independently of God, then God’s aseity is compromised with respect to the moral 
status of those actions, moral properties, etc.  In short, (3) must be rejected.  Since the denial of 
(3) compromises an important belief for the theist (God’s aseity), U-DC argues a rejection of (4) 
is the appropriate alternative.  And a denial of (4) is just to say that no action, moral property, 
moral obligation, etc., has moral value intrinsically, but that value is conferred upon it 
extrinsically.  For U-DC, this is expressed in terms of (1), either in virtue of God’s commands or 
the divine will.  And lest we have some recalcitrant moral concept whose moral status floats free 
of God’s will, M must range over the entire class of moral concepts.  So an unrestricted DC will 
accept something like the following:  
(5)     An action, moral property, etc., has moral value V only if God commands/wills 
that action, moral property, etc., have V.   
Scotus would reject (5) for at least two reasons.  First, it is obvious from the previous 
                                                 
537 Proposition (1) is actually a necessary and sufficient condition (for a U-DC), but for the present purpose, the 
focus shall be on (1) as a necessary condition.     
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discussions of goodness that Scotus restricts M in (DC) to exclude goodness from depending 
directly upon divine commands, and thus Scotus cannot be characterized as a proponent of U-
DC: moral goodness derives from the complex interchange between an agent’s nature and causal 
powers on the one hand, the ends and circumstances right reason dictates ought to accompany an 
act, on the other.538  Hence what is good in no way depends directly upon a divine command or 
willing for its moral value.  
Thus Anthony Quinton’s statements concerning God’s relation to morality are simply 
false.  Unfortunately, Quinton’s bold claims have “poisoned the well” with respect to how the 
question of God’s relationship to morality is discussed regarding Scotus’s ethics.  As we saw, 
Quinton states that goodness depends upon divine commands, and thus, when critics (Bettoni, 
Wolter, Ingham) react to such claims, they tend to focus exclusively on goodness, and accurately 
emphasize that Scotus is not a voluntarist about value.539  Unfortunately, in disposing of the 
claim that Scotus isn’t a voluntarist about goodness (i.e., an axiological voluntarist), they seem to 
draw the incorrect inference that Scotus isn’t a voluntarist about moral matters tout court.  In 
other words, they have not paid attention to the various ways the Subtle Doctor believes certain 
aspects of the moral realm do in fact depend upon God.    
Since goodness does not depend upon any divine act, the most we can say (so far) about 
Scotus’s “voluntarism” is that he restricts M in (DC) to exclude goodness.  So value-type 
properties do not depend upon some divine act.540  In what follows, I shall argue that Scotus 
restricts M in (DC) to only include only contingent deontological propositions—specifically, 
                                                 
538 Ordinatio I, d. 17, p.1, q.2, n.62.   
539 See especially Allan B. Wolter, “Introduction,” Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, 3-29. 
540 I focus here explicitly on goodness as the token value-type property, but the same would apply for beauty, since 
Scotus conceives of beauty and secondary goodness as similar in nature.  See chapter 4. 
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propositions about our obligations we have toward one another.  
That Scotus’s moral theory is not a version of U-DC is also evident in the Subtle Doctor’s 
rejection of (5) for a second reason:  
(6) Some moral truths are necessarily true—and their corresponding actions are 
right—independently of the divine will. 
This is crucial to the Subtle Doctor’s rejection of (5), but in order to see this, we need to 
understand Scotus’s conception of natural law.  According to Scotus, natural law strictly pertains 
only to those [moral] propositions whose truth value is known from their terms alone (veritas 
nota ex terminis), or conclusions that necessarily follow from them.541  Scotus identifies these 
necessary, a priori moral truths with the following principle: “If God exists, then he alone ought 
to be loved as God.”542  For Scotus, the content of the First Table of the Decalogue in the Ten 
Commandments follows directly from this principle: namely, those commandments and 
prohibitions pertaining to our relationship with God, or as Scotus puts it, those precepts that have 
God as their immediate object.543  According to Scotus, the commands and prohibitions 
contained in the First Table—natural law in the strict sense—have their respective truth values 
prior to any decision on the part of the divine will, and thus are independent of God’s will or 
commands.544  He claims that natural law principles like these are “necessarily true,” and that 
                                                 
541 See Ordinatio III, d.37, q.un., n.16; Ordinatio IV, d.17, q.un, n.19; Ordinatio IV, d. 33, q.1, n.22.     
542 Ordinatio III, d.37, q.un., n. 20: “Si est Deus, est amandus ut Deus solus.” The first two commandments, in the 
form of prohibitions (‘you shall have no other gods,’ and ‘you shall not show irreverence for God’) follow from this 
principle.  
543 Ordinatio III, d.37, q.un., n. 19.   
544 See Ordinatio III, d.37, q.un., n.14, 20.  As Williams explains, “Notice that Scotus’s preferred formulation of 
moral precepts is as indicative sentences using the gerundive, represented in English by sentences of the form “Φ is 
[not] to be done,” rather than as imperatives.  Accordingly, Scotus’s moral precepts are propositions, which are 
either true or false, rather than commands, which do not have truth values.”  See Thomas Williams, “The 
Franciscans,” in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford University Press, 2013), 
177, n.19.   
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“not even God could make them false.”545  Nor can God make a dispensation from these 
precepts, in such a way that someone could rightly will the opposite of what these precepts 
command or prohibit.546  So these precepts are always obligatory and no exception can be 
made—not even by God himself.   
And so we see a second way in which Scotus would restrict M in (DC): Since necessary 
moral truths have their value independently of any divine willing or commanding, they cannot be 
included into the way that morality depends upon God—at least in so far as it would depend 
upon some divine act.  Thus our obligation to love and obey God, to make him our ultimate end 
and most treasured object of our worship stems not from God’s willing or commanding that it be 
such, but is a necessary moral truth, as part of the fabric of the universe.  In other words, our 
obligations to God have intrinsic moral worth.  I should point out that just because Scotus denies 
that necessary moral truths are grounded in God’s will or commands, does not mean that such 
truths are not grounded in God at all.  As we will see below, Scotus grounds them in God’s 
infinite goodness.  In any case, this sets Scotus apart from most forms of theological voluntarism, 
as some morally right actions are right independently of divine commands and thus their 
rightness is outside of God’s control. 
In contrast, Scotus argues that the Second Table of the Decalogue—the commandments 
involving human beings’ relationships toward each other—is only a part of natural law in a 
“broad” sense.  These commandments and prohibitions (e.g., do not murder, do not steal, etc.) 
are not necessary, a priori truths, like the First Table, nor do they follow necessarily from 
                                                 
545 Ordinatio III, d.37, q.un, n. 3. “Quae sunt de lege naturae, vel sunt principia practica nota ex terminis, vel sunt 
conclusiones necessario sequentes ex talibus principiis; sive sic sive sic, habent veritatem necessariam; ergo non 
potest Deus facere eas esse falsas.”  While these statements appear in the initial pro and con arguments, it’s clear 
from the context (see n.40) that Scotus accepts this opinion, and the arguments made there support his overall 
viewpoint.  
546 Ordinatio III, d.37, q.un., n.20.   
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them.547  Scotus argues that God could make a dispensation from them.  For example, in arguing 
against the position that all the commandments in the Decalogue belong to natural law in the 
strict sense (Aquinas’s view548), Scotus makes the following claim:  
I ask therefore, whether leaving all the circumstances in the act of ‘killing a human’ the 
same, except the one circumstance of whether the act is prohibited or not prohibited, can 
God bring it about that that very act, which with those same circumstances is prohibited and 
illicit at one time, would be not prohibited and licit at another time?  If so, then God can 
make a dispensation without qualification, in the same way he changed the Old Law—with 
respect to the ceremonial laws—when he gave the New Law.  Indeed, he did not bring it 
about that the precepts of the ceremonial law remained binding but were not to be observed, 
but he made it the case that the act remained the same, but people were no longer obligated 
to it as they had previously been.  And so this is how any legislator makes an unqualified 
dispensation: when he revokes a precept of his own positive law, namely, by making it the 
case that the prohibited or illicit act remains the same in its nature, but the feature of it 
being prohibited or illicit is removed, and the act is made licit.  Yet if God cannot bring it 
about that this act, which, with such circumstances was prohibited, with the same 
circumstances as when it was prohibited is no longer prohibited, then God cannot make it 
the case that ‘to kill’ is not prohibited—But it is obvious that God did make it that case that 
‘to kill’ was not prohibited with Abraham and others.549 
Scotus’s point is twofold: first, since natural laws (strictly considered) are necessary 
moral truths that cannot be changed or dispensed with, and since God has made a dispensation 
with respect to the various precepts of the Second Table in the Ten Commandments, then contra 
Aquinas, not every one of the Ten Commandments belongs necessarily to the natural law.  
Second, and more importantly, God has the ability to make the same act—under the same 
                                                 
547 Ordinatio III, d.37, q.un., n.18, 25.   
548 For Aquinas’s view, see Summa Theologiae I-II, q.100, a.1 and Summa Theologiae I-II, q.100, a.8.   
549 Ordinatio III, d.37, q.un., n.13: “Quaero ergo an stantibus omnibus circumstantiis eisdem in isto actu ‘occidere 
hominem’, ista circumstantia sola variata ‘prohibitum et non-prohibitum’, possit Deus facere quod iste actus, qui 
cum eisdem circumstantiis aliis aliquando est prohibitus et illicitus, alias esset non-prohibitus sed licitus? –Si sic, 
simpliciter potest dispensare, quemadmodum mutavit Legem Veterem quando dedit Novam, et hoc quantum ad 
caerimonialia; non quidem faciens quod, stante praecepto de caerimonialibus, non essent illa servanda, sed faciens 
quod actu illo manente eodem, non tenebatur quis ad illum sicut prius (ita etiam dispensat quicumque legislator 
simpliciter, quando revocat praeceptum iuris positum ab eo, faciendo scilicet quod—actu prohibito vel praecepto 
manente eodem secundum se—auferatur ratio prohibiti vel illiciti et fiat licitum); tamen non potest facere Deus de 
isto actu, qui cum talibus circumstantiis erat prohibitus, quod manentibus eisdem circumstantiis prioribus 
prohibitione non sit prohibitus, cuius oppositum manifeste patet de Abraham et multis aliis.”     
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circumstances—either obligatory or prohibited, simply by divine fiat.  Thus acts of the Second 
Table (i.e., acts pertaining to our relationship with others) depend upon God’s will for their 
moral worth—and so they lack any intrinsic moral value, since the very same act could be 
prohibited or obligatory simply by God’s choice.  Thus nothing concerning the intrinsic features 
of the act within a certain context makes it right or wrong.   
 However, Scotus does note that while these precepts in the Second Table of the 
Decalogue are not logical deductions following necessarily from the First Table, they are 
nevertheless “highly consonant” with it.550  This “consonance” passage has created serious 
disparity among Scotus scholars, and no one entirely knows what he means by this, since Scotus 
nowhere gives a precise account of what he means by saying that the precepts of the Second 
Table are “highly consonant” with the natural law in the strict sense.  He is clear that consonance 
is something weaker than entailment, since such precepts do not necessarily follow from our 
obligations to God; he is also clear that such consonance does not require God to prescribe the 
exact laws he did in fact prescribe.  But these claims only tell us what consonance is not.  What 
is the positive content of the claim that the precepts of the Second Table are “highly consonant” 
with the law of nature in the strict sense?  
As I see it, there are three broad approaches to what I’ll call the “Consonance Problem”: 
teleologist, aesthetic, reductionist.  The teleologist approach attempts to explain consonance in 
terms of features that fit our natures and our appropriate ends; the aesthetic approach argues that 
God has aesthetic rather than moral reasons for choosing specific Second Table precepts; the 
reductionist reduces consonance to the role the Second Table precepts play in fulfilling our 
                                                 
550 Ordinatio III, d.37, q.un., n. 25-26: “Alio modo dicuntur aliqua esse de lege naturae, quia multum consona illi 
legi, licet non necesario consequantur ex primis principiis practicis, quae nota sunt ex terminis et omni intellectui 
necessario nota.  Et hoc modo certum est omnia praecepta—etiam secundae tabulae—esse de lege naturae, quia 
eorum rectitudo valde consonant primis principiis practicis necessario notis.” 
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obligation to the First Table (loving God).  Let’s consider the merits of each in turn.  
  Some have desired to soften Scotus’s claims about morality and God’s dispensations by 
focusing on the Second Table’s precepts being “highly consonant” and concluding that Scotus is 
not really a voluntarist about it, but instead some type of crypto-Aristotelian teleologist, and that 
morality is intimately tied to our nature as humans, even though God has sometimes made a 
dispensation from such laws.  For example, Allan Wolter writes:  
Scotus maintains…that while the second table represents what is “valde consonans” with 
natural law, certain aspects of the second table of the decalogue can be dispensed with 
according to right reason, when their observation would do more harm than good.  But God 
could obviously not dispense from all its precepts at once, for this would be equivalent to 
creating man in one way and obligating him in an entirely different fashion, something 
contrary to what he “owes to human nature in virtue of his generosity.”551   
So on this interpretation, the Second Table precepts are intimately linked with human nature and 
are only dispensed with in special circumstances.  But in general, Second Table precepts align 
with the teleological direction human nature provides.   
Three important points that Scotus explicitly makes about these precepts and divine 
willing weigh heavily against this option.  First, Scotus clearly states that God can make what 
was illicit at one time licit—without changing the nature of the act, without changing the 
circumstances under which the act was performed.  He could do so simply by divine fiat.552  If 
so, then it’s hard to see how the consonance of certain precepts of the Second Table with the 
First really matter for God’s determination of some act’s moral worth, or how they could be 
connected to human nature, since God has willed some precepts and their opposites at various 
points in history.  And even if one option might be more consonant than another, Scotus still 
insists that God could have chosen otherwise—there is nothing morally or logically binding on 
                                                 
551 Allan B. Wolter, Scotus on the Will and Morality, 24.  
552 Ordinatio III, d.37, q.un., n.13. 
217 
 
God to establish the precept the way in fact he has currently established it.  In other words, God 
doesn’t have any moral obligation or moral reason to make some precept of the Second Table 
obligatory or prohibited, and he especially does not have to do so on the basis of human nature.   
Second, when we consider Scotus’s claims about divine justice, he explicitly states that 
God is not bound to anything but his own goodness and those necessary moral truths, and that 
everything else God could have rightly and justly willed otherwise than he did.  For example, 
after defining justice in one sense along Anselmian lines as “rectitude of the will preserved for its 
own sake,”553 Scotus remarks that God not only has this rectitude of will, but that His will cannot 
even be slanted (inobliquabilem).  Why?  Because God’s will is the chief standard or norm 
itself.554  In order for there to be a deviation from some norm, there must first be a distinction 
between that norm and the will which deviates from it.  But this is impossible in the case of God, 
because his will provides the basis for moral norms themselves: what God wills is right, and 
hence no deviation by the divine will is possible.555   
But if we consider justice in the Aristotelian sense of a virtue or habit which naturally 
inclines the will to rectitude, then the divine will does not have any rectitude that inclines it 
deterministically to anything other than its own goodness.  The divine will, Scotus claims, is 
related to every object other than itself only contingently, and so could be equally inclined to it 
and its opposite.  Scotus concludes that God has only one justice—the justice that inclines him to 
                                                 
553 Anselm, De Veritate 12.  Sancti Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia, ed. F.S. Schmitt (Stuttgart-
Bad Canstatt: Friedrich Fromann Verlag, 1968). 
554 Ordinatio IV, d.46, q.1, n.10: “Primo modo habet enim rectitudinem voluntatis, immo voluntatem 
inobliquabilem, quia prima regula est ‘et servata propter se.’  
555 See also Ordinatio IV, d.46, q.1, n.25. “Quod autem dicitur quod quandoque non potest agere praeter 
‘secundam,’ non videtur probabile, quia quidquid non includit contradictionem potest simpliciter agere, et ita velle; 
sed non potest aliquid velle quod non posset recte velle, quia voluntas sua est prima regula; ergo quidquid non 
includit contradictionem potest Deus recte velle. Et ita, cum ista iustitia secunda determinet ad aliquid cuius 
oppositum non includit contradictionem, potest Deus velle et recte velle, et agere praeter istam iustitiam secundam.” 
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render what’s due to his own goodness.556  Scotus further elaborates that the divine will is not 
inclined deterministically to anything in such a manner that it can’t be justly inclined to the 
opposite of that thing.  In fact, God could justly will the opposite.557   
In Ordinatio I, d.44, Scotus applies his distinction between God’s absolute power and his 
ordained power to the moral realm.  According to Scotus, by God’s absolute power, God can act 
in any manner not involving a contradiction.558  He goes on to claim:  
Accordingly, I say that there are many other things he can do ordinately; and when the 
correctness of the law according to which someone is said to act rightly and ordinately is in 
the power of the agent himself, there is no contradiction involved in the claim that many 
things other than those that are made in conformity with these laws can be made ordinately.  
Therefore, just as he can act otherwise, so also can he establish a different law; and if that 
law were established by God, it would be correct, because no law is correct except insofar 
as it established by the divine will’s acceptance.559   
In this passage Scotus unapologetically and emphatically suggests that not only could God 
establish a different set of laws than he actually did, but that if he did so, those laws would be 
right or correct.  Divine acceptation—and not human nature—establishes a law as right.    
Third, Scotus explicitly states that the Second Table precepts are not connected to human 
nature in the way that the First Table precepts are, and that God could create a human being 
directed at the ultimate end without requiring that God establish contingent moral precepts in any 
                                                 
556 Ordinatio IV, d.46, q.1, n.29: “Primum declaratur, quia cum iustitia proprie sit rectitudo voluntatis habituatae, et 
per consequens quasi naturaliter inclinans ad alterum vel ‘ad se quasi ad alterum’, et voluntas divina non habeat 
aliquam rectitudinem inclinantem determinate ad aliquid nisi ad suam bonitatem quasi ad alterum, (nam ad 
quodcumque aliud obiectum mere contingenter se habet, ita quod aeque potest in hoc et in eius oppositum), sequitur 
quod nullam iustitiam habet nisi ad reddendum bonitati suae illud quod condecet eam.” 
557 Ordinatio IV, d.46, q.1, n. 32: “Sed ad nullum obiectum secundarium ita determinate inclinatur voluntas divina 
per aliquid in ipsa, ut repugnet sibi iuste inclinari ad oppositum illius, quia sicut sine contradictione potest 
oppositum velle, ita potest iuste velle, alioquin posset velle absolute et non iuste, quod est inconveniens.” 
558 Ordinatio I, d.44, q.un., n.7. 
559 Ordinatio I, d.44, q.un., n.8.  Translated by Thomas Williams, John Duns Scotus: Ethical Writings (Forthcoming, 
Oxford University Press).  Emphasis mine.  
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one way rather than another.560  Thus there can be no deduction from human nature to the ends 
we ought to pursue, other than the ultimate end.  In order to see this point clearly, let’s compare 
Scotus’s conception of natural law with that of Aquinas.  
Aquinas’s teleologically driven natural-law eudaimonism requires an intimate correlation 
between human nature and the end(s) for which humanity was created: human nature grounds 
and directs the way in which we reach both harmony with one another and the final end, God 
himself.  There are (at least) two connected reasons for this.  The first reason stems from 
Aquinas’s conception of natural law.  Aquinas generally defines law as “An ordinance of reason 
for the common good, promulgated by him who has the care of community.”561  According to 
Aquinas, there are three types of law: positive, eternal, and natural.  Positive laws pertain to the 
state and its various rules and sanctions; eternal laws pertain to God’s secondary direction, 
moving all entities to the various ends for which they were created.562  Natural law contains 
various divine laws implanted in our nature for our direction toward the ends distinctive of our 
natures.        
According to Aquinas, natural laws are grounded in the first practical principle for action, 
which he defines as “Good ought to be done and pursued, and evil avoided.”563  This necessary, 
a priori principle, is the fundamental precept of the law of nature and directs action towards 
                                                 
560 Ordinatio III, d. 37, q. un., n. 18.  “Et non est sic, loquendo universaliter de omnibus praeceptis secundae tabulae, 
quia de ratione eorum quae ibi praecipiuntur vel prohibentur, non sunt principia practica simpliciter necessaria, nec 
conclusiones simpliciter necessariae.  Non enim est necessaria bonitas, in iis quae ibi praecipiuntur, ad bonitatem 
finis ultimi; nec in iis quae prohibentur, malitia necessario avertens a fine ultimo, quin—si istud bonum non esset 
praeceptum—posset finis ultimus attingi et amari; et si illud malum non esset prohibitum, staret cum illo acquisitio 
finis ultimi.”   
561 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.90, a.4: “Et sic ex quatuor praedictis potest colligi definitio legis, quae nihil 
est aliud quam quaedam rationis ordinatio ad bonum commune, ad eo qui curam communitatis habet, promulgata.”  
562 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.93, a.1.   
563 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.94, a.2.  “Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum legis, quod bonum est faciendum 
et prosequendum, et malum vitandum.”  
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various ends latent within an entity, in conjunction with various levels of existence.  Thus with 
all existent substances, we seek the goodness of preservation of our existence.  With animals, we 
seek animal goods—procreation and childrearing.  Finally, we seek human goods—goods that 
are unique to us as rational animals.  Here, Aquinas sees two goods as ends that are distinctive 
of our rational natures: know God and be sociable.564  Virtues, on this model, perfect our natures 
with respect to our various ends: the theological virtues perfect our nature with respect to God, 
while the moral virtues perfect our nature with respect to others—they enable us to be sociable, 
flourish, and live life in harmony with one another.  So what we ought to do as humans follows 
directly from our nature and the first practical principle of action implanted in our nature.  
Consequently, the distinction between the First Table of the Decalogue and the Second easily fit 
Aquinas’s twofold structure of the ends as goods appropriate to our rational natures: the former 
is thus expressed in the First Table of the Decalogue, and the latter expressed in the Second 
Table.   
Second, according to Aquinas, the commands in the Decalogue are not merely 
expressions of the divine will, but further reveal what our natures already direct us toward.  So 
moral norms are directly tied to our natures and what it means for God to create a human 
being—with certain powers and capacities, on the one hand, and ends or goals on the other.  It’s 
a package deal: creating humans with their particular natures necessitates certain moral norms 
which govern and direct their behavior as rational animals.   
As Dave Horner explains,  
Traditional Christian [natural law theory] views maintain that God’s will is expressed, first 
of all, in his creation—in his creating humans with the natures that they have.  He could 
have created very different kinds of things, with very different natures and conditions for 
                                                 
564 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q.94, a.2.  I should note that for Aquinas, even though we share certain ends 
and goods with animals, such as procreation, since we are rational animals, our reason must direct the manner in 
which we fulfill the end of procreation.   
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flourishing.  But having created humans with the nature that they do have, he has thereby 
established the moral constraints within which their moral world can legitimately operate, 
and his subsequent divine commands are thus constrained by those creational powers.565  
Consequently, Aquinas thinks that all of the commandments in the Decalogue belong to the law 
of nature in the “strict sense.”566  In creating humans, Aquinas’s God is bound to establish certain 
moral parameters in virtue of the types of beings he creates.  And since these laws are tied to our 
natures and the natural law implanted there, we can infer from human nature what ends or goals 
we ought to pursue and what obligations we have toward one another.   
Scotus repudiates this account at both junctures.  First, the first practical principle for 
action is not “do good,” but “love God.”  I see two important implications of this: one, Scotus’s 
version of the first practical principle of action does not more generally direct us toward both 
finite and infinite goods, as Aquinas’s account does.  Indeed, for Scotus, the natural law 
implanted in our nature to order and inform our actions contains no reference to how we ought to 
treat our fellow humanity whatsoever: contingent divine commands supply that content and not 
necessary, a priori principles guiding how we ought to treat one another.  The first practical 
principle of action simply directs us to our ultimate end—the infinite good itself.  Two, even 
where these two incongruent approaches overlap—namely, both approaches have God as an 
object of natural law in the strict sense—they differ with respect to which human faculty is 
central to the moral project.  For Aquinas, when the object is God, the appropriate human faculty 
is the intellect and its role is knowing God.  For Scotus, the first practical principle of action 
directs us to God via a different human faculty, namely, the will and its affection for justice.567  
                                                 
565 David Horner, Review of God’s Call: Moral Realism, God’s Commands, and Human Autonomy, by John E. 
Hare, Eerdmans, 2001.  Philosophia Christi 8 (2006): 186-190. 
566 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.100, a.1.   
567 Ordinatio II, d.6, q. 2.  By affection for justice, Scotus has in mind loving God for his own sake, rather than 
simply for the advantage that loving God might bring.  Cf. Ordinatio III, d. 28-29.  A full discussion of the nature 
and role of Scotus’s two affections of the will is outside the purview of this dissertation.  For the latest scholarship 
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Consequently, our nature only directs us to one moral precept as necessarily binding upon us; 
specifically, to love God as our infinite good and highest end.  These twin features of Scotus’s 
natural law theory—an emphasis on the will both in God’s establishment of moral norms and the 
human will in loving God—highlight the shifting tide toward ethical and theological voluntarism 
at the University of Paris in general, and specifically among the Franciscan masters.         
Second, in contrast to Aquinas, nothing in human nature grounds the means to reach the 
final end, nor is there any intrinsic connection between the Second Table precepts and human 
teleology.568  As Thomas Williams aptly explains,  
The human good is a loving union with the Triune God, and it is perfectly possible to have 
such a union even if one commits adultery.  Scotus does not simply mean that adulterers 
can repent and be forgiven.  He means (indeed, he explicitly says) that God could easily 
have set up the moral law in such a way that adultery was not forbidden, and his doing so 
would in no way have diverted us from the attainment of our ultimate end.569 
Scotus thinks that we are all by necessity obligated to love and obey God, and that our nature 
                                                 
on the topic, see Peter King, “Scotus’s Rejection of Anselm: The Two-Wills Theory,” in Johannes Duns Scotus 
1308-2008: Die philosophischen Perspektiven seines Werkes/Investigations into his Philosophy. Proceedings of the 
‘Quadruple Congress’ on John Duns Scotus. Part 3.  Archa Verbi Subsidia 5, ed. by Ludger Honnefelder, Hannes 
Möhle, Andreas Speer, Theo Kobusch, and Susana Bullido del Barrio, Münster: Aschendorff, 2010, 359-378. Archa 
Verbi Subsidia 5. Johannes Duns Scotus 1308-2008: Investigations into his Philosophy, edited by Ludger 
Honnefelder, Hannes Mohle, Andreas Speer, Theo Kobusch, Susana Bullido Del Barrio (Munster: Aschendorff , 
2011), 359-378. 
568 Cross, “Natural Law, Moral Constructivism, and Duns Scotus’s Metaethics: The Centrality of Aesthetic 
Explanation,” 184.  In his Phd dissertation, William Patrick Lee argues for the same conclusion in an interesting and 
slightly different manner, namely, from the understanding of what is ‘essential’ to humanity for both Scotus and 
Aquinas.  According to Lee, Aquinas and Scotus “both agree that if God creates man, God must endow him with 
what is essential to man, and that God is free to change anything else about man. The cause for difference is that for 
St. Thomas, man’s moral orientation to the goods prescribed in the second table of the Decalogue is essential to 
man, whereas for Duns Scotus it is not.”  Lee’s argument, it seems to me, hinges upon the nature and extent of 
Scotus’s essentialism.  On the one hand, Lee provides plenty of arguments and evidence that Scotus was an 
essentialist about natures—including humanity.  However, at times Scotus seems completely comfortable claiming 
that the same kind nature could be imbedded with different powers and capacities.  But if Lee is correct, this would 
further substantiate the anti-teleologist reading of Scotus, and well as further explain why Scotus and Aquinas differ 
about the Second Table.  See Lee, Natural Law and the Decalogue in St. Thomas and John Duns Scotus, Marquette 
University, 1980.  
569 Thomas Williams, “The Libertarian Foundations of Scotus’s Moral Philosophy,” The Thomist 62 (1998): 214.  
Cf. Ordinatio IV, d.26, q. un.  See also Ordinatio III, d.38, q.un., n.15, were Scotus makes the same point with 
respect to lying.   
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directs us to him as our final end, as the first practical principle of action states.  But the means 
by which we reach him and relate to others is entirely contingent upon the divine will, and not 
grounded in human nature or finite ends—as goods—that we ought to pursue.  Thus the 
teleological approach to the Consonance Problem directly contradicts many of Scotus’s 
teachings about God, the natural law, and the role of human nature (or rather, lack thereof) in the 
establishment of moral norms.   
In light of these worries, a second solution to the Consonance Problem has been 
developed (in different ways) by Richard Cross and Oleg Bychkov.  This view denies that 
consonance refers to some tight connection between human nature and moral norms: God does 
not have any moral obligation to prescribe certain laws to fit our nature.  It also denies that God 
has moral reasons for preferring one ordering of laws to another.  But to say that God has no 
moral reasons to prescribe the laws that he does prescribe is not to say that he has no reasons at 
all.  According to this view, he has non-moral reasons: aesthetic considerations.  In a recent 
article, Richard Cross argues that “consonance” should be interpreted as aesthetic considerations 
for God’s choosing certain moral precepts.570   
Unfortunately, Cross’s view is plagued with interpretational and conceptual problems. 
With respect to interpretational difficulties, there are two issues here.  One, some of the passages 
Cross enlists in support of his aesthetic considerations refers to moral goodness resulting from an 
act’s harmony (convenientia) with a number of conditions.571  As I have argued in chapter 4, it is 
true that Scotus does connect goodness with beauty (Scotus says that they are similar).  
                                                 
570 Richard Cross, “Natural Law, Moral Constructivism, and Duns Scotus’s Metaethics: The Centrality of Aesthetic 
Explanation,” in Reason, Religion, and Natural Law: Historical and Analytical Studies, ed. Jonathan Jacobs 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 175-197.   
571 Cross, “Natural Law, Moral Constructivism, and Duns Scotus’s Metaethics: The Centrality of Aesthetic 
Explanation,” 189.  Cf.  Scotus, Quodlibet 18, a.1. 
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However, goodness is not the same thing as rightness of certain Second Table precepts—and 
each, according to Scotus, has a different set of necessary and sufficient conditions: rightness is a 
prescription of what we should do and grounded in God’s will; moral goodness is an evaluation 
of how well we do what we ought to do, and requires a harmony of a number of factors.  This 
distinction will become even clearer in the next chapter.  In any case, appealing to passages 
where Scotus compares moral goodness with beauty is irrelevant to the question at hand: namely, 
whether aesthetic conditions establish the rightness of Second Table moral prescriptions. 
Two, Cross appeals to what he sees as aesthetically minded passages that are irrelevant to 
the current topic, such as passages on the cognitive powers of the intellect perceiving God’s 
infinite being.  For example, he appeals to the following two passages, stating that Scotus 
appeals to “aesthetic considerations” here:  
The sense powers, which are less cognitive than the intellect, immediately perceive 
inappropriateness (disconvenientiam) in their object: this is clear in the case of hearing 
relative to an inappropriate object.  Therefore if infinite were incompatible with being, the 
intellect would immediately perceive this inappropriateness and incompatibility, and then it 
could not have infinite being as its object.572  
And,  
The intellect, whose object is being, finds no incompatibility understanding something 
infinite: rather, it seems perfectly intelligible.  But it is remarkable if a contradiction in 
relation to the first object is made evident to no intellect, when discord (discordia) in sound 
so easily offends the hearing.573   
Three things must be kept in mind with respect to these passages that Cross enlists as 
supporting evidence for aesthetic reading of the Consonance Problem.  One, even if Scotus 
appeals to aesthetic considerations at various places in his thought, it doesn’t mean that such an 
                                                 
572 Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d.2, part 1, q.1-3, n.72. translated by Wolter and Bychkov, John Duns Scotus: The 
Examined Report of the Paris Lecture: Reportatio I-A, volume 1 (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 
2004).  Cross, “Natural Law, Moral Constructivism, and Duns Scotus’s Metaethics: The Centrality of Aesthetic 
Explanation,” 190.   
573 Ordinatio I, d.2, pars.1, q.1-2, n.136.   
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appeal is relevant to the current topic.  Suppose Scotus’s use of disconvenientia above happens to 
be an aesthetic notion.  What follows from it about the nature of the Second Table precepts?  
Nothing: there’s no reason disconvenientia has to be an aesthetic notion when talking about the 
moral law just because it is an aesthetic notion here.   
Two, aesthetic considerations do not seem to play a significant role in the above passages 
at all.  The discovenientia of ‘infinite’ and ‘being’ (if they were in fact disconveniens to each 
other) would not be aesthetic at all, but logical/conceptual.  It’s not that infinite and being would 
be like checks and plaids or whatever—jarring and hideous in combination—but that they would 
be logically incompatible with each other.  The point of the analogy is not that the 
disconvenientia of ‘infinite’ and ‘being’ is the same thing as the disconvenientia of hearing and 
an ugly sound; it’s that both are known in the same way: by immediate, non-inferential 
perception in a sense of ‘perception’ that isn’t limited to the senses.  In other words, this passage 
isn’t about aesthetics at all; it’s a defense of the idea that there is such a thing as logical intuition.  
This point is made clearer if the last quote above by Cross were carried through the rest of the 
pericope:    
The intellect, whose object is being, finds no incompatibility understanding something 
infinite: rather, it seems perfectly intelligible.  But it is remarkable if a contradiction in 
relation to the first object is made evident to no intellect, when discord (discordia) in sound 
so easily offends the hearing….For if the unfittingness immediately offends when it is 
perceived, why does no intellect naturally flee the understood infinite as if from something 
incompatible, and so destroys its first object?574 
Thus Scotus’s point is not to say that perception of the infinite being is some kind of aesthetic 
                                                 
574 Ordinatio I, d.2, pars.1, q.1-2, n.136.  The first half of the translation is from Cross; the added material is mine.  
“Item, quia intellectus, cuius obiectum est ens, nullam invenit repugnantiam intelligendo aliquod infinitum, immo 
videtur perfectissimum intelligibile.  Mirum est autem si nulli intellectui talis contradictio patens fiat circa primum 
eius obiectum, cum discordia in sono ita faciliter offendat auditum: si enim disconveniens statim ut percipitur 
offendit, cur nullus intellectus ab intelligibili infinito naturaliter refugit sicut a non conveniente, suum ita primum 
obiectum destruente?” 
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taste we have for metaphysical entities, but rather that both a discord in harmony and a 
logical/conceptual contradictions are known immediately and intuitively.  The harmony of a 
discordant sound merely serves as an example.    
Three, Cross seems to take it for granted that convenientia and disconvenientia are 
always aesthetic terms.575  But as I have argued in chapter 4, while convenientia and 
disconvenientia apply to beauty, the notions in themselves are much broader.  I argued there that 
Scotus uses convenientia as technical term, conveying a proper relationship among entities.  For 
example, in his various questions on the works of Aristotle, Scotus often asks whether Aristotle 
appropriately or correctly applies or defines something, or whether some definition suitably 
captures the things being defined.  And in each of these cases, he uses convenientia.576  
Furthermore, in Questions on Porphyry’s Isagoge, Scotus uses ‘convenientia’ to refer to the 
fittingness or properness of the definition or concept, given the nature of the terms involved.  A 
few cases will suffice to make the point:  
• Q.15:  “Whether the definition of a genus is fitting (convenienter) to what has been 
given.”  
• Q.17:  “Whether ‘difference of species’ is fittingly (convenienter) posited in the 
definition of a genus.”  
• Q.19:  Whether ‘in quid’ is appropriately (convenienter) posited in the definition of 
a genus.”   
• Q.21:  “Whether this definition of a species is fitting (conveniens): ‘A species is 
what is predicated of many  numerical differences in virtue of the fact that it is a 
quiddity.”’  
• Q.23:  “Whether the first division of differences is fitting (conveniens).”  
                                                 
575 Cross, “Natural Law, Moral Constructivism, and Duns Scotus’s Metaethics: The Centrality of Aesthetic 
Explanation,” 188-190.   
576 For example, see Scotus, Quaestiones Super Praedicamenta Aristotelis q. 30, 35, 38, 43 and 44; Quaestiones 
Super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis V, q.4 and q.12; and Quaestiones in Primum Libros Perihermenias 
Aristotelis q. 4.   
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• Q.25:  “Whether the first division of a difference, namely, ‘a difference is what a 
species surpasses from a genera’ is appropriately (convenienter) given.”  
• Q.35:  “Whether this definition of an accident is fitting (conveniens)…”577  
Now we would be foolish to say that Scotus’s use of convenientia in his commentaries on 
Aristotle and Porphyry conveys some deep aesthetic truth about reality!  On the contrary, Scotus 
uses convenientia as a term for a proper relationship between two entities.  And one type of 
convenientia happens to be beauty.  But the fact that Scotus uses the word convenientia to refer 
to beauty does not necessarily mean that in every usage of the term Scotus has some aesthetic 
consideration in mind.  In most cases he doesn’t.       
The same concern applies to the term ‘consonance’ itself: purveyors of the aesthetic 
interpretation simply assume that Scotus’s use of the term has aesthetic undertones, and read that 
back into the passage about the Second Table.  It is true that consonans has a semantic range that 
includes a harmony (of sounds).  But I cannot find a single passage in Scotus’s writing that uses 
consonance in such a way.  Rather, Scotus mainly uses the term to signify some type of 
“agreement” between two things with absolutely no aesthetic connotations whatsoever.   
Consider some examples from Scotus’s Questions on the Metaphysics and the Ordinatio 
where Scotus uses consonans or its various cognates for a general “agreement” between two 
things, without any aesthetic undertones.  In the Questions on the Metaphysics VIII, Scotus says 
“This [conclusion] agrees (consonant) with Book VII, where [Aristotle] compares generations 
according to velocity, in chapter 4.”578  Also in Book VIII, he claims:  
If therefore it is asked why there is a per se unity from matter and form, I respond 
according to the Philosopher in the text: that because ‘one is in actuality, the other in 
potentiality, then [the question] is without difficulty.’ This is explained as follows: because 
                                                 
577 Quaestiones in Librum Porphyrii Isagoge, Opera Philosophica 1 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan 
Institute, 1999). 
578 Quaestiones Super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis VIII, q.2-3, n 49: “Hoc consonant VII, ubi comparat 
generationes secundum velocitatem, cap 4.”   
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that same thing was first in potentiality on account of its matter, and now it is in actuality 
through its form.  ‘For by the extraction of the potency in the act,’ according to the 
Commentator here, ‘it is not a growth in multitude but perfection.’  And it seems that the 
exposition of the commentary agrees (consonare) with this text.579        
In these passages, the importation of aesthetics is nowhere implied.  The term simply 
refers to an agreement between two ideas.  The same point could be made from many passages 
from the Ordinatio.  Consider two passages from the Prologue to the Ordinatio:  
To the other, that which was supposed ought to be denied, namely, that being is naturally 
known to be the first object of our intellect, and this according to the total indifference [of 
being] to the sensible and insensible, and this is what Avicenna says is naturally known.  
For he has mixed his own sect—which was the sect of Mohamed—with philosophical 
matters, and certain things he says are proven by philosophy and reason, and other things 
consonant (consona) with his own sect.580 
Concerning the second, namely the agreement (concordia) of the Scriptures, it is so 
obvious: in those things not evident from their terms, nor having principles thus evident 
from their terms, many diversely disposed people do not firmly and infallibly agree 
(consonant), unless they are inclined to assent from a cause superior to their intellect.  But 
the writers of the sacred Canon, variously disposed and existing in diverse times, agree 
(consonabant) entirely in such inevident things.  Augustine handles [the topic] this way in 
City of God, XVIII ch.42: “Our authors should have been few, lest on account of their 
multitude they become worthless, and are not so few, that their agreement (consensio) not 
be wondered at: for neither in the multitude of philosophers will one easily find agreement 
(conveniant) between all the things they thought.” And this Augustine proves there in the 
examples.581 
                                                 
579 Quaestiones Super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis VIII, q.4, n.7: “Si ergo quaeritur quare ex materia et forma 
est unum per se—responsio, secundum Philosophum in littera: quod quia ‘hoc actus, illud potentia, non adhunc 
dubitatio.’  Hoc sic exponitur: quia illud idem quod prius fuit in potentia per rationem materiae, iam est in actu per 
formam. ‘Extracto enim de potentia in actum,’ secundum Commentatorem hic ‘non largitur multitudinem, seb 
perfectionem.’ Et videtur expositio commenti consonare cum littera illa.”    See also Quaestiones Super Libros 
Metaphysicorum Aristotelis VII, q.20, n.36: “Item, quae est differentia huius opinionis subtilis, quae videtur sequi 
rationem, et primae, quae videtur grossa et est sensui consona?”  
580 Ordinatio, Prol., pars. 1, q. un., n.33: “Ad aliud negandum est illud quod assumitur, quod scilicet naturaliter 
cognoscitur ens esse primum obiectum intellectus nostri, et hoc secundum totam  indifferentiam entis ad sensibilia et 
insensibilia, et quod hoc dicit Avicenna quod sit naturaliter notum.  Miscuit enim sectam suam — quae fuit secta 
Machometi —  philosophicis, et quaedam dixit ut philosophica et ratione probata, alia ut consona sectae suae.”   
581 Ordinatio, Prol., pars. 2, un., n.102: “De secundo, scilicet Scripturarum concordia, patet sic:  in non evidentibus 
ex terminis, nec principia sic evidentia ex terminis habentibus, non consonant multi firmiter et infallibiliter, 
diversimode dispositi, nisi a causa superiori ipso intellectu inclinentur ad assensum; sed scriptores sacri Canonis, 
varie dispositi, et exsistentes in diversis temporibus, in talibus inevidentibus consonabant omnino.  Hanc viam 
pertractat Augustinus XVII De civitate cap. 42: ‘Auctores nostri pauci esse debuerunt, ne prae multitudine 
vilescerent; nec ita sunt pauci, ut eorum non sit miranda consensio:  neque enim in multitudine philosophorum facile 
quis invenerit, inter quos cuncta quae senserunt conveniant,’ et hoc Ausutinus probat ibi in exemplis.”   
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These passages show that Scotus often uses the term consonans and its various cognates 
to refer to an agreement between two things, without any importation of aesthetic notions 
whatsoever—unless, of course, we’re willing to say that Scotus finds aesthetic beauty in the 
harmony Avicenna creates by conjoining philosophical ideas with the Muslim religion.  These 
examples could be repeated indefinitely.582  In the last passaged cited, interestingly enough, 
Scotus seems to use consonans as synonymous with concordia, consensio, and convenio, all of 
which mean ‘agreement’ or ‘harmony,’ but not in any way that necessarily implies some 
aesthetic connotation.  Any hint of aesthetics remain entirely absent here.      
Furthermore, in examples where Scotus appeals to the concept harmony in an 
aesthetically relevant way, he does not use the term consonans, but harmonicus.583  If Scotus had 
any aesthetical understanding of consonans, he would presumably use the term in those cases 
where it would appropriately describe the situation.  But he doesn’t.  So in aesthetically 
appropriate settings, Scotus doesn’t use consonans, and in a plurality of different contexts where 
aesthetics plays absolutely no role, Scotus uses consonans.  The only appropriate conclusion 
from such data is that Scotus doesn’t take consonans to be an aesthetically loaded term, but mere 
agreement between two things.  So it seems that the aesthetic reading is basically a matter of 
fetishizing a particular group of words.  Yet, as I have now shown, consonans and convenientia 
                                                 
582 For example, there are plenty of other passages in the Ordinatio where consonans lacks any aesthetic undertones.  
For a sampling of passages from just the second half of Book 4 of the Ordinatio, see Ordinatio IV, d.43, q.2, n.104; 
n.141, Ordinatio IV, d.44, pars.1, q.un., n. 50; Ordinatio IV, d.45, q.1, n.17-18; Ordinatio IV, d.46, q.1, n.34; 
Ordinatio IV, d.47, q.1, n.33; Ordinatio IV, d.49, pars. 1, q.6, n.319; Ordinatio IV, d.49, pars. 2, q.un., n.463.   
583 Lectura I, d.17, pars. 1, q.un, n. 95: “Sonus harmonicus in cithara immutat auditum, delectationem causando; et si 
fiant eaedem notae, alio tamen modo ordinatae—ut si cordae percutiantur alio ordine—non causabit delectationem 
nec sonum delectabilem.  Quid est causa principalis istius immutationis? Certe sonus, et non convenientia aut 
proportio in sono, quia relation non est causa effectus; temen absolutum sub relatione potest esse causa effectus 
cuius non esset causa nisi haberet illam relationem…immutatio igitur auditus a sono est propter sonum, sed quod sit 
delectabilis, hoc non est a sono ut sonus est, sed ut harmonicus et sic ordinatus.”  See also Ordinatio I, d.17, pars. 1, 
q.1-2, n.152.  
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are not exclusively or primarily about aesthetics at all, and so their appeal as an explanation for 
God’s choosing certain ethical norms remains quite tenuous. 
Moreover, even if this view could be substantiated by the textual evidence, which I’ve 
argued it cannot, an ugly conceptual problem lurks in the background.  Given the radical notion 
of freedom Scotus wishes to ascribe to God, and the true lack of limitations he wishes to place on 
God’s absolute power (God can justly will anything that does not involve a contradiction), this 
view seems to limit God’s freedom of choice to only prescriptive options with some intrinsic 
aesthetic appeal.  On this view, God could only prescribe laws for humans that have some 
aesthetically appealing feature to them.  But doesn’t this limit God’s sovereignty and aseity in 
precisely the way Scotus wishes to avoid?  Doesn’t this limit God’s overall options as far as what 
he can choose?  
In a footnote, Cross responds to similar worries raised by Terence Irwin.584  Cross claims 
that “God has options in cases that each alternative choice can be perceived to be aesthetically 
pleasing; in other cases, he has no choice.”  Thus, so long as God has multiple aesthetically 
pleasing options, he could retain the veneer of libertarian freedom.  In cases where he doesn’t, 
God must choose the aesthetically pleasing option.  Yet this seems to limit Scotus’s God in 
precisely the way in which Scotus wishes not to limit God: namely, constraining God beyond 
mere logical possibility.585  Cross seems to realize this, but nevertheless concludes that “Scotus is 
more concerned with providing a non-empty account of the grounding of the secondary 
principles than he is with preserving radical voluntarism.”586   
                                                 
584 See Irwin, The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study, Volume I: From Socrates to the 
Reformation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 694-695.   
585 Ordinatio I, d.44, q.un., n.7 -8; Reportatio I-A, d.44, q.1, nn.7-10.   
586 Cross, “Natural Law, Moral Constructivism, and Duns Scotus’s Metaethics: The Centrality of Aesthetic 
Explanation,” 192, n.57.   
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But is he?  This is a particularly odd claim to make, considering that we have no evidence 
for taking consonans in the debated passage aesthetically, and plenty of evidence for Scotus’s 
desire to preserve his radical voluntarism: at every possible place in his discussions of divine 
freedom, Scotus constantly emphasizes the freedom of the divine will over everything else.587  In 
these texts and many others, Scotus desires to save God’s will not only from the Islamic 
necessitarianism found in Avicenna, but also from the restrictions that might be placed upon 
God’s nature by anything beyond mere logical possibility.  For example, in Reportatio I-A, d.43, 
Scotus claims that:  
And so I say that God can bring about not only those things which he has not brought 
about, but even the opposite of those things he has brought about, because it is necessary 
that each opposite is possible for God…For nothing is impossible for God, unless it 
includes a contradiction.588 
In light of this, I pose the following question to the aesthetic solution to the Consonance 
Problem: can God choose a non-aesthetically pleasing option?  If yes, then it’s hard to see how 
adding aesthetics does anything to supply content to the Second Table Precepts, since nothing 
determines or inclines God to act in such a manner (if it did, it would compromise God’s 
freedom).  But if God cannot choose a non-aesthetically appealing option, as Cross surmises, 
then aesthetic reasons end up collapsing into logical reasons, since logical reasons are the only 
restrictions Scotus wishes to place on the divine will.  In other words, if God cannot bring about 
a non-aesthetically pleasing option, doing so would have to involve a contradiction—per 
Scotus’s own words concerning divine power and what God can do.  But Scotus explicitly claims 
                                                 
587 See Ordinatio I, d.44, q.un., nn7-8; Ordinatio IV, d.46, q.1, n.25;  Reportatio I-A, d.39-40, q.1-3, a.3, nn.38-44; 
Reportatio 1-A, d.44, q.1, nn.7-10; Also see Ordinatio I, d.39, q.1-5, n.21 [Appendix A of Vatican Edition vol. VI, 
page 425-426].  For an explanation of why this question appears in the appendix of the Ordinatio, see Steven 
Dumont, “The Origin of Scotus’s Theory of Synchronic Contingency,” The Modern Schoolman 72 (1995): 150, n.7.      
588 Reportatio I-A, d.43, q.2, n.32: “Et sic dico quod potest facere non tantum alia quae non fecit, immo opposita 
eorum quae fecit, quia oportet quod utrumque oppositorum sit Deo possibile…Nihil enim quod non includit 
contradictoria est Deo impossibile.”  
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that the Second Table precepts are not logically necessary in the way the First Table precepts are, 
and their denials do not result in contradictions.   
Second, as I’ve shown, Scotus explicitly argues that the divine will isn’t determined to 
anything but his own goodness—and I take it this would apply this to aesthetic considerations 
too.  But if Cross is correct, then Scotus’s God would be bound to something beyond his own 
goodness, namely, he would be required to prescribe laws that are aesthetically pleasing.  Yet 
this would contradict what Scotus specifically says.  So God cannot be bound to choosing some 
aesthetically pleasing option.     
The only way out of this conclusion would be to place beauty under the conception of 
infinite goodness, such that, in making judgements about beauty, God would not need to appeal 
to something beyond or independent his goodness: beauty would have to be an absolute quality, 
convertible with God’s infinite being and goodness.  In other words, beauty would have to be 
transcendental.  But as I have shown in chapter 4, Scotus conceives beauty as a non-absolute 
quality that is not convertible with being, and thus not convertible with goodness—infinite or 
otherwise.  And since God is only bound to his own infinite goodness, his will cannot be 
determined by aesthetics considerations.   
Oleg Bychkov has also recently argued for an aesthetic conception of Second Table 
Precepts.  After a tour de force in contemporary neurobiology and aesthetics, Bychkov appeals to 
various passages in Scotus that purport to show that God has aesthetic tastes—just like 
humans.589  The passages cited all refer to either moral goodness or the virtue of charity, and so 
my comments to Cross would equally apply here: it is not useful to appeal to these topics in 
                                                 
589 Oleg Bychkov, “‘In Harmony with Reason’: John Duns Scotus’s Theo-aesth/ethics,” Open Theology 1 (2014): 
53-54.  Cf. Lectura I, d.17, pars. 1, q. un, n.57; Ordinatio 1, d.17, n.62.   
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order to show that God operates the same way with respect to Second Table precepts, because 
goodness and virtue are distinct concepts from each other and distinct from rightness as 
prescribed by the divine will.  And furthermore, there is no textual evidence to treat God’s 
establishment of these moral norms on the basis of aesthetic considerations,590 and plenty of 
evidence that doing so would contradict Scotus’s notion of divine freedom.  Bychkov’s 
conclusion is rather telling, as it all but admits that no textual evidence exists to support his view 
that the Second Table precepts are governed by aesthetic considerations:    
Whatever the exact scenario may be, there is clear textual evidence that according to 
Scotus, God as aesthetic taste, just like us.  And if he has aesthetic taste in perceiving moral 
beauty, there is a good chance that his legislative activity in the area of moral law will be 
similarly based, in order that his laws might allow for beautiful harmonious patterns in the 
soul to play out.591 
However, simply because God has aesthetic tastes in perceiving moral beauty, there is no reason 
to suspect that such perceptions of beauty govern or regulate the moral norms God wishes to 
establish.  There may be a chance, as Bychov says, but it’s an unlikely one.  And given the 
further restrictions this would place on God’s creative activity, the aesthetic solution to the 
Consonance Problem remains highly improbable.   
Moreover, I’m not even sure if Scotus has a conception of “moral beauty,” as most of the 
passages where Scotus connects beauty with goodness, he’s not necessarily claiming that moral 
goodness is beautiful (though it may be), but rather stating that what makes something beautiful 
and what makes something morally good are similar in the sense that they are both non-absolute 
qualities that require a harmony of a number of external conditions for their obtainment.592  So in 
                                                 
590 This is especially true since ‘consonance’ has a broader usage in Scotus than mere aesthetics, as I have shown in 
above.    
591 Bychkov, “In Harmony with Reason,” 54.  Emphasis mine.   
592 See Ordinatio I, d. 17, p.1, q.2, n.62 and Ordinatio II, d.40, Q.un, n.7. 
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light of the dearth of evidence that consonance should be interpreted aesthetically, and in light of 
the abundance of passages defending Scotus’s radical view of divine freedom, the aesthetic 
solution to the Consonance Problem seems rather suspect.   
Given that attempts to provide some positive content for the notion of consonance 
founder on explicit statements to the contrary and a lack of explicit statements in support (plus 
various other confusions and conceptual problems), the only option that remains is that there’s 
no positive content beyond being serviceable to express love of God.  In other words, 
consonance should be reduced to conformity with the First Table.593  Scotus says that the 
principles in the Second Table are highly consonant with certain necessary moral truths.  But 
these Second Table, run-of-the-mill moral principles can be dispensed with, and God can rightly 
will the opposite of what he has in fact willed about them.  Furthermore, notice that the main 
moral truth Scotus has in mind that these contingent principles are consonant with is that God 
must be loved.   
So it seems as though a whole host of commands and prohibitions could in theory be 
compatible—indeed, consonant—with this principle, so long as the agent acts in accord with the 
primary moral principle of loving God via the contingently ordained commands.  If God says 
“don’t steal,” then I don’t steal as an expression of my love for God.  And when God told the 
Israelites to plunder the Egyptians, their obedience in stealing the Egyptians property 
demonstrated or expressed their commitment to loving God.  Thus the commandments in the 
Second Table of the Decalogue are simply contingent means to reaching God as our end or goal.  
                                                 
593 Thomas Williams has endorsed something like this view in various places.  See “How Scotus Separates Morality 
from Happiness,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1995), 425-445; “Reason, Morality, and 
Voluntarism in Duns Scotus: A Pseudo-Problem Dissolved,” The Modern Schoolman 74 (1997), 73-94; “The 
Libertarian Foundations of Scotus’s Moral Philosophy,” The Thomist 62 (1998), 193-215; and “A Most Methodical 
Lover?  On Scotus’s Arbitrary Creator.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (2000), 169-202.        
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So their consonance with the first principle refers, not to something in their nature as precepts—
like some intrinsic status they have—but rather to the fact that God desires that we obey him 
through such commandments—commandments which he could have made entirely different 
than he did.  The fact that nothing in their natures as precepts make them consonant with the 
principle of loving God should be obvious from the fact that (1) God can make the same act 
under the same set of circumstances licit or illicit, (2) God’s justice requires only that he satisfy 
his own goodness, and besides that, could will any contingent thing justly, and (3) there is no 
necessary deduction from human nature to moral obligations we have toward one another 
(Second Table Precepts).   
So I propose that ‘consonance’ indicates the suitability of a commanded action to serve as 
a means by which one can express love for God; that suitability derives entirely from God’s 
commanding it, and not from anything in the nature of the commanded act that requires or 
inclines God to command it.  At least one passage from Scotus confirms this reading—Ordinatio 
IV, d.33—where Scotus claims that God makes dispensations from the (previously established 
contingent) moral order when the opposite of some precept is better suited in a particular setting 
to fulfill human beings’ obligations to the First Table; in other words, when the opposite of some 
precept is more in harmony with the primary law of nature, i.e., loving God.594  So sometimes the 
current precept fits better with loving God, and at other times it does not.  Hence “consonance” 
refers to the precept’s connection to loving God, not something grounded in human nature or 
some standard of value independent of God’s will.   
However, this view is not without difficulty, as this interpretation seems to make 
consonance a vacuous term.  I admit that it makes consonance a somewhat empty concept.  But I 
                                                 
594 Ordinatio IV, d.33, n.19.   
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think it best explains what Scotus says about God’s justice and his ability to make dispensations.  
Furthermore, Scotus is a transitional figure trying to break with tradition at a number of points.  
And it seems at times, he is less clear of the implications of his view than he seems to admit, or 
his admissions of a radical voluntarism are tapered with discretion and the veneer of traditional 
natural law language.    
Thus, the aesthetic interpretation and the consonance reductionist both agree that (a) God is 
not bound morally to choose certain contingent moral precepts, and (b) that whatever God does 
in fact choose in that regard will be just.  We differ, however, on how to interpret Scotus’s 
consonance claims, and what restrictions—if any—are further placed on God’s will by aesthetic 
considerations.  While the aesthetic interpretation suggests that God has non-moral reasons for 
prescribing specific second table precepts, the reductionist view doesn’t have to claim that God 
doesn’t have reasons for choosing some precept.  Maybe he does.  But the only possible reason 
would be that in some deep and profound (inexplicable?) way, certain precepts usually are better 
for our becoming co-lovers of God.  When they are not better in a particular situation, God 
changes them.  But wouldn’t this mean that God has constraints?  Yes, but only to his own 
goodness and that creatures love him.  On the aesthetic view, the reasons are independent of God 
and thus question his sovereignty, his aseity, and his ability to act uninhibited by anything but his 
own nature.  On the reductionist view, God’s reasons are inextricably tied to his absolute power, 
his own goodness, and the mysterious nature of libertarian freedom.  For as Scotus says,  
And if you ask why the divine will is more determined to one pair of contradictories than to 
another, I respond: “the untutored seek causes and demonstration of everything,” according 
to the Philosopher in Metaphysics IV, “for the principle of demonstration is not 
demonstrable”… and thus there is no cause why the will willed, except because the will is a 
will, just as there is no cause why heat heats, except that heat heats, because there is no 
237 
 
prior cause.595 
Whatever we make of the Consonance Problem and God’s reason (or lack thereof) for 
choosing some precepts over others, I think it is safe to conclude the following few points: first, 
that “God should be loved” is a necessary moral truth that not even God can change.  Second, 
God has the absolute powder to establish Second Table precepts in any fashion he desires (even 
if we can debate why he desires some over others), and when he does so, those laws are just, 
because his will is the standard for justice itself.  
Divine Willing or Commanding?  
Does Scotus think that contingent moral laws depend upon divine commanding or divine 
willing for their moral status?  While is it true that Scotus often speaks in terms of God’s 
commands expressing the content of the Second Table precepts,596 numerous passages explicitly 
state that the divine will determines which contingent moral rules are right and wrong.597  For 
example, Scotus says that “Just as [God] can act otherwise, so also can he establish a different 
law; and if that law were established by God, it would be correct, because no law is correct 
except insofar as it established by the divine will’s acceptance.”598   
Thus on Scotus’s account, the divine will decides which contingent moral precepts are 
obligatory, prohibited, and permissive.  However, one main method of informing his creatures as 
                                                 
595 Ordinatio I, d.8, pars.2, q.un., n.299. “Et si quare ergo voluntas divina magis determinabitur ad unum 
contradictoriorum quam ad alterum, respondeo: ‘indisciplinata quaerere omnium causas et demonstrationem’ 
(secundum Philosophorum IV Metaphysicae), ‘principii enim demonstrationis non est demonstration’… ‘quare 
voluntas voluit’ nulla est causa nisi quia voluntas est voluntas, sicuit huius ‘quare calor est calefactivus’ nulla est 
causa nisi quia calor est calor, quia nulla est prior causa.” 
596 Most notably in Ordinatio III, d.37, q.un., n.18.     
597 Ordinatio III, d.37, q.un, n.15; Ordinatio IV, d.46, q.1, nn.10, 25, 29, 32.   
598 Ordinatio I, d.44, q.un., n.8.  Translated by Thomas Williams, John Duns Scotus: Ethical Writings (Forthcoming, 
Oxford University Press).   Emphasis mine.  
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to the content of such law stems from God’s commands, primarily as recorded in the 
Decalogue,599 and secondarily through direct divine interaction with creatures.600  Whether such 
precepts can be known via other means—such as reason—will be postponed until the next 
chapter.  So thus far, Scotus restricts what moral value depends upon God to only contingent 
moral precepts, which depend upon the divine will for their moral status. 
        
What Type of Dependence?  
What type of dependence does Scotus hold?  In other words, in what way do 
deontological propositions depend upon the divine will?  First, it’s essential to point out that 
since necessary deontological propositions have their truth value independently of the divine 
will, they cannot depend upon any type of divine act—willing or otherwise.  It seems as though 
Scotus wishes to ground these necessary moral truths—i.e., God must be loved—in the divine 
nature itself, as the infinite good and ultimate end of all things.  For example, consider the 
following passage: 
I say that ‘to love God above everything else’ is an act of conformity to natural right reason, 
which dictates that what is best ought to be loved most, and thus is an act that is right in and 
of itself; indeed, its rectitude is self-evident, as a first practical principle of action.  For, 
something must be loved most, and that is nothing but the highest Good itself, just as 
nothing but the highest Truth ought to be held as true by the intellect. And this argument is 
confirmed because moral precepts belong to the law of nature, and thus “You ought to love 
the Lord your God,” belongs to the law of nature, and so this act’s rightness is known.601   
                                                 
599 See Ordinatio III, d.37, q.un., nn. 19-26.  
600 See Ordinatio III, d.37, q.un., nn.4, 13.   
601 Ordinatio III, d.27, q.un., n. 14: “De Primo dico quod ‘diligere Deum super omnia’ est actus conformis rectae 
rationi naturalis, quae dictat optimum esse summe diligendum, et per consequens est actus de se rectus; immo 
rectitudo eius est per se nota (sicut rectitudo primi principii in operabilibus): aliquid enim summe diligendum est, et 
nihil aliud a summo Bono, sicut non aliud a summo Vero est maxime tenendum tamquam verum apud intellectum.  
Confirmatur etiam istud, quia praecepta moralia sunt lege naturae, et per consequens istud Diliges Dominum Deum 
tuum, etc. est de lege naturae, et ita notum est hunc actum esse rectum.” 
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Elsewhere, Scotus makes a further argument for this position: he argues that the grounds for 
loving something are the thing’s goodness and unity.  Since God has perfect and infinite 
goodness and unity, he ought to be loved most.602  And this is precisely why God has no control 
over necessary moral truths of this type: God has an infinite mode of being.  Goodness and unity 
are really identical and only formally distinct from being, and thus God has an infinite degree of 
unity and goodness as well.  Since this is necessarily the way God is—one’s mode of being 
cannot be changed, because it’s the way in which something has existence—anything else that 
exists and is able to rationally recognize God’s infinite being, goodness, and unity, will 
immediately recognize that one ought to love God most.603  Not even God could change that, 
since he, by nature, is the most infinitely valuable and infinitely desirable being.  
Furthermore, in the Prologue to his Lectura, Scotus argues that one should love God most 
is a necessary truth, and can be demonstrated from an Anselmian perfect being theology.  “I 
should love God above all,” he claims, can be demonstrated from “God is that which nothing 
greater can be thought.”  Because of such greatness, God is supremely lovable, and therefore, “I 
ought to love him most.”604  For Scotus, God’s place as the greatest conceivable being—the 
infinite being, the infinite good—grounds the obligation to love and obey him.   
                                                 
602 Ordinatio III, d.29, q.un., n.6: “Hoc etiam confirmatur, quia pensatis rationibus bonitatis et unitatis, quae sunt 
rationes diligibilis, post Bonum Infinitum—in quo est perfectissima ratio bonitas—occurrit in se ipso alia ratio 
maxima, scilicet unitas, quae est perfecta identitas: quilibet enim naturaliter inclinatur ad dilectionem sui post 
Bonum Infinitum; inclinatio naturalis est semper recta.”  See also Ordinatio III, d.27, q.un., n.30.   
603 Scotus argues that natural reason reveals that the only supremely lovable object is the Infinite Good.  And that 
only the infinite good is worthy of supreme love.  See Ordinatio III, d.27, q.un, n. 47: “Ratio naturalis ostendit 
creaturae intellectuali aliquid esse summe diligendum, quia in omnibus obiectis et actibus (et hoc essentialiter 
ordinatis) est aliquid supremum, et ita aliqua dilectio suprema, et ita obiectum etiam est summe diligible; ratio autem 
naturalis recta non ostendit aliquid sicut summe diligibile, aliud a Bono infinito, quia si sic, ergo caritas inclinaret ad 
oppositum eius quod dictat recta ratio, et ita non esset virtus; ergo dictat solum Bonum infinitum esse summe 
diligendum.”   See also Ordinatio III, d.27., n.30, where Scotus argues that no being can be ultimately satisfied 
except in that thing in which being is found most perfectly, namely, God.  
604 Lectura, prol., pars. 4, q.1-2, n.172: “Similiter, me diligere Deum est contingens, et tamen de hoc potest esse 
veritas necessaria, ut quod debeam Deum diligere super omnia.  Et hoc demonstrative potest concludi sic: ‘Deus est 
quo maius cogitari non potest;’ igitur, est summe diligibilis; igitur summe debeo eum diligere.” 
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So our obligations to the first table of the Decalogue—those necessary moral truths (i.e., 
deontological propositions with a necessary truth value)—have an ontological dependence on 
God’s infinite goodness.  Given God’s nature as God, we have a permanent and morally binding 
obligation to love and seek him—an obligation so strong, that not even God could change it.  In 
fact, even God himself is bound to love himself and seek his own good above all else.605  This 
obligation isn’t due to God’s power, as one who enforces obligations with punishments and 
rewards, whereby “might makes right,”606 but because of God’s infinite value, as the greatest 
conceivable being and our highest good.   
Nevertheless, since Scotus argues that contingent deontological propositions depend upon 
the divine will for their truth value/obligatory status, we can further inquire into the way they 
depend upon the divine will.  Given Scotus’s insistence that the divine will has complete control 
over the truth values of contingent moral propositions, and his insistence that this control is a 
function of God’s sovereign and absolute will, it seems best to interpret Scotus’s claims that the 
Second Table of the Decalogue depends upon God in terms of a causal dependence.607  In other 
                                                 
605 Ordinatio I. d.2, pars. 1, q.1-2, n.95; Ordinatio IV, d.46, q.1, nn.14-16; 48; De Primo Principio IV, 5.   
606 Christine M. Korsgaard argues that this “voluntaristic” view of obligation was held by the likes of both Hobbes 
and Pufendorf.  See Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 21-27. 
In his famous A History of Philosophy, Frederick Copleston provides a similar voluntarist account of obligation for 
Scotus.  On Copleston rendering of Scotus, actions are not good because God wills them, but because of God’s 
nature.   Copleston, however, believes that there is another sense in which the divine will plays an important role.  
“That it is not the content of the moral law which is due to the divine will, but the obligation of the moral law, its 
morally binding force.”  On Copleston’s understanding of Scotus, the moral law “acquires obligatory force only 
through the free choice of the divine will.”  In support of this, Copleston musters a single passage from Scotus that 
states, “To command pertains only to the appetite or will.”  No doubt Scotus thinks to command pertains only to the 
divine will, and that is precisely the problem with Copleston’s interpretation.  Scotus believes our obligation to obey 
the commands of God is necessary and therefore prevolitional.  Since commands only pertain to what can be willed, 
and our obligation to obey and love God is necessary prior to any action on the part of the divine will, therefore, 
contra Copleston, the source of obligation cannot be grounded in the commands of God.  See Copleston, A History 
of Philosophy Volume 2: Mediaeval Philosophy Part II: Albert the Great to Duns Scotus (Garden City: Image 
Books, 1962), 270.  
607 Ordinatio I, d.44, q.un., n.8.  Scotus claims that no law is right or correct unless it is established as such by the 
divine will itself. 
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words, God’s will causes of the content and truth value of contingent deontological propositions.  
Thus we get something like the following three principles for obligation, prohibition, and 
permissibility, respectively, in regard to any contingent moral truth, which I have adapted and 
augmented from Philip Quinn’s causal account:  
• Obligation: For every proposition which is such that it is logically possible that 
God wills that p, and it is logically contingent that p, a sufficient causal condition 
that it is obligatory that p is that God wills that p, and a necessary causal condition 
that is it obligatory that p is that God wills that p.   
 
• Prohibition: For every proposition which is such that it is logically possible that 
God wills that p, and it is logically contingent that p, a sufficient causal condition 
that it is forbidden that p is that God wills that not-p, and a necessary causal 
condition that it is forbidden that p is that God wills that not-p.  
 
• Permission (licit): For every proposition which is such that it is logically possible 
that God wills that p, and it is logically contingent that p, a sufficient causal 
condition that it is permitted that p is that it is not the case that God wills not-p, 
and a necessary causal condition that it is permitted that p is that it is not the case 
that God wills that not-p.608   
Consider for example the prohibition against stealing.  According to Scotus, since 
stealing does not belong to natural law in the strict sense, it is a logically contingent moral 
proposition, and thus it is possible that God could will stealing.  In fact, Scotus thinks that at 
certain times in history, God has willed just that!609  As it happens, God has in fact willed that 
stealing is wrong, making it prohibited.  But it is entirely possible that God could will stealing, 
thereby making stealing obligatory.  The point: any contingent moral proposition causally 
depends upon the divine will for moral status as obligatory, prohibited, or permissible.  No 
intrinsic feature in the nature of these propositions or the actions they describe necessitates God 
                                                 
608 Philip Quinn, “Divine Command Ethics: A Causal Theory,” 312.  Quinn formulates the causal conditions in 
terms of God’s commands, but as I have argued above, Scotus places their dependency upon the divine will—hence 
the modification. But overall, I think Quinn’s view best captures Scotus account of obligation.   
609 Ordinatio III, d.37, q. un., nn. 2-4; 40.  
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to imbue them with their current moral status; rather, God’s will is the sole cause of such.  Thus 
when we act in accordance with the obligations as established by God’s will, we act rightly; 
when we act contrary to the moral requirements set forth by the divine will, we act illicitly.  In 
other words, Scotus adopts a constructivist viewpoint toward these contingent moral duties—
God may have reasons for choosing them, but they are not moral ones.610 As Hare puts it,  
One objection often raised to divine command theories of ethics is that they make ethical 
rightness arbitrary.  After all, if what is right is simply what God commands, and God is not 
bound by any antecedent standards, could not God command just anything, and it would be 
right?  In Scotus, the second table of the law is, in a sense, arbitrary.  It is within God’s 
discretion (in Latin, arbitrum).  But this is not arbitrary in the modern pejorative sense 
implying that a decision is made without rational grounds that should be present.  A 
decision to grade papers by the alphabetical order of the students’ names is arbitrary, 
because the grading should be done on the papers’ merits.  But God does have a reason for 
prescribing a set of laws to human beings, namely that these laws are a good route for 
humans to get to their final end to become co-lovers with God.  What Scotus is denying is 
that the route that God prescribes is the only possible route, and so is mandatory for God to 
prescribe.611 
To aid in clarifying Scotus’s position on these matters, let’s consider Scotus’s 
understanding of moral dependence in terms of an analogy: picture a room with a vast number of 
light switches with three settings: on (up), off (down), and neutral (middle).  Consider on the top 
of each light switch some moral proposition written (e.g., honor your parents), and on the bottom 
the prohibition against that proposition (e.g., do not honor your parents).  Furthermore, let’s 
stipulate that every light switch representing contingent moral propositions is originally set in the 
neutral position.  On Scotus’s view, God causes the moral truth value of each proposition by 
metaphorically turning the switch to on (morally right/obligatory), off (morally 
wrong/prohibited/illicit), or leaving the switch in the middle (permissible/licit).  For contingent 
                                                 
610 See Richard Cross, “Natural Law, Moral Constructivism, and Duns Scotus’s Metaethics: The Centrality of 
Aesthetic Explanation,” 188-191.   
611  John E. Hare, God and Morality: A Philosophical History (Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2009), 99.   
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moral propositions, these are chosen by the divine will; for necessary moral truths, only one 
position of ‘on’ or ‘off’ exists, such that God cannot change the switch.  Furthermore, whatever 
way in which the lights are ordered, God has established it as the contingent means of 
metaphorically seeing him—but he could have chosen a different way.  What’s important is not 
necessarily the lighting of the room per se, but that fact that God has chosen that specific 
arrangement of the light to illuminate our path to him as the ultimate end.  
So, that God should be sought is a moral necessity, but the means to this end solely 
depends upon God’s will.612  This, it seems, motivates the common assumption that Scotus held 
to a divine command theory of ethics.  It is true, after all, that Scotus believes the moral value of 
most human actions are grounded in the will of God.  But the region shared with unrestricted 
versions of (DC) diverges at a central point, specifically, the intrinsic goodness of being lovers of 
God.  This is done, not because it is command by God, but for its own sake—because it is 
intrinsically good.          
Given all of this, it follows that Scotus cannot accept (4) in its present form.  Recall that 
(4) claims actions have moral value intrinsically.  However, Scotus believes that many actions 
(Second Table precepts) do not have their moral value intrinsically, but are grounded in divine 
volition.  Nevertheless, unlike a U-DC, Scotus rejects (5) and thus accepts a reconstituted version 
of (4): 
(4a)     Right actions that are necessarily right have their moral value intrinsically.   
 
Included in (4a) is our obligation to obey and love God, as well as making him our ultimate end, 
resulting in (5) being false.  But a second valuative principle is needed to account for actions 
                                                 
612 See John E. Hare, God’s Call: Moral Realism, God’s Commands, and Human Autonomy (Grand Rapids: W.B. 
Eerdmans, 2001), 66-75, and “Scotus on Morality and Nature,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 9 (2000): 15-38.   
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excluded by (4a):  
(4b)     Any right action that is not necessarily right has no intrinsic moral value.     
Consequently, (4b) remains true only for actions excluded by (4a): namely, contingent moral 
actions (Second Table prescriptions) which have their moral value only in relation to the divine 
will.  So, (5) must be reformulated in Scotistic terms: 
(5a)     A necessary condition for the rightness of any contingent moral truth is that God 
wills it. 
 
Since the majority of moral truths are contingent upon God’s creative will, nearly all moral 
actions will be right only by divine prerogative.  On Scotus’s account, God has the freedom to 
either create or refrain from creating.  Once God creates, necessarily, his creatures are obligated 
to love and obey him as their highest good—not even God can change it.613  However, the path 
God chooses for his creatures, and what he commands them to do, depend entirely upon God.  
Once it is commanded, humanity is obliged to obey the command out of a necessary moral duty 
to love God.614  The Second Table of the Decalogue wholly depends upon the divine will, and 
thus God could have commanded differently than he did—and that would have been right.615 
Scotus’s claim that divine willing is unnecessary for the intrinsic value of some actions, 
along with his denial that goodness depends upon any divine action, preclude his theory from 
properly being classified as a version of U-DC.  But for the very same reason, Scotus upholds the 
fundamental impetus for a U-DC, specifically, the problem of divine aseity and the intrinsic 
value of certain actions.  In distinguishing (4a) from (4b), Scotus’s version upholds the original 
                                                 
613 Scotus, Ordinatio III, d.37. , q.un, nn. 3, 16-17.   
614 See Thomas Williams, “The Libertarian Foundations of Scotus’s Moral Philosophy,” The Thomist 62 (1998): 
193-215, and “A Most Methodical Lover?  On Scotus’s Arbitrary Creator,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 
(2000): 169-202.        
615 Scotus thinks God has done this in our own history.  See Ordinatio III, d.37, q.un., n.13. 
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incentive for a U-DC, the argument from God’s aseity.  Recall that a U-DC wishes to uphold (3) 
but is concerned that (4) is at odds with it.  Distinguishing necessary moral truths from 
contingent moral truths, of which only the former has intrinsic value, Scotus facilitates a novel 
solution to the problem.  In separating (4a) from (4b), Scotus can agree with a U-DC that any 
intrinsic moral truth distinct from God would in fact compromise his aseity—hence, (4b).  But, 
in contrast to a U-DC, Scotus can legitimately claim (4a): that necessarily right actions have their 
moral value intrinsically.  This is accomplished by stressing that (4a) is not distinct from God, 
but grounded in God’s nature as the infinite good and therefore does not violate (3).  For Scotus, 
the only necessary good with intrinsic moral value is that humans love and obey God as the 
ultimate end.  Why? Because God has intrinsic infinite goodness.  Consequently, the duty to 
obey the commands of God is grounded in God’s supreme goodness, as a perfect being. 
Conclusion 
It is here—on God’s relationship to moral norms—that Scotus is a transitional figure.  
His views are the ethical halfway-house between the natural law eudaimonism of his 
predecessor, Thomas Aquinas, and the unrestricted divine command theory of his successor, 
William of Ockham.616  Many interpreters of Scotus, however, have not been clear as to what 
aspect(s) of the moral realm depend(s) upon God, nor have they been clear as to the way in 
which it depends upon God.  These blunders, along with a failure to carefully see that the Subtle 
Doctor subtly distinguishes moral goodness from moral rightness, have led to a panoply of 
misleading interpretations of Scotus’s ethics, on both sides of the spectrum: both from those 
                                                 
616 For this interpretation of Ockham, See Thomas M. Osborne, “Ockham as a Divine-Command Theorist,” 
Religious Studies 41 (2005): 1-22; and Servais Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, tr. by Mary Thomas 
Noble (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 240-253. 
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wishing to interpret Scotus as an ardent defender of divine command ethics, and also from those 
wishing to make Scotus into some quasi-natural law theorist, closer to Aquinas and mainstream 
Catholic tradition.617 
The truth, it seems to me, lies somewhere in the middle: Scotus restricts the divine 
control of the moral realm to contingent deontological propositions, which depend upon the 
divine will in the sense of being caused by God to have their particular moral status.  That is to 
say, he holds a restricted-causal-will-theory.  Furthermore, God could change which of these 
contingent moral norms are obligatory, prohibited, or permissible without changing the nature of 
the act itself, and without altering human nature.  He could do so simply by divine fiat.  In the 
next chapter we’ll see how Scotus considers the relationship between goodness and rightness—
and only then will we be in the proper place to consider the whole of Scotus’s metaethics and its 
relationship (or lack thereof) to normative ethical theorizing, and furthermore, enable an answer 
to the following question: what kind of voluntarist is Scotus? 
                                                 
617 Parthenius Minges takes this approach to the extreme, when he argues that there is only a verbal difference 
between Scotus and Aquinas on natural law.  See Minges, Der Gottesbegriff des Duns Scotus: auf seinen Angeblich 
Exzessiven indeterminismus (Wien: Verlag von Mayer & Co., 1907), 101-119.   
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CHAPTER NINE:  
THE SEPARATION OF GOODNESS FROM RIGHTNESS 
 
This final chapter intends to accomplish two things.  First, I argue that Scotus separates 
goodness from rightness.  Second, I deal with a potential puzzle in Scotus’s account, namely, 
that moral goodness seems accessible to right reason and is not directly tied to God’s causal 
control, whereas the rightness of an act seems to depend upon God’s will, and doesn’t seem, at 
least initially, to be accessible to natural reason.  Furthermore, the acting agent’s nature seems to 
play a role in the goodness of an act but not in the act’s rightness.     
The Separation of Goodness from Rightness 
As we have already begun to see, Scotus distinguishes the rightness of an act from the 
goodness of an act.  The moral rightness of an act depends upon whether the act conforms to (1) 
a necessary moral truth or (2) one of God’s contingent precepts that God wills as one of the 
many possible means to reaching him.  In either case, an act’s rightness results from its 
conformity to one of these.  In contrast, the moral goodness of an act concerns the harmony of all 
factors pertaining to the act, which would include elements involved in (1) and (2).  Given this, 
goodness is a broader notion than rightness, such that we could conceive of acts on this model 
which are right but lack the appropriate moral goodness.  I have already made some broad 
arguments for this position in chapters 2-6, and chapter 8, respectively.  In what follows, I argue 
for this distinction in three further ways: from the relationship of goodness and rightness to the 
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divine will, from the existence of inordinate circumstances, and from the nature of Scotus’s 
autonomy clause.   
First, we can see this distinction from an examination of the divine will’s role in 
goodness and rightness, respectively.  As we saw in Scotus’s “conformity of wills” thought 
experiment in chapter 6 (Ordinatio I, d.48), conformity to the divine will is not sufficient for an 
act’s moral goodness.  Furthermore, Scotus provides many explicit passages setting out the 
various conditions for an act’s moral goodness, and none of them contain anything about God’s 
will as the determining factor.618  For example,  
It can be said that just as beauty is not some absolute quality in a corporeal body, but is the 
aggregation of all things appropriate to such a body (such as magnitude, shape, and color), 
and the aggregation of all its aspects (which are all fitting of that body and to each other), 
so also the moral goodness of an act is a certain décor of the act, including the aggregation 
of proper proportion to all things to which it should be proportioned (such as the potency, 
the object, the end, the time, the location and the manner), and this specifically as what is 
dictated by right reason ought to pertain to the act.619 
Thus in his explicit statements about what makes an act morally good, Scotus provides tons of 
detailed information about the role of various factors, but never mentions the divine will.620   
                                                 
618 See Quodlibet 18, a.1; Ordinatio II, d.7, nn. 28-39; Ordinatio II, d.40, q.un., nn.7-11.   
619 Ordinatio I, d. 17, p.1, q.2, n.62: “dici potest quod sicut pulchritudo non est aliqua qualitas absoluta in corpore 
pulchro, sed est aggregatio omnium convenientium tali corpori (puta magnitudinis, figurae, et coloris), et aggregatio 
etiam omnium respectuum (qui sunt istorum ad corpus et ad se invicem), ita bonitas moralis actus est quasi quidam 
decor illius actus, includens aggregationem debitae proportionis ad omnia ad quae habet proportionari (puta ad 
potentiam, ad obiectum, ad finem, ad tempus, ad locum et ad modum), et hoc specialiter ut ista dicantur a ratione 
recta debere convenire actui…”   
620 One might object that meritorious goodness requires divine acceptation and thus does in fact depend upon a 
divine act for its goodness.  This is true.  However, Scotus clearly argues that divine acceptation is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for an act’s meritoriousness, for at least two reasons.  One, order for an act to be meritorious, 
Scotus claims that the act must also be generically and morally good—the kind of act must be appropriate to the 
agent, her nature, her causal powers, and be performed with an appropriate object in mind, for one or many good 
ends, in the right manner, time, and place (Quodlibet 18, a.1; Ordinatio I, d.48, n.5; Ordinatio II, d. 40, q.un.).  And 
since these factors do not depend upon a divine act, a divine act alone is not sufficient for an act’s meritoriousness.  
Two, according to Scotus, in the present dispensation, God ordained that divine acceptation only occurs when an act 
was performed from the incurrence of the co-causes of a free will and the virtue of charity (Lectura I, d.17, Pars.1, 
q.un, nn.102-103).  Since these are independently necessary conditions for an act’s meritoriousness (at least in the 
present dispensation), divine acceptation isn’t sufficient for such acts.  Thus, while a meritorious act’s goodness 
does require some involvement from God, any meritorious act’s goodness isn’t the sole result of divine acceptation.  
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   However, as we saw in chapter 8, Scotus claims that the divine will determines the truth 
value of contingent deontological propositions.  God’s will, he argues, suffices to provide some 
deontological proposition its truth value, and thus, sufficient to make some corresponding act 
licit or illicit.621  Consequently, the goodness of an act does not directly depend upon the divine 
will, but the rightness of an act does directly depend upon its conformity to the divine will.  Thus 
Scotus separates goodness from rightness.  
Second, the existence of inordinate circumstances (or lack of appropriate circumstances) 
in some acts shows this distinction.  Suppose God commands that some act be carried out, 
making the performance of the act right.  In addition, suppose the agent does carry it out, but 
does so in a disordered manner: through the wrong means, or at the wrong time, or with the 
wrong intent in carrying out the action.  In such a case, it is possible for the act to still be morally 
right without obtaining perfect moral goodness.  Thus rightness and goodness are distinct notions 
for Scotus.   
For example, suppose that I obeyed God’s command to help the poor, but merely for 
vainglory: suppose I provide a beggar a sufficient amount of money, but I do so, neither out of 
love for God, nor out of pity for my fellow human—I give alms to the poor because I want 
people to see me as generous.  In this case, I’ve performed an act that God prescribed as 
obligatory, but I’ve done so for a disordered end.  It seems that in such cases, I’ve performed a 
morally right act, since God commanded it, but morally dubious one, since a disordered end 
suffices to make the act morally bad.  In other words, my right action can be evaluated as 
                                                 
And even so, it is still the case the moral goodness does not seem to depend upon some divine act for its moral 
value.  Hence, an act’s moral goodness does not depend directly upon the divine will for its moral worth. 
621 Ordinatio III, d.37, q.un., n.13; Ordinatio I, d.44, q.un., n.8.   
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morally bad, even though I ought to have carried out the act (without the disordered end).   
Now one might argue that since the act was morally (contrarily) bad given its disordered 
end, it can’t be right.  And maybe so, as Scotus doesn’t address this possibility, as far as I can 
tell.  But Scotus thinks that an act need not have circumstances incompatible with the act’s 
goodness in order to fail at being good; it merely needs to lack some of these conditions.  As we 
saw in chapter 7, privative badness occurs when an act lacks some circumstance needed for 
moral goodness, but whose circumstances are not contrary with its goodness.  For example, 
suppose I give alms for neither a good nor bad end.  In this case, my act would lack the requisite 
requirements for moral goodness and so would be generically good and privatively bad.  But 
then, the act performed was the right act, but lacked moral goodness.  Thus goodness and 
rightness are distinct.   
Or consider Immanuel Kant’s shopkeeper example: Kant envisions a case whereby a 
shopkeeper treats people honestly and fairly because it’s good for business.622  This act may lack 
a good end, but it isn’t incompatible with a good end, such as the customer’s own flourishing.  In 
Kant’s example, I think Scotus would claim that the act would be morally indifferent, but still 
right in the sense of acting in conformity to God’s law of truth-telling.  So the act of truth-telling 
in this case would be right, but the shopkeeper’s action could not be evaluated as morally good—
not for the same reasons Kant gives—but because the act lacked an appropriate end.  So 
goodness and rightness are distinct.     
Third, we can see this distinction from Scotus’s requirement for rational self-direction.  
Scotus thinks that the moral goodness of an act requires the agent’s right reason make a 
judgment for oneself—what I have called the “autonomy clause” for moral goodness: it is not 
                                                 
622 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:397.  
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sufficient that the agent is informed from another that the action should be carried out, but the 
agent must make the appropriate judgment for herself.623  So let’s suppose God commands some 
action.  Furthermore, suppose that the agent comes to this knowledge not by one’s own 
judgment, but by the judgment of another.  Now suppose the agent carried out the act in 
question.  The act is surely right, as it conforms to a divine precept.  However, according to 
Scotus, the act would lack moral goodness, since it lacks the appropriate judgment by the agent.  
For example, God commands that I not tell a lie.  Now suppose I’m in a sticky situation 
where lying would be convenient.  Furthermore, let’s say that some moral authority in my life—
say, a priest—knows of my current situation and has advised me not to lie, but he hasn’t given 
me any rational reasons for such council.  When my troublesome circumstances present 
themselves, I inconveniently tell the truth, not because I’ve formed a judgement that lying in 
these circumstances is wrong, but simply because the old priest told me not to lie.  Here’s the 
curious result of such a case: according to Scotus, my action was morally right, since God’s will 
has made it the case that lying is prohibited, and my act conformed to this precept.  But notice 
that on Scotus’s view, my action lacks a necessary condition for moral goodness: namely, right 
reason forming a judgment about the appropriateness of the act.  Thus Scotus’s autonomy clause 
precludes this morally right act from being morally good.  So goodness and rightness are distinct.     
From these arguments, I conclude that an act can be morally right while simultaneously 
failing to exhibit moral goodness (i.e., by conforming to God’s moral laws while failing to meet 
right reason’s requirements for moral goodness), and furthermore, that an act cannot be morally 
good without being right.  Thus (1) goodness is broader than rightness, (2) an act’s being morally 
                                                 
623 Quodlibet 18, a.1, nn.11-12. 
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right is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for an act’s being morally good,624 and (3)  
other than necessary moral truths, moral norms and the rightness derived from their 
corresponding actions is contingent upon divine volition, whereas goodness is much more 
complicated and involves the harmony of a whole range of factors, including the object, the act, 
the nature of the agent, the end, the manner, and the means.  So according to Scotus, moral 
rightness requires fulfilling my obligations to God’s commands about which acts are right and 
wrong; moral goodness encompasses a broader evaluation of just how well I fulfill such 
requirements.  
The Problem 
But how are the moral goodness of an act and the rightness of an act connected?  There 
seem to be twin problems confronting us here:  
The Problem of Rationality: right reason plays a critical role in moral goodness, forming 
judgments about which objects are fitting to which acts, ends, means, etc.  Right reason 
does not initially seem to play such a role in an act’s rightness: the rightness of an act 
concerns its conformity to the precepts set forth in the divine will, which seem to be 
known through God’s revelation and not through natural reason.   
 
The Problem of Nature: moral goodness depends upon the agent acting upon the 
judgment that the act fits her nature, causal powers, the type of act, etc.  Rightness of an 
act is not tied directly to our nature as moral agents, but depends upon the act’s 
conformity with God’s will—and God could prescribe any number of acts and their 
opposites without changing human nature.   
 
So what do we make of all this?  Well, unlike Aquinas, Scotus never attempted a summa 
or any kind of systematized summary of his ethical thought—an early death prevented him from 
                                                 
624 Part of my reasoning for claiming this will be developed more fully below.  Basically convenientia of the object 
with an act implicates rightness of the act.  In other words, to say that an act is right will mean, for Scotus, that God 
makes an object of the act either appropriate of inappropriate.  See below.  
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the chance at doing so.  Instead, we mainly have smatterings of ethical thoughts scattered 
through his commentaries on Lombard’s Sentences, and a few quodlibetal questions related to 
particular ethical issues.  In his commentaries on the Sentences—Lectura, Ordinatio, and 
Reportatio—Scotus often interweaves discussions of ethics within larger debates of whatever the 
book and question in Lombard’s Sentences pertained to.  For example, Scotus situates one of the 
central passages on moral goodness within a larger passage on the fall of the bad angels, and 
Scotus just says enough about goodness to make his larger, and only tangentially related, 
point.625    
We do not have a complete treatise about how each aspect of his ethics fits together.  We 
do not have, as far as I can tell, anything explicitly stating how moral goodness and moral 
rightness relate to one another.  He treats each topic, and clearly states the conditions under 
which acts are morally good and morally right.  But his treatments of each are often occasional—
and not systematic—in nature.  And he does not show how the two concepts relate with one 
another.  Presumably, conjoining the two concepts into a unified theory shouldn’t be that 
difficult, since Scotus has supplied all of the pieces.  The pieces, however, do not seem to fit well 
with one another, at least based upon the details that Scotus provides.  
This may be the reason that some interpreters have overemphasized the voluntaristic 
aspects of Scotus’s thought, while many others dismiss the voluntarist passages and exaggerate 
                                                 
625 Ordinatio II, d.7, q.un. cf. nn.28-38.  Examples of this could easily be multiplied.  Here’s another one: in his 
Sentences, Lombard’s systematic exposition of theology follows this pattern: Book 1: God, the Trinity; Book 2: 
Human Nature, The Fall, etc.; Book 3: Salvation; Book 4: The Sacraments.  Given Lombard’s systematic structure 
in the Sentences, and the fact that Scotus is commenting on them, we would expect Scotus to provide a similar 
systematic structure to how he answers various topics.  And so, for example, we would expect a discussion from 
Scotus on the virtue of charity in Book 3. And he does do this.  But some of the most revealing aspects of his views 
on the virtue appear not in Book 3, but in Book 1.  Why?  Well, Lombard had argued in Book 1 that charity is 
identical with the Holy Spirit.  So, Scotus feels the need to stop and address the virtue of charity there, to show that 
charity is not the same thing as the Holy Spirit.  So he provides a long explanation of his own view of charity there.  
But even here, it is not a systematic treatment of the virtue, but just enough to make Scotus’s own point.  He 
augments what he says there once he gets to Book 3.  
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the role of rationality in moral matters—on the pain of contradiction, so the theory goes, 
reinterpreted one in light of the other.  Others simply admit a fundamental contradiction and 
move on.  For example, C.R.S. Harris writes that Scotus’s 
Whole ethical theory is this haunted by a vast inconsistency of his own making, within the 
domain of natural morality itself.  For while he does not deny the rational nature of the 
moral law, he attempts, nevertheless, to make it dependent upon the divine will, and it is the 
presence of this contradiction in his doctrine which has rendered is so particularly 
susceptible to one-sided misinterpretation.626  
Harris rightly recognizes the lopsided interpretations of Scotus’s ethics.  Yet a more charitable 
reading of Scotus would at least attempt a rational reconstruction of the missing pieces in an 
effort at resolution.  As Alvin Plantinga has reminded us in another context,627 we do not have to 
show the exact relationship between Scotus’s theory of goodness and rightness in order to stave 
off the worry of contradiction; we only have to provide one possible way in which the two may 
cohere.  Harris, however, warns against this: 
We must therefore content ourselves in pointing out the two opposing currents of Duns’ 
thinking without making any attempt to twist them into agreement, and it is only by a frank 
recognition of the antinomy that we can hope to avoid the one-sided interpretation in which 
his teaching has so often been distorted.628 
          But I suspect one of the main reasons Harris denies the possibility of reconciliation stems 
from his failure to separate Scotus’s account of goodness from rightness.  It would be true that if 
Scotus claimed that goodness necessarily and independently depended both upon the divine will 
and conformity with right reason in the same way, we would have a blatant contradiction.  But 
the Subtle Doctor is far too subtle, and far too smart to make such a simple mistake.  But if 
goodness and rightness are two distinct notions in Scotus, as I have argued above and throughout 
                                                 
626 C.R.H. Harris, Duns Scotus, vol.2: The Philosophical Doctrines of Duns Scotus (Oxford University Press, 1927), 
308.   
627 Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1974), 24.   
628 Harris, Duns Scotus, vol.2: The Philosophical Doctrines of Duns Scotus, 335.   
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this dissertation, it seems at least possible to reconcile the two into a complete account of 
morality, even if Scotus failed to do so himself, and even if, his views on each matter make for 
uneasy bedfellows. 
I suggest the starting point for this reconciliation must be Scotus’s notion of the end; or 
rather, his conception of the end in the ultimate sense.  Recall that Scotus claims moral goodness 
relies on all of the circumstances, but most importantly the end.629  However, our natures only 
necessarily direct us towards the infinite good as our ultimate end.  This is the practical principle 
of action; it is grounded in our nature.  It is known a priori.  So rationality and nature are not a 
problem in one important respect: our nature does in fact point us to our ultimate good.  And we 
can, by reason, know that we ought to love God most.630  Thus goodness and moral rightness 
converge in those necessarily right actions—loving God as our ultimate end and infinite good.  
We can see this best in the following two passages:   
I say that ‘to love God above everything else’ is an act of conformity to natural right reason, 
which dictates that what is best ought to be loved most, and thus is an act that is right in and 
of itself; indeed, its rectitude is self-evident, as a first practical principle of action.  For, 
something must be loved most, and that is nothing but the highest Good itself, just as 
nothing but the highest Truth ought to be held as true by the intellect. And this argument is 
confirmed because moral precepts belong to the law of nature, and thus “You ought to love 
the Lord your God,” belongs to the law of nature, and so this act’s rightness is known.631   
And,  
Natural reason reveals to an intellectual creature that something must be loved most, 
because in every essentially ordered object and act there is something supreme, and so 
[there is] something supremely lovable, and so there is also a supremely lovable object.  
                                                 
629 Ordinatio I, d.48, n.5. 
630 Lectura, prol., pars. 4, q.1-2, n.172; Ordinatio III, d.27, q.un., n. 14, 47; Ordinatio III, d.29, q.un., n.6; Ordinatio 
III, d.27., n.30. 
631 Ordinatio III, d.27, q.un., n. 14: “De Primo dico quod ‘diligere Deum super omnia’ est actus conformis rectae 
rationi naturalis, quae dictat optimum esse summe diligendum, et per consequens est actus de se rectus; immo 
rectitudo eius est per se nota (sicut rectitudo primi principii in operabilibus): aliquid enim summe diligendum est, et 
nihil aliud a summo Bono, sicut non aliud a summo Vero est maxime tenendum tamquam verum apud intellectum.  
Confirmatur etiam istud, quia praecepta moralia sunt lege naturae, et per consequens istud Diliges Dominum Deum 
tuum, etc. est de lege naturae, et ita notum est hunc actum esse rectum.” 
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But natural right reason does not reveal something as supremely lovable other than the 
Infinite Good, because if it did, then charity would incline to the opposite of what right 
reason dictates, and so it would not be a virtue; therefore, [right reason] dictates that only 
the Infinite Good ought to be supremely loved.632 
By natural reasoning we come to see that our nature directs us towards our ultimate end, and that 
God must be loved most as our infinite good—and thus those precepts in the First Table of the 
Decalogue, our nature, and our natural reasoning converge.   
But this is not the case for the Second Table precepts, because the acts they prescribe are 
not always required for the attainment of our ultimate end, and God can and does at times change 
which acts are right, without changing human nature.633  The problem then, centers upon the role 
of nature and natural reason in the relationship between Second Table precepts and morally good 
actions: how do I know that God has contingently commanded such and such, so that my act may 
be right, and when carried out according to the dictates of right reason, evaluated as good?  Thus 
how can our reason access these contingent prescriptions, and what role does our nature play 
since moral goodness requires right reason to judge which acts are appropriate to a whole host of 
conditions, including our natures and causal powers?   
One obvious solution to the problem of rationality would be to claim our knowledge of 
contingent prescriptions originates from some type of supernatural revelation: either directly by 
God telling us, or indirectly through the Scriptures.  Accordingly, nature and reason would direct 
us to God as our ultimate end and infinite good, and God supernaturally tells us the nature and 
extent of our obligations towards each other.  Scotus obviously recognizes a place for this kind 
                                                 
632 Ordinatio III, d.27, q.un, n. 47: “Ratio naturalis ostendit creaturae intellectuali aliquid esse summe diligendum, 
quia in omnibus obiectis et actibus (et hoc essentialiter ordinatis) est aliquid supremum, et ita aliqua dilectio 
suprema, et ita obiectum etiam est summe diligible; ratio autem naturalis recta non ostendit aliquid sicut summe 
diligibile, aliud a Bono infinito, quia si sic, ergo caritas inclinaret ad oppositum eius quod dictat recta ratio, et ita 
non esset virtus; ergo dictat solum Bonum infinitum esse summe diligendum.”    
633 Ordinatio III, d.37, q.un., n.18.   
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of moral knowledge.634  And yet he consistently argues that right reason can naturally come to 
know which objects and which acts are appropriate or fitting.635   
Consider the moral act of ‘honoring one’s parents.’  How would the appropriateness of 
this object (as an object to honor rather than, say, scorn) be known?  Well, I want to suggest that 
God’s will makes it an appropriate object.  However, I must address one possible hurdle: Scotus 
has also argued the appropriateness of some object results from his concept of convenientia: two 
things that should stand in some relationship to each other.  Thus, children ought to act in an 
honoring way towards their parents.  But as we have seen, rightness of the act derives solely 
from its conformity to the divine will’s prescription of the act—and Scotus claimed that God 
could make the same act right or wrong for the same agent without changing the agent’s nature.  
So according to Scotus, God could make one’s parents an appropriate object of dishonor.  Is 
there some infelicity here? 
Well, that depends.  If I am right about Scotus’s use of convenientia, it conveys not only a 
proper relationship between two entities, but also a non-inferential grasping of such a 
connection.  We can see this most clearly in the following passage examined in the last chapter:     
The intellect, whose object is being, finds no incompatibility understanding something 
infinite: rather, it seems perfectly intelligible.  But it is remarkable if a contradiction in 
relation to the first object is made evident to no intellect, when discord (discordia) in sound 
so easily offends the hearing….For if the unfittingness immediately offends when it is 
perceived, why does no intellect naturally flee the understood infinite as if from something 
incompatible, and so destroys its first object?636 
                                                 
634 Ordinatio III, d.37, q.un., n.18. See also Ordinatio IV, d.33, q.1, nn.10-11.   
635 See for example Quodlibet 18, a.1, nn.8-12.  
636 Ordinatio I, d.2, pars.1, q.1-2, n.136.  The first half of the translation is from Cross; the added material is mine.  
“Item, quia intellectus, cuius obiectum est ens, nullam invenit repugnantiam intelligendo aliquod infinitum, immo 
videtur perfectissimum intelligibile.  Mirum est autem si nulli intellectui talis contradictio patens fiat circa primum 
eius obiectum, cum discordia in sono ita faciliter offendat auditum: si enim disconveniens statim ut percipitur 
offendit, cur nullus intellectus ab intelligibili infinito naturaliter refugit sicut a non conveniente, suum ita primum 
obiectum destruente?” 
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As I pointed out in the last chapter, the point of the analogy is not that the disconvenientia of 
‘infinite’ and ‘being’ is the same thing as the disconvenientia of hearing and an ugly sound; 
rather, both are known in the same way: by immediate, non-inferential perception in a sense of 
‘perception’ that isn’t limited to the senses.  So a discord in harmony and conceptual 
incongruities are known immediately and intuitively.  So if we take this usage of convenientia 
and apply it to the present case, maybe Scotus has something like that in mind when he says right 
reason must judge the act appropriate (conveniens) to the object and other conditions: an agent 
immediately perceives—in the moral sense of perceiving—something proper to certain acts.  
And it seems, at least prima facie possible, that such immediate perceptions could be supplied by 
God via the faculty of intuition.      
So, as we saw in the last chapter, certain acts turn out to be right or wrong because God’s 
will has determined it to be the case.  Yet that would just mean that God’s will makes an object 
either appropriate of inappropriate for a certain kind of act.  For example, God makes it the case 
that the act of murder is wrong.  But a more robust description of the act might help clarify this: 
murder is the act of ‘killing an innocent human being.’  And here, the fuller description supplies 
an object.  So when Scotus says that Second Table precepts like “you shall not murder” depend 
upon God’s will for their moral status, he means that God makes it the case that ‘killing an 
innocent human being’ is morally wrong, which, put differently, says ‘an innocent human being 
is an inappropriate object for an act of killing.’  So if I’m in a situation where I have a knife in 
my hand and I’m about to bury it into Joe—an object that fits the description of ‘an innocent 
human being,’ the act would be morally illicit, but also morally bad, since God has made it the 
case that the object (an innocent human) and act (killing) are incongruous.   
So I’m suggesting God decides that some act is right or wrong, and he does so by 
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determining which act-object combinations are appropriate or inappropriate (inconveniens).  
Furthermore, perhaps we have immediate intuitions aligning with God’s claims, such that, we 
can morally perceive the truth of the proposition that killing an innocent human being is wrong.  
Suppose I hate Joe and I’m thinking about killing him.  I know Joe is an inappropriate object for 
killing via two other things I know: (1) a particular fact about the case, namely, Joe is innocent, 
(2) some God-given intuition that innocent human beings ought not be killed; i.e., I immediately 
perceive the unfittingness (inconvenientia).   
Accordingly, reason plays an important role in two ways: one, in immediately perceiving 
or intuiting which act-object combinations are fitting or unfitting and consequently, right or 
wrong, and two, in the processes of conscience and synderesis: taking the general principle that 
‘killing an innocent human being is morally wrong’ and applying it to the present case—
determining if the object of this particular act is innocent.637  So maybe it is the case that the only 
way we know, say, murder is wrong, is that God has told us so—not supernaturally—but 
naturally: God has given us the appropriate intuitions.  And knowing that still leaves room for 
right reason to operate: it must know the object is the sort that falls under the description 
‘innocent,’ it must know this particular agent’s stabbing someone with a knife with the intent to 
kill constitutes an interior act of killing, etc.   
So on Scotus’s account, God could have made it the case that innocent humans ought to 
be killed.  And if he did, he would have given us intuitions that align.638  Thus for contingently 
                                                 
637 See Ordinatio II, d.39, qq.1-2.  Interestingly, in direct opposition to Bonaventure and in agreement with Aquinas, 
Scotus argues that synderesis and conscience are in the intellect rather than the will.  Furthermore, Scotus doesn’t 
give us a detailed account of his own views in the question (or elsewhere); rather, he mainly criticizes the view of 
Henry of Ghent.  See Langston, “Scotus and Ockham on Synderesis and Conscience,” in Conscience and Other 
Virtues: From Bonaventure to MacIntyre, ed. Douglas Langston (University Park: Pen State University Press, 
2001), 53-69.   
638 In Ordinatio IV, d.46, q.1., n.48, Scotus gestures in this direction by claiming that God might give our natures 
what is needed to know certain precepts are right or wrong.  
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right actions, which act-object units are right and wrong depend upon God making the object 
either appropriate or inappropriate, and we have the ability to form judgments about acts and 
objects, such that we can know what ought to be done in order for an act to be morally good.  If 
God has willed otherwise, we would have an entirely different set of intuitions, and reason would 
need to make appropriate judgments about them instead.   
But if such intuitions are supplied by God (via moral intuition), so that we immediately 
know things like killing an innocent human being is wrong, doesn’t this make it unlikely or 
nearly impossible that we sin?  Scotus would  answer ‘no,’ for at least three reasons.  First, even 
when the intellect intuitively grasps the major premise of a practical syllogism, reason can still 
be mistaken about which objects fall under the general description (e.g., innocent human being), 
and so which acts are applicable or inapplicable.  For example, I might know that innocent 
human beings are inappropriate objects of killing, but nevertheless fail to recognize Joe’s 
innocence.     
Second, things can go awry with respect to the relationship between privately bad acts 
and rightness: recall that a privatively bad act lacks something needed for (circumstantial) moral 
goodness, but the act does not have some positive condition that would make the act 
incompatible with such goodness.639  Suppose God makes ‘honoring one’s parents’ an 
appropriate act-object combination for humans.  This still leaves reason room to consider what 
would be appropriate ways to honor one’s parents, given my nature as human and their present 
circumstances, etc.  And suppose I honor them by giving them money to aid in their needs, but 
                                                 
639 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n. 20: “Potest autem aliquis agere non cum circumstantia debita, et tamen non cum 
circumstantia indebita; puta quando non ordinat actum ad finem debitum, nec tamen ipsum ordinat as finem 
indebitum; tunc ille actus est malus privative, non contrarie, sicut ille qui ordinatur ad finem indebitum, et ex multis 
talibus actibus generatur habitus consimilis in malitia, scilicet privativa, non contraria. Exemplum huius: dare 
eleemosynam non propter finem bonum, scilicet amorem Dei vel subventionem proximi, non tamen propter malum 
finem, puta vanam gloriam vel nocumentum alicuius, est actus malus privative, non tamen contrarie.”  
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not enough to satisfy the demands that right reason sets forth.  I’ve done a morally right action, 
but one that lacks morally goodness because I’ve failed to give them a sufficient amount.  I have 
failed to make a correct judgment; that is, reason failed to see the conveniens with the 
circumstances: my humanity, casual powers (my ability to act in the world), the nature of the act 
of honor, a fairy robust description of the object (my parents), the time, the manner, the location, 
and my intent for honoring them.  So even if the object-act unit has its status as obligatory or 
prohibited from God, and I know such things by some God-given intuition, right reason still has 
plenty of work to do in order for my act to rise above simply being the right act, but obtain 
perfect moral goodness.  And when reason errs, an intellectual failure leads to a moral failure.      
Third, because of the will’s unconditional freedom, it can always reject the claims of the 
intellect.  This is true not only for Second Table precepts, but even for our actions related to God.  
For example, Scotus says that we often act contrary to our happiness, even when we know what 
our happiness consists in: a person could conceive of happiness as the enjoyment of the divine 
essence, and know that fornication in no way leads to that happiness, and yet, the person could 
seek fornication anyway.640  So having proper intuitions about which act-object combinations are 
morally right or wrong in no way ensures that a person will execute the appropriate action, 
because according to Scotus, the will must always have the ability to reject such practical 
syllogisms in order to retain its freedom.  And it can do so by willing contrary to the moral 
prescription, or even by not willing at all.  So having the correct intuitions about which act-object 
combinations are right and wrong is necessary but not sufficient for an agent to act in a morally 
                                                 
640 Ordinatio IV, dist. 49, q.9.  While this example and question appear in the Wadding Edition, the editors of the 
Vatican edition believe this to be a reportatio: a student report of Scotus’s lecture on the question, which has been 
interpolated here to fill in the unfinished pieces of the Ordinatio after Scotus’s untimely death.  But the material is 
certainly “Scotistic” and exactly the kind of thing Scotus probably said.  See Ordinatio IV, dist. 43-49, in Iohannis 
Duns Scoti Doctoris Subtilis et Mariani Opera Omnia, vol  XIV, 394.  Scotus makes a similar point in Ordinatio I, 
d.1, pars.2, q.2.  See especially n.92 
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good manner: that agent must make a judgment pertaining to all of the circumstances, and the 
agent’s will must ascent to the act’s rightness of its own accord.   
Thus one way to solve these worries about the uneasy bedfellows of rightness and 
goodness would be as follows: what makes an act right or wrong is simply God’s choosing it to 
be that way—and God does so by making some object-act combination either fitting or unfitting.  
But suppose God generally “rigged the dice,” such that, whatever precepts are obligatory, he also 
made it the case that our right reason intuits their “fit” with the other factors involved.  So 
stealing is prohibited, and thus illicit.  But given our natures, causal powers, and the kind of the 
act, we can know that acts of this kind are generically bad when performed.  This would still 
uphold Scotus’s claim that there is no necessary deduction from human nature to the acts we 
ought to perform, even if contingently, God has made it the case that we can naturally form 
correct judgments about such matters.  Had God made (or when God makes) the act of stealing 
obligatory—as Scotus believes was the case with the Israelites plundering the Egyptians—God 
could change our intuitions to fit the particular case, because for some mysterious reason that act 
in the particular case makes us better co-lovers with God.641 
One might think all of this is speculation; however, there are at least two passages where 
Scotus gestures in this very direction: in a question concerning why lying is wrong, Scotus 
entertains Aquinas’s position that acts are generically good or bad in virtue of their objects, and 
so generically bad acts can never be good, and since lying is a generically bad act, it can never be 
made good.642  In response Scotus argues,  
What one believes to be entirely false is no more inappropriate or illicit matter for speech 
than a human being who is innocent and useful to the commonwealth is illicit matter for 
                                                 
641 See Ordinatio III, d.37, q. un., nn. 2-4; 40; Ordinatio IV, d.33, q.1, nn.10-11.   
642 Ordinatio III, d.38, q.un., n.16;  Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II q. 18 a. 2-3 and Summa Theologiae 
II-II q. 110 a. 1.   
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killing.  But with these conditions on the part of the matter (that is, the human being) 
remaining intact, it can become licit to kill such a human being, for example, if God 
revoked the commandment “You shall not kill” (as was said in the previous question [d. 37 
n. 13])—and not merely licit, but meritorious, for example, if God commanded someone to 
kill, as he commanded Abraham concerning Isaac. Therefore, by topical reasoning from the 
similar or from the lesser,  it can become licit to make an utterance believed to be false if 
the commandment not to deceive one’s neighbour (a commandment that evidently exists) is 
revoked, since the commandment not to deceive is no more binding than the commandment 
not to kill. For it is less bad to take true opinion away from one’s neighbour, or to be the 
occasion of generating false opinion in him, than to take away his bodily life.  Indeed, there 
is scarcely a comparison.643 
Scotus makes a similar point in a passage about procreating and marriage:  
Proof that it is not intrinsically sufficiently good in terms of moral goodness: no willing is 
intrinsically good in virtue of having a morally good object unless its object is intrinsically 
worthy of being willed, in other words, unless its object is the unqualifiedly ultimate good.  
Such willing is loving God, which can never be contrary to right reason; indeed, it is 
necessarily in accord with right reason that such an act tend toward such an object.  But that 
is because this object is the ultimate end, which is to be willed in its own right by 
everything ordered to the end, in whatever way it can love that end.  For a human being can 
distinguish everything that is for the end either rightly or wrongly, because it can order it to 
God and thus use it, or not order it to God and thus enjoy it, which is a great sin.  
But it is evident that the object of the act of procreating or of willing to procreate offspring 
is not the ultimate end, but merely something ordered, or capable of being ordered, to the 
ultimate end.  Therefore, such an act is not intrinsically sufficiently morally good.  
Therefore, it is capable of [being morally good in virtue of] being characterized by the right 
circumstances.644 
There are a number of points we can glean from these passages.  First, as we have seen 
elsewhere, God can make an act licit or illicit—such as killing, lying, and procreating—simply 
by willing/commanding that such an act ought to be done.  And making such acts licit or illicit 
means that God makes the object of such an act appropriate or inappropriate, as Scotus seems to 
claim here, since his response concerns Aquinas’s claim that generically good/bad acts are only 
good/bad in virtue of their objects.  Second, Scotus says that no object is intrinsically good and 
                                                 
643 Ordinatio III, d.38, q.un., n.17.  Translated by Thomas Williams, John Duns Scotus: Ethical Writings 
(Forthcoming, Oxford University Press). 
644 Ordinatio IV, d.26, q.un., n.15-16.  Translated by Thomas Williams, John Duns Scotus: Ethical Writings. 
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necessarily worthy of love except the infinite good.  All other objects have no such intrinsic 
value, and thus when combined with an act, could be made right or wrong by divine fiat.  And 
for God to do so, would simply mean God makes some object either appropriate or inappropriate 
for some act.  Furthermore, in response to Aquinas’s view about generically good acts being 
good in virtue of their objects, Scotus seems to deny the existence of intrinsically bad acts, save 
those that have God as their immediate object (e.g., hating God).645  So which acts and objects 
are right or wrong depend upon God making the object appropriate to the act.  
Ironically then, in an attenuated sense, goodness too depends upon God, but not directly: 
morally good acts (both generic and specific) are ones in which the agent’s right reason judges 
that the act and object et al. are fitting, and the reason why it’s fitting happens to be God’s 
making that act-object combination appropriate or inappropriate, and consequently, right or 
wrong.  So goodness requires an action based upon a rational judgement or a moral perception, a 
perception which stems from God’s willing the act-object combination as appropriate or 
inappropriate.  Thus while moral goodness narrowly construed does not depend upon God, all 
thing considered, moral goodness does depend upon an act and object judged as appropriate by 
the agent, and this appropriateness ultimately depends upon God’s making it the case.  But even 
so, according to Scotus, moral goodness pertains more to the agent making the judgment and 
acting according to it: morally perceiving or intuiting the fittingness of the act with the agent’s 
nature, causal powers, and the kind of act, and with the object and the circumstances that specify 
the act.  And the agent can do so, even if one were unaware of God’s will: just because one has 
appropriate intuitions about which acts are fitting does not necessarily imply one has to know the 
reason behind their fittingness, namely, the divine will.     
                                                 
645 Ordinatio IV, d.26, q.un., n.17. 
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Perhaps then, an act’s moral goodness does not directly depend upon the divine will for 
its moral worth, even if an act’s goodness requires God to make an act-object combination 
fitting: the moral goodness of some agent’s act does not directly depend upon the divine will for 
its moral worth because moral goodness of some act directly concerns the agent forming a 
judgment about the act’s fittingness, and the agent could do so, even if she is unaware of the 
ultimate  reason for some act’s fittingness: the divine will.  As Thomas Williams says, “While 
the fact that murder is wrong depends upon and is in some sense explained by the fact that God 
wills that murder is wrong, our knowledge that murder is wrong does not depend upon our 
knowledge that God wills that murder is wrong.”646  Accordingly, moral goodness requires a 
judgement about the suitability of the act to the object and other conditions; it does not, however, 
require a second-order judgement about the source of that suitability—God.    
That solves the rationality problem.  The nature problem seems a bit more complicated.   
According to Scotus, our nature only necessarily directs us to God.  Thus Scotus offers a 
minimalist picture of what follows from our nature: while we have other ends that satisfy various 
potentialities in us—e.g., survival, procreation—our rational nature is not dual-focused, as 
Aquinas interprets the Aristotelian tradition, directing us naturally to our twofold end and 
twofold happiness—community with others (imperfect happiness) and God (perfect happiness).  
It is rather singularly focused on God as the ultimate end and our infinite good.  Thus, Scotus 
radically alters the Aristotelian conception of flourishing and human nature.  Let’s see how.     
Aristotle conceives all action as teleological: all agents act for the sake of some end 
conceived as good.  The highest good consists in humanity’s final end, which Aristotle identifies 
with happiness.  However, while everyone agrees that happiness is our final end, they often 
                                                 
646 Thomas Williams, “Reason, Morality, and Voluntarism in Duns Scotus: A Pseudo-Problem Dissolved,” 93. 
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differ as to what this happiness consists in.647  How do we determine the nature of this 
happiness?  For Aristotle, it’s determined by our function—by an investigation into human 
nature in order to see what kind of thing a human actually is—and thereby obtain a better grasp 
on human happiness.  Function generally describes the activity an object is designed to fulfill, 
and fulfilling its purpose is said to be the object’s good.  So a good knife is good in so far as it 
cuts well, for that is its function or end.   
Aristotle applies the same strategy to humans: the function will be the telos human nature 
was designed to fulfill.  Grasping our end requires grasping our nature qua humanity: since we 
share with plants and animals the nutritive part of the soul, and we share with animals the 
sensitive part of the soul, this cannot be what makes us human, as distinct from plants and 
animals, and is thereby incapable of determining our unique function.  The distinctive part that 
determines our function is rationality: we are rational animals.  As such, our function consists in 
reasoning well or good.  This leads Aristotle to his concept of the human good: “And so the 
human good proves to be activity of the soul in accord with virtue.”648  Since our good has been 
identified with man’s happiness, happiness is only obtained through a life of virtue.  Human 
flourishing is thus construed as living out a (complete) life of virtue in the context of the polis.                 
Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that rationality is distinctive to humanity and thus 
constitutes its function.  So, like Aristotle, knowing the nature of our happiness consists in 
knowing humanity’s function as a rational animal.  Aquinas appropriately asks whether this 
happiness consists in any created good, and on Aristotelian grounds he claims it does not.  He 
                                                 
647 Aristotle draws this distinction in Nicomachean Ethics I.4.1095a18-20.  He states, “As far as its name goes [i.e., 
the highest good men seek], most people virtually agree; for both the many and the cultivated call it happiness…But 
they disagree about what happiness is.”  
648 Nicomachean Ethics, I.7.1098a17-18.   
267 
 
argues that happiness consists in a complete good, where “complete” means the total satisfaction 
of desire.  If the final good was not something that terminated in fulfillment of all desire, 
happiness would not be the ultimate end.  Aquinas then argues that the object of the will is 
humanity’s universal good, and as such, only this can satisfy our will. This good as our ultimate 
end, of course, is God:  
It is impossible for human happiness to be found in any created good.  For happiness is the 
complete good, which totally satisfies the desire: otherwise, it would not be the ultimate 
end, if something remained to be desired.  But the object of the will—the object of human 
desire—is the universal good, just as the object of the intellect is the universal true.  From 
this it is obvious that nothing can satisfy the human will, except the universal good.  And 
this is not found in any created good, but only in God: because every creature is good by 
participation.  And so only God can satisfy the human will…therefore human happiness 
consists in God alone.649  
As a result of changing the nature of humanity’s highest good, Aquinas differentiates 
imperfect happiness from perfect happiness, the former consisting in Aristotle’s conception of 
human flourishing in the life of the polis—natural happiness obtained in this life—while the 
latter consists in the beatific vision, or perfect happiness in the next life.  According to Aquinas, 
Aristotle didn’t take his own teleology far enough, for the final end must be God: only the 
infinite good is final, self-sufficient, and complete, and thus only the infinite good can ultimately 
satisfy our natures.   
Consequently, once the Aristotelian conception of happiness is supplemented with a 
Christian notion of teleology whereby the summum bonum is augmented from a mere finite or 
earthly conception of human flourishing in the context of the polis, to an infinite and 
                                                 
649 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q.2, a.8: “Impossibile est beatitudinem hominis esse in aliquo bono creato. 
Beatitudo enim est bonum perfectum, quod totaliter quietat appetitum: alioquin non esset ultimus finis, si adhuc 
restaret aliquid appetendum.  Obiectum autem voluntatis, quae est appetitus humanus, est universale bonum; sicut 
obiectum intellectus est universale verum. Ex quo patet quod nihil potest quietare voluntatem hominis, nisi bonum 
universale. Quod non invenitur in aliquo creato, sed solum in Deo: quia omnis creatura habet bonitatem 
participatam. Unde solus Deus voluntatem hominis implere potest…In solo igitur Deo beatitude hominis consistit.”    
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transcendent end, Aquinas makes the necessary interpretive move that Aristotle was only 
working in the sphere of natural or imperfect accounts of happiness, and his account must be 
tweaked in order to provide a complete account of morality.   
This significant alteration has at least two implications for Aquinas’s own account of 
human flourishing.  First, Aquinas thinks that our nature and function direct us towards an end 
which we lack the natural powers to achieve on our own.650  As such, only imperfect happiness 
can be achieved through our natural powers in this life.  Perfect or complete happiness consisting 
in a vision of the divine essence requires supernatural aid and the addition of theological virtues: 
grace perfects nature. 
 Second, when Aquinas alters the object or end of human teleology in the summum bonum 
from the context of the polis to that of God, the nature of his ethical account changes: when the 
highest good is something this worldly, the nature of the virtues were construed a certain way, 
and directed toward social life in the polis.  But when the highest good becomes a transcendent 
end, the highest virtues must be supplemented as well.  His argument runs as follows: the virtues 
are necessary to perfect humanity, and this perfection is directed at our happiness.  However, as 
we have seen, human happiness is twofold: imperfect happiness obtained through our natural 
powers, and perfect happiness that “surpasses” human nature.  This latter happiness, Aquinas 
claims, can only be obtained by God’s power.  Because the latter surpasses human nature, man’s 
capacities which enable him to act well to his natural ends aren’t sufficient; consequently, we 
need “principles” of supernatural assistance for perfect happiness.  Such “principles” Aquinas 
calls theological virtues, for the following three reasons: their object is God, they are infused in 
                                                 
650 See Summa Theologiae, I-II, q.42, 5, 5. 
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us by God, and they are known only through divine revelation.651    
To summarize: for Aristotle, our ultimate end consisted in something this-worldly, and 
could be achieved through natural powers in the context of one’s community.  Aquinas 
recognizes a place for human flourishing in community with others, but also recognizes that this 
end cannot ultimately satisfy our natures—only the infinite good can do that.  And thus Aquinas 
conceives two ends particular to our nature as rational animals: know God and be sociable.        
In contrast to Aquinas’s Aristotelian adaptation, Scotus only provides one end that our 
rational nature directs us towards, and that’s God himself.  Our rational nature only directs us 
necessarily to the ultimate end, our infinite good.  So unlike Aquinas, our rational nature’s ends 
and subsequent goods are not dual-focused, directing us to God and creatures, providing 
normative constraints for both.  Scotus’s first practical principle of action, after all, is ‘love God,’ 
and not some more general truth like Aquinas’s ‘do good,’ which directs us both towards finite 
and infinite ends (e.g., being sociable, knowing God).652  Thus when we deliberate about moral 
actions, on Scotus’s view human nature will play a more reduced role, since we cannot make 
deductions from our rational nature to any goods other than the infinite good.  If we have other 
obligations, then they arise, as we’ve seen, from the divine will expressed in his commands.  
Thus Scotus provides a minimalist view of what ends and various entailment relations 
exist given our nature as humans.  Aquinas, by way of contrast, has an extremely robust account 
of human nature and the various ends that can be deduced from it.  Indeed, the entire natural law 
that governs human action can be deduced from our nature as rational animals and the first 
practical principle for action: do good and avoid evil.653  Not so for Scotus: our rational nature 
                                                 
651 See Summa Theologiae, I-II, q.62.1.     
652 See especially Ordinatio III, d.37, q.un., n.14; Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, qq. 93-94. 
653 See Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, qq. 93-94.   
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only directs us to God as the infinite good—whatever else we are obligated to do, it is not the 
result of deciphering what finite goods we are directed towards, but intuiting what contingent 
laws God has prescribed for humans to become co-lovers with God.    
So what does Scotus mean when he says that the agent must make a judgement about the 
act’s fittingness with its nature, the kind of act, and causal powers?   Well, since he was writing 
in the heyday of medieval Aristotelianism, I think it’s easy for us to wrongly attribute to Scotus 
some robust concept of nature, with a whole host of ends and goals.  In other words, I think it’s 
easy to assume he holds the same view of human nature that many card-carrying schoolmen 
would have held: namely, some robust version of Aristotelianism, of which Aquinas is the gold-
standard.  In other words, we read ‘nature’ and we automatically think ‘Aquinas’s 
Aristotelianism.’   
But this cannot be what Scotus holds to, since Scotus explicitly states on multiple 
occasions that God could make the same act licit or illicit for humans without changing human 
nature,654 and that, various human acts and their opposites are not necessary for our natures to 
reach our final end.655  Thus Scotus seems to deny the very foundations of Aquinas’s 
Aristotelianism about our nature and the various finite ends that it naturally and normatively 
directs us towards.  So how does Scotus use ‘nature’ in this moral context, when he claims that 
agent must form judgments about the kind of the act, the agent’s nature and causal powers, and 
the object, etc.?  
I want to suggest that Scotus has in mind a minimalist picture of human nature, in that all 
he means by ‘nature’ is simply that: the kind of creature acting, without all of the Thomistic-
                                                 
654 Ordinatio III, d.37, q.un., n.13; Ordinatio I, d.44, q.un., n.8; Ordinatio IV, d.26, q. un; Ordinatio III, d.38, q.un., 
n.15. 
655 Ordinatio III, d.37, q. un., n. 18; Ordinatio III, d.33, q.1; Ordinatio IV, d.26, q. un. 
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Aristotelian import about various ends.  Recall that for Scotus, an act arises above being 
naturally good when the agent forms a judgment about the act.  But judgements are the types of 
things rational agents do.  And in Scotus’s writings, we see three types of rational agents: 
human, angelic, divine.  I want to suggest that when Scotus uses the phrase “the nature of the 
agent,” he often just means to index the act to some particular type of rational agent—such as a 
human—as opposed to some other type of rational agent—such as God—but without all the 
metaphysical baggage Aquinas’s account would associate with nature and its various finite 
ends.656   
Recall that Scotus conceives of two types of secondary goodness: secondary natural 
goodness and secondary moral goodness.  Secondary goodness concerning acts can be taken as a 
“quasi-genus” in which there are two species: acts of non-rational agents that are fitting to 
certain ends consonant with their natures, and acts of rational agents who judge the act suitable 
to certain ends appropriate to them as rational agents.  The former Scotus calls ‘secondary 
natural goodness;’ the latter he calls ‘moral goodness’ and is possible only in rational agents.657  
But since there are three types of rational agents, each of these have their respective goodness 
when they meet the conditions for rational self-direction.   
By ‘nature’ then, Scotus means those various qualities of an agent relevant for moral 
evaluation of the particular kind of agent’s act: rational or non-rational,658 and if rational, 
whether its mode of being is finite or infinite and its corresponding intensity,659 whether its will 
                                                 
656 See Ordinatio I, d.48.  
657 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.10.   
658 Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.4-11; Ordinatio I, d.1, pars.2, q.2, n.95; Quodlibet 16, a.2.  
659 Lectura I, d.17, pars.1, q.un., n.55; Ordinatio I, d.48; Quodlibet 16, a.1. 
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is created or uncreated,660 the agent’s particular causal powers,661 its various affections,662 etc.  
All of this is relevant in determining an act’s moral worth, and each of these various qualities 
may differ depending upon whether the agent in question is human, angelic, or divine.  Thus 
Scotus simply means that an agent must take into account his own nature and causal powers 
when acting for an act to obtain moral goodness.   
For example, take the obligation to ‘love God above all else.’  Since this obligation is a 
necessary moral truth, it’s obligatory for both God and creatures.  But given God’s infinite mode 
of being, and the corresponding infinite intensity in his acts, God must love himself with an 
infinite intensity that would be inappropriate—indeed, impossible!—for a finite creature.  A 
human, by contrast, must love God above all in a way that is fitting (conveniens) with its finite 
nature.  It would not be fitting for us to love God with an infinite intensity, nor would it be fitting 
for God to love himself with a finite intensity.  So that’s the kind of thing Scotus has in mind 
when he says that an agent must form a judgment about the act’s fittingness with an agent’s 
nature and causal powers.  It is not a tacit appeal to some underlying teleology directing us 
towards a whole host of normative ends; rather, it’s a declaration that diverse kinds of rational 
agents have different natures and causal powers relevant for the overall moral evaluation of their 
acts.  
So unlike Aquinas, for example, we cannot look into human nature and deduce that the 
act of murder is unconducive to human flourishing because it violates the end or goal of being 
sociable—and so on for other normative constraints that human nature and its ends might 
produce.  By ‘nature of the agent,’ Scotus simply means the type of creature—imbued with 
                                                 
660 Ordinatio II, d.43, q.un., nn.3-6; 
661 Quodlibet 18.1, a.1, n.13. 
662 Lectura II, d.6, q.2; Ordinatio II, d.6, q.2; Reportatio II, d.6, q.2.   
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certain causal powers and affections—doing the action, without the metaphysical import of a 
horde of ends Aquinas thinks govern and constrain moral action.         
But what about those finite ends that our sub-rational nature seems to direct us towards, 
like eating and procreating?  Do they have moral ramifications?  Scotus claims that whether an 
act is moral depends upon the type of object, and that certain types of objects aren’t moral 
ones.663  Thus some of the ends that our sub-rational nature direct us towards have objects that 
would not bring it into the realm of moral, perhaps like eating.  In these types of cases, if the 
object were appropriate to the act and the nature of the agent, then the act would have a 
secondary natural goodness.  So raw meat might be fitting for a beast, but unfitting for a human.  
When the object of the act of eating—say a salad—fulfilled its role in restoring a human’s 
energy, the act would have a secondary natural goodness.   
Other objects of our sub-rational natures would in fact bring the act into the realm of 
moral, like the act of procreating.  And here, it seems that Scotus might say something like the 
following: the acts of non-rational agents can exhibit a secondary natural goodness when they 
fulfill the end of procreation with objects which are fitting to their nature: that is, others of their 
same kind-nature.  But as a rational animal, reason ought to govern the way in which we fulfill 
this end, by forming a judgment about which object is appropriate.  And what makes the object 
of the act of procreation appropriate (in the present dispensation) is whether or not the object 
happens to be one’s spouse.  At times in the distant past, God has made a dispensation from this, 
allowing men to procreate with a number of women so that more people might exist to love 
him.664  But currently, since God has willed that the act of marriage makes the object of the act 
                                                 
663 Ordinatio III, part 1, q.2; Quodlibet 18, a.1, n.14. 
664 See Ordinatio IV, d.33, q.1-3.   
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of procreation appropriate, our actions are right only when they conform to this divine precept.  
And if the act were carried out in conjunction with a judgment about the act’s appropriateness 
(and other circumstances), the act would also be morally good.  Thus some natural ends have 
moral ramifications; others do not.  When they do, the act is right only when God 
commands/wills it.    
Conclusion 
 Accordingly, while it is obvious that Scotus distinguishes the moral goodness of an act 
from the rightness of an act, the relationship between the two seem a bit tenuous.  Here we see 
Scotus struggling as a transitional figure, whose views on moral metaphysics are deeply rooted 
in Lombard’s hierarchy of goodness, but whose account of normativity has taken a decidedly 
voluntaristic turn.  As a good scholastic, we see Scotus striving for the project of a robust moral 
metaphysics of goodness, open to the many fine-grain distinctions that only a schoolman would 
appreciate.  But at the same time, we see Scotus as a theological voluntarist, ever wary of placing 
constraints upon God, and always willing to sacrifice moral norms on the altar of potentia 
absoluta.  And in that vein, we see the Subtle Doctor simultaneously desiring to uphold a rational 
metaphysics of goodness while denying any normative implications of it to human nature, ethical 
eudaimonism, and natural law.   
 While his views of moral goodness and rightness make for uneasy bedfellows, they do 
not seem blatantly contradictory, so long as something like the account I provided here is correct.  
Had the Subtle Doctor not succumbed to a premature death, perhaps he would have written a 
treatise on morality that might explain these incongruities more carefully.  But in absence of this, 
we have to let the texts speak for themselves: Scotus believes that an act’s rightness depends 
upon whether it conforms to some moral truth—either a necessary moral truth or a contingent 
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precept.  For contingent precepts, God makes certain actions right or wrong by making the act 
either appropriate or inappropriate to a certain object.  In contrast, the moral goodness of an act 
is a broader evaluation of how well the agent performs the act, in conformity with a whole host 
of conditions as right reason dictates, and this would include forming judgments about which 
acts are appropriate  to certain objects et alia.  I have suggested that reason could know such 
things are fitting for a particular kind-nature by moral intuition, even if their ultimate status as 
fitting or unfitting stems from the mysterious will of God.   But even here, the agent need not 
know the ultimate source for some act’s appropriateness in order to form a judgment that the act 
is appropriate—to require such things would be to confuse ontology with epistemology. 
276 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION: 
 
Writing in the heyday of both Aristotelianism and voluntarism, John Duns Scotus’s moral 
philosophy offers a unique glimpse into a transitional time from an innovative, eccentric, and 
transitional figure.  On the one hand, the Subtle Doctor clings to the fruitful production of past 
scholastics, particularly on the relationship between being and goodness, the Great Chain of 
Being, and the moral metaphysics of goodness, while simultaneously providing new and 
interesting justifications for these well-established doctrines.  But we also see a mind shaped in 
the aftermath of the Condemnation of 1277, steeped in the voluntarism of his Franciscan 
predecessors, and thoroughly committed to producing and defending philosophical views that 
uphold God’s utmost freedom at any cost.   
In terms of being and goodness, Scotus agrees with the commonly made claim that 
‘everything that exists, is good’—[B].  His own account of why this is the case hinges upon the 
plausibility of his formal distinction: that two things can be inseparably connected in such a way 
that they are really identical, and yet have different rationes or characteristics that make them 
what they are, and furthermore, that such characteristics are not simply ways we describe or 
conceive one indiscriminate thing, but are features of those things discoverable by the mind.  No 
doubt that many of Scotus’s contemporaries surmised that carving a further distinction between a 
conceptual distinction and a real distinction was absurd.  But Scotus finds the formal distinction 
useful in numerous contexts, including the relationship between being and goodness.     
On that score, goodness is an inseparable and necessary (quasi-) attribute of being, such 
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that whatever has being, also has goodness.  Since being comes in two modes—finite and 
infinite—goodness also comes in these two modes.  Finite being is divided into Aristotle’s ten 
categories which represent finite modes of being.  Thus in each category of being, there exists a 
goodness proportional to being.  In the category of substance, beings are arranged hierarchically 
in terms of their perfections as substances.  Since God’s being is infinite, his infinite goodness 
shines like a beacon of light atop the apex of the hierarchy of being.665  Thus Scotus’s account of 
[A] remains Augustinian in terms of its nature, while at the same time discarding the heavily 
Neoplatonic elements—like the robust privation theory and the language of measure, form, and 
order.  Nevertheless, aspects of an Augustinian “Great Chain of Being” remain, even though 
Scotus prefers to call it an “Order of Eminence,” and even though Scotus reconstructs this 
account within the working metaphysis of his day, particularly along the lines set forth in 
Aristotle’s Categories and Metaphysics.  Furthermore, while Scotus identifies good with 
perfectum or completeness, one kind of which he links to an end—as the Aristotelian nature 
account does—he nevertheless rejects that the end is the only factor for determining an act’s 
goodness, and denies that such goodness resulting from the end and other factors converts with 
being.  Thus the end doesn’t perfect the agent in the way it does for Aristotle and Aquinas.  
With respect to acts, every act, in so far as it is an act, will have a natural or ontological 
goodness because it has being.  But not every act receives moral goodness.  As a species of 
secondary goodness, moral goodness is not an absolute quality—like natural goodness— but a 
secondary, extrinsic, and accidental perfection that requires a whole host of conditions as judged 
by right reason.  As such, Scotus follows Lombard and his students by claiming moral goodness 
                                                 
665 See De Primo Principio, 4.84: “You are the boundless good, communicating your rays of goodness so 
generously, and as the most lovable being of all, every single being in its own way returns to you as its ultimate 
end.” 
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does not convert with being, and thus, in the final analysis, does not perfect the agent in the way 
acts do for Aquinas’s ethical eudaimonism.   
Moreover, at the heart of Scotus’s moral philosophy lies the distinction between an act’s 
moral rightness and an act’s moral goodness.  Moral rightness concerns what we ought to do, 
while moral goodness is an overall evaluation of how well we do what we ought to do.  The 
rightness of an act depends upon whether it conforms to either a necessary moral truth, or a 
contingent moral truth whose truth value depends upon God’s willing it to be the case.  Since the 
majority of moral norms are not necessary moral truths, the bulk of moral norms, according to 
Scotus, are supplied by God’s commands as expressions of his will.  In contrast, an act has moral 
goodness when the agent of the act has acted in conformity with a judgment that such an act is 
appropriate with a whole host of situations or conditions.    
The separation of goodness from rightness allows Scotus, on the one hand, to uphold the 
rationality of the moral life, while simultaneously rejecting its connection with the ethical 
eudaimonism and the natural law theory of Aquinas.  The only natural law principle our nature 
directs us towards is loving God as our infinite good.  All other prescriptions and prohibitions 
cannot be deduced from our nature, nor do they contribute to some diminished sense of 
flourishing in this life, akin to Aquinas’s imperfect happiness.  While our nature directs us to 
God as our infinite good and the source of happiness, it does not provide normative provisions 
for our treatment of others.  Such information depends upon God’s will as its ontological basis, 
and could be known to us, I have suggested, via the faculty of intuition.                       
I’ll close this study with a question: what kind of voluntarist was Duns Scotus?  Well, as 
Bonnie Kent has aptly noted, there are numerous kinds of voluntarism that flourished in the 
thirteenth century at Paris, and precisely which kind of voluntarism in question makes all the 
279 
 
difference in the world.  Roughly, she notes three kinds of voluntarism: psychological, ethical, 
and theological.  Psychological voluntarism is simply a general emphasis on “the affective and 
volitional aspects” of human nature, which began with Franciscans such as Bonaventure.     
Ethical voluntarism designates “a strong emphasis on the active character of the will, the claim 
that the will is free to act against reason’s dictates, and the conviction that moral responsibility 
depends on this conception of the will’s freedom.”666  Theological voluntarism indicates a strong 
emphasis on God’s freedom and his ability to will anything but logical contradictions.  All of 
these distinctions are helpful.  And, although somewhat outside the purview of this dissertation, 
elements of psychological and ethical voluntarism are definitely found within Scotus’s ethics.  
But on the topic of theological voluntarism itself, given Scotus’s views, it seems to me we need 
to make further subcategories of moral theological voluntarism and axiological theological 
voluntarism—the former being a voluntarist view of the moral law and what God is able to 
command; the latter being about God’s general relation to value itself: is value itself determined 
by God’s will?   
With respect to moral theological voluntarism, we could say that Scotus is a quasi-moral 
theological voluntarist, since Scotus restricts God’s control of the moral realm to only contingent 
moral truths.  God cannot make necessary moral truths false, and thus, they are outside of the 
power and control of his will.  God cannot will that people hate him, nor can he will that we love 
something else as our ultimate end.  But with respect to all other moral norms, God could justly 
will whatever he wants.  And if he did, conformity with such laws would be morally right.        
As for axiological theological voluntarism, Scotus is not an axiological voluntarist in any 
                                                 
666 Bonnie Kent, Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century (Washington, 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 94-96.   
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sense: with respect to primary goodness, value supervenes upon being—the ontological goodness 
of every created thing and (& THE uncreated thing) is necessarily determined by the thing’s 
being.  So substances have their value fixed by their being (since goodness is a formal property 
of being), and thus the value of some entity is not directly tied to God’s will.  With respect to 
moral goodness, acts are good in so far as they are elicited in accordance with a judgement made 
by the agent’s right reason concerning the act’s fittingness with the object and the circumstances 
of the act.  Thus moral goodness does not directly depend upon the divine will for its value.  The 
same thing could be said about beauty: since beauty involves the harmony of a number of 
features, it does not depend directly upon God’s will making it the case that something is 
beautiful.   
So in what sense is Scotus a theological voluntarist?  We should say he is a quasi-moral 
theological voluntarist, since only contingent moral truths directly depend upon the divine will 
for their moral status.  Thus Scotus is only theological voluntarist in a very limited sense; 
namely, with respect to contingent moral laws governing interpersonal relations between 
humans.  Limited though it may be, it does have huge ramifications for the future of moral 
philosophy, the rise of theological voluntarism in its various forms, and the rejection of 
Aquinas’s natural law theory and ethical eudaimonism.  
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